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STELLDMGEN 
1. Social learning, in the form of a regular and permanent process of 
monitoring & evaluation, secures a great flexibility in the perpective of 
steering development actions towards sustainability (this thesis). 
2. Although participation was a central issue in the official discourse 
embodying the agrarian revolution, it was manipulated by the ruling body 
in a such way that it reinforces its political power (this thesis). 
3. A rentier state corrupts development and develops corruption instead 
(this thesis). 
4. "Good manners have much to do with the emotions. To make them ring 
true, one must feel them, not merely exhibit them" (Amy Vanderbilt (1963) 
New Complete Book of Etiquette, pt. 2, Introduction). 
5. "Bureaucracy is a giant mechanism operated by pygmies" (Honors de 
Balzac Epigrams; quoted by Heywood, A. (1997) Politics. Hampshire: 
McMillan). 
6. "When you steal from one author, it's plagiarism. When you steal from 
many, it's research" (Wilson Mizner, 1876-1933). 
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FOREWORD 
SETTING THE SCENE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ALGERIA 
Introduction 
This book tells the story of the agricultural development process in post-
independence Algeria, in general, and agricultural development planning and 
policy-making, in particular. These issues were taken for granted and went 
unquestioned for more than three decades following the independence of the 
country in 1962. In this respect, this study represents a great opportunity for a 
development practitioner and planner to look at them from the perspective of his 
own experience. Nevertheless, I do not nourish any pretension of labeling myself as 
a true sociologist, although some circumstances did lead me to work as such for the 
last five years. 
The study looks at these issues from the point of view of social actors, albeit 
individual or collective, and their interlocking strategies and interests. More 
particularly, it looks at how these actors intervened in the process of agricultural 
development actions, depending on their power and resources, to influence it, adapt 
it to their preferences and needs, shape it, and make it top-down or participatory. 
Many authors have been writing about these issues and are, thus, not new. 
However, they bear some innovation in the pure Algerian context. 
In this so-called developmental process, planning played a great role, given it is 
within the planning system that developmental objectives were decided upon and 
design of development actions took place. In the case of post-independence Algeria, 
planning followed a top-down approach which excluded the richness of knowledge 
held by what is commonly known in the planning jargon as the planning-object (the 
supposed beneficiaries of a given development action). However, the adoption of 
such a planning approach is not as neutral as it might seem to many of us. To believe 
in the neutrality of such a choice is a pure illusion. It was in fact influenced by 
different factors, among which the political one remains the most important. 
Trying to understand the failure of many development actions planned during 
post-independence Algeria, the study initially based its assumptions on the 
shortcomings of the universal, rich jargon of development and planning and how it 
influenced the planning institution in Algeria in general. However, this seemed to 
explain only part of the development drama but it did not ffluminate enough of the 
whole problem. Like in a dream, I found myself knocking many times on a big house 
called 'development' whose door opened every time on 'polities'. Hence, at the 
beginning of my work, an important question needed to be put into perspective: 
Does a political dimension exist and/or interfere in planning and, thus, in a development 
process? 
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After having spent some effort trying to understand facts and, consequently, 
seeking an answer to this question, I found myself caught up in a sort of 
philosophical debate where the answer of a given question turns out to be another 
question. Attempting to answer the previous question, I ended up asking: Where, in a 
developmental debate, lies the boundary between planning (and thus development), and 
politics? 
Immediately, a second concern seemed to be the key answer to complete my 
understanding of the failure of development in post-independence Algeria. It resides 
in the intrinsic features that characterized the Algerian state since 1962, i.e. the state 
formation process that took place in 1962, the basic culture of the regime that 
developed since then, and how these influenced and oriented the development 
process and, consequently, shaped the development planning system. 
General overview: Political influence over the development process 
In brief, the development process in post-independence Algeria can be 
deconstructed into three distinctive periods in reference to the years 1979 and 1988, 
which can be considered as two important turning points in the state developmental 
philosophy. 
However, it can be said that although many realizations were concretized during 
these first period (1962-1978) in Algeria, and planned development achieved some 
equity and fair distribution of national income during the 1970s. Development 
actions were undertaken under the aegis of the three revolutions1 of the socialistic 
regime to benefit large masses of the populace under a very voluntaristic welfare 
policy, although unsustainable because it mainly depended on the revenues derived 
from oil exports for funding. 
This trend was completely stopped in 1979 and reversed by the change in the state 
developmental policy. In fact, during the 'black decade' (1979-1988), as it is called in 
Algeria, the infiltration of the ruling body by some skilled practitioners of parasitism 
reversed the developmental process by slowing down the rate of investment and 
development. As a consequence, the majority of the population was excluded from 
the revenues of the oil rent, which exclusively profited the opportunistic individuals 
and lobbying groups represented by different factions in or located at the periphery 
of the power circle. During this period, the political leadership completely changed 
the orientation of the development policy. Instead of equitably distributing the 
national income among the population through mass-oriented development actions, 
the state decided to use the huge amounts of financial resources gained from oil 
exports to import consumption and luxury goods and allocate - once a year and for 
few years only - a tourist allowance to nationals wishing to travel abroad. It is said 
by many that during this period, while the minority (the nomenklatura or 
privilegentsia) was getting the lion's share of the cake, the majority (the populace) was 
1 The Agrarian Revolution, the Industrial Revolution and the Cultural Revolution were the three 
revolutions launched by the socialistic regime during the 1970s. 
SETTING THE SCENE XV 
sharing only a small piece of it. Needless to say, planning played a major role in this 
so-called decade, as it was closely linked to the political process of decision-making 
and oriented the development process in a mere rent-seeking direction. In 1986, 
when oil prices met their heaviest blow since the 1970s, Algeria started moving 
ahead into a real multi-dimensional crisis with political, economic, social, and 
cultural dimensions at the same time. 
In 1988, this multi-dimensional crisis became unbearable for the population and 
yielded the popular uprisings of October 5th, which announced the beginning of a 
decade of instability, violence and structural adjustment. These uprisings brought in 
return democracy and pluralism after some independent organizations of lawyers, 
students, journalists and physicians sprang up and spoke up with the help of human 
rights national organizations, their demand for social justice and change, as well as a 
guarantee of freedoms of expression, association, and meeting rights. In addition, 
the voice of the excluded populace demanded the stopping of the people's exclusion 
from the decision-making arena and decisions that affected their lives. However, the 
type of democracy decided upon by the regime, based on the Constitution adopted 
in 1989, was conceived in such a way that the power would remain entirely in the 
hands of the same actors that were already controlling the state. It is not necessary to 
recall what happened after that insofar that, as a consequence of this manipulation, 
Algeria ran into the worst and bloodiest period of its post-independence history. 
Anyone may ask why this political power dimension has such importance in a 
book that is supposed to focus upon a development process. I must admit that this 
question is a pertinent one. Contrary to what many development practitioners and 
agronomists may believe in Algeria - and maybe everywhere else - I assert that 
development does not solely concern technocratic or technological issues. 
Development never was - and would be - an apolitical debate. To believe that 
development is an apolitical issue as many of my compatriots still do is just naivete 
and nonsense. In fact, development, as it has always been conceptualized and 
perceived - especially by those in power in many less-developed countries (LDC) -
needs a state to decide for it, a government to execute it, and a public bureaucracy to 
administer it. If so, none can disagree that all these different institutions conform to, 
or at least are influenced by, a strong political intervention intrinsic to the 
development decision-making arena. As Munck (1993:113) put it: 
Development in the Third World is the overarching referent of the political discourse 
This is why, my opinion and according to many authors, understanding the 
development philosophy in any country requires a prior understanding of the 
county's politics and, consequently, the historical dimension that shaped it. 
Moreover, dissenting with this vision of planned development, the study 
attempts to introduce elements of an alternative view. It thus looks at the issues of 
participation and social learning in relation to sustainable development. In the case 
of Algeria, the centralization of decision-making, the non-neutral adoption of a top-
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down planning approach, and the development of a feeling of 'acquired assistedness' 
among some segments of the population put the issue of participation in 
development actions into a political perspective. As Dudley (1993:160) suggests: 
True participation is about power, and the exercise of power is politics. 
A brief statement on the major problems in the Algerian scene of development 
Setting the macro-level scene 
As it is the case in many other Third World countries, even though Algeria has 
experienced a rapid and sustained economic growth during the 1970s thanks to high 
oil prices, it did enter a tremendous recession in the 1980s which was precipitated by 
several different causes at the national level as well as at the international one. It is 
not the subject of this chapter to examine these causes, but at least it can be 
mentioned that one of the evident facts of this situation is that a Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP), as a consequence of a bad governance, was designed 
and applied which made things worse for the under-privileged segments of the 
population. 
In fact, since the Structural Adjustment Programme was implemented, the poorest 
segments of the population bear the consequences of its drastic measures, although 
they were already not happy with the unfair state policy of national income 
distribution of the "black decade'. As a matter of evidence, after having been 
completely 'erased' during the 1970s, some 'social indicators' of development (or 
under-development), such as malnutrition and epidemic diseases are reappearing 
again. More importantly, poverty, unemployment and illiteracy are rapidly 
increasing. 
In 1994, approximately 50% of the population has been officially categorized as 
'poor', or living below the conventional poverty line. Today, if we look at the 
purchasing power of what was then known as the middle class (high-school 
graduates and high staff of public institutions), based on my own experience, it is 
not difficult to assume that this rate is much higher. 
Issues such as the proportion of population living below the poverty line are very 
sensitive for the government. Having seemingly achieved good economic results at 
the macro-level due to the therapy of the "Lords of Poverty"(Hancock, 1992) - the 
IMF and the World Bank - the government has no will to reveal these very sensitive 
statistics and thus openly recognize the failure of its social policy. Given the on-
going situation, the government fears that the worsening social situation would 
engender upheaval within the populace and worsen the already dramatic security 
situation in the country. This is even more sensitive that the on-going SAP was 
conceived without any contribution from nor consultation with representatives of 
civil society. 
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Many problems can be cited in this context to clarify the reasons why the state-
adopted strategy of development failed. Most of these problems are found within 
the process of the state formation since 1962 and the adopted and implemented 
philosophy of development since then. The most important ones remain: 
1. A very centralized authoritarian state composed of and/or influenced by diverse 
lobbying and interest groups that worked towards satisfying the interests of the 
different clans of this oligarchy rather than those of the whole population, 
especially during the "black decade'. 
2. The centralized development planning system excelled in designing top-down, 
blue-print development plans that are basic features of the development 
problématique in the country. 
3. A lack of legitimate and legitimized organizations working towards the 
development and promotion of the disadvantaged. Mass organizations, created 
by and under the one-party system, and "whose emphasis on individualism and 
abstract affiliation tended to dissolve communities and to discourage genuine and 
authentic political engagement" (Esteva and Prakash, 1998: 288), were designed 
more to 'contain' the excluded's voice than to help them speak up. 
4. Reduced and strongly-controlled access to public development resources by the 
disadvantaged pushed many individuals to reorient their strategies of building 
linkage with the state administrative apparatus, which reinforced the 
development of patron-client relationships. As a result, dependency on state 
willingness for one, and opportunism for the other became the rule rather than 
the exception, and an economy of affection became the basic feature of the 
development philosophy. 
5. An extended marginalization of the population and its exclusion from partaking 
in decisions that affect their lives engendered a great lack of credit in the state and 
its bureaucratic apparatus among the population in general and the 
disadvantaged in particular. The latter, as vulnerable as they are, become a stock 
of potentially-destructive 'energy' than can serve the cause of upheavals, if 
manipulated by clans opposed to the ruling body. The actual situation in Algeria 
is a good example of this. 
Now, establishing the scene for the proper process of agricultural development on 
which this study focuses, it is clear that the overall macro-context, as presented 
above, had many consequences for the agricultural sector. Major characteristics of 
these consequences are as hereafter follows. 
The philosophy of agricultural development planning 
As stated earlier, agricultural development was perceived in Algeria as solely 
technocratic (or technological) measures to be implemented to improve the 
productivity of major crops and/or farming systems. These measures ranged from 
diffusion of high-yielding varieties and improved breeds to intensive agricultural 
practices, to availability of credit, etc. Development exclusively concentrated on 
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indicators related to economic growth such as yield, without the slightest reference 
to other quantitative and/or qualitative indicators of human development. In some 
cases, agricultural development was perceived as being synonymous with 
unsustainable public subsidies and price policies, as was the case for the steppe 
rangelands (see Case No. 3 presented in chapter 5 of this book). Given the socio-
political and cultural settings of opportunism and parasitism, it is easy to conclude 
who benefited most from these measures. 
Moreover, agricultural development planning was staffed with technocrats, such 
as agronomists, water specialists, economists, livestock technicians, etc., and in love 
with their presumed unassailable scientific/technical knowledge which did not 
need, in their opinion, to be tested against 'falsification'. This led to a top-down 
planning vision that assumed that the Domaines Autogérés (DAs) - or the Domaines 
Agricoles Socialistes (DASs) later - which until 1987 constituted the bulk of the 
'planning-object' for agricultural development planning and policy-making - were 
passive recipients of development actions, confusing of their agricultural labourers 
for farmers. In these DASs, all decisions were made by appointed managers from the 
Ministry of Agriculture or by the supposedly 'elected' bodies among the agricultural 
labourers. 
Later, in the beginning of the 1980s when the private sector was integrated into 
the 'planning-object' of the agricultural development actions, the rural elites 
benefited most from the planning of these actions, either at the level of the 
conception or ever at the moment of implementation. This can again be understood 
by reference to the state formation process that took place in Algeria in 1962, the 
composition of the state apparatus, and the pattern of state-society relations that 
developed. Needless to say that rural elites, whose interests were well represented at 
the periphery of the state, took the lion's share of the benefits made available by 
some agricultural development efforts. 
Kept into a voluntary amnesia from what was really going on in the field of 
development, planners and policy-makers repeated errors and mistakes in the 
design and implementation of development actions, becoming self-referent to the 
level of arrogance, and not in need to learn from past experiences. 
The lack of legitimized farmers' organizations in agricultural development 
As mentioned earlier, planning of agricultural development, as in the planning 
system in general, was build upon a centralized, top-down vision, which conformed 
to the mainstream political philosophy of the centralized state. As a self-proclaimed 
power and lacking popular legitimacy, the post-independence state had to maintain 
a close control over any organization that acted within the development field, 
especially agricultural development, given the history of peasantry in Algeria. It 
goes without saying that for such a state, a centralized and strongly-controlled 
power without competition from any decentralized, popular movement is a sine qua 
none condition for its duration and maintenance. The example of the state's seizure of 
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the spontaneous popular movement of the 'autogestion' of the summer of 1962 is 
undeniable. 
Looking to set strong mechanisms of peasantry control, the state, through the one-
party system, settled upon the Union Nationale des Paysans Algériens (UNPA) which 
had to serve initially as a professional forum for farmers, in replacing of the 
Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs de la Terre (FNTT), a very virulent peasant union 
affiliated with the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA), the main force 
behind the 'autogestion' movement. After some time, it appeared that UNPA became 
more a political tribune in charge of disseminating the official political discourse 
rather than a professional movement. Among the great achievements of this union 
was the total demobilization of real professional farmers and its infiltration by 
opportunistic pseudo-farmers motivated by their interests based on rent-seeking. 
Moreover, as a political frame, this union served more the interests of its 
opportunistic leaders, albeit at the national or the regional levels, rather than the 
professional concerns of farmers. Many of its national leaders, although illiterate, 
were awarded higher positions in the hierarchy of the system (ministers, members of 
parliament, senators, etc.). 
As a consequence, legitimized professional organizations in charge of genuine 
agricultural development were lacking until 1990 when, as a favour of the 
democratization process, truly professional farmers' organizations boomed and 
started to act to the detriment and extreme unwillingness of the UNPA which is still 
kept alive to this day, thanks to the 'kindness' of the regime and its exclusive 
recognition of UNPA as the peasants' sole official representative. 
The lack of participation in agricultural development 
The state formation process that took place at independence and the outcome it 
yielded, the philosophical orientation of the agricultural development planning and 
the lack of legitimate truly professional farmers' organizations in charge of 
agricultural development are important features that explain the lack of popular - or 
farmers', in this case - participation in the process of development. Moreover, some 
pseudo-farmers became accustomed to assistance rather than relying up on 
themselves for their own development. Self-depreciation, as defined by Freire (1972: 
49), was used as a successful tool in positive discourse to create assistedness among 
farmers. Consequently, the majority felt a lack of self-confidence in their abilities to 
be self-reliant. Participation, as a political slogan, has been used in the official 
discourse but participation with the 'count-on-oneself slogan, has been always 
controlled through different measures. 
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The focus of this study 
Following what I have said above, I consider that many entrance points of 
sociological research can be found in the agricultural development field, three of 
which will compose the focus of the present study. These are: 
1. the opportunities offered by participation of the 'planning-object' in their self-
development in steering development actions towards more sustainable 
outcomes; 
2. the role of independent and grass-roots local organizations in sustainable 
development and participation enforcement; 
3. the importance of knowledge and social learning in a sustainable development 
action. 
It has to be said that the third point mentioned above stems from the necessity of 
participation as, among many other reasons, it can be used as an additional source of 
knowledge and resources for development. In such a context, social learning is 
particularly recommended for planners and policy-makers in order to improve their 
knowledge about the field of development. 
What can participation offer to development? 
In the context of the study, participation can redirect the course of a given 
development action within two important dimensions of development: The 
functional and the structural ones. Speaking of a functional dimension of a 
development action relates to the technocratic issues of preparation and 
implementation of development actions, while the structural dimension concerns the 
political issues surrounding the relationships between the 'planning-subject' (the 
planners) and the 'planning-object' (the so-called beneficiaries) and the distributional 
frame of the 'planning-subject'. 
For the first dimension, active participation of the beneficiaries (or planning-
object) and encouragement of this implication from the inception of a development 
action is seen to ensure beneficiaries' ownership of this action and facilitate its 
implementation in a more efficient way. This can be perceived through the 
mobilization of additional knowledge and resources for the realistic preparation of a 
development action. The planning-object may feel more concerned about such a 
development action, being the principal 'maître d'ouvrage' of this action. 
For the second dimension, participation of the planning-object is an important 
consequence of democratization and empowerment of the civil society. The issue is 
not put here as an appeal to the political will of the governing body or the powerful 
clans; it is just that now, as the political climate in many parts of the Third World has 
shifted to social democracy (Munck, ibid.: 114), development theory needs a new 
face in order to fit into the context. Participation becomes, in fact, the condition for a 
contextualized ('localized') development in the place of the decried top-down 
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approach. Whether participation will be manipulated as a political slogan to sustain 
the existing status-quo or used to truly empower civil society is another question to 
be dealt with later in this book. But one thing is evident: If there is no participation, 
exclusion is more likely to continue and expand with the potential dangers that it 
carries. As a matter of evidence, Algeria is now paying back with the years of 
exclusion by the years of bloody violence. 
On the other hand, my advocacy of participation reflects a strong assumption that 
beneficiaries (or planning-object), as knowledgeable and capable social actors, have 
enough - but most of the time misused - potentials for their own development (or, as 
I would prefer, self-promotion), even without any external support. 
The study investigates some development actions relating to this issue in a 
comparative form to illustrate what participation can really offer to development. It 
goes without saying that participation is seen both as an end as well as a means for 
development. 
What is the role of local organizations in development? 
For too long a time, agricultural development actions were planned and conceived 
from the capital (Algiers). For such a huge country like Algeria, it seems that 
planners, thanks to their divine mandate and knowledge, have achieved a great deal 
of standardization, i.e. all farmers cultivating the same crop are viewed as identical, 
or at least similar. For them, it is easier to plan for 'the' farmer that will be multiplied 
by 900,000 rather than to plan for 900,000 farmers. However, agriculture is an "art de 
la localite" (van der Ploeg's cite) and agricultural planning needs to be 'localized'. 
In this context, legitimate (representative) and legitimized (acknowledged by the 
authorities) local organizations, as intermediaries for development, are acutely 
needed to both facilitate the genuine participation of the planning-object - which will 
become at the same time the planning-subject - in both development planning and 
implementation, and steer development actions towards the preferences of their 
constituencies. 
On this issue, the study looks at the genesis of selected independent farmers' 
organizations within the field of development and what role they played in 
development. 
How necessary is the social learning for development? 
Rational planning methods have been used intensively in Algeria for agricultural 
development planning, even though with a great deviation and striking misuse, 
given the political interference that the planning system faces daily. However, they 
yielded very rigid blueprints for development actions which did not fit the reality of 
rural peoples and, as a consequence, did not achieve their set objectives. In some 
projects, trial-and-error methods have been injected to make development actions 
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more flexible and 'correctable' in their course of action. Achievements in this context 
were more significant. 
Social learning, as supported by appropriate mechanisms for monitoring and 
evaluation of development actions, helps to sustain good development governance 
and to steer at least cost the course of a development action toward the achievement 
of the agreed-upon objectives. 
On this issue, the study introduces some development actions which were based 
on social learning in their monitoring and evaluation and shows how the immediate 
objectives of a given development action can be monitored and even revisited, 
reframed, and adapted to achieve the desirable goal they are targeting. However, in 
my opinion, social learning goes hand in hand with another planning method based 
on multi-phasing and phase-shortening. 
The objectives of this study 
In accordance with the focus of the study mentioned in the previous section, the 
overall goal of this study is to re-frame the context of agricultural development 
process at both levels of planning and implementation, within which a strong 
political influence takes place. Connecting this to the present situation of Algeria, it 
aims to demonstrate that the conventional development philosophy adopted by the 
post-independence state can no longer work, especially in relation to issues such as 
sustainable development, poverty alleviation, natural resources management and 
conservation, etc. This development thinking has become obsolete, as Sachs (1992a: 
1) suggests, for the hopes and desires that have made its idea fly for at least three 
decades are now exhausted. 
In this framework, the study not only reinforces the view that this development 
thinking is obsolete but attempts to shed light on the needed foundations of an 
alternative re-humanized (and re-humanizing) development view. The basic concepts 
of these foundations are participation, local organizations and social learning which will 
be used to formulate recommendations that can be observed in the design of an 
appropriate method for development actions' preparation, implementation, and 
evaluation and monitoring. 
The structure of this book 
This book comprises 9 chapters that are structured into 4 parts. The first part 
concerns a comprehensive description of the research process. Chapter 1 presents the 
main causes of the problem background. Chapter 2 introduces the elements of both 
the analytical and the prescriptive theoretical frameworks. Chapter 3 introduces the 
basic features of the research path (hypotheses, research questions, method and 
techniques for field research, etc.). 
The second part reviews the empirical path of the obsolete vision of the 
conventional development thinking adopted by the post-independence state in 
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Algeria. Chapter 4 sets the general background environment of agricultural 
development. Chapter 5 starts with the agrarian revolution policy (Case No. 1) that 
was launched in 1973 but used in this study as a macro-case that completes Chapter 
4 in our understanding of how the state formation process that took place in 1962 
influenced the vision of development in Algeria. Two other following cases are 
presented: (1) The cereal seed production improvement policy (Case No. 2) that was 
run for many years, swallowing huge amounts of public resources without achieving 
sustainable results; and, (2) The collective rangelands management policy (Case No. 
3). Chapter 6 introduces the verification of the study's hypotheses in these cases and 
proposes a general discussion about the obsolescence of the conventional 
development thinking. 
The third part concerns the proposed alternative development view that I would 
label as the re-humanizing development alternative. Chapter 7 presents the empirical 
material (Cases Nos. 4, 5 and 6) which introduces the effects of participation, local 
organizations, and social learning in making development sustainable and adequate to 
the beneficiaries' needs and preferences. Chapter 8 closes this part with the 
verification of the study's hypotheses in these cases. 
The fourth and last part concerns a general discussion of the findings and the 
outreach dimension of this research. In this order, Chapter 9 covers the general 
discussion of the general research and sub-research questions. It also proposes some 
recommendations concerning methodological considerations intended to make 
development actions more participatory, more oriented to the needs of the 
beneficiaries and more flexible in their implementation. These would be, in essence, 
the advocated items for re-humanizing the development process. 

CHAPTER 1 
PROBING THE PROBLEM BACKGROUND: 
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT THINKING 
1.1 Introduction 
This work studies the development process and its outcomes within the context of 
post-independence Algeria. In such a context, jargon such as policy, programme, 
and project are widely used in a very integrative and hierarchical way, as if there 
were a continuum between the three terms. However, the most known and 
perceived of the three terms in the field of development is project. 
Projects are widely used as tools for development. As vehicles for finance-induced 
growth and change, development actions1, and more particularly projects, have been 
for not less than three decades the most widespread models of purposive planned 
intervention aiming to accelerate development (Cernea, 1987: 3). Through their 
intensive use, projects became, in fact, the unique and necessary instruments 
planners have at hand to organize and implement development actions and allocate 
resources, trying to achieve the objectives of societal institutions. They are thus "the 
dominant arrangement for implementing high-priority development policies in 
developing countries" (Rondinelli, 1983: 307). 
Despite this importance, development actions in general, and projects in 
particular, given the way they were conceived, prepared, and implemented, turned 
out to be total failures in many cases or, if not, demonstrated at least very serious 
shortcomings. For some failures, the low capacity to prepare and analyze projects 
was brought as an explanatory argument. For others, projects proved to be 
inadequately adapted to their purpose, particularly in people-centered development. 
In other cases, they are criticized because they created, wittingly or unwittingly, 
enclaves, siphoning resources from non-project activities, and did not generate much 
- if any - sustainable development beyond their time-frame (Cernea, 1987:4). 
We often face situations where development projects implemented in Third 
World countries do not take account (or rather, completely ignore) the complexities 
of the human condition and the integrity of local communities. In fact, this is more 
the rule than the exception. Yet, it is not uncommon that projects "generate gross 
inequities, blatant injustices and cultural stress" (Schwarzweller, 1987: x-xi). Some 
development theorists argued, according to Rondinelli (ibid.: 308), that projects have 
not achieved their objectives and have inhibited social learning and institution-
building in developing countries; others alleged they are primarily control 
mechanisms that have become part of the development problem rather than a 
solution; still others argue that projects are inherently ineffective in responding to 
the needs of the poor. As an illustration of these criticisms, many evaluation 
' Given the relationship between projects, policies, and programmes, and in order to simplify things, I 
will make use within this study of a more encompassing term, that is 'development action', given that 
projects are important instruments for implementation of either policies and/or programmes. 
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commissions called for extensive change in the way projects were formulated and 
implemented. 
Unfortunately (or fortunately), instead of succumbing to this increasing flow of 
criticisms, projects continue to be here and will remain with us forever, as many 
authors argue (van Dusseldorp, 1990: 336; von Oppen, 1990: 353). This is true for no 
suitable and effective alternatives have yet been developed to compensate for 
projects' limitations. Moreover, they are likely to remain, as Rondinelli (ibid.: 308) 
argues: 
The primary instruments of international assistance and policy implementation in developing 
countries because they provide advantages to international agencies and national government 
that other forms of administration appear to lack. 
Returning to the statements mentioned above concerning the failure of projects, it 
seems that we are blaming the 'victim' rather than trying to understand why these 
actions, supposedly designed to bring about positive change to undesirable 
situations, ended up achieving the opposite results. Any development action is 
thought of, conceived of, implemented, and evaluated by people and, accordingly, 
our understanding of its output should be related to human-beings' rationality and 
behaviour in their attempt at either conceiving or implementing these actions. 
In this context, achieving a comprehensive understanding of the outcome of a 
given development action requires first its 'relocation' in its own human context, 
given that each development action is time- and location-specific, and knowing that 
both time and space do not possess a meaning per se, unless human-beings are 
present within. To achieve such an understanding it seems, in my opinion, wiser to 
figure out the different influences that impinge upon the functioning, organization 
and norms of the development planning system and how these influences shaped, 
either directly or indirectly, the outcomes of development actions. Figure 1.1(1) 
below tries to describe these different influences in the case of Algeria. 
Having defined these influences, it is thus time to investigate the following three 
main issues of this so-called human context that governs the development planning 
system: 
1. The politico-institutional aspects of the development planning system and its 
logic of functioning, which is related to state formation, its political logic, and its 
developmental philosophy, given that in countries like Algeria, development 
planning is an inherent function of the state bureaucratic apparatus. 
2. The 'universal' intellectual legacy of development and how it influenced the 
development planning system, given that planning has been rooted in the field of 
development as applied science, and having a strong philosophical background. 
North-South transfer of technology has played quite a role at this level. 
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3. The procedures of the development planning function in terms of design of 
development actions and the relation of the design phase to the implementation 
and evaluation phases, on the one hand, and the relationships of development 
actions' design to their beneficiaries and clienteles, on the other. This is intended 
to illustrate the structure of the action cycle in practical terms. 
Figure 1.1(1) - Influences on the development planning system in Algeria 
Political influence 
(state formation, ideology, 'culture') \ 
In the following sections I shall elaborate more upon these issues. I shall first 'go 
back' into the history of development and the concept 'project' and attempt to 
reconstruct the 'universal' intellectual legacy and its influence on the development 
planning system in Algeria. Following this will be a brief description of the 
development planning system and the political influence it has undergone since the 
formation of the post-independence state. However, in this chapter I will content 
myself with a sketch of the major 'emerging properties' of the Algerian political 
system, given that the state formation process will be presented at length in Chapter 
4 as a background information. Finally, the outcomes of the development process as 
embedded in this context will be the subject of my empirical investigation, and thus 
are presented within the case-studies later in Chapter 5 of this book. 
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2 This section owes much to Boukrouh's programme for the Presidential Elections in 1995, translated 
into English and elaborated by the researcher (MM). 
1.2 Exploring the history of 'project' and the universal legacy of 'development' 
1.2.1 The Industrial Revolution and the philosophical heritage of development2 
In the eighteenth century, after several moral reforms and a long intellectual 
maturation, a segment of humankind in Europe engaged, under the banner of the 
Industrial Revolution, in a new adventure of development in a rational and 
systematic manner. Land and animals, as essential pillars of traditional processes of 
production, were abandoned in favour of a new mode of goods and worth creation 
and accumulation: Industrialization. 
This phenomenon led societies and countries that adopted it to a tremendous 
material and scientific development and has given them, at the same time, their 
actual power. 
However, for its full achievement, this new civilization required a social 
organization founded on the concentration of populations in order to ensure 
availability of labour in time and space. This spawned a boom of grand urban 
centres. Additionally, it required an appropriate and adapted human profile and 
psychology, i.e. the worker. Thus, an adequate philosophy of education and framing 
was thought of and implemented. In fact, industrial production is a mass production 
of a standardized product whose consumption must be 'democratized'. The grand 
urban concentrations provided an abundance of labourers and consumers and 
justified the formation of social infrastructures needed for the mental preparation of 
both the worker and the consumer, which are in reality the two sides of the same 
coin (person). 
In this context, man did not fit the requirements as he was not originally 
programmed to be 'industrious'. It was thus necessary to condition him with training 
and culture to play his newly defined role of an industrious man. For that, the 
educational system was designed to take care of him from an early age. Hence, the 
school, resembling more and more a factory in its functioning, accustomed him to 
the behaviour for which he was to be destined. In fact, the authority of the teacher, 
compliance with disciplinary rules, civic education, temporal rhythms and 
schedules, collective work, task repetition, etc. became the new values that 
announced the future social automatisms necessary in an industrialized society. 
By becoming rooted in the psychology of workers and consumers, and through 
continuous technical improvement, the industrial system permitted the use of 
human energy and natural resources to maximum efficiency, to transforming them 
into wealth and power to the benefit of the people who adopted it. 
As its refinement advanced, the industrial order then secreted away the 
psychological, intellectual and technological elements that prepared its own 
overtaking, and engendered a universe that is not totally theorized yet. 
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The heritage this era bequeathed upon the development thinking could be 
summarized by the four following fundamental statements: 
1. The industrial era required classification, centralization, standardization and 
uniformization; 
2. The industrial society was the effect of a deterministic vision based on order, 
synchronization, repetition, and the mechanization of processes and behaviours; 
3. The industrial era required the encapsulation of populations in megalopolitical 
cities, fabric-schools, huge factories, mass organizations and political parties; 
4. The industrial era was characterized by heavy (or hard) technologies such as 
mining, mechanics, chemical industries, etc., which needed a disciplined, docile, 
well-ordered and impecunious population. 
1.2.2 The methodological setting: The concept 'project' and its initial influence 
As the contemporary essential means of policy and programme implementation, 
projects are not new to man. According to Checkland (1989: 273), although projects 
have been carried out by men for several thousand years, it is only as recently as the 
1950s and 1960s that certain methods of preparing, designing and implementing 
them appeared, and it is not surprising that engineers and architects played a strong 
role in this development. It is said that these methods were a strong influence under 
the 'reign' of the Marshall Plan, after World War II. 
The project concept began to be widely known through the expansion of what is 
identified today as the 'blueprint approach'. According to Korten (1984: 181), this 
approach, with strong emphasis on careful pre-planning - the preparation phase -
reflects how development programming was supposed to work. At this level, 
provision of data from investigations and studies, or even pilot projects, help project 
designers choose the most cost-effective designs to achieve prescribed outcomes. 
After the project design has produced to a 'project document', the implementation 
phase starts and implementers are supposed to execute the project plan faithfully, 
much as a building contractor follows construction blueprints, specifications, and 
schedules. Once the project activities have been completed, an evaluator checks and 
measures the actual changes in the project target population and provides feed-back 
to the planners so that blueprints can be revised (Korten, 1984:182). 
Nonetheless, the stipulated revision of blueprints does not benefit the initial 
project as it is already over. It is only supposed to provide some insight for future 
planning. I must, however, recognize that this way of evaluating projects is very 
intriguing. 
This approach, which emerged from epistemological models of the classical 
physical sciences (Korten and Klauss, 1984: 169), based mainly on systems 
engineering thinking, was applied for more than three decades to actions concerning 
rural development. It is largely recognized that its shortcomings have been 
frequently acknowledged by development planning specialists. In fact, the under-
lying philosophy of systems engineering that constituted the theory-base of projects 
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did not solve the factual problem that systems engineering, as impressive it can be in 
carrying out technological projects, failed when applied to the messy, changing, ill-
defined problem situations which project managers had to cope with in their day-to-
day professional lives (Checkland, 1989:274). 
Moreover, even though this approach can show some relative efficiency when 
dealing with defined problems in stable environments, it tended to be unresponsive 
to local diversity and variability of self-organized systems like social systems which 
operate in a more organic [or organismic] fashion (Korten and Klauss, 1984: 169). It 
is, in fact, a programming approach that can be seen as sometimes being appropriate 
for certain types of development projects, like physical infrastructure projects, where 
tasks and outcomes can be easily defined and predicted, environments are more or 
less stable, and costs predictable to a large extent (Korten, 1984:182). In other words, 
I would say that this approach fits some specific types of development actions where 
human agency can be controlled to a large extent. 
Unfortunately, in rural development, the situation is far from being similar to 
physical development. In fact, objectives are more often multiple, ill-defined (or not 
well-perceived), and subject to perpetual negotiated change; task requirements are 
unclear; environments are constantly being reformed; and costs are unpredictable 
(Korten, 1984:182). 
In this context, awareness of the inadequacy of the blueprint approach to rural 
development problems is increasing, though its assumptions and procedures are still 
dominating most rural development actions (Korten, 1984:182). 
1.2.3 The theoretical perspective of development: A denial of human agency 
When dealing with issues related to development actions, one cannot avoid 
introducing current theories of development and see how they deal with the basic 
issues of development. Of course, it is not the aim of this study to discuss these 
diverse theories at length. I will content myself with briefly showing the underlying 
philosophy of mainstream development thinking and the shortcomings of its main 
theories. 
Existing theories are seen to be depressing, as Long (1984: 168) puts it, for 
overlooking [or rather denying] the capacity of ordinary working men and women 
to improve their social conditions. In more detail, Long (1984:168) writes: 
The theories we have before us, whether they be regarded as 'liberal' or 'radical', are coloured 
by simple deterministic and centralistic thinking... Both versions, however, see social change as 
emanating from centres of power in the form of state or international intervention and as 
following some broadly determined development path. These external forces encapsulate the 
lives of Third World peoples, reducing their independence and undermining forms of 
solidarity, resulting in increased centralized control by powerful economic and political groups. 
In this respect, it does not seem to matter whether the country in question be considered 
'capitalist' or 'socialist', the same general tendency towards incorporation and centralization 
takes place. 
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Moreover, he argues (Long, 1988:117), that: 
Although both approaches mention the important role played by the state agencies and other 
organizations, neither approach attempts to analyze the type of interactions and negotiations 
that occur between the representatives of the various organizations and the farmers themselves. 
This vision sustains the presumed 'passivity' of the so-called 'beneficiaries' or 'target 
groups' that underlies the mainstream thinking of development practitioners, based 
on a rather 'mechanical' input-output model of the relationships between project 
and/or policy planning, implementation and outcomes. This highlights the 
tendency, as Long and van der Ploeg (1989: 227) argue, to conceptualize the planned 
intervention process as linear and implying a stepwise progression from formulation 
to outcome via implementation. Moreover, they contend (Long and van der Ploeg, 
1989:227) that: 
Separation of 'policy', 'implementation' and 'outcomes' is a gross over-simplification of a much 
more complicated set of processes which involves the reinterpretation or transformation of 
policy during the implementation process, such that there is in fact no straight line from policy 
to outcomes. 
As a consequence of such a vision of development, Long (1984:170) argues that this 
way of thinking implies increased (remote) presence of government bureaucracy in 
the countryside and increased influence of urban styles of life on rural populations 
and areas, what Chambers (1983: 13) calls the 'urban bias' of rural development. 
Hence, the common feature of these various theories of rural change is the tendency 
that changes in the organization and activities of rural people are (exclusively) 
perceived as responses to a powerful set of external forces manipulating at their ease 
the process of social change (Long, 1984: 171). In this sense, I argue that such 
development theories, articulated with an 'induced assistedness', see beneficiaries as 
passive recipients of development which always need the state and its bureaucracy 
to be developed. 
1.2.4 The social characterization of a project and the inconsistency of planners 
One of the main issues that characterize a development action is the evidence of it 
being either an "arena for struggle" (Crehan and von Oppen, 1988) or an "arena of 
negotiation for strategic groups" (Bierschenk, 1988). Although I agree that such 
conceptualizations highlight a dynamic, competitive interaction over scarce 
resources between diverse actors with different interests involved in a project, I 
wonder whether the former conceptualization is the more likely to be adequate in 
such an environment. In my opinion, such a conceptualization connotes a social 
darwinist thinking which implies that actors are represented as "gladiators" fighting 
in the arena (von Oppen, 1990) for their survival. This presumption is sustained by a 
literal expression of the term 'struggle' as explained as "a hard fight or a bodily effort" 
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(Harraps Dictionary, my italics), while the description given by Crehan and von 
Oppen (1988) resembles a 'mental fight' more closely implying a hard use of one's 
strategizing capacity, and thus knowledge. In similar vein, I do not completely reject 
the evidence that a struggle can sometimes take the meaning of a bloody war, as it 
has happened in many parts of the world. Nevertheless, although I agree with such a 
conceptualization in its figurative sense, I would lean towards the second 
conceptualization which seems more appropriate for development arenas. In fact, 
'negotiation' refers more to a "process of bringing agreement through talks" (Harraps 
Dictionary, my italics), given that talks is here used in both a literal and a figurative 
senses. Not only that, even when shut out of or excluded from a negotiation process, 
social actors sometimes have recourse to other 'weapons of the weak', such as 
passive resistance, to block a developmental process which is not in line with their 
preferences. 
Accordingly, I suggest that the implementation of a development action - and 
sometimes even its design and evaluation - is perceived as a constant process of 
negotiation supported by strategic groups and their own respective projects 
(Bierschenk, 1988: 146), or their own basic linking loops (Dusseldorp, 1992: 39). In 
fact, a development action should rather be seen as a social event between different 
groups with different interests, playing their own role in shaping the final outcome 
of this event. As many cases show, a project might be funded by a foreign donor and 
involve foreign planners and 'experts' whose role, although maybe very influential, 
can be challenged by others, such as those of so-called 'target groups'. These latter 
actors are seen instead as self-motivating and capable of exerting their own influence 
(Crehan and von Oppen 1988:113). 
Notwithstanding this evident 'human diversity', planners have always perceived 
these 'target groups' as undifferentiated actors in the way they design development 
actions. Even when they acknowledge their erroneous vision, they still consider 
themselves as self-proclaimed representatives of the beneficiaries and continue to plan 
for them because of the uniqueness of their knowledge and experience, devising 
appropriate strategies for a better life for their 'clients' (Crehan and von Oppen 1988: 
141; authors' italics). 
In this sense, planners take their importance in the development field because of 
their self-referential orientation that society will walk into chaos without them, 
overlooking the fact that the most dramatic chaos in this world was planned, 
although hard to admit, by planners themselves. My empirical material about the 
common rangelands in Algeria (Case No. 3 in Chapter 5 of this book) verify this. 
However, planners are not really independent actors in the development field. 
They are part of a politico-institutional environment that has its own norms, 
standards, values, etc., as we shall see in the following section. 
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1.3 The political-institutional environment of the development planning system 
1.3.1 Algeria post-independence state and its development philosophy 
After 132 years of French colonization, Algeria became independent in 1962. A civil 
war between the different factions of the revolutionary elite was nearly declared 
during the summer of 1962 because of a lack of consensus how the country should 
be governed. This was hardly prevented at the last minute by ordinary Algerians 
who poured into the streets crying "seven years, enough" (Quandt, 1998:22). 
The state hurriedly developed through the imposition of a self-proclaimed regime 
led by a populist leader who declared a one-party system with strong backing of the 
military. However, the regime of this populist leader did not stay long. In June 1965, 
the military ousted the first president of the Algerian Republic and took the strings 
of the country in their hands. Since then, the political system consisted of a troika 
composed of the party (the Front National de Liberation, or FLN), the military, and the 
bureaucracy, with the outlines of a familiar authoritarian regime (Quandt, ibid.: 26). 
With the nationalization programme that the regime implemented in the early 
1970s, most of the economy was placed under state ownership, setting the stage for a 
form of 'state capitalism' (Quandt, ibid.: 27; Pfeifer, 1985). The greatest 
nationalization was the one of oil and gas in February 1971. With the revenues from 
these two natural resources, the regime became a recipient of a vast inflow of capital 
that spawned "an avaricious, predatory elite that clings to power as the sole path to 
well-being" (Quandt, ibid.: 7). Although nationalization of oil and gas occurred in 
1971, it was only during the 'black decade' that Algeria started developing some 
features of a predator, rentier state, as Quandt (ibid.: 32) mentions implicitly: 
The authoritarian state has typically seized control of most of the economy and thus has 
enormous resources for dispensing forms of patronage.... Jobs in the bureaucracy may be 
available to loyalists and relatives of those in power; fortunes can be made as the regime allows 
a share of the 'rents' to go into the pockets of supporters and collaborators. 
Many authors (Quandt, 1998; Boone, 1990; Bellin, 1994) depict a "rentier state" 
paradigm as an economic system based on rent-seeking rather than on economically 
productive activities, i.e. activities which add something to the common wealth. 
Distribution of the vast revenues of oil and gas was conducted "in ways that provide 
widespread corruption and discourage efficient investment in productive sectors" 
(Quandt, ibid.: 5). In such a system, "rentier activities are defined as politically 
mediated opportunities for obtaining wealth through non productive economic 
activity" (Boone, 1990:427; my italics). 
Very pervasive in much of the Third World, including Algeria, the "rentier 
syndrome" engenders troubling implications for economy, polity, and society, such 
as slowed economic growth, emasculated social forces and incoherent state policies. 
It is a determined consequence of the prevalence of parasitic cronyism in business-
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3 1 partly owe this title to Wiggins, S. (1985). 
state relations that undermine both economic development and state capacity 
(Bellin, 1994:427). 
In more detail, Bellin (ibid.: 43; her italics) describes three hazards that emerge 
within this kind of system, i.e. when profits become politically mediated: 
1. Society suffers welfare loss because the state bureaucratic elites have discretionary 
power over the distribution of resources, although the Weberian image of 
bureaucracy is built upon rules that minimize personal discretion (Heywood, 
1997, 340). Public resources are thus distributed according to criteria that are 
economically irrational. This may be possible for two primary reasons: Either for 
the personal gain of the bureaucrats to get offered the biggest kickback, or for the 
political survival of the regime, either through buying acquiescence from potential 
opponents or through building a political clientele. 
2. The entrepreneurial class will lose its political autonomy and become either 
"eunuch capitalists" or "emasculated bourgeoisie", i.e. they cannot challenge the 
state or act as a countervailing force of state elites in the definition of public 
policy. 
3. The state will be enjailed in clientelistic relations which can ultimately cannibalize 
it and undermines its capacity to conduct coherent developmental economic 
policy. 
On the same track, Bellin (ibid.) argues that the occurrence of these hazards "turns 
on number of intervening political variables, specifically the nature of state structure 
and the logic of the regime's sustaining political coalition". The description fits, to a 
large extent, the Algerian case and it is in this context that the development planning 
system had to prove its abilities to change positively the miserable situation of 
Algeria's major part of the population. 
1.3.2 The role of the inherent bureaucratic obstacle in rural development3 
Bureaucracy is commonly known as the executive 'hand' of government, as it refers 
to the administrative machinery of the state. Although the Weberian image depicts 
its as an 'ideal type' of a rational administration system, many of us see it as 
suggesting inefficiency, pointless and time- and efforts-consuming procedures. In 
politics, it can be seen, according to Heywood (1997:340), as either: 
• A closed system, for it lacks openness and accountability; or, 
• An instrument of class subordination; or, 
• A system of self-serving and inherently inefficient bureaucrats. 
To understand the partial failure of development actions whose shortcomings can be 
attributed to organizational aspects of development administration, Wiggins (1985) 
argues it is wise to compare the task requirements of rural development and the 
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distinctive competence of the [bureaucratic] organization involved in the 
implementation of a development action. He describes the situation of rural 
development as follows: 
1. The goals are often not specific, single, and unchanging; 
2. The project environment, both physical and human/institutional, changes 
unpredictably; 
3. There would be a need, in some projects, to create a demand for the services being 
established; 
4. There is a need to mobilize local resources (labour, funds, knowledge, and 
organizational capacity) for the achievement of project objectives; 
5. The rural populations are scattered over large areas where communications are 
poor; 
6. The project may confront a plethora of decision-makers in dealing with local 
populations; 
7. The project may promote technologies which are either not proven or have been 
proven in some similar but not identical environment. In fact, this occurs 
frequently. 
Moreover, he states that such task requirements bear managerial implications that 
Third World bureaucracies cannot deal with, given the following four main 
tendencies that characterizes the structural, institutional and cultural nature of these 
organizations: 
1. Ad hocism: Project planning, preparation and selection in Third World countries 
does not follow any systematic identification and formulation which can explain 
to a large extent the 'failure' on the development front. The whole process is 
marked by a high degree of ad hocism. 
2. Role culture: Many DCs inherited, upon independence, a replica of the 
bureaucracy of the their former colonizing country. This mainly aimed to infuse 
institutions with a 'role culture', where functional specialization exists, where the 
orientation is towards control, standardization and efficiency, and where 
decisions are cautiously - and in a very mechanistic way - made by precedent. 
Moreover, these organizations adequately fit into an environment of work tasks 
that are reasonably stable and predictable, but not in people-centered 
development situations. In this context, maintenance of a strict hierarchy and a 
high degree of centralization of decision-making are common features. 
3. Power culture: Upon their independence, an organizational and managerial 
model that is power-culture based, called 'hub-and-wheel', was largely 
perpetuated in most of DCs. All decisions are taken at the centre of the wheel, and 
all problems are resolved there. This model can be highly personalistic and does 
little to promote motivation or learning amongst subordinates. When the 
magnitude of tasks and the number of supervised staff overwhelm the capacity of 
the central manager, as in this scenario, the organization runs into chaos. 
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4. Informalism: This is the most important trait determining the functioning of DCs 
bureaucracies, by means of which institutions' staff remain subject to pervasive 
pressure from 'outside' to ignore organizational norms and to pursue alternative 
goals. This 'economy of affection', largely established in Africa, pushes most civil 
servants to direct public resources to benefit their kinsfolk, clan, and tribe through 
direct or indirect linkage, resulting in favouritism, graft, nepotism, and 
corruption. 
Consequently, Wiggins (ibid.) argues that the distinctive competence of typical DCs 
bureaucracies and the task requirements of rural development represent a prefect 
mismatch which particularly explains why project implementation is so bad too 
frequently. I must add that the above-described ad-hocism of LDCs bureaucracies 
also explains why the design very often leaves much to be desired. 
Moreover, one of the main functions of bureaucracy that needs to be mentioned 
here, according to Heywood (ibid.: 347), is the stability and continuity within 
political systems. "While ministers come and go, the bureaucracy is always there". 
However, what may seem as an advantage can be also a problem as continuity can 
have some disadvantages. In the absence of effective public scrutiny and 
accountability, as was the case for Algeria, it can lead to corruption, arrogance, and 
insularity, or even to a bias in favour of conservatism, as top bureaucrats may see 
themselves as the "custodians of state's interest" Heywood (ibid.). 
1.4 As a matter of summary... 
These different points mentioned in the previous sections explain to a large extent 
the failure of the current development thinking, especially when linked to the actual 
project paradigm. Accordingly, stereotyping, or the denial of human agency and 
diversity, rigidity in planning, unequal access to public resources, inefficient 
monitoring and evaluation, and lack of participation are consequences of this a 
thinking that hampered in one way or another the real development of Third World 
populations. Léger (1984, cited by Burkey, 1993: xvii) indicates seven main reasons 
for disappointing results in rural development actions: 
1. Target groups are not homogenous; 
2. Technological options do not always correspond to the motivation of target 
groups and to the constraints of the environment; 
3. Equitable distribution of revenues and benefits may be a myth; 
4. Government and NGO strategies for project conception and implementation do 
not necessarily represent the aspirations and interests of target groups; 
5. The human and social factors are too often neglected; 
6. Projects are planned in a rigid manner, based on an overly idealized economic, 
political and institution environment; 
7. The already existing or newly created organizational entities do not foster 
efficient/effective project management. 
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However, Honadle and Rosengard (1983: 304) warn to not "throw out the baby with 
the bathwater" by assuming that these criticisms are less directed to the project 
approach itself than to the poor use of it. Given the different points I mentioned 
earlier, I disagree with this assumption, although I agree that we should keep the 
baby but, being sick, he needs some special care. 
To my knowledge, the major problem of the project approach, that is the blueprint 
approach, resides in its excessive 'rationalization' and 'idealization' in terms of 
advanced, rigid and comprehensive planning. It is, in fact, closely related to the 
scientific thinking that impinges upon the approach itself and its philosophical 
origins, i.e. 'rationalism' and 'deductionism', which engendered the excessive 
disregard of human agency in development planning. So, if it is acknowledged that 
'rational' planning has deeply influenced, for instance, the "blueprint' project model 
which I intended to present the major weaknesses of in this chapter, then a great 
amount of criticisms formulated by development scholars hold also for the approach 
itself. This is a fundamental causality linking the use of a concept to its philosophical 
and socio-cultural origin, which asserts that any user of a given concept is 
systematically enveloped in the philosophical and sodo-cultural values of this 
concept. 
However, the intellectual and philosophical load carried by the concept 'project' 
was not the sole factor of the development failure. In fact, the misuse of the tool 
'project', as mentioned by Honadle and Rosengard (ibid.), given the political-
institutional environment described earlier, exacerbated the sickness of the already 
sick baby. 
1.5 Looking for change: Which alternative? 
I have directed my arguments in the preceding paragraph towards the criticisms and 
shortcomings of the current project approach and its underlying philosophy. I 
stressed that these criticisms are not only formulated towards the use of the 
approach but towards the approach itself as well. Searching for a better way to 
improve the use of the project model, I first have to assume that rural development 
projects operate within human activity systems that can be conceptualized as self-
organizing, but not 'autopoetic' systems. For this reason, the need to search for a 
more 'humanistic' approach which, according to Korten and Klauss (1984: 169), 
"favours the organizational models of self-organizing systems", is highly 
underscored. In such a model, structures and information flows are oriented and 
steered towards goal-setting and problem-solving processes of their various 
subsystems or actors of the so-called systems. More than that, such flows should be 
guided so that "innovative and adaptive action - that is, learning - occurs con-
tinuously throughout the total system" (Korten and Klauss, 1984: 169), by using the 
creative abilities of all actors, thus reinforcing the centrality of the actors and their 
learning ability. 
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Accordingly, I suggest that the alternative approach of development model 
should strengthen the centrality of people in their development and self-promotion, 
and the necessity of a social learning process in order to achieve sustainable 
developmental outcomes. Of course, a learning process in a given development 
action should not be perceived exclusively as a mere educational process but mainly 
as a forum where design, implementation, and evaluation processes are melted in an 
iterative cycle which paves the way for the mutual learning of all actors involved. 
1.6 Why is the approach shift necessary? 
The first attempt to answer this question, which might be seen as a personal concern, 
can be understood by the fact that "although many people in the development 
community are seriously considering project weaknesses" (Honadle and Rosengard, 
1983: 299), very few are really exploring either alternatives or how to improve the 
current model of 'projectized' development. 
Inspired by the results of the current development thinking and sustained by the 
post-independence politics and its 'bloody' outcomes that Algeria is facing these last 
years, this is thus an attempt from a development practitioner, with no excess of 
pretension, to propose an alternative development vision which avoids making the 
socio-economic conditions of the disadvantaged groups or segments of the 
population worse. 
The second attempt to answer this question is related to the new conceptual and 
theoretical developments that occurred these last years among development thinkers 
all over the world, such as Farmer First, Beyond Farmer First, Development From 
Below, Development From Within, etc. This tendency is clearly continued by 
Honadle and Rosengard (1983:304) who urge that: 
To better equip projects in their encounters with local institutional environments, a new 
approach is needed.... In such an approach, the issue of sustainability - and its recurrent costs 
and organizational learning components - has a better chance of obtaining the dominance it 
needs. 
Moreover, in the preface of his edited volume, Booth (1994a) is very sincere and 
convincing, and puts a huge pressure on both policy-makers and social scientists to 
quickly react to the challenge of the development failure. Booth's main concern 
(1994a: xi) is that: 
The challenge of world poverty, like that of global environmental change and the construction 
of a rriinimally viable order in the international system of states, is both a political challenge and 
a scientific one. 
In this respect, it seems quite propitious to look for another perspective of 
development that can bring a modicum of equity and ethic to the development of 
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Third World populations, where the continuing and growing problems of human 
misery and environmental catastrophe are mostly localized (Booth, 1994a: xi). 
1.7 Conclusion: What can really be done? 
Being both a planner and a social scientist at the same time, I would recognize that 
the dilemma I face these days is not easy to handle; a dilemma related to an object 
(the project) that is filled with continuous criticisms, which I fully admit as a social 
scientist, but which I still need to use as a planner or a development practitioner, as 
no other alternative is available to me. Although strongly criticized, I must admit 
that the 'project' method presents some indubitable advantages that, according to 
Rondinelli (1983:308-316), are as follows: 
1. Projects are identifiable, bounded and organized sets of development activities; 
2. Projects can be effective means of translating development plans and policies into 
specific courses of action; 
3. Projects are vehicles for mobilizing and allocating resources to development 
activities; 
4. Projects can be analyzed and appraised before funds are committed; 
5. Projects are temporary activities that can lead incrementally to accomplishing 
larger development goals; 
6. Projects can be used to undertake unique, innovative and non-routine 
development activities; 
7. Projects can be used to channel development resources to specific groups of 
beneficiaries and to particular locations; 
8. Projects can be formulated as manageable units of activity guided by well-defined 
planning and administrative procedures; 
9. Projects can be organized in a variety of ways and undertaken by a wide range of 
organizations; 
10.Projects can be externally supervised and controlled and used to exert influence 
over broader development policies. 
In an attempt to reflect on how can we make the "baby' safe and adapt it to the new 
needs of development after we have thrown away the bathwater', a very famous 
commercial slogan came to my mind that says: If you cannot beat them, join them. 
This tempted me to phrase this slogan in a way that is applicable to my own 
dilemma, which is also the case of many development practitioners, saying: If you 
cannot avoid them, improve them -1 mean projects and development actions in general. 
Thus, my modest contribution in this research seeks to improve the way 
development actions are actually designed and implemented by slufting them from 
a 'planner-centered' approach to a mere 'beneficiary-centered' one. This was inspired 
by the new organizational developments in Algeria at the grass-roots level, such as 
the institution of new farmers' organizations into professional associations of 
common interest which employ such highly qualified technicians as agronomists, 
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extensionists, and sodo-economists. Thus, I thought that this educated - as well as 
the Algerian planners - should be offered tools that can be used in designing and 
implementing participatory development actions that fit the needs of their 
'employers'. 
CHAPTER 2 
EXPLORING CONCEPTS AND THEORIES: 
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I establish the conceptual framework for the study by presenting two 
basic concepts derived from the problem background described in the previous 
chapter that will pave my theoretical way. These concepts of 'planned development' 
and 'sustainability' of development. Both concepts represent different meanings of 
the facets of current development flunking underlying the project model of rural 
development in Third World countries. The former represents the model of 
introducing change through interventions, especially state ones, attempting to lead 
traditional societies into modernity, or to bring modernity into traditional societies. 
The latter represents the unachieved promises of many aspects of development 
(economic, social and ecological). 
Both concepts appeal to some understanding of the processes to be manipulated 
within the frame of a development action and thus require prior knowledge as a 
prerequisite to devise adequate strategies of action. However, planned development, 
long confined in a self-referent planning approach, negated some human processes 
that are undeniably the basis of sustainability in people-centered development. 
Understanding and mamtaining resilience mechanisms of an eco-system or the 
underlying processes of gathering knowledge about this eco-system are among these 
human processes. Meanwhile, sustainability could not be concretized and achieve a 
'non-return' point of development without these human processes which represent 
the most fundamental of the three basic elements of the "critical triangle of 
sustainability": (1) Economic sustainability, that is sustainable economic growth; (2) 
Social sustainability, that is a fair distribution of the economic growth and equitable 
resource access for poverty alleviation; and, (3) Environmental sustainability, that is 
the conservation of the environment through sound natural resources management 
(Oram et al, 1998:1). 
Both concepts are linked to the involvement of people as far as knowledge is 
concerned. Given that knowledge can never be complete or eminate from a single 
source, opportunities for other actors, in addition to planners and policy-makers, 
should then be offered within the frame of development actions. The former, 
confined to a blue-print, top-down planning approach, did not create many 
opportunities in this sense and failed to move development ahead. Sustainability 
was not achieved because of the rationality of planned development and the rigidity 
of its design, given the way the blue-print approach looked at development as taking 
place within a controlled environment. Sustainability was assumed as given in the 
methodological characteristics of this planning approach. 
In my endeavour to elaborate on these issues, I shall 'delineate' the main theories 
and concepts that will be used in analyzing the actual situation of these two concepts 
in the context of the Algerian development field (that is, knowledge for 
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understanding) and to reflect later on some needed institutional adjustments 
required for a 're-humanized' approach of development (that is, knowledge for 
action). 
Given the above criticisms, as well as parts of the problems stated in the previous 
chapter, I shall attempt to design a conceptual framework which first aims to 
analyze the present situation of 'planned development' and 'sustainability'; this will 
be my analytical framework. I will next make use of the empirical material I am 
presenting in this book, combined with conceptual and theoretical elements, to 
proceed towards methodological propositions and practical recommendations for an 
alternative view which looks toward re-humanizing development; this will be my 
prescriptive framework. Figure 2.1(1) describes the linkages between the retained 
elements of the proposed conceptual framework and the underlying assumptions of 
the researcher. However, several concepts and ideas developed in this chapter are 
not new. They are mentioned in a great amount of literature of the last decade but 
have been only partially applied in the planned development process. For most 
Algerian planners, these are either relatively new or are often not taken into 
consideration, as Cases Nos. 1,2, and 3 will show later. 
Figure 2.1(1) - Visualizing the study conceptual framework 
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To compare between the current development thmking and its results, and my 
proposed alternative view and its advantages, I shall make use of a constructivist 
metaphor of the 'development theatre' as an attempted conceptualization of the 
context of a given development action. Being my own suggested part of the 
conceptual framework, the basic theoretical elements of this metaphor, compatible 
with concepts and theories reviewed in the following sections, are thus mentioned 
in the final section of this chapter. 
2.2 Concepts of planned development and sustainability 
2.2.1 What is development and planned development? 
Referring to the tremendous amount of literature on development, I have found it a 
difficult task to propose a general working definition for this concept. The question 
of what is development and what is not? surfaced many times in the literature. These 
concepts are presented as buzz words' or 'pet words'. 
In addition to the fact that it was synonymous - and used exclusively - with 
economic growth, development was measured by indicators such as rates of national 
and per capita income growth. Such an indicator, derived from a simple division of 
the national income by the number of inhabitants, bears a fallacious assumption that 
the national income was equally distributed among all inhabitants. Quite an 
idealistic view of a fictious egalitarian society! 
Moreover, development in Third World countries was seen, according to 
Brohman (1996:55), as: 
A transformative process from traditional, agricultural, and rural economy toward a modern, 
industrial, and urban one. 
Development was originally based on a false - and sometimes arrogant -
ethnocentric assumption that change in a given traditional, 'primitive' society can 
only be achieved through outside deterministic intervention, given a presumed inert 
structure of this type of society and the passivity of its constituents. 
Notwithstanding this, dissatisfaction with this vision of conceptualizing 
development inspired a corresponding search for alternatives or other indicators 
that may better reflect the state of development in Third World countries, such as life 
expectancy, standards of health and literacy, access to various social and public 
services, freedom of speech, the degree of popular participation in government or 
decision-making, and environmental conservation (Conyers and Hills, 1984:29). 
In line with this statement, I shall introduce another vision on the concept 
'development' which will be one of the building blocks of this book. Derived from 
the concept of integrated human development, the concept 'development', in the 
sense of this study, refers to the Cocoyoc paradigm which concerns the development 
of people and not things (Conyers and Hills, ibid.: 27-28). Aiming to give the every 
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person the right to free himself/herself from every form of domination or 
oppression and develop as a whole person in relation to others, it relies on an 
inextricable integration with and a high degree of overlap between the basic 
perspectives of a sustainable development. These, according to Conyers and Hills 
(ibid.: 28, authors' italics), are: 
1. The economic perspective which concerns production of goods and services, and 
their related activities, particularly their commercial and monetary aspects; 
2. The social perspective which concerns the more general well-being of individuals 
or groups of people; 
3. The political perspective which concerns the distribution of power between 
different groups and individuals, particularly the power to control, or make 
decisions about, the use of resources; 
4. The natural or environmental perspective which concerns the maintenance of the 
environment where development occurs. 
According to Schmale (1993: 7), this vision of development refers to any change in 
thought by concerned people (development 'beneficiaries' or 'target groups') so that 
specific problems they face may be solved and/or improvements made in their lives 
beyond material and economic improvements. In this order, development takes on a 
more universal definition, including the change of political structures into more 
democratic, participatory ones as well. This is extremely important in the sense of 
sustainable development, although this cannot be measured by quantitative 
economic indicators in the same way as economic growth. This type of development, 
which has a more human face, was clearly illustrated by Jan Pronk, a former Dutch 
minister for international co-operation, who said: "Freedom comes first, then food" 
(cited by Schmale, ibid.). 
This vision of development reverses the long-standing ignorance of the 'human 
factor' and the 'non-economics variables' in the conventional vision of development 
and its inherent procedural theories of planning based on the exclusiveness of 
scientific rationality, and the blue-print approach, which created very rigid and 
mechanistically operated projects. 
As a matter of convention, I refer to planned development in this study as a 
process by which development actions are identified, designed, implemented, and 
evaluated under a given voluntarily time- and space-restricted framework placed 
upon adopted theories of, in and for planning, in order to achieve a deemed desirable 
situation in accordance with the needs and preferences of the beneficiaries of these 
actions. Issues related to planning organization, theories, and styles will be 
elaborated upon more in Section 2.5 in this chapter. Before I return to planning, I will 
first introduce sustainability and link it to planned development. 
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2.2.2 Sustainability and sustainable development 
In terms of meaning, sustainability is a ship that sails under different flags, if I dare 
to rephrase Adams (1993: 208). As a consequence, this creates confusion about the 
concept of sustainable development, which can be better understood if one talks of 
the "sustainable patterns and processes of development" (Elliott, 1994:1). 
The concept stems from the merging of two other basic concepts, bodies of 
knowledge, and literature. These are 'sustainability' and 'development', with a great 
emphasis, however, on the 'environment'. It shows the extreme interdependency 
between 'development' and 'environment' (Elliott, ibid.: 14). 
All of these concepts have been broadly used in literature, discourses, slogans, etc. 
to show that they sometimes mean different things to different people, depending on 
which side one is holding the stick or who is setting the agenda. 
Many authors have proposed a set of key words in order to attempt a working 
definition of sustainable development. Some looked at it from the human-being 
welfare point of view, arguing that it is a kind of development, according to Allen 
(1980, quoted by Elliott, ibid.: 3), that, 
[It] is likely to achieve lasting satisfaction of human needs and improvement of the quality of 
human life. 
Many others looked at it from the economic point of view, arguing, according to 
Turner (1988, quoted by Elliott, ibid.), that, 
[It] would seek to maintain an 'acceptable' rate of growth in per-capita real incomes without 
depleting the national capital asset stock or the natural environment asset stock. 
Others finally looked at it from the environmental point of view saying, according 
Redclift (1987, quoted by Elliott, ibid.), that, 
[The term] suggests that the lessons of ecology can, and should be applied to economic 
processes. 
In this respect, it is suggested that human activities should use resources efficiently 
and that by-products or side-effects of these activities should not harm the 
environment. 
However, the most frequently used definition of sustainability is the one 
proposed by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 
1987: 43) - known as the Brundtland Commission - suggesting that sustainable 
development is: 
A development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs. 
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According to Adams (1993: 211), sustainable development in this respect relies on 
two concepts: The first is the concept of basic needs and its corollary of the primacy 
of development action for the poor; the second involves the environmental limits. It 
prioritizes political and economic changes to achieve sustainable development 
(Elliott, ibid.: 11). 
This broad conceptualization of sustainable development is corroborated by Tolba 
(1987 quoted by Elliott, ibid.: 3), who suggests that 
The concept sustainable development encompasses: 
1. Help for the very poor because they were left with no option other than destroy their 
environment; 
2. The idea of self-reliant development, within natural resources constraints; 
3. The idea of cost-effective development using different economic criteria to the traditional 
approach; that is to say that development should not degrade environmental quality, nor 
should it reduce productivity in the long run; 
4. The great issues of health control, appropriate technologies, food self-reliance, clean water 
and shelter for all; 
5. The notion that people-oriented initiatives are needed; human-beings, in other words, are 
the resources in the concept. 
Summing up all these different conceptualizations, I suggest that sustainable 
development concerns the realization at a lower cost and a lasting maintenance of 
the best-ever trade-off between economic growth, equity, and environmental 
sustainability - the "3E's" - on which our future depends (Oram et ah, 1998:5). 
2.2.3 Linking development planning to sustainability 
Having delineated the meaning of planned development and sustainability in the 
context of this study, I will now link both concepts to define the prerequisites of a 
successful development action seeking to achieve sustainable outcomes. According to 
van Dusseldorp (1992: 12), for any development activity to achieved and sustain its 
goals, four prerequisites need to be fulfilled, which are very seldom fully achieved. 
These prerequisites are as follows (author's emphasis): 
1. The possibility of formulating a consistent, realistic and durable set of objectives, 
which is acceptable, for all, or at least for a large majority of the people who will 
be involved and affected by the planned development. This prerequisite sets in 
fact the debate about development for whom? and whose objectives count more?. 
2. The availability of knowledge of all relevant processes and their 
interrelationships, which have to be influenced, in order to change the present 
situation in such a way that the adopted objectives will be realized. This 
prerequisite sets the debate around the appropriate planning theories in 
development and their foundation on available knowledge. 
3. The availability of means and power to influence these processes, i.e. all needed 
material resources that are required to realize development according to the 
adopted objectives. 
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4. The political will to use the available means and power, to influence the relevant 
processes, in order to realize the desired objectives. In other words, this 
prerequisite sets the entire philosophy of development. 
It is thus clear that knowledge from whatever source is essential in attempting a 
successful manipulation of the processes a development action is intended to 
influence in order to achieve the deemed desirable situation. This is what I shall 
introduce in the following section. 
2.3 Knowledge: A critical input for making development sustainable 
The design of development actions requires a prior knowledge about processes to be 
manipulated or influenced in order to transform an undesirable situation into one 
deemed desirable. In general, a development action takes place in "an evolving 
environment of values, understandings and problem resolutions" (Camhis, 1979:115, 
quoting Bolan 1974: 32), and any planning theory which "ignores these relationships 
necessarily engenders resistance, hostilities and blocking behaviour" (Camhis, ibid.). 
This introductory statement highlights the critical character of knowledge and 
information as inputs in planning and - as a consequence - in planned development 
and sustainability. Determining, in the following order, how knowledge is 
generated, exchanged, gathered, transferred, transformed and used by different 
social actors within the context of a development action becomes necessary in such a 
study. 
Within the context of a developmental action, knowledge products are exchanged 
between social actors. This leads to conceptualize, first of all, knowledge, according 
to Arce and Long (1992:211), as: 
Constituted by the ways in which individual members of society or social groups categorize, 
code, process and impute meaning to their experience. 
Knowledge is thus not a simple set of facts that many dictionaries can attribute to the 
concept, argues Box (1989a: 2, quoting Knorr-Cetina 1981), because facts are social 
constructs which do not exist on their own but are made by people within specific 
contexts. Thus, knowledge is the ideas and values which govern the imputation of 
meaning to these facts (in order to socially construct 'reality'). It is then obvious to 
say that knowledge dynamics and processes can be best understood by relating 
them to the context in which the construction and reconstruction of meaning take 
place (Box, 1989a: 2). 
According to the foregoing discussion, the locus of change as regards agricultural 
development, as Box (1989a: 4) puts it, lies within the production conditions of the 
farmer, who deals with a continuous process of adaptation to these conditions by 
testing out alternatives and choosing the ones that adequately fit these so-called 
production conditions, be they agronomic, ecological, economic, social, cultural, and 
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even ergonomic. Of course, it cannot be denied that some alternatives are provided 
by researchers and scientists via extension workers. Even though it is so, the 
activities of scientists and extensionists are neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for agro-technological change (Box, ibid.). This evidence is epitomized by 
the fact that farmers still refuse improved and high-yielding varieties and continue 
growing their 'traditional' landraces. This leads to the notion that adoption of a 
given technology or innovation by farmers can best be understood by reference to 
their conditions. As an evident fact, farming must not be exclusively seen as a 
technical practice; it is in fact a location-specific, mmti-dimensional interaction 
between man and the biosphere. This what makes Box (1989a: 3) say that agricultural 
knowledge as a unique substance does not exist. What exist instead are bodies of 
knowledge relevant to particular, specific contexts which may vary widely for 
different categories of professionals involved in agricultural development. To say so, 
all actors involved in a given developmental action process, generate, gather, 
maintain, exchange and use a body of knowledge that is relevant for their livelihood 
conditions. Moreover, all actors are at the same time both sources and users of 
knowledge and its subsequent products. This is why it is crucial that planners, 
researchers and development staff should integrate their mutual knowledge and, 
more importantly, should make room for farmers' or peasant communities' 
knowledge during the designing, implementation and evaluation of development 
actions. Later in this chapter, concepts such as participation and social learning that 
facilitate this process will be presented. 
Knowledge, however, is processed, exchanged, and used by social actors in their 
ways to deal with daily real-life events. I shall thus take this opportunity to 
introduce the centrality of social actors within social settings and examine how they 
process their experiences and develop wisdom and knowledge. This is my aim in the 
following section. 
2.4 Centrality of people in development: An actor-oriented perspective 
2.4.1 A brief introduction to the actor-oriented approach 
I have just argued that knowledge and its organizational and social arrangements to 
support its different processes are extremely important for planned development 
and sustainability. Ackoff (1984: 195) reinforces this statement and links it to the 
centrality of people in development. He argues that development is a product of 
one's knowledge and thus one's learning about one's environment in order to meet 
one's needs. It is thus illusive to think that one person, be it the planner or the policy-
maker, can develop another person, as he/she can just not learn in his/her place. 
Notwithstanding this statement, large segments of elite intellectuals, be they in 
Third World or in developed countries, still think that a rural society, or one that is 
mainly constituted of peasants and farmers, is a 'traditional society', supposedly 
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based on an inert structure which is only put in motion by outside intervention 
(Elwert and Bierschenk, 1988: 99); an intervention that can take, in development 
terminology, the form of a policy, a programme or even an individual project. 
However, contrary evidence exists that shows how thousands of African farmers 
and their communities - and surely elsewhere in the Third World - elaborate 
strategies to cope, for instance, with long-term drought, sometimes without any help 
from outsiders. Anyone of us facing this evidence would conclude these 
communities are quite dynamic systems and that the presumed 'traditional society' 
exists only in the minds of these so-called intellectuals. Accordingly, Box (1989a: 4) 
argues: 
We have no evidence that to show that 'traditional farmers' exist, who just repeat what their 
fathers did. Traditional subsistence agriculture exist only in one place: In the heads of so-called 
modern agricultural technicians. 
This thinking is in fact sustained by a Western ethnocentrism which posits that Third 
World countries should follow a similar development path as Western countries. But 
a great difference needs to be mentioned here. As Long (1977:186) contends: 
Whereas the Western experience was of an industrial revolution from within, the Third World 
experiences a 'revolution' from outside brought by the impact of Western technology and by the 
transfer of social and cultural skills. 
Moreover, all theories of development and planning 'tested' in the Third World were 
designed on a high standardization pattern, and based on utilitarianism and 
methodological individualism. Besides of viewing human beings as identical objects 
represented by a uniform prototype, these theories perfectly 'materialize' this 
centrism, and enhance and consolidate the already inherent characteristics of 
linearity and externality of the process of social change. Unfortunately, none of these 
theories give attention to the ways in which local actors contribute in shaping the 
outcomes or even modifying "the patterns of regional and national development" 
(Long, 1977:187). 
Emphasizing the increasing stereotyping revealed by these theories of 
development, Long and van der Ploeg (1994: 64; my italics) argue that: 
A more dynamic approach to the understanding of social change is therefore needed which 
stresses the interplay and mutual determination of internal and external factors and 
relationships, and which recognizes the central role played by human action and consciousness. 
In this context, the actor-oriented perspective, which emanated from anthropological 
work on socio-economic change, focuses upon the variations in response to broadly 
similar external circumstances shown by different social groups and categories 
(Long, 1977: 187; Long and van der Ploeg, 1994: 64). Furthermore, it highlights the 
differentiated and multi-structured nature of rural societies and does not regard 
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peasants, farmers, and/or their communities as a homogenous population, as Long 
( 1 9 7 7 : 1 8 7 ) argues. 
From this perspective, actors are not seen simply as "disembodied social 
categories (based on class or some other classificatory criteria)" or "passive recipients 
of intervention". According Long ( 1 9 9 2 : 2 1 ) and Long and van der Ploeg ( 1 9 9 4 : 6 4 ) , 
[They are] active participants who process information and strategies in their dealings with 
various local actors as well as with outside institutions and personnel (my italics). 
On another level, Long's ( 1 9 7 7 : 1 8 8 ) arguments take us far from the methodological 
individualism beliefs of most planners (see Faludi, 1 9 7 3 ) by arguing that 
[This perspective] entails an understanding of the structural and ideological frameworks that 
limit [or may constrain] peasant action, whilst also focusing on the process by which particular 
individual and groups evolve in their ways of dealing with their changing environment. 
Further, Long ( 1 9 7 7 : 1 8 8 ) argues further that: 
An actor-oriented perspective emphasizes the need to appreciate the significance of 
development and change from the actors' or recipients' perspectives. 
However, being aware of the weaknesses of this perspective, Long ( 1 9 7 7 : 1 8 9 ) 
acknowledges mat, if combined with a systematic wider historical and structural 
phenomenon, different economic and political strategies and perspectives on change 
can be isolated to reflect the actors' point of view (and not from the planner's or the 
policy-maker's point of view) since many of the choices and strategies pursued by 
individuals and groups have been shaped by processes outside the immediate arena 
of interaction (Long, 1 9 8 8 : 1 2 6 ) , or what Brown ( 1 9 8 3 : 2 0 ) identifies as the interface's 
context. It can also document the ways in which existing forms of organization have 
been creatively adapted to meet the demands of new circumstances. In this respect, 
such an approach can combine both micro and macro levels of analysis and gives 
equal attention to horizontal and vertical patterns of co-operation and control. 
On the other hand, concerning state intervention, the actor-oriented approach, as 
Long argues ( 1 9 7 7 : 1 9 0 ) , attaches a great interest to the three following main issues: 
1. How state policies are intimately related to the development of the national 
economy and to the interests of the social groups or classes who control the 
governmental machinery and who, therefore, formulate (directly and/or 
indirectly) these policies. 
2 . How types of organization and development agencies set up to implement 
specific programmes and what the nature of their relationships to central or local 
government bodies is. 
3 . How objectives and feasibility of specific policies are determined and how their 
intended and unintended consequences are documented. 
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As Long (ibid.: 191) further mentions: 
This involves giving careful attention to how particular groups interpret the aims of 
government and its programmes; how they participate in them and how they may utilize the 
newly-available resources in pursuit of their own goals. 
The actor-oriented perspective begins with the simple idea that different responses 
among social actors can develop under the same or similar circumstances. Such 
differences reflect variations on how actors attempt to cope, cognitively or 
organizationally, with the situations they face in their daily life (Long, 1988; 1990). 
Thus, one can even assume that the differential patterns of response to similar 
circumstances are partly the creation of the actors themselves (Long and van der 
Ploeg 1994: 64). Thus, according to Long (1989b: 247), this perspective reconsiders 
the essential nature and importance of 'human agency' and consequently develops 
useful analytical concepts such as 'social actor' and 'social interface' as salient 
features that comprise its basis. In the following section, I shall introduce these as 
well as other concepts that can be derived from this perspective. 
2.4.2 Human agency and the concept of 'social actor' 
According to Long (1989b, 1992), the actor-oriented perspective is strongly related to 
the concept of 'human agency'. Citing Giddens (1984:1-16), Long (1992: 22) and Long 
and van der Ploeg (1994: 66) write: 
The notion of agency attributes to the individual actor the capacity to process social experience 
and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion. Within 
the limits of information, uncertainty and other constraints (e.g. physical, normative or politico-
economic) that exist, social actors are 'knowledgeable' and 'capable'. They attempt to solve 
problems, learn how to intervene in the flow of social events around them, and monitor 
continuously their own actions, observing how others react to their behaviour and taking note 
of the various contingent circumstances. 
Moreover, Long and van der Ploeg (1994: 66) admit that "agency is not simply an 
attribute of the individual actor", but "entails social relations and can become 
effective only through them". 'Collective' agency, on the other hand, depends on the 
emergence and strategic manipulation of a network of social actors and the 
channelling of special items at certain interfaces. To accomplish this, it is essential for 
the actors to gain the struggles in arenas where the attribution of specific meanings 
to certain events, actions and ideas take place (Long and van der Ploeg, 1994: 67). 
This is why "particular intervention models (or ideologies) become strategic 
weapons in the hands of the institutions and personnel charged with promoting 
development", as Long and van der Ploeg caution us. 
Furthermore, argue Long and van der Ploeg (ibid.), to reach decisions discursive 
means must be explicitly or implicitly used. These can vary and "form part of the 
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differentiated stock of knowledge and resources available to actors of different 
types". 
Finally, Long and van der Ploeg introduce how the individual and the social actor 
may be differentiated by stating that the "social actor is socially constructed rather 
than simply a synonym for the individual or a member of Homo Sapiens". Having 
that said, they hammer out that (Long and van der Ploeg, 1994: 66): 
The social construction of actors is underpinned meta-theoretically by the notion of agency. 
2.4.3 Social actor and the concept of 'linking loop' 
If in real life, planning and implementation of development actions are very often 
particular functions of different entities and institutions. However, this is not the 
case for human-beings. According to van Dusseldorp (1992: 39), social actors have in 
their minds goals and objectives they want to achieve at the lower cost possible. For 
this purpose, they have always recourse to a rational decision model which helps 
them make decisions 'based on a system of logical thought". This refers to the 
concept of 'linking loop' which can be differentiated into three forms: 
1. The 'basic linking loop' which represents the interrelated decisions and activities 
social actors want to make and perform in order to realize some set objectives. In 
this situation, they conceptually and actually link their objectives, their 
perception of their present situation and their (scarce) resources. 
2. When social actors realize that it is individually impossible for them to achieve 
their objectives, unless they combine their efforts and resources altogether. In this 
situation, the "basic linking loops' of different social actors need to be combined 
into and take the form of a 'communal linking loop'. 
3. The 'formalized linking loop' represents the way decisions are made within 
organizations and are represented by the project cycle. It represents a 
systematized, institutionalized, fragmented and inflexible process including a set 
of complex 'communal linking loops'. 
2.4.4 Social interface at the development encounter 
In their daily life, collective and/or individual actors are continuously trying to 
control their surrounding environment in order to achieve their objectives. At the 
same time, wittingly or unwittingly, there may be 'friction' amongst themselves and 
even come to create points of encounter or interfaces. According to Long (1984: 10; 
1989a: 2), the concept of interface suggests: 
Some kind of face-to-face encounter between individuals or units representing different 
interests and backed by different resources. The interacting parties will often be differentiated 
in terms of power. 
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Long (1984:10; 1989a: 2) argues that studying this interface aims to: 
Bring the dynamic and emergent character of the interactions that take place and show how the 
goals, perceptions, interests, and relationships of the various parties may be reshaped as a 
result of being brought into interaction. 
One of the most important 'locations' of this study is to 're-construct' the main 
development encounters within the context of development actions that are 
investigated. These encounters will put different types of social actors into close 
interaction, and are called social (and/or organizational) interfaces. Social interfaces, 
characterizing a sort of face-to-face 'meeting' of two different types of social actors 
involved in a given development action, are defined by Long (1988:127; 1989a: 2) as: 
The critical points of intersection or linkage between different social systems or levels of social 
order, where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative values and social 
interest, are most likely to be found. 
The analysis of organizational interfaces is one of the several key aspects of interface 
analysis that will be used in this study for the following properties, as defind by 
Long (1988:127): 
1. It focuses upon the linkages that develop between the interacting individuals or 
parties rather that on the individuals themselves. It is assumed that continued 
interaction encourages the development of boundaries and snared expectations that 
regulate the interaction of the participants in such a way that the interface itself 
becomes an organized entity. 
2. It draws attention to the forces creating conflict or incompatibility between the 
parties concerned. Although interface interactions presuppose some degree of 
common interest, they are also likely to generate conflicts arising from 
contradictory interests or objectives. (It goes without saying that "the dynamic 
and potentially conflicting nature of social interfaces" (Long, 1989a: 1) is highly 
stressed). 
3. It highlights differences in world-views or cultural interpretations between the 
interacting parties or individuals. Such differences are not merely idiosyncratic 
but reflect differences in patterns of socialization and professionalization. The 
result is often miscommunication or a clash of rationalities. 
Another author, Brown (1983), studied the interfaces that take place within or 
between organizations and how they influence the overall performance of these 
organizations. He argues that the importance of the so-called organizational interfaces 
resides in both the importance of the conflicts they may induce and the increasing 
importance of managing these eventual conflicts at these social junctions. Given that 
development interfaces are far from being restful encounters, "if you don't manage 
interface conflicts, interface conflicts will manage you" (Brown, ibid.: 15). In this way, 
conflict might be defined both as "a process which begins when one party perceives 
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that the other has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his" (Thomas, 
1976, cited by Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991: 556), as well as "an incompatible 
behaviour between parties whose interests differ" (Brown, 1983: 4). According to 
him, an incompatible behaviour refers to particular actions conducted by one party in 
order to oppose or frustrate the other party, and interests are represented by 
recognized and unrecognized stakes that might be affected by the interaction of the 
two parties. Moreover, he states that the four following basic trends, observed along 
the evolution of organizations, describe with great emphasis the obviousness of 
conflict occurrence: 
• The more numerous and diverse the levels and specialized divisions within an 
organization, the more opportunities for conflict at their interfaces. 
• The more interdependence between parties, the higher the cost of poorly 
managed conflict at their interfaces. 
• Social and technological change processes produce conflict at old and new 
organizational interfaces. 
• Interfaces are inherently susceptible to conflict because of their position between 
social units. 
In general, the interface is defined by shared tasks, i.e. both actors need each other to 
accomplish their activities, and by an acceptance of a common authority, i.e. both actors 
obey to common standards, norms and values (Brown, 1983:22). 
But, in order to be 'fruitful' and 'productive', the interface analysis must not be 
confined to an investigation restricted to the face-to-face encounter of the two social 
actors who are present. Long (1989a: 2) and Arce and Long (1992: 214) recommend 
that it should take place within broader institutional and power contexts, given that 
an actors' interaction can be affected by the actors themselves as well as the broader 
institutional and cultural frameworks and resources which might not be physically 
or directly present at the interface. This is very close to Brown's (1983: 20) interface 
context. 
For the same purpose, Brown (1983: 20) proposes an analytical framework based 
on four elements that constitute the interface: (1) The interface itself; (2) The parties 
to that interface; (3) The party representatives; and (4) The larger context [see Figure 
2.4.4(1)]. Consequently, he assumes that the representatives are individuals, the 
parties are social units or organizations, the larger context may include 
organizations, societies (or even subjective matters such as laws, policies, etc.), and 
the interfaces are intermediaries between the parties and the larger context. This 
supports the case that the causes and effects of conflict itself occur at multiple levels. 
Furthermore, he (Brown, 1983:20, his emphasis) argues that: 
Events at the interface are the result of the interplay of the four elements over time. Some 
interplays are relatively visible and quick; others move slowly and invisibly [see Figure 
2.4.4(1)]. Interface events involve two dynamics: (1) The long-term interplay of parties, interface 
context, and interaction outcomes that alter interface definition and organization; and (2) The short-term 
interaction of representatives perceptions', communications, and actions within the interface. 
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Figure 2.4.4(1) - Interface elements and dynamics 
(Source: Brown, 1983:20) 
In the preceeding sections, I have introduced the concepts of planned development 
and sustainability; demonstrated the crucial role of knowledge in development; 
shown how social actors intervene within social settings and abstract knowledge and 
wisdom from their own experiences. It is now time to undertake a brief but detailed 
journey into the planning system in charge to devise not only plans but also 
processes in order to achieve development. 
2.5 On planning theory and planned inconsistency 
2.5.1 Introduction to planning history 
Planning - or the capability to plan - is an essential characteristic of human beings 
which is as old as human history (van de Putte, 1991: 22). In development, planning 
has become a very important part of the process itself. Planning became useful when 
human beings began to intervene in specific processes to influence their own (self-) 
development (van Dusseldorp, 1992: 4). It is argued that the origin of planning 
coincided with "the moment when ambiguity entered society's code of behaviour" 
(Camhis, 1979: 3). After an intensive application in Europe immediately after World 
War II, planning, as related to development, became a widely accepted function of 
Third World governments in their development endeavours (van de Putte, 1991: 22; 
Conyers and Hills, 1984: 42). 
In an attempt to define planning, Conyers and Hills (1984:3), describe it as: 
A continuous process which involves making decisions (or choices) about alternatives ways of 
using available resources with the aim of achieving particular goals at some time in the future. 
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After their independence, most Third World countries embraced planning because it 
was seen as being the most fitting approach for resources allocation for the purpose 
of accelerating the pace of development (van de Putte, ibid.). Due to the tremendous 
developmental problems inherited by newly-independent states in Third World 
countries, planning became very important and began to dominate development 
administration (van de Putte, ibid). 
In most Third World countries, planning is centralized and remains the 
'hinterland' of highly trained professionals with a unique knowledge that gives them 
the exclusive right to plan for others. As a rule, planners do not participate in the 
execution of their plans (van de Putte, 1 9 9 1 : 2 3 ) . 
Considering the importance and high expectations placed on it, and given the 
heavy routinization that took place within the planning process which excluded the 
beneficiaries of a given development action from participating in the first stage of 
the process, planning instead seemed to be a "giant with feet of clay". According to 
van de Putte (ibid.): 
The result of the focus on planning for the administration of development processes was, and 
still is, a profusion of plans that bear little attention to the reality of development. 
As a consequence of this, especially in the context of people-centered development, 
van de Putte argues that: 
Objectives and targets are set at too ambitious levels and prove to be difficult to achieve during 
implementation. 
2 . 5 . 2 Theories in, of, and for planning 
In planning and planned development, as we have seen, the centrality of knowledge 
as a crucial input in planning development needs not to be demonstrated. It is cited 
as the second prerequisite for sustainable development [see Section 2 . 2 . 3 ] , just as it is 
important for all theories used in the planning process. These different theories are 
in fact, the warrant of the availability of knowledge about the processes a given 
development action is targeting. 
In planning, theories can explain and predict phenomena and provide insight into 
how actions should be undertaken They can also indicate certain causalities -
although frequently assumed - and predict if these causalities are likely to take place 
in the future. It is on the basis of these causalities - be they real or assumed - that 
endeavours and actions will be developed (van Dusseldorp, 1 9 9 2 : 1 3 ) . 
McConnell ( 1 9 8 1 : 1 4 ) , distinguishes three interrelated types of theories that are 
important for planning: 
1 . Substantive theories in planning which derive knowledge from the disciplines to be 
used in the planning of a given activity. For instance, the minimum factor law that 
EXPLORING CONCEPTS AND THEORIES 33 
explains the base in plant nutrition is a substantive theory for a crop production 
project. 
2. Procedural theories of planning which regulate the planning process and determine 
which style of planning should be used. For instance, a blue-print style of 
planning is a good example of a procedural theory that fits hardware projects. 
3. Social theories for planning which explain the relations between society 
development and planning orientation. For instance, in Marxist theories of 
development, the state is the only entity that plans for the whole society. It 
highlights the orientation of planned development in the light of state-society 
relations. 
Many authors (Faludi, 1973; Camhis, 1979) insist on the distinction to be made 
between theories in planning and theories of planning. For Faludi (1973: 3), the latter 
concerns the form of the planning process while the former represents the content of 
the planned activity. As Camhis (1979:5) puts it, 
We are thus led to believe that the right form of the planning process will inevitably determine 
the right content or what the real problem is. 
Another distinction needs to be observed in the substantive theories in planning. In 
this order, Chen (1990:40) distinguishes two types of theories: 
1. Descriptive theories are somehow analytical tools that depict a present situation 
(what it is now). In project document, this type of theory can be found in the 
analysis of the present situation (or in the project justification). For instance, in the 
case of the present study, this applies to the understanding of the present 
situation of planned development process. 
2. Prescriptive theories are 'idealistic' or 'normative' methodologies prescribing how 
and with what the present situation can be changed (what and how it should be). 
In project documents, this type of theory is mentioned (very often implicitly and 
rarely explicitly) in the planned activities part (or in the project strategy). In the 
case of this study, for instance, this will represent the recommendations I shall 
outline for improving the planned development process. 
It is these two types of theories, argues van Dusseldorp (1992:14), that constitute the 
policy, programme or project theory. The latter indicates the processes as they are 
functioning now and the propositions of a 'futurist' functioning, having in mind that it 
is sustained by a "black box' thinking of an input-activity-output model [see Figure 
2.5.2(1)]. 
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Figure 2.52(1) - The logic of project planning 
(Source: unknown) 
2.5.3 Styles of planning 
Planning can be performed through different styles. Van Dusseldorp (1992: 17) 
introduces many authors and their specific styles of planning, noting that styles of 
planning are based on different social theories for planning. Consequently, some 
authors (van Houten, 1974 cited by van Dusseldorp, ibid.) indicates a centralized 
planning style versus a decentralized planning style. Based on the way objectives are 
formulated, differentiation of indicative planning from imperative planning and 
task-oriented prognoses is made (van Dusseldorp, ibid.; his emphasis). 
Moreover, Friedmann (1973: 51, also cited by van Dusseldorp, ibid.) distinguishes 
between allocative planning, i.e. concerned with the distribution of scarce resources 
among competing users and mamtaining the present societal status quo, and 
innovative planning, i.e. destined to induce structural change in a given configuration 
of societal relations, and reform the present societal status quo. 
Further, van Dusseldorp (ibid.) distinguishes between the direction of the vertical 
flow of aggregation/disaggregation a top-down style of planning and a bottom-up 
style. The former starts at the national level, first disaggregated into sectoral plans 
and then into projects at the local level. The latter - also called participatory planning 
- starts with project identification at the local level, aggregated into regional and/or 
sectoral plans at the regional level, and then provides material for building national 
strategies and formulating national plans. 
Finally, another classification is utilized by van Dusseldorp (1992: 21), based on 
the way a plan is drawn, and the flexibility it may offer during its implementation. 
The blue-print style is a logical and rational style of planning, which is known for its 
rigidity in design and implementation. Evidently, many cases showed that the use of 
this instrument is far from being successful in people-centered development projects. 
The other model of process/programmatic style emphasizes flexibility based on a 
learning process and where participation, bottom-up flow and integration are key 
features. Moreover, regular mechanisms of internal-interim evaluation should be built 
into the implementation process and freedom must be given to the project 
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management to make changes in the project design, when approved by the internal-
mterim evaluation panel. 
2.5.4 Major approaches and schools of thought in planning theory 
In this work, Camhis (1979) performs a very interesting comparison between these 
four approaches and demonstrates how they have been influenced by the different 
philosophical currents, showing that planning theory was highly inspired in its 
evolution and made a rational use of philosophical and scientific concepts. Basing 
his classification on the procedural theories of planning, Camhis (1979) differentiates 
between four major approaches to planning theory: 
• Rational comprehensive planning; 
• Disjointed incrementalism planning; 
• Mixed scarming planning; and, 
• Transactive planning, developed by Friedmann (1973; 1984). This will be 
elaborated upon in Section 2.7.2. 
A classification of the different schools of thought in planning theory is proposed by 
Friedmann (1996: 10), suggesting that planning theory developed within a 
continuum whose extremes are clustered with: 
• Authors of a conservative pole of 'ideology' that look to the confirmation and 
reproduction of existing relationships of power in society, on the one hand; and, 
• Authors of a radical pole of 'Utopia', that look to the transformation and 
transcendence of existing relationships of power within civil society, on the other 
hand. 
In the centre of this continuum, institutionalism, sociology, pragmatism and 
historical materialism are the other intellectual influences that contributed to the 
shaping of planning theory. According to Friedmann (ibid: 20), four major schools of 
thought (or traditions) for planning theory have developed out of this web of 
intellectual influences: Social Reform and Social Mobilization (as the two older schools 
that reach back to the first half of the XTXth century), and Policy Analysis and Social 
Learning (as two recent currents which have their origins from the period between 
the Great Depression and World War II). 
1. Social Reform focuses on the state and its role in societal guidance, and whose 
authors affirm liberal democracy, human rights, and social justice, with a great 
tolerance of positive social change. For them, planning is the application of 
scientific knowledge to public affairs and consider it as a professional 
responsibility and an executive function. Planning is thus turned into a territory 
fenced-off from intruders, be they politicians or ordinary citizens. 
2. Policy analysis has no distinctive philosophical position, whose practitioners have 
always recourse to a conventional tlurtking based on a 7-steps ideal-typical 
decision model. Many analysts are versed in neo-classical economics, statistics, 
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and mathematics, and consider themselves as 'technocrats' serving the existing 
centers of power. Major values in this current are individualism, supremacy of 
market in resources allocation, and inherent conservatism of the equilibrium 
paradigm. 
3 . Social Learning focuses on overcoming the contradictions between theory and 
practice (or knowing and acting). It can regarded as a major departure from the 
planning paradigms of Saint-Simon and Comte (the fathers of sociology), and is 
derived from two streams: The pragmatism of John Dewey, and the historical 
materialism of Karl Marx. Theorists claim that knowledge is derived from 
experience and validated in practice, and is thus and integral part of action. For 
them, knowledge emerges from an ongoing dialectical process whose main 
emphasis is on practical undertakings. They assert that social behaviour can 
change through social experimentation, careful observations of the results, and 
willingness to admit to error and to learn from it. 
4 . Social Mobilization departs from all other traditions and asserts the primacy of 
direct collective action 'from below'. Planning is seen as a form of politics, to be 
conducted without the mediation of 'science'. However, scientific analysis, mainly 
in the form of social learning, plays an important role in the transformative 
processes sought by social mobilization. 
2 . 5 . 5 Planners and social simplifications: The planners' cherished politics of labelling 
In the development world, the different actors involved interact and negotiate the 
outcomes of planned developmental actions. To understanding how this negotiation 
process takes place, it is suggested development action formulation and 
implementation be analyzed through what Arce et al. ( 1 9 9 4 : 1 5 2 ) call the "social life 
of rural development". Consequently, part of this process in a development study or 
analysis deals with actors' practices to understand their strategies and how they 
'internalize' planned development interventions. However, although being a 
necessary condition for the understanding process itself, it remains insufficient. It is 
thus recommended that the specific configurations of administrative practices and 
how discourses of development are elaborated within the planning and policy-
making system be investigated. 
Given that different actors are involved in development actions, each of them 
develop, when interacting and negotiating with other actors, a different style of 
discursive action. These utterances cognitively illustrate their perception towards a 
given issue, let's say 'participation', for instance, and show how they reflect actors' 
position within the context of a given development action. Apthorpe ( 1 9 8 6 : 3 7 7 ) 
argues that: 
Discursive actions can be taken as an example of the capture and exercise of power by some 
sorts of people, arguments and organizations against others through specific happenings, in 
particular arenas, over various periods of time. 
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Some kinds of discourse, such as development discourse, are said to be professional 
and scientific and on that account are perceived to be unproblematic and thus 
unquestionable, both socially and politically (Apthorpe, 1986: 378). 
Notwithstanding, one must recognize that it contains elements of both social and 
political aspects as well as it can be developed and disseminated by bodies having 
either political constituencies or social and economic ideologies. If the concept of the 
"social construction of rural development" is acknowledged, we should hence 
recognize that the context of a development action encompasses more than one 
rationality and, consequently, more than one rationale of development. One of these 
rationales, which impinges upon planned development thinking and policy-making 
is the planners' and policy-makers' cherished labelling. According to Wood (1985a: 
343, my italics).), labelling is: 
A way of referring to the process by which policy agendas are established and more 
particularly the way in which people, conceived as objects of policy, are defined in convenient 
images. 
In other words, labelling refers to a process of planned development actions in 
general, where development beneficiaries are labelled as the planning-object, in a 
very standardized manner. Hence because of labelling, it happens that instead of 
"policy capturing a developmental initiative or intervention, policy is made captive 
of a discursive intervention" (Apthorpe, 1986: 380). Thus, 'target groups', 'resources-
poor farmers', and so on, become captured elements of labelling themselves, which is 
"part of an authoritative donative discourse in development policy" (Wood, 1985a: 
344). And, because labelling "shelters behind an ideology of rationality and avoids 
being perceived as prejudice, it appears as natural and objectively true" (Wood, 
1985a: 345). As Schaffer, cited by Wood (ibid.) suggests: 
Labels are, after all a shadow across reality which can be useful disguises. 
In this respect, labelling becomes a "generic process in human society" as well as a 
"relationship expressing power at various levels of interpersonal and institutional 
interaction" (Wood, ibid.). 
Furthermore, a self-proclaimed, authoritarian state, like the post-independence 
Algeria, lacking popular foundations of legitimacy, needed instead a language of 
rationality that could be seen as a source of legitimacy and power through allocative 
planning. Hence, the needed rationality was made possible by the co-optation of 
science for policy, and then "taxonomies" were borrowed from "subservient" social 
scientists "to present the political as non-political" (Wood, ibid.). 
This is how, through co-opted planners and policy-makers, authoritative labelling 
became an inherent part of the state development discourse, facilitated by the "social 
simplifications", as "basic givens of modern statecraft" or "abridged maps" (Scott, 
1998: 3) elaborated upon by these planners and policy-makers. 
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2 .5 .6 The role of the state and its bureaucracy in development planning 
I have mentioned earlier in Section 2 . 5 . 4 that planning is seen as a form of politics, 
and now add that "politics was first the art of preventing people to mind their own 
business and concerns" (Amnay, 1 9 9 8 : 3 , quoting Paul Valéry). This statement 
introduces the inter-relationships between planning, policy-making and 
implementation, on the one side, and between politicians, planners and 
administrators, on the other. As Conyers and Hills ( 1 9 8 4 : 1 7 ) argue, 
Planning cannot be considered in isolation from the social, administrative and, in particular, 
political environment I which it has to operate. It is especially important to take into 
consideration the political system in the country concerned (for example, the way in which 
political leaders come to power, whether it is a one-party or multi-party system and the degree 
of centralization or decentralization), the political ideology of the government in power and the 
social structure of the society. 
It is then propitious to understand how and why the planning system achieved its 
actual outcomes in Third World countries, although it meant to achieve the opposite 
ones. This was already mentioned in Chapter 1 when I outlined the different facets 
of the problem. In line with Scott ( 1 9 9 8 : 2 ) , I suggest that planning was part of a 
global, perpetual undertaking of 
A state's attempt to make a society, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic 
state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion. 
For this purpose, the state had recourse, according to Scott (ibid.: 4 ) , to "a pernicious 
combination of four elements", all "necessary for a full-fledged disaster". These are: 
1. The "administrative ordering of nature and society" yielding the "transformative 
state simplifications" mentioned earlier. 
2 . The "high-modernist ideology" of scientific and technical progress embedded in 
the self-confidence of planners, which is the mastery of nature and the rational 
design of social order based on the understanding of natural laws. 
3 . An authoritarian state that is willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive 
power to bring these high-modernist designs into being". 
4 . A "prostrate civil society" that lacks the capacity to resist these plans and designs. 
Nobody can deny that these high-modernist schemes, plans, and designs went 
unquestioned and indisputed, given the rationality and scientificality of their 
foundations. However, they required, as argues Scott (ibid., 3 4 9 ) : 
A less skilled, less innovative, less resourceful population. This population, once created, would 
ironically have been exactly the kind of human material that would in fact have needed close 
supervision from above [from the state]. 
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Though they succeeded in effectively hiding their potentially destructive 
consequences, such as the undermining of individuals' capacities for autonomous 
self-governance, these schemes, plans, and designs brought to light the capacity of 
ordinary human actors to modify them or to bring them down (Scott, ibid: 352) 
either through overt opposition or silent, pacifist resistance. In this respect, some 
planners can be mentioned for their silent, pacifist resistance inasmuch as they felt 
frequently frustrated, argue Conyers and Hills (1984: 18), by "political interference" 
and by their inability to achieve meaningful results due to the nature and 
distribution of socio-economic and political power. 
2.5.7 Major theoretical criticisms towards rational planning 
Many criticisms have been directed towards 'rational' approaches of planning for 
being too inspired by scientific thinking based mainly on 'rationalism' and logic', 
and their striking oversight of human aspects in social life. I shall present some of 
these criticisms in the following section. 
Planning theory was strongly inspired by utilitarianism and methodological 
individualism as its main philosophical foundations. These perspectives look at 
human beings as mere individual objects that can be manipulated as any other 
object. As Bailey (1975:2) puts it: 
The propriety of the treatment of people as objects is a theme which runs through planning 
itself. 
Given that knowledge is valued according to its use, science and its exaltation as 
knowledge par excellence became, through its visibly practical contribution to 
specialized problems and its promotion through planning, the "only standard for 
reason" (Bailey, 1975: 3), excluding social (indigenous) knowledge for a lack of 
scientificality. On the other side, Bailey argues that if social problems are problems 
of particular groups of people in particular situations, the available social 
(indigenous) knowledge that can be used to help solve these problems is similarly 
partial and situationally relative. Considering the incompleteness of both types of 
knowledge, one can say that "practicality and use of social knowledge is not an 
absolute quality" (Bailey, ibid.), considering that knowledge is socially constructed 
and situationally relative. 
Then to be practical as required by development planning agencies - and given 
that to be "practical in our society is a term of praise", as Bailey says (ibid.: 2) -
planned development - and consequently planning - can only be location-specific. It 
is this characteristic that was somehow lacking in the conventional, rational 
approaches of planning. 
Further, the same author writes that planning is a process of manipulating the 
physical environment (and people are just parts of this physical environment in the 
mind of planners, given the influence of utilitarianism), and that "physical conditions 
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have social co-ordinates and meanings which are important" (Bailey, ibid.: 5). 
However, planning approaches and methods, which were always dominated by 
architects and engineers, consider that the relevant pieces of the physical world and 
the nature of social relationships which use, and are constrained by, that world as 
"out-of-bounds" and "treated just as physical phenomena" (Bailey, ibid.: 6). Until 
then, planning was organized around the physical and the spatial, and had no place 
for abstract social knowledge, given that science can only be 'materialistic'. Hence, 
any claim to integrate something that can be called 'social' "suggests a fear of 
opening Pandora's box" (Bailey, ibid.: 7). Even when planners decided to integrate 
some sociological knowledge, they thought of a mere crude behaviourist approach 
(because of its materialistic orientation) which "views people as variants of the rats 
and pigeons studied by many behaviourist psychologists", seemingly forgetting that 
what "differentiates man from other mammals is his consciousness" (Bailey, ibid.: 8). 
Conceiving the social basis of life under the three interrelated concepts of 
'structure', "behaviour' and 'consciousness', Bailey (ibid.: 8) urges that 
Behaviour is only as significant as consciousness and intention dictate, and social structure 
exists only as far consciousness creates and recognizes it. 
He concludes (Bailey, ibid.: 9) therefore that 
Consciousness is a crucial part of the sociological model of the world and is the cornerstone of 
any discussion of meaning and subjective satisfactions and discontents. 
Thus, the centrality of people and their knowledge become salient issues and must 
gain their place in planning schemes as far as "social beliefs and action are essentially 
relative", as Bailey argues. However, the problem within planning was always how 
to make room for this so-called centrality of people and their knowledge. In my 
opinion, participation and social learning, the subjects of the following sections, are 
seen as conceptual tools to improve the planning process in its attempt to achieve a 
re-humanized development. 
2.6 Participation in development A necessity or a political luxury? 
2.6.1 Why participation? 
In a very structured but nevertheless iterative process, van Dusseldorp (1992) 
describes the details of the main steps a project cycle have to follow. But more 
interestingly, he develops a concept of no man's land when the project arrives at the 
hand-over stage where the project may fail to sustain the outputs of the 
implementation phase. If no sufficient preparation is made, it is likely that the hand-
over and integration stage might be seen as a propitious opportunity for others than 
the intended beneficiaries to reap the benefits of a given project (van Dusseldorp, 
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1992: 217; his emphasis). Moreover, other dangers could be identified in such a 
situation, like the fact that the existence of the project is rapidly 'erased' at its 
termination stage and no sustainable outcome of this project remains. 
Among other reasons, I suggest that a lack of beneficiaries' participation during 
the preparation and implementation phases of a development action can -
sometimes partially but surely - explain the aforementioned situation. Sometimes, 
the project has been identified by another body that has very little knowledge about 
the wishes of the beneficiaries; in other cases, the government does not possess the 
required resources to handle the 'after-project' period, but this could have been 
circumvented with an a-priori participation; or in few cases, officials try to inten-
tionally avoid a real participation of beneficiaries in identifying and implementing 
development actions given the assumed risk of empowerment of the latter. 
Beneficiaries' participation in making decisions that can affect their lives is 
essential, at least in providing equitable opportunities for people to defend their 
interests and mind their concerns. In development actions, participation has even 
greater importance given that at the hand-over stage, as described earlier, it is 
already too late to correct the situation. People should have been prepared to 'take 
care' of the 'baby' after its delivery. 
However, participation must not be seen as a temporary or casual involvement of 
people. Bhaduri and Anisur-Rahman (1982:1) suggest that: 
Participation is a social experience shared by individuals and groups who live in definite 
economic and social relations to each other in a society. 
In this sense, participation must be seen as a permanent, continuous and dynamic 
process rather than a sporadic, on-the-spot event that takes place within some 
contexts and not others to keep it in agreement with the preferences of the powerful 
actors. 
In general, participation has primarily been used as a political slogan rather than 
an expression of a real concern for the beneficiaries. In many cases, 'farmer 
participation', 'empowerment', or 'incorporating farmers' view' have continued to be 
seen as parts of new-fashion movement, supported by a proliferation of references, 
books and articles which lacked concrete evidence of how to apply these ideas other 
than in a manipulative way, or even to be replicated is similar settings when 
successful concrete evidence existed. 
In the development context, participation gives people, especially the 'hitherto 
excluded', the opportunity to manage their own affairs, influence public decisions, 
and participate in activities that affect their lives (Esman and Uphoff, 1984: 15). In a 
similar vein, participation requires more social learning, risk taking, commitment, 
co-ordination skills, and patience from the beneficiaries. In fact, it requires a political 
and institutional will not only to apply it in some cases, but to settle on it as a 
permanent pattern of consultation. 
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Having said this, I acknowledge that the participation debate in this study will 
not be oriented towards the necessity or importance of participation in and for 
development. This issue has been frequently stressed by a large number of authors. 
In my opinion, discussion on the issue of participation should go beyond this. For 
the sake of this study, participation must be assimilated as a personal responsibility 
and a collective and individual right in one's (self-)development because 
development combines in a single stroke the act of knowing and the will to change 
some currently undesirable conditions. Given that both of these aspects are 
acknowledged to be intrinsic characteristics of individuals, development actions 
should thus only be exclusively participatory. This is not a simple appeal for 
humanitarian charity from the powerful actors in a given social setting. Rather, it is 
more of an appeal to the national authorities to gather and secure the required 
conditions for a regular 'democratic' participation of people in all decisions that 
affect, directly or indirectly, the quality of their lives. Otherwise, the menace of 
exclusion and its potential dangers will fill the void. As a case in point, the years of a 
minor privilegentsia's exclusion of the majority during Algeria's "black decade' are 
being paid back through the bloody years of violence the country has experienced 
since 1 9 9 2 . 
However, it is strongly recommended that enough knowledge is gathered on how 
the different ways participation can be adequately implemented and, of course, what 
the inherent costs and benefits of each approach might be. Unless this is done, 
participation can yield highly dramatic situations, not to mention potentially 
catastrophic dilemmas. 
In this respect, van Dusseldorp ( 1 9 8 1 : 2 8 ) recommends that the following pre-
requisites need to be fulfilled to settle on the best way for beneficiaries to participate: 
1. Beneficiaries must be aware that any given current situation is not in concurrence 
with their objectives; that it is not an unchangeable destiny (or fatality); that it is 
possible to change it, and; that they should mobilize themselves and their 
available resources to change it. 
2 . Beneficiaries must be indubitably convinced that the benefits of their participation 
in the planned development process are greater than the costs. 
3. Beneficiaries should be given a chance to become involved in tire stages of the 
planned development process. This means that the social and political context 
should be prepared for the beneficiaries' participation to adequately take place. 
Moreover, in order to differentiate between the types of participation, van 
Dusseldorp ( 1 9 8 1 : 36-55; my italics) presents a useful typology based on different 
criteria, such as degree of voluntariness, depth and way of involvement, range of activities, 
level of effectiveness, eligibility for participation, and style of participation. Later, I shall 
describe the most relevant participation form(s) that, according to Van Dusseldorp's 
typology, fit my suggested alternative development view. Before I do this, I want to 
emphasize that my vision of participation slightly differs from van Dusseldorp's in 
some areas. 
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In van Dusseldorp's very careful conceptualization of participation I detect an 
implicit vision where participation looks more like a contribution or a collaboration in 
the sense defined by Dudley (1993: 160). It is somehow seen as a 'political luxury' 
that planners cannot afford unless its introduction is well prepared (without 
precisely mentioning who must prepare this introduction); otherwise, it may hamper 
the planning process. This conceptualization of participation falls under what 
planners like to refer to as 'good participation'. Or, in other words, one which serves 
the maintenance of an actual status quo in favour of the planners (Wood 1985b: 368). 
However, Dudley (ibid.) argues that: 
True participation is about power, and the exercise of power is politics. 
To make sure that he made himself well understood, Dudley continues, saying that 
this type or form of participation inevitably becomes simply a concrete manifestation 
of a broader political process, which is used, in my opinion, as a protective action to 
prevent a real democratic process directed toward implementing genuine 
participation. If we are to encourage this kind of participation, we must know that "it 
cannot be divorced from its political context and consequences" (Dudley, ibid.). 
Again, the example of Algeria of the 1970s comes to my mind, where participation 
was applied exactly according to this view. 
I will now contrast van Dusseldorp's conceptualization of participation with the 
'other' vision, which emphasizes that participation is more than a necessity for 
development. Participation, in my opinion, is a human right someone's to decide - or 
at least participate in decisions - about one's destiny within the limits of societal 
order and organization. It should not be regarded, as Cernea (1987: 4) puts it, as an 
appeal to the humanitarian feelings of planners and politicians. In suport of this 
view, the FAO Peasants' Charter (quoted by Burkey, 1993: 56; my italics) suggests 
that: 
Participation by the people in the institutions and systems which govern their lives is a basic 
human right and also essential for realignment of political power in favour of disadvantaged 
groups and for social and economic development. 
No one can deny that these previous statements put an end, in very clear terms, to 
the debate around the necessity of participation in and for development. It sets in 
fact the Terms of Reference of applying the concept in the development field, in 
relation to the political and institutional aspects of implemention. This vision, which, 
I assume, puts planned development - and, consequently, planning - into a "political 
perspective" (Low, 1991: 3), is totally shared by Goulet (1989). In his paper, he begins 
with a very clear introduction describing the social situation that makes people's 
participation, in general, indispensable, saying that (ibid.: 165), 
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The political re-democratization now under way in numerous countries... radically challenges 
the development strategies pursued during periods of dictatorial rule. The cry for greater 
political freedom is paralleled by demands for more equitable development policies. This 
linkage needs no explanation, since dictatorships employ high degrees of coercion to impose 
development policies conceived at the summit, and distribute the fruits of those policies to only 
a small circle of privileged clients and allies. On both counts, the majority of nation's populace 
is excluded. Not surprisingly, therefore, that majority, actively or passively, seeks to change 
both its political rulers and their development strategies. 
The political 'transmogrification' (or metamorphosis) process in Algeria that began 
in the early 1990s provides a good example of the veracity of this statement, 
although change is taking shape under the shadow of violence. 
For Goulet, participation is a "de-professionalization in all domains. . . . in order to 
make 'ordinary people' responsible for their own well-being" (Goulet, ibid.: 165). 
Citing Freire, the famous Brazilian pedagogue, he writes that (ibid.; my italics): 
The supreme touchstone of development is whether people who were previously treated as 
mere objects, known and acted upon, can now actively know and act upon, thereby becoming 
subjects of their own social destiny. When people are oppressed or reduced to the culture of 
silence, they do not participate in their own humanization. Conversely, when they participate, 
thereby becoming active subjects of knowledge and action, they begin to construct their properly 
human history and engage in processes of authentic development. 
I cannot resist to underline that Goulet defines participation as the process of 
authentic development once humanization of the so-called 'planning-object' turns them 
into active subjects. 
This vision of participation looks, in fact, towards breaching the hegemonic 
tendencies of labelling in the policy field and, consequently, in the planning process, 
by bringing some new anti-labels or at least counter-labels to life. As Wood (1985b: 
369) puts it: 
This would be firmer evidence of the re-location of power and initiative, of de-
professionalization, of a breakdown of monopolies of knowledge, pseudo-skills and 
information, of a genuine participation (on the ground floor) through the negotiation of 
agendas and rules. 
As a consequence of this breaching, Wood argues that development, while viewed as 
a political process, needs to be de-bureaucratized, saying that: 
The relationships involved in such negotiations would be de-bureaucratized and political, not 
de-politicized and bureaucratic. 
I would define participation, quoting Stiefel and Wolfe (1994:2; my emphasis), as 
The organized efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given 
social situations, on the part of groups and movements hitherto excluded from such control. 
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This definition highlights some issues required for genuine participation that I 
believe worth considering, and which are: 
1. The organized nature of the participating entities as bodies having structure and 
procedures (HOW to participate?); 
2. The set objective of participation is an increasing control by the structured and 
organized participating entities (WHY to participate?) ; 
3. The target of participation, in terms of control, is over resources and regulative 
institutions (WHAT is the target of participation); 
4. The participating entities are primarily comprised of the 'hitherto excluded' 
groups or movements (WHO participate?). 
Of course, the concept of WHEN to participate? is still missing from the framework. 
This concept relates to which stage of the planned development process 
participation can best take place. According to Goulet (1989:167), 
A 'people-centered' development, which assigns priority to the satisfaction of basic human 
needs of the poor masses, to job creation, self-reliance, and the active preservation of cultural 
diversity, obviously requires a form of participation in which non-elites play an active role in 
the diagnosis of their own problems. 
Yet, the very moment at which participation begins is an important indicator that 
gives a clear idea about the motives of resorting to participation as a mechanism to 
involve people, as Goulet (ibid.) suggests: 
To judge whether participation is authentic empowerment of the masses or merely a 
manipulation of them 
Accordingly, when the populace has a voice in defining or diagnosing its problems, 
development has a solid chance of centering the real needs of this populace (Goulet, 
1989:175). 
Getting back to van Dusseldorp's (1981: 36-55) typology of participation, I make 
the point that the best form of beneficiaries' participation in planned development 
process is the one that is free, spontaneous and not induced (especially by the state), 
both direct and indirect, complete, organized, intensive, and unlimited, 
particularly involving the disadvantaged members of a community and preferably 
targeting social action. 
I acknowledge that such a vision of participation is idealistic, although planning 
and, as a consequence, planned development bear an idealistic vocation (van 
Dusseldorp, 1997: pers. comm.). I am tempted here to state that idealism offers 
incentives to make people work towards their objectives (and dreams). If Nelson 
Mandela was not idealistic, he would have never become the president of South 
Africa. 
However, I think that this vision in fact represents the most difficult form of 
participation, but one which is more fit for sustainable development, given the 
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Table 2.6.1(1) - Making the concept participation operationalized 
My suggestions | van Dussedorp (1981) 
j 
! Stiefeï and Wolfe (1994) j 
| completed by Goulet (1989) | 
HOW to participate? | Free, spontaneous, not 
i induced, direct and 
j indirect, organized 
I Organized efforts j 
] ; 
...i............................ . i 
WHY to participate? i Social action ] Increased control ] 
WHAT is the target of 1 i Resources and regulative j 
participation? ! institutions 
J Disadvantaged people j Hitherto excluded groups 
WHEN to participate? j Complete, unlimited | Since the diagnosis of ] 
j problems 
2 . 6 . 2 Local organizations as instruments for participation 
In the previous section, I mentioned the characteristics that a genuine participation 
should be based on. The major ones among these are organization, intensiveness and 
both direct and indirect representation. In my own opinion, these three issues are 
strongly related to each other, on the one hand, and are both related to the social 
action targeted by participation, on the other hand. If the 'hitherto excluded' wish to 
achieve increased control over resources and regulative institutions is to be realized, 
they must be aware that this would require intensive work for their interests' 
representativeness, both directly - through regular meetings of all members of the 
excluded population - and indirectly - through democratically elected bodies of the 
'critical triangle of sustainability' I mentioned earlier in Section 2 . 2 . 2 . This is not as 
idealistic as it seems given that, as Goulet ( 1 9 8 9 : 1 6 8 ) contends: 
The most difficult form of participation to elicit and sustain is also the most indispensable to 
genuine development. This is the type of participation which starts at the bottom and reaches 
progressively upward into ever widening arenas of decision-making. It is that form of 
participation which is initiated, or at least ratified, by the interested non-elite populace at an 
early point in the sequence of decisions. It matures into a social force wielding a critical mass of 
participating communities now enabled to enter into spheres of decision or action beyond their 
immediate problem-solving. 
Without denying that I myself am a bit of an idealist, I point out that this form of 
participation, as represented in Table 2 . 6 . 1 . ( 1 ) , represents the ultimate stage people 
can attain. So to not lose the pace with the concern of sustainable development, it is 
strongly recommended that the participation process itself should follow a stepwise 
learning process combined with the institution-building of local organizations, as 
demonstrated in the following section. 
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excluded population. This consequently means a prior organization of the forces of 
the excluded through setting their own organizations. 
In this context of the issue of local organizations and its direct relation to 
participation, this seems like an opportune time to reinforce my opinion by 
mentioning the two following quotations cited by Esman and Uphoff (1984: 23), 
quoted from India's Vlth Five Year Plan and the FAO Peasants' Charter: 
Critical for the success of all redistributive laws, policies and programmes [proclaimed in this 
plan] is that the poor be organized and made conscious of the benefits intended to them. 
Organized tenants have to see that the tenancy laws are implemented. Organizations of the 
landless have to see that surplus lands are identified and distributed to them in accordance 
with the law within five years. . . . The general lesson of the experience so far is that because of 
leakages in delivery systems and ineffective achninistration, rural programmes fail to improve 
the distribution of income. The Planning Commission is proposing a massive shift of resources 
in favour of rural areas with an in-built redistributive character in almost every programme. 
But whether these [programmes].... will have the desired equalizing effect will depend on the 
extent to which the organized pressure of the beneficiaries counteracts the weaknesses of the 
administration and the opposition of vested interests (Government of India, 1978:1.98). 
Rural development strategies can realize their full potential only through the motivation, active 
involvement and organization at the grass-roots level of rural people, with special emphasis on 
the least advantaged, in conceptualising and designing policies and programmes and in 
creating aclministrative, social and economic institutions, including co-operatives and other 
voluntary forms of organization for implementing and evaluating them (FAO, 1979:8). 
These quotations bring to light the importance of local organizations as a means (to 
an end) of participation in rural development. It is not said that local organizations 
are sufficient in themselves to eHminate the burdens of poverty or the deprivations 
of status and opportunity, but these affirmations vividly illustrate existing 
possibilities (and, I would add, the necessity) for development from below or from 
within, which can be facilitated by government, donor, or private agencies (Esman 
and Uphoff, ibid.: 10). According to Esman and Uphoff (ibid.: 18), local organizations 
are not all what rural development needs, of course, but still, as Cernea argues (1984: 
192): 
High yielding social organizations are not less important for development than high yielding 
varieties. 
In fact, rural development requires four basic components. These are: (1) Public 
investments and expenditures; (2) Government policies; (3) Appropriate technol-
ogies; and, (4) Effective institutions (be they government agencies, private 
enterprises, private voluntary agencies, or local organizations). 
In this order, it might be worth saying that, where the required resources to 
achieve a given benefit are likely to need the combined efforts or skills of a number 
of people, some form of organization might be essential (Curtis, 1991:10). This vision 
of an organization corroborates the required economic and institutional 
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improvements that Esman and Uphoff (1984: 16) think are still possible in 
developing countries, even without revolutionary change claimed by many radical 
authors who think that lesser measures than radical structural changes are only 
palliative and doomed to failure. These improvements are able to contribute to 
higher productivity and a better quality of life for rural people, with a capacity to 
enhance their ability to influence their future. Esman and Uphoff are apparently 
advocating a step-by-step process of organization-building similar to the one I 
proposed above for genuine participation. 
The local organizations I want to define in my study are organizations involved in 
development actions, which act on behalf of and are accountable to their 
membership, in order to distinguish them from state agencies and from pure social 
and/or cultural associations (Esman and Uphoff, 1984: 18). Some of them are 
supposed to be professional associations of farmers based on different farming 
specializations, such as cereals producers, seed growers, horticulturists, etc. They 
represent a third sector which can be distinguished from both public and private 
sectors, and can, according to Esman and Uphoff (ibid.) act as intermediaries 
between rural residents and government agencies and private commercial firms. 
In a similar vein, Schmale (1993:6) defines local organizations as: 
Indigenous, non-governmental as well as non-profit organizations among whose principal 
functions is to promote development activities for the benefit of poor and disadvantaged 
people within the society. 
In the matter of LOs' contribution towards development, Esman and Uphoff (1984: 
24) argue that this can be evaluated through efficiency, equity and empowerment, 
although some LOs may perform none of these roles. We must recall here that 
organizations are viewed as social configurations for a common benefit and, if LOs 
produce few or no positive benefits, they are quite unlikely to last very long or to be 
more than nominal entities. 
Rural people are scattered over huge areas, with very poor communication 
means, and suffer from a great lack of funds, personnel, and administrative capacity 
for the provision of the required services. Sometimes, although the services are 
provided, they proved to be irrelevant and even detrimental to the circumstances of 
these people. This indicates either a communication gap between governments and 
their rural constituencies, and/or an inabilty of the latter - possibly because of poor 
organization - to define the required needs and claim effective assistance. In such a 
context of deteriorating services and decaying infrastructure, a local organization 
can be, given a legitimate representativeness of its constituencies, a means to 
increase the efficiency of resources use and distribution by ensuring: (1) The provision 
of accurate and representative information; (2) An adequate frame of programmes 
adaptation; (3) An opportunity for group communication; (4) An additional 
possibility for resource mobilization; (5) A source of technical knowledge; (6) A00 
responsibility over rational utilization and maintenance of facilities and services; 
and, (7) A good partner for co-operation. 
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Being accountable to their membership, LOs can be adequate means to promote 
equity over opportunities and benefits, and contribute consequently to a political 
stability within the area of intervention. While I agree that this issue is not widely 
agreed upon, it is not an impossible achievement, given that it is highly conditioned 
by the leadership and the current procedures of decision-making within the 
organization. I still believe that dedication and accountability of the leaders towards 
their constituencies and transparency in decision-making are essential for achieving 
this objective. 
Empowerment is the most controversial issue among the three objectives of a local 
organization. It is, in fact, not looked upon favourably by local notables and rural 
elites, as far as it gives additional voice and capacity to rural populations in 
influencing public policies and, even more, in trying to change an actual status quo 
and a present power structuration in the rural society. 
These three outcomes represent the steps of a local development continuum, 
given that the three are interrelated. In fact, without advances in efficiency, equity can 
never be promoted. Similarly, advances in equity support and sustain empowerment 
(Esman and Uphoff, 1984: 28; my italics). As an external consequence, the 
development of vigorous LOs will yield important implications for extending public 
administration outreach and for improving government agencies and personnel 
performance (Esman and Uphoff, ibid.: 22). 
A viable local organization is identified by Esman and Uphoff as having more than 
one level of organization, that is, one lower level which performs functions at the small-
group level, while the higher level undertakes more complex business and 
governance activities; it must be seen among a system of institutions performing 
various functions in rural development, showing complementarities, even though not 
important, and having effective linkages between and among them; and linked to the 
higher-level decision centers through multiple channels (authors' italics). For the latter 
issue, multiple channels can refer to an indirect representation vis-à-vis the Ministry 
of Agriculture, in the Parliament, or in other specific bodies. 
However, genuine participation and the building up of viable local organizations 
are sustained and conditioned by the introduction of some structural changes within 
the public administration system in charge of planning and implementing 
development. Decentralization is among these required changes. 
2.6.3 Decentralization: A needed reform of development administration 
After their independence, Algeria, just as many Third World countries did, adopted 
a centralized economic planning system for many reasons that were understandable 
at that time. With both top-down, dirigist intervention and strong state control 
through a huge bureaucratic apparatus and parastatals, centralization was viewed 
by national authorities as the correct path to follow, despite the increasing negative 
effects it engendered. 
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Due to the way post-independence nations came into being after colonization, 
with constructed boundaries, centalization was seen as the only solution, and 
decentralization could, in their eyes, be seen as threatening the national unity (van 
Dusseldorp, 1997: 323). The market, as an immoral and anarchic mechanism of 
decentralization, was another cause advanced by the advocates of centralization for 
it "rewards the few at the expense of the many". 
Meanwhile, some critics of this view saw some "powerful political reasons for 
mainting central control and intervention", as centralization sustains political 
stability (RondinelH et al, 1984:1), and thus maintains the regime. Others argue that a 
centrally-planned economy "provides for pay-offs as a way to allocate scarce goods 
and services" which empowers "kleptocrats" and opens up opportunities for 
corruption as "a commonplace of authoritarian regimes" to develop (Rose-
Ackermann, 1996:373). 
In fact, centralization of development planning has been adopted more in the self-
interest - both political and economic - of the elites who controlled the post-
independence state. Centralized administration and control may be justified by 
scarcity of resources and lack of national unity, but such a justification cannot mask 
the elite behaviour aimed at self-enrichment and perpetuation of their position of 
power. Partially because of centralizing policies, the political system in such 
countries as Algeria contains few strong judicial, administrative, or political 
mechanisms able to constrain the setf-seeking actions of the powerful actors within 
it. Thus, as Nellis (1983: 138) would suggest, "control over allocation of societal 
resources has frequently meant unjustified personal use of these resources". 
In another respect, centralization also served to mute competition for leadership 
posts, or at least channel it in a certain way that do not threaten the status of upper 
echelons - who are only 'accountable' to the all-directing, all-powerful head of state, 
which in return allows for "rich, unjustified, and often illegal rewards for those in 
ruling group" (Nellis, ibid.: 138). 
Nonetheless, the increasing interest in decentralization, especially in terms of 
development planning and administration, arose from three main converging forces 
that, according to Rondinelli and Shabbir Cheema (1983:10), are: 
1. The disillusionment with the results of central planning and control of 
development planning during the 1950s and 1960s; 
2. The implicit requirement for new ways of managing development actions based 
on the growth-with-equity strategies that emerged during in the 1970s; 
3. The growing realization that societies became more complex, government 
responsibilites began to expand, and difficulties to plan and administer all 
development actions from the center were increasing. 
As far as sustainable development is concerned, decentralization allows "a greater 
representation and participation of the local population" (van Dusseldorp, 1997:323). 
However, decentralization may be seen as dangerous for central bureaucrats as it may 
mean the death of the central bureaucracy, and is thus opposed by them by any 
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means. In fact, bureaucrats of Third World countries just cannot imagine their 
existence without centralization, which is the 'oxygen' of their social status. 
Decentralization would also mean that they have to look after citizens' needs, 
devoluting and deconcentrating development administration to local level. In this 
case, they could no longer control the resources and look after their own interests 
and their allies. 
2 . 7 Social learning and its inherent approach of planning development 
2 .7 .1 Social learning theory and its expansion into development 
In the preceding sections, I have been showing the strong interconnection between 
participation, organization building, and social learning. It is now time to introduce 
the basics of social learning theory, which deals with the unique ability of humans 
and human groups to function as learning organisms (Korten, 1 9 8 4 : 1 6 9 ) in order to 
adapt to their ever-changing environment. According to Goldstein ( 1 9 8 1 : 2 3 1 ; my 
italics): 
Whether change is aimed at achieving more autonomous forms of personal, interpersonal, or 
societal adaptation, the process itself must account for the committed and knowledgeable 
participation of those who will be affected by change. In its generic sense, change, whether it is 
pursued individually or collectively, is an educative and learning process. 
Hence, it is argued that behaviour change itself is a learning experience which is 
similar to any other educational enterprise. According to Goldstein (ibid.: 2 3 2 ) , this 
means that: 
Learning occurs in any interpersonal and interactional experience that is directed toward 
planned change. 
According to Dunn ( 1 9 8 4 : 1 7 1 ) , the long evolution of humankind has been 
embedded in an environment where emerged a process of social evolution, distinct 
from biological evolution, which is supported by a social learning process distinct 
from a purely stochastic learning process. It is the latter that inspired engineers to 
develop a stochastic learning theory used in the field of automation to design 
learning robots. Furthermore, in reference to both group and individual level 
learning processes, Dunn states that individual learning and behaviour are shaped 
by the nature of the group activities in which the individual participates and 
through which he is moulded, and which in turn, are frequently moulded by him. At 
a community level, social learning results not in the transformation of individual 
behaviour but rather in the transformation of group behaviour which must be 
monitored in relation to group goals. In this context, learning became largely 
socialized among human beings as the presence of, and the sharing with, other 
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learning organisms was the dominant aspect of any individual organism's learning 
environment. 
It is because of the complete misunderstanding of this social learning process that 
the instruments and goals for social change, such as policies and projects, have been 
poorly defined. In fact, social change has frequently been dominated by an attempt 
to implement change by processes which are incompatible with the reality of social 
evolution. Acting on a basis of a sort of social engineering, imposed by the physical 
sciences, in general, and the blue-print approach, in particular, policy-makers 
presupposed that change agents can act as external to the social learning process and 
have the knowledge and power to design a terminal state that will bring consistent 
goals and controls in a deterministic fashion (Dunn, 1 9 8 4 : 1 7 4 ) . According to Ackoff 
( 1 9 8 4 : 1 9 5 ; his italics): 
Development is not a condition or a state defined by what people have. It is a capacity defined by 
what they can do with whatever they have to improve their quality of life and that of others. Therefore, 
development is assimilated to the possession of a desire for improvement and the ability to 
bring it about. It is more a matter of motivation and knowledge than it is of wealth. 
It is clear that development, as a capacity of people to improve their quality of life, 
depends first of all on their motivation and knowledge, rather than on the 
instruments and resources available to them, in the sense that development is a 
product of learning, not of production. This does not mean that these instruments 
and resources are unnecessary for development. Their efficient use, however, when 
they are available, requires adequate knowledge and a consequent motivation. In 
this context, Ackoff argues that development is a product of oneself learning to 
better meet his/her needs, and because it is essentially a learning process, one 
person cannot develop another because he/she cannot learn for another, given that 
he can only help another learn for himself. Therefore, "a government cannot develop a 
country; it can only help its country develop itself (Ackoff, ibid.; author's italics). 
In the same context, Korten ( 1 9 8 4 ) introduces a learning approach to 
development. He presents few cases among a number of successful experiences that 
provide exceptions to the more typical outcomes. He states that examination of these 
cases suggests that the blue-print approach never played more than an incidental 
role in their development. Without being designed and implemented, each of them 
emerged through a long-term learning process in which villages and programme 
staff shared their knowledge and resources to create the necessary fit between needs, 
actions, and the capacities of the assisting organization. Each of them had a leader 
who spent time in the villages with an idea, tried it, accepted and corrected his 
errors, and built a larger organization around what he had learned. For him, one key 
point in these cases that deserves a special note is the fact that there was no aim to 
simply test a programme model in a pilot context and leave it to others to implement 
and expand. On the contrary, each of them was distinguished by a substantial 
continuity of personnel. The people who had the experience of 'designing' the original 
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programme were the same people who built the organization around that model 
adapted to its requirements (Korten, ibid.; author's italics). 
The challenge presented by this perspective was to integrate action-taking, 
knowledge-creation, and institution-building into a coherent learning process, based 
on the natural organismic evolution of social systems. Accordingly, social learning 
becomes central in any development activity as far as some empirical evidence 
shows that, in many cases where learning process was applied, projects were 
successful because a programme model responsive to the beneficiary needs at a 
particular time and place was worked out, and each had built a strong organization 
capable of making the programme work. In fact, this was achieved with a high 
degree of fit between programme design, beneficiary needs, and the capacities of the 
assisting organization, as shown by Figure 2.7.1(1), following (Korten, 1984:180; his 
italics). 
Figure 2.7.1(1) - Schematic representation of fit requirements 
(Source: Korten, 1984:184) 
Means of Demand Expression Organizational Decision Processes 
2.7.2 Friedmann's humanist transactive planning approach 
The transactive planning approach is the one that stems from the social learning 
planning school of thought, previously mentioned in Section 2.5.4. According to 
Friedmann (1973: 171), the main postulate for transactive planning resides in 
bridging the huge gap in communication between planners and their "clients"1, 
1 Notice that he uses clients instead of another objectifying metaphor. 
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aiming to change knowledge into action through an "unbroken sequence of 
interpersonal relations". 
Put in other words, transactive planning helps to overcome the difficulties 
planners and clients experience in communicating valid meaning to each other. This 
can in fact be an adequate way of removing the barriers to effective communication 
between those who have access primarily to "processed knowledge", mostly known 
in planning as rational, scientific knowledge, and those whose "knowledge rests 
chiefly on personal experience", mostly known as indigenous knowledge. 
Consequently, this improves the linkage of knowledge with action. 
In this way, it is not only the centrality of knowledge, especially indigenous 
knowledge, that gains attention in transactive planning, but the relationship between 
planners and their clients as well. In fact, transactive planning advocacy believes that 
the real solution involves a restracturing of this basic relationship, given that each 
party has a different method of knowing. For instance, the planner works mainly 
with processed (rational, scientific) knowledge that is abstracted from the world and 
manipulated through postulates of theory and scientific method. Meanwhile, the 
client works basically from the personal (indigenous) knowledge he/she draws from 
his/her life-experience, which is considered to be much richer in content and in 
reference to aspects of daily life, although it is not as systematized as "processed 
knowledge" (Friedmann, 1973:172). 
It is worth noting here that the indigenous knowledge of the client is 
acknowledged and given a central place in this planning theory, to the contrary of 
the other theories in and of planning based on a hegemony of rational, scientific (or 
processed) knowledge. In itself, this statement bears an overwhelming originality in 
planning theory that needs to be stressed. 
Of course, it goes without saying that putting these two types of knowledge into a 
perfect exchange situation remains much easier to say than to realize. The difficulties 
reside not only in their different foci of attention and degrees of practical relevance, 
but in their current language also. The language of planners is conceptual and 
mathematical, with a strong scientific objectivity which is sometimes unfamiliar to, 
and beyond the comprehension of, the clients. On the other side, the client's 
language lacks the formal restrictions that impinge upon planning documents. The 
latter employs a dynamic, experience-related jargon that aims to speed 
communication, but is, however, less precise if compared to that of the planners. 
Moreover, in updating their respective knowledge, planners may turn to other 
members of their profession or to universities while clients essentially rely on 
organizations of their own kind (Friedmann, ibid.: 172). 
It is likely that this difficulty can be overcome through dialogue and mutual 
learning, given that the underlying planning style of this approach is based on 
"planning with people" instead of "planning for people". It has a transactive meaning -
based on interpersonal sequence - and an underlying model of social learning 
(Friedmann, 1984: 190). In this context, social learning is not used as a vague 
metaphor suggesting a cybernetic process which organizations might use to adapt 
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themselves to rapidly changing, 'turbulent' environments, but as a process which 
connects scientific and technical knowledge to organized action. The outcome of 
such an alternative is, as Friedmann (1984:192) argues, that: 
The characters of actor, inquirer, and planner-theorist are intermixed, and the process of 
'planning' comes to be embedded in the undifferentiated process of the action itself. 
It must be noted that this alternative thinking in planning theory does not 
exclusively fit with allocative procedures of plartning as these are solely concerned 
with the distribution of scarce resources. Thus, the use of this model can be of great 
significance, especially in the context of an innovative practice which 
characteristically takes the form of a political (counter-labelling) struggle to 
overcome the status quo (Friedmann, ibid.; author's italics). 
In this respect, this planning model can be introduced in a new vision of 
development thinking on the design path in order to reinforce the interpersonal 
relationships between planners, implementers, and the so-called 'target-groups'. Of 
course, it must be said that, given that it is based on the recognition of the client's 
knowledge (in the dialogue) and a mutual understanding, this planning theory is 
strongly connected to participation, the other central postulate of my suggested 
framework for the alternative development view. Moreover, like participation, such 
a plarvning model based on social learning is also sustained and conditioned by an 
effective decentralization process of the public administration system in charge of 
planning and implementing development. 
2.8 Conceptualizing a development action: The development theater 
After having reviewed the major theories and concepts relevant to the subject of the 
present study, it is now time for me to define the contours of my own proposed 
aspect of the analytical framework to be used in the comparison between the 
conventional development tbinking, adopted by the state in post-independence 
Algeria, and the alternative view I am proposing. This will help complete our 
understanding of the different interactions between a development action and its 
global context during the entire cycle of this action. 
According to Grindle (1980: 6), a development action intends to affect a change 
within the context in which it is applied. Because the actual development vision in 
Third World countries presupposes that the nation-state is the "unit of development" 
(Buttel and McMichael, 1994:48), the majority of development actions, designed and 
implemented in Third World countries, are related to the objectives of public policies 
that are embedded, as (Grindle, ibid.: 6) puts it, in: 
An on-going process of dedsion-making by a variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is 
determined by the content of the programme being pursued and by the interaction of the 
decision-makers within a given poHtico-acLministrative context. 
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The task of implementation is to establish a link between the goals of public policies 
and the outcomes of governmental activity. Therefore, it involves the creation of a 
'policy delivery system' in which public policies are translated into action 
programmes or even individual projects that aim to achieve the ends stated in public 
policies. Consequently, policy implementation remains conditioned by programme -
or even project - implementation. Thus, the study of the process of policy 
implementation imposes investigation upon and analysis of concrete development 
actions. In my opinion, such an investigation would concern the following topics: 
• The content of the development action, that is the outcome of the design stage; 
• The implementation of the development action and its context; 
• The implementing institution and its accountability towards beneficiaries; 
• The level and the form of the beneficiaries' participation. 
For the sake of this study, I will assume that the cycle of a developmenal action takes 
place within a context that I conceptualize as the 'development theater'. In my own 
perception, a development theater does not designate a physical or spatial location, 
although development actions take place within a voluntarily-defined territory. It is 
a mental construct that encompasses several social actors linked by the specific roles 
they have to play within the context of the development action. 
Each of these social actors has to play a given definite role. Of course, the roles 
played in this 'theater' are not only less 'histrionic' compared to the ones played in an 
artistic performance; they are mere 'real-life' roles, and can be of different types and 
take place at the design stage, the implementation stage or even at the evaluation 
stage. Some of the actors can be seen on the stage while others are behind the 
'curtains' backstage. The importance of the actors is not conditioned by the position 
of the actors in the theater but by the importance of the roles they play. In most 
development actions, designed and implemented along the lines of conventional 
development thinking, the most important roles are very often the ones whose 
actors are behind the 'curtains'. 
Located in the center of the development theater is an 'arena of decision-making'. 
Given that developmental success is measured in realms of action, and that all 
development actions are themselves traceable to prior decisions, Goulet (1986: 301; 
author's italics) suggests that: 
An arena of decision-making.... is an intellectual locus of field where choices are made... The 
domain of assumptions, procedures, modes of reasoning, processes of classification and 
standards of judgement leading to prefer one among many possible courses of action. 
This arena does not possess a meaning by itself. Its meaning stems from the space it 
gives to different actors and rationalities to act and/or interact in making the 
required decisions within the development theater. According to Goulet (ibid.; 
authors' italics): 
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A rationality. . . . is a mode of flunking, universe of cognitive assumptions and methodological 
procedures, or body of criteria for establishing truth or validity. 
It is in fact the dominant rationality that will settle the sense of any developmental 
action and decide which actor and subsequently which role is the most important. 
According to Goulet (ibid: 301), development decisions are made by three 
different categories of actors: 
1. Politicians (or their bureaucratic agents); 
2. Technical specialists (economists, agronomists, engineers, financial experts, 
industrial planners, etc.); and, 
3. Persons pressing some special or general concern which range from private 
fincancial interests to the advocacy of ethical values that could benefit the entire 
humankind. 
Goulet (ibid: 302; my italics) suggests that the first categories of actors apply to 
distinct rationality systems, the political and the technological. However, the third 
category is less homogeneous and among which people that champion morale, 
ethical and humane values (such as freedom, social justice or participation in making 
decisions that affetc their lives) can be found. These people bring to the decision-
making arena the third brand of rationality: The ethical (or humane). This relies "on 
moral judgements about what is good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust" 
(Goulet, ibid: 303). It is among this latter people that farmers, through their 
representatives or organizations, can be ranged. 
Being part of the analytical framework, the development theater will be 
conceptualized as a forum where different social actors (albeit individual or 
collective) interact and negotiate meanings and outcomes of a given development 
action as well. In this respect, it will show how different rationalities - political, 
technological and ethical - are interacting in the decision-making arena to shape the 
final decision and outcome of development actions. Given the presence of these 
different actors in our development theater, the actor-oriented perspective which 
acknowledges the existence of human diversity, the capacity of human beings to 
learn from their experiences in order to survive even in harsh environments is likely 
to explain the different responses of similar actors towards a similar stimulus. 
Methodological tools like interface analysis and development discourse analysis are 
considered adequate means to see how these actors react, devise strategies of coping, 
and how their rationalities shape their actions. In this order, development discourse 
analysis will permit to penetrate the rationality of planners and policy-makers and 
understand how and why scientific concepts are deviated from their ontological sense 
in order to serve both the implicit and explicit goals of a stereotyping planned 
development perspective. This means that development - and consequently planning -
might need to be put into a political perspective. 
By adopting these concepts, farmers, researchers, extensionists, and others 
involved in a given development theater will be conceptualized as social actors using 
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their 'mental faculties' and strategizing capacity to direct their struggles towards 
'making space' for 'their' change. 
Furthermore, given that a development action puts different (scientific, 
technocratic, and indigenous) types of knowledge into close interaction, and that 
knowledge is a critical input in development, the 'development theater' is a useful 
'tool' that reveals which place is 'reserved' for indigenous knowledge by politicians, 
planners, and even scientists within the development theater. This having been said, 
the attention that these latter actors accord to this type of knowledge brings up the 
issues of participation and how participating beneficiaries are organized. 
The aim is to show how actors participate in knowledge processes according to 
their need for information, especially the planners, and to point out any discon-
tinuity at the interface encounters that exist within the development theater. In fact, 
it will help in 'drawing a picture' of the three main different loci or components 
based on the three rationalities suggested by Goulet ( 1 9 8 6 ) as mentioned above. 
These are the political component, the technocratic component, and the farmers 
component on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it will serve as an investigative 
tool to describe the interaction of the three components (or their representatives) at 
the interfaces that are likely to be found between them in the development theater. I 
assume that such an endeavour, combined with a discourse analysis, is likely to reveal 
interesting contradictions in how different parties conceptualize and give meanings 
to issues such as development, project, policy and participation. In such an 
endeavour, a special focus should be placed on how the scientific community 
perceives the farmer and his/her farming practices from a development (or 
modernization) perspective. 
In order to reinforce the interaction between these above-mentioned different 
types of knowledge and rationalities, the use of Friedmann's transactive planning 
theory, as a derived form of the social learning theory to be applied in planning, and 
some concepts such as participation, and local organizations that consequently become 
embedded in this theory will serve as a prescriptive framework to improve the level 
of sustainability of the development theater. The final aim of the prescriptive part of 
the framework is to highlight the main features of a new methodology for 
development actions design, implementation, and evaluation. 
In this respect, the introduction of a 'humanistic' social theory for planning has a 
strong appeal, given that it is only 'humanism' that recognizes and "concentrates on 
those characteristics which mark us off from physical objects - imagination, meaning 
and creativeness" (Bailey, 1 9 7 5 : 1 0 ) . Either as a consequence of (or as a prerequisite 
for) this prescriptive perspective, our (I still consider myself as a planner yet) vision 
of the development beneficiaries (human-beings in planning) needs to be adjusted. 
According to Bailey ( 1 9 7 5 : 1 2 ) : 
[These] should not be treated as passive receptacles of their environment but as potentially 
creative actors. Their status as victims of their situation and their powerlessness is only a result 
of the unequal distribution of power and thus the wherewithal to realize this potential 
creativity. 
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In fact, our belief, as planners, in the opposite meaning of this statement stems from 
our own (and exclusively ours) fiction developed and sustained by the different 
currents of philosophy that impinged upon planning theory. 
In such an alternative conception of development model, planning is embedded in 
a sort of process of grafting personal (social or indigenous) knowledge on processed 
(theoretical, rational or scientific) knowledge through mutual learning. This can only 
be based on a trusting relationship between human beings where dialogue takes its 
central place (Friedmann, 1984: 190; his italics). In this context, according to 
Friedmann: 
Planners appear as facilitators and mediators of group-based activities; they use their special 
skills in the service of the common task. In a way, then, they must not only share the abstract 
purposes of client groups but align themselves in ways that will abolish (or at least minimize) 
status differences arising from command of different kinds of knowledge. 
In the case of the development theatre, the planner, according to Dunn (1984: 172), 
seen as a social system experimenter, cannot be exogenous to the system he is 
attempting to understand and transform. He is not dealing with the analysis and 
transformation of a fully deterministic system, as is the case with the classical 
physical sciences experimenter. In fact, the planner/social experimenter is immersed 
in the act of social system self-analysis and self-transformation. He is even the agent 
of social learning and social change. He is not interested in establishing universal 
scientific standards as the social system he is trying to understand is 
phenomenologically unique, and both its structure and function are temporary in 
character. 
Moreover, Dunn (1984:173) believes that the developmental hypothesis the social 
experimenter can formulate and test is a presupposition that, if the organization and 
behaviour of the social system is modified in a certain way, the goals of the system 
will be more adequately realized. Given the unicity of the social system under study, 
these hypotheses are not tested repeatedly under nearly identical or controlled 
conditions, as is the case in the physical sciences. In this order, the goal-setting and 
problem-solving processes become an iterative, sequential series of adaptations of an 
adaptable, goal-seeking, self-activating system. 
So far, developmental hypotheses arise out of anomalies of social organization 
when the social system functions do not adequately serve the social system goals. 
They are then tested through a social system reorganization designed to bring the 
system goals and functions into consonance. But sometimes the developmental 
hypotheses and associated system and/or subsystems reorganizations fail to be 
enough to bring about consonance of total system goals and functions. Then the 
intervention of the planner/social experimenter has to deal not with the reorganiz-
ation of the system's functions, but with the reformulation of total system goals as 
well. 
In this order, a viable mechanism of regular monitoring and learning needs to be 
built in any development action. This can be achieved through the adaptation of a 
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programming style of planned development action and a reinforcing role of the 
evaluation in its large sense. In this respect, I suggest that shortening the duration of 
a development action, or building it into many short phases, and its embeddedness 
in a more long-lasting overall 'development theater where a learning evaluation is 
held at the end of each action or phase of action, can be the basis of this so-called 
mechanism. 
Attempting an analogy with a real theater, a theatrical performance consists of 
many acts. Between every two acts, spectators take a break to 'digest' the 
performance, review the dialogue, and discuss the quality of the actors' 
performance. Just as in a theatrical play, as the actors perform the play again and 
again, their performance becomes better and better. 
CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIBING THE RESEARCH PROCESS: 
ON HYPOTHESES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters I introduced the major types of constraints that constitute, 
in my opinion, the problem background of development in general and 
development actions as they are currently conceived, implemented, evaluated, and 
corrected. Following that, I attempted to delineate an appropriate descriptive and 
prescriptive conceptual framework for the study. 
In the present chapter, I shall describe the main features of the research process. I 
shall first describe the main hypotheses and sub-hypotheses this study aims to test, 
using a prescriptive/normative style for their formulation. Thus, hypotheses and 
sub-hypotheses are written in accordance to my vision of how development actions 
should be designed, implemented, and evaluated. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall present the research strategy and design, 
as well as the methods and techniques used during the research process. A special 
section is reserved to explain the position of the researcher in the research context 
and the identification of the researcher's eventual bias in order to try to control it. 
3.2 Formulating hypotheses: The fulfillment of the required prerequisites 
As mentioned in section 2.2.3 of the previous chapter, it is acknowledged that one 
primary condition to guarantee substantial and sustainable success in a development 
action resides in the fulfillment of the four following prerequisites formulated by 
van Dusseldorp (1992:12): 
1. The possibility of formulating a consistent, realistic and durable set of objectives, 
which is acceptable to all, or at least to a large majority of the people who will be 
involved in and/or affected by the planned development; 
2. The availability of knowledge of all the relevant processes and their 
interrelationships which have to be influenced to change the present situation in 
such a way that the objectives will be realized; 
3. The availability of the means and power to influence these processes; 
4. The political will to use the available means and power, to influence the relevant 
processes in order to realize the desired objectives. 
In most development actions designed for and implemented in Third World 
countries, these prerequisites were never completely fulfilled, especially in people-
centered development actions. More clearly stated, in some development actions, 
some prerequisites might have been fulfilled to some extent, but others have never 
been fulfilled, even to a very small extent. In fact, objectives were generally ill-
defined and subject to a top-down decision-making process; knowledge was 
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mobilized in a very reductionist way - most of the time supposedly a 
rational/scientific approach - with a complete denial of people's knowledge; means 
and power were never sufficiently made available, and when available were not 
equitably distributed among the needy; and finally, the political will was never 
concretized unless the development action in concern aimed to incorporate, 
encapsulate, and increase control over rural populations or at sustaining an actual 
status quo which benefits the powerful actors. 
In this context, I suggest that the integration of certain features such as 
participation - either direct or indirect - and its underlying philosophy (i.e. 
democratization), and social learning - either as flexibility in the project design and 
implementation or as a monitoring and evaluation mechanism - can increase the 
probability that these four prerequisites may be fulfilled to a higher extent than they 
have been in the past. 
The above mentioned statement, written in the prescriptive/normative way of a 
successful and sustainable development action, sets the formulation of the general 
hypothesis (Hg) of this study as Box 3 . 2 ( 1 ) shows below: 
| Box 3.2(1) - The general hypothesis (Hg) of the study | 
Participation and social learning increase the probability of the fulfillment of the four prerequisites 
^ required for a sustainable development action. ^ 
However, this general hypothesis is strongly dependent upon the effects of other 
factors, given van Dusseldorp's four prerequisites mentioned earlier. For achieving a 
better understanding of whether this general hypothesis is fulfilled or not, I suggest, 
for the purpose of this study, to 'fragment' it into four hypotheses which can be 
formulated in such a way that the points of focus of this study can be clearly and 
easily located. These are delineated in Box 3 . 2 ( 2 ) below: 
| Box 3.2(2) - The four hypotheses (HI - H4) of the study | 
HI - Development objectives are not determined by planners in an exclusively top-down way and are 
always in accordance with beneficiaries' needs. 
H2 - Major needs of required knowledge about processes to be influenced by a development action are 
covered by different sources of knowledge. 
H3 - All needed resources for the achievement of a development action objectives are available and 
fairly distributed among the actors. 
H4 - The political will to use the required resources for a given development action is concretized in 
^ order to achieve the formulated objectives. ^ 
Relating these four hypotheses to the main concepts of the conceptual framework, as 
described in the previous chapter, and seeking to achieve a better understanding of 
the causes that influence the fulfillment (be it partial or total) or unfulfillment of 
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these hypotheses, I decided to de-construct each of the four hypotheses into three 
sub-hypotheses, as shown by Figure 3 . 2 ( 1 ) below. 
Figure 3.2(1) - A multi-loop hypotheses thought 
HI - Development objectives are not determined by planners in an exclusively top-
down way and are always in accordance with beneficiaries' needs. 
The conventional thinking of development, which is a top-down, outside- and 
planner-centered model, resulted, in most cases, in wrong diagnoses and ill-defined 
objectives, leading to the total (or partial) failure of development actions. This 
situation can be improved through the creation of opportunities for beneficiaries to 
define their problems and take part in the diagnostic phase and objectives 
formulation. Thus, the formulation of development objectives should emphasize an 
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increased participation of beneficiaries themselves and their knowledge. This highly-
recommended participation, resulting in a balanced dialogue, should bring about the 
required equilibrium between the different worldviews and their underlying 
rationalities that are present in the development decision-making arena and create 
opportunities for the so-called 'target groups' or 'beneficiaries' to partake in a process 
where decisions that concern their lives are made. This will undoubtedly yield a 
formulation of developmental objectives and priorities that are agreed upon by all 
parties whose interests are at stake in a given development action. Thus: 
Hll- Genuine active participation of beneficiaries at earlier stages in the process of planned 
development improves problems identijkation and objectives formulation. 
H12 - Genuine active participation of beneficiaries in the process of planned development 
secures a required equilibrium of different worldviews (and their underlying 
rationalities) in the development decision-making arena. 
H13 - Objectives are formulated for increasing people's genuine active participation in their 
(self-) development. 
H2 - Major needs of required knowledge about processes to be influenced are 
covered by different sources of knowledge 
The hegemonic supremacy of the so-called rational/scientific knowledge in the 
development theater for a long time denied the capacity of indigenous knowledge to 
overcome some of the uncertainty that exists within a human context, especially 
when the agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions are the worst. 
Consequently, it overlooked the evident necessity of building a dialogue interface 
between these two types of knowledge. This led to a situation where development 
actions were always designed using a narrow-focus and strictly reductionist vision 
supported by the technical paradigm. For instance, the development of cereal crop 
production projects were exclusively designed according to breeders' or 
agronomists' vision of development based on the philosophy of intensification This 
situation can be improved by acknowledging the increasing importance of people's 
knowledge in their (self-)development and the building of a development interface 
between scientific and indigenous types of knowledge where dialogue and mutual 
learning can take place. As a consequence, the recognition of beneficiaries' 
knowledge within the development theater by other actors, scientists particularly, 
not only sustains the learning process but increases its efficiency as well. Thus: 
H21 - Recognition of the importance of beneficiaries' knowledge in their (self-)development 
provides additional knowledge that is essential in the development theater. 
H22 - Building a development interface based on dialogue (between local/indigenous and 
scientific types of knowledge) and mutual learning produces the adapted knowledge 
required for processes (especially social processes) to be influenced in the development 
theater. 
H23 - Recognition of local/indigenous knowledge by other actors involved in the development 
theater increases the efficiency and effectiveness of the learning process. 
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H3 - All resources needed for the achievement of the objectives of the development 
action are available and fairly distributed among the actors 
The lack of availability of resources required for development has always been 
referred to as a problem of scarcity and inadequacy due to the tremendous 
constraints faced by Third World countries in terms of resources mobilization. This 
evidence, which I partially agree with, obscures the real fact that the problem is 
related rather to an unfair distribution of these resources, and Algeria is one of the 
best examples of this in the Third World. Genuine, active, and legitimized 
participation of beneficiaries, in that order, creates more opportunities for the 
'excluded' to access the required resources for their (self-)development. Moreover, 
their participation in this context can readjust the power structure within the 
community and, if empowered, they can not only work toward a more equitable 
distribution of resources, but mobilize some additional resources from their own 
endowments as well. Consequently, if this is achieved, availability of required 
resources for development will increase to a fair extent. Thus: 
H31 - Genuine active participation of beneficiaries opens better opportunities for the 
'excluded' to benefit from the resources made available via development actions. 
H3Z- Genuine active participation of beneficiaries secures a better involvement of the latter in 
local resource mobilization and their fair distribution. 
H33 - Availability of resources and their fair distribution sustains the genuine active 
participation of the beneficiaries in their (self-)deoelopment. 
H4 - The political will to use the required resources for a given development action 
is concretized in order to achieve the formulated objectives 
This is the most sensitive prerequisite to fulfill, because it basically depends on the 
political leadership and other top policy-makers and their readiness to accept power 
•bargaining talks' with the excluded. On the other hand, more sensitive is the factual 
evidence that political leadership in Third World countries can no longer govern 
their societies in the 1990s as they did during the last two or three decades. Two 
examples that need to be mentioned here are South Africa and the era of apartheid 
and Algeria with its decade of violence. It is, then, a choice for politicians to make, 
whether they open their highly-bureaucratized system of development 
administration to a 'democratic' participation of their population to take over and 
decide for their (self-)development or they get swept out by the increasing unrest of 
their constituencies. In this sense, I assume that unless a real democratization process 
is settled upon, participation becomes an illusive issue, given that participation can 
be only sustained through the involvement of strong and independent voluntary 
organizations. Such organizations, however, cannot exist without a democratization 
of social life. Moreover, democratization of social life means very little without a real 
decentralization of decision-making (both as déconcentration and devolution). 
Consequently, it is only through the democratization of social life and genuine 
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partidpation of the population at all levels of the decision-making process that a 
political will can be secured to use the resources required for development fairly. 
Thus: 
H41 - Genuine active participation of beneficiaries requires their increased involvement at all 
levels of the development decision-making arena. 
H42 - Democratization of social life sustains a genuine active participation of beneficiaries in 
their (self-)development. 
H43 - Political will to use the required resources for people's development is secured through 
decentralization of the decisim-making. 
Of course, these hypotheses/objectives will require some adjustments in the 
institutional settings in order to be achieved. One of these adjustments that must be 
mentioned here is the cultural change that must take place in the way Third World 
elites think of peasantry and rural constituendes in agricultural and rural 
development undertakings. In my opinion, the institutional responsibility of the 
required cultural change is the new charge of the rivil sodety, the educational 
system as well as the communication and information systems in the Third World 
countries. Two basic issues need to be given more attention in this cultural change 
process: (1) The poHtical/ad^ministrative elites must be educated to appredate their 
people's knowledge and experience (i.e. rural people are highly strategizing, 
knowledgeable, and capable artors); (2) The sdentific elites must be educated in the 
importance of local/indigenous knowledge and a more inter- and/or multi-
disdplinary concept of development (i.e. development problems are so complex that 
a single disdpline cannot handle alone whatever its strength). 
Having said this, it is worth mentioning that the test of hypotheses against the 
empirical material will be intentionally differentiated. In Chapter 6,1 shall test only 
the hypotheses HI, H2, H3, and H4, given that the failure of post-independence 
Algerian conventional development thinking is not new for many readers who have 
experience with similar situations in Third World countries. In Chapter 8, however, I 
move a level down by testing the three underlying sub-hypotheses for each 
hypothesis to show the idiosyncrasies of the alternative development view I am 
advocating. 
3.3 On the general research question and sub-questions 
After having formulated the main hypotheses of the present study, I now proceed to 
the formulation of the general research questions and sub-questions. Insofar as I 
mentioned earlier, the main condition of making a development action as successful 
as possible is the fulfillment the four pre-requisites and their related conditions. 
How these pre-requisites and conditions might be fulfilled is the main interest of this 
study. Hence, I propose the general research question to be as follows: 
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How can major actors whose interests are at stake in the development theater steer planned 
interventions towards a sustainable development ? 
Looking back to this formulated question, I face a dilemma with the concept 
'sustainable development'. To which actor or group of actors should development be 
sustainable in the sense of this question and this study? As the implicit and explicit 
assumptions of this study may suggest, sustainability of the outcomes of a given 
development action is posited here to be in line with the interests of the "hitherto 
excluded" (Stiefel and Wolfe, 1994), the disadvantaged segments of the population. 
Hence, as Figure 3.2(1) earlier showed, the pre-requisites and conditions of 
sustainability rely to a large extent on the centrality of the beneficiaries' knowledge 
and the importance of these beneficiaries' participation in their (self-)development. 
Given that development actions throughout the last three decades up to the present 
(especially in the Algerian case) have been designed without consultation with their 
supposed beneficiaries, resulting in a huge gap between the priviligentsia and the 
disadvantaged, it is thus highly propitious to focus more on the impact of 
beneficiaries' participation and knowledge in steering a given development action 
towards their (self-)development. Thus, I propose to reformulate this primary 
research question suggested above as follows: 
How can beneficiaries' participation and knowledge improve their steering of a development 
action toward the target of yielding sustainable outcomes? 
However, although I consider beneficiaries' participation and knowledge to be a 
necessary condition for a sustainable (self-)development, it is not a sufficient 
condition per se, provided that the so-called beneficiaries are not completely 
independent vis-a-vis other potential actors acting in the development theater. They 
are still, in fact, strongly dependent upon actors that are extremely self-referent for 
being self-impressed by the rationality and 'scientificality' of their knowledge, such 
as planners, researchers, development staff, etc. And the availability of beneficiaries' 
knowledge means very little if its importance is not truly acknowledged by these 
latter actors. In other words, without learning from past failures they planned, 
implemented, and evaluated, and/or from on-going development actions, debate 
with these actors upon issues such as beneficiaries' participation and knowledge 
becomes an exercise in ambiguity and deceit. In this context, beneficiaries' 
participation and knowledge, as essential features of the development theater, 
cannot improve the present situation of development actions much if not sustained 
by a real social learning process, the necessity of which is acknowledged and 
supported by all actors whose interests are at stake in the development theater. 
Consequently, I suggest that the final formulation of the general research as Box 
3.3(1) shows: 
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I Box 3.3(1) - The general research question of the study | 
How can the (direct and indirect) participation of the beneficiaries and the social learning ability of 
diverse actors acting in the development theater secure sustainable achievements of a people-centered 
planned development action? 
L J 
Having said that, I see that in order to answer this 'whole' research question, 
different sub-research questions must also be examined [see Box 3.3(2) below]: 
I Box 3.3(2) - The sub-research questions of the study | 
Ql. To what extent and when is participation of the beneficiaries required in order to steer 
development actions towards their (self-)deoelopment? 
Q2. Which role(s) can local organizations play in the beneficiaries' steering of development actions? 
Q3. Which mechanisms are required to make monitoring and evaluation play the role of a learning 
process in steering development actions? 
Q4. Can the design of a practical methodology be proposed according to the issues advocated in this 
study, such as participation, local organizations, and social learning? 
Q5. What might be the shortcomings of this methodology and what political, institutional, and socio-
cultural pre-requisites are needed for such a methodology to work? 
3.4 Embracing constructivism: The revenge of the human spirit in development 
The context of the advocated issues of participation, social learning, and transactive 
planning defines the humanistic orientation of the study, which represents the 
naturalistic and qualitative approach of inquiry I adopted in the present study. Even 
though the connotation of qualitative research might be subjective, verbal, and 
descriptive, the use of more than one method of inquiry becomes necessary as a 
means of triangulation in order to secure a required level of data validity, reducing 
the effect of the above-mentioned subjectivity as much as possible. As Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994a: 2) put it: 
Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to 
its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of meanings people bring to 
them... Qualitative research, as a set of interpretive practices, privileges no single methodology 
over any other... Nor does qualitative research have a distinct set of methods that are entirely its 
own. Qualitative researchers use semiotics, narrative, content, descriptive, archival, and 
phonemic analysis, even statistics. 
In this context, the qualitative researcher is seen as a bricoleur - "a Jack of all trades or 
a kind of professional do-it-yourself person" - dealing with the multiple 
methodologies of qualitative research as a bricolage, that is a pieced-together, close-
knit set of practices that provides solutions to a problem in a concrete situation; each 
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solution (bricolage) which is the result of the bricoleur's method being an emergent 
construction (Denzin and Lincoln, ibid.; authors' italics). 
Moreover, the researcher-as-bricoleur, such as I am, state that his underlying 
paradigm - a basic of set of beliefs that guide action, according to Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994b: 99) - is constructivism in the sense defined by Guba and Lincoln 
(1994) that articulates an ontology based on relativism, an epistemology that is 
transactional and subjectivist, and a methodology that is dialogical (hermeneutical) 
and dialectical, given that "human behaviour, unlike that of physical objects, cannot 
be understood without reference to the meanings and purposes attached by human 
actors to their activities" (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:106). In a similar vein, paradigms 
are human constructs which cannot be open to proof in a given conventional sense; 
they represent beliefs that are basic in the sense that they must be accepted simply 
on faith, given that there is no way to establish their ultimate trathfulness. 
Allegorically illustrated, the adoption of this way of flunking aims at the 
construction of the development theater in whose centre lies a decision-making 
arena where an mter-rationalities equilibrium is suggested for development to be 
sustainable. 
3.5 Position of the researcher in the research context and bias identification 
Plainly stated, this research draws a parallel between the subject of development 
planning in Algeria and my own multi-specialized experience. In order to help 
uncover the potential personal bias that this study might include, and for the 
purpose of informing the reader about the way I tried to tackle this problem, I shall 
provide my own educational and professional background. 
In 1980, I graduated as a BSc Agronomist from an Algerian agricultural high 
school after a four-year period of studies. At that moment, the Ministry of 
Agriculture was implementing a new recruitment policy to staff the Domaines 
Agricoles Socialistes (DASs) with new BSc holders. This led me - against my will, of 
course - to take a position as DASs Manager for six years. During that period, I 
witnessed how these farms were subject to many interventions based on an 
administrative, top-down, standardized development model. 
In 1986, I joined the Institut Technique des Grandes Cultures (iTGC) as Head of 
Breeding and Improvement Service in the Research Department. In this service, 'we' 
had to develop and promote high-yielding varieties (HYVs) as a fundamental tool 
for agricultural intensification. Later, in 1988,1 took the position of Head of Planning 
Department within the same institution. At that time I found myself within a system 
I used to criticize some years before when I was a 'farmer' but, more paradoxically, 
doing the same things in the same way I was myself criticizing. 
In late 1992, with the start of my MSc study in Management of Agricultural 
Knowledge Systems (MAKS) at Wageningen Agricultural University, I began my 
new career-dimension of a social scientist. This led me to start looking very critically 
at my present job as planner, especially when weighing it against my previous 
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experience as a 'farmer'. 
In other words, the description of my multi-specialized career as mentioned above 
accurately describes me as being at a cross-roads. It is this diversified experience which 
made me believe that, as a planner, the job 'we' were doing was wrong in the sense 
that 'we' assigned 'ourselves' the exclusive and extreme authority to design policies 
and projects for people without their consent or even consulting them. 
It has to be recognized that this study frequently draws on my personal 
experience and the risk of an egocentric bias is acknowledged. But for the sake of 
minimizing this bias as much as possible, I tried to design the research methodology 
in a way that would use different research techniques as a means of triangulation. 
Moreover, during the rounding-up learning cycle in section 3 . 6 . 2 , 1 organized a feed-
back 'exercise' with some potential actors about the provisional results of the 
research. This was to bring greater adhesion to the research findings instead of 
considering them a personal achievement, and attempt to control my own intrinsic 
bias as much as possible. However, the interpretation of the results remains entirely 
my responsibility. 
In a final word, this research process finds me at a crossroads, where I sometimes 
have difficulty choosing which 'persona' should speak in a given setting. Of course, 
the social researcher 'persona' is the more dominant in this study, but sometimes he 
was relayed by the 'farmer' (DASs Manager) 'persona' to criticize the work of the 
planner and/or the agronomist - technocratic development agent. 
3.6 On the research strategy and design 
3 .6 .1 On the research strategy: The case-study 
As Denzin and Lincoln ( 1 9 9 4 : 2 ) mention, qualitative research involves the studied 
use and collection of a variety of empirical materials - such as case-study, among 
others - which describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in 
individuals' lives. A case study (or a case history), as defined by Black ( 1 9 9 3 : 6 2 ) , is "a 
biographical or autobiographical study and report of an individual, group or 
phenomenon". According to Yin ( 1 9 8 4 : 1 3 ) , any case study is an empirical inquiry 
that looks at a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, and in which 
multiple sources of evidence (methods of data collection in this case) are used; it 
allows the researcher to understand and retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of the real-life events. It can, in fact, "provide a richly detailed 
'portrait' of a particular phenomena" (Hakim, 1 9 8 7 : 6 1 ) . 
Based on this thinking, realities are captured, according to Guba and Lincoln 
( 1 9 9 4 : 1 1 0 ) , in: 
A form, of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and 
specific in nature, but also alterable as are their associated 'realities'. 
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To achieve this, according to Buhner (1983: 9), a case-study involves the in-depth 
study of a particular milieu (village, association, organization, institution) rather 
than a widely drawn random sampling of individuals. Consequently, the researcher 
thus relies on a repertoire of methods to gather data such as informal interviews, the 
use of knowledgeable informants in the locality, and participation in and 
observation of events in the setting as and when they occur. 
In this way, I made use of case-studies to describe the real events of some 
development actions that took place in the Algerian context after the first decade of 
the country's independence in 1962. In some case-studies, the historical dimension 
coincided with the birth of ITGC in 1974, which from its inception has had the 
national mandate to develop food crops in Algeria. But, most importantly, some 
case-studies shed light on the structural and socio-political changes that Algeria has 
undergone since the beginning of the 1990s. 
3.6.2 On the research design: Three learning cycles 
Due to its complexity, the study has followed three main learning cycles or steps. 
These are as follows: 
• 1st cycle (the primary cycle): I first began with an archive study on some 
development actions undertaken from the 1970s onwards in order to define three 
main points: (1) The way of tlimking of policy-makers and planners when 
designing development actions; (2) The understanding of the role assigned to 
evaluation in these development actions; (3) The choice of other development 
actions based on an alternative philosophy of development - in complete 
differentiation - to be compared to the development actions comprising the 
archive study. 
• 2nd cycle (the formalization cycle): I conducted in-depth investigations into the 
development actions chosen during the first step, based upon the issues and 
insights gathered up to that point. During this step I utilized the techniques of 
interviews, personal experiences, and life-histories for the investigation. This step, 
in addition to the first, allowed me to gather enough data for a primary analysis 
that was undertaken directly at the end of this phase. This gave birth to some 
grey areas that needed to be cleared up through another learning cycle. 
• 3rd cycle (the rounding-up cycle): I focused in this cycle more on the essential 
points that appeared to lack consistency during the primary analysis undertaken 
at the end of the second cycle. Moreover, it was used as a means of triangulating 
doubtful results obtained during the first and second cycles. At the same time, this 
step rounded off the fieldwork period by making a secondary analysis in the field 
and getting feed back from some potential actors, giving them the opportunity to 
comment on some research findings. 
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3.7 Methods and techniques of field investigation 
In this section, one important thing is worth to reveal. Methodolatry, as a combination 
of method and idolatry to describe a preoccupation with selecting and defending 
methods to the exclusion of the actual substance of the story to tell, and as a slavish 
attachment and devotion of method (Janesick, 1994: 215), has been avoided as much 
as possible. In fact, the methodology I developed follows one objective: To keep both 
experience and the act of knowing as close as possible. More in line with Janesick 
(ibid.), this study aims to present solid descriptive data to help the reader 
understand the meaning of the experience being examined. It has to be clearly said 
that this investigation followed an appropriate strategy that influenced the choice of 
an adequate method and techniques. 
As stated above, many methods and techniques of investigation and data 
gathering were identified in order to achieve the proposed research strategy to 
provide enough evidence through case-studies. This explains my recourse to 
utilizing multiple sources of evidence both by the methodological aspects of the 
research strategy (the case-study), as well as the obligation to secure a required level 
of triangulation for trustworthiness and authenticity. 
As Denzin and Lincoln (1994b: 353) argue, the constructivist paradigm tells us 
that it is through his/her interaction with key informants and respondents that the 
socially situated researcher creates the realities that describe the places where 
empirical materials are collected and analyzed, and where interpretive practices of 
qualitative research are implemented. These practices represent the multiple 
methods and techniques the researcher-as-fcrico/ewr must employ and have "a 
working familiarity" with (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994b: 359). 
Among the very renowned methods and techniques of social research among the 
researdiers-as-fcricoZewr, I have mostly used the following ones. 
3.7.1 Archival study and documents analysis 
This is what Denzin and Lincoln (1994b: 355) call the "mute evidence", that is, written 
texts and cultural artifacts, which leaves its traces on the past of a social 
phenomenon or on a given community. These materials cannot be interviewed; they 
can only be interpreted. 
Since the early 1970s, the Ministry of Agriculture in Algeria undertook many 
development actions, especially in the field of cereal crops. A tremendous number of 
papers have been written by national and international experts about these actions. 
A quick archival study of some of these papers helped to understand the way policy-
makers think when designing such actions. It must be said that this material was 
first evaluated according to the 6-questions matrix developed by Steward (1984: 23, 
in van Dusseldorp and Southwold, 1994:32-35). 
As a matter of contrast, this way of thinking has been compared with the one that 
was observed during the implementation of other development actions conducted 
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according to my prescriptive, theoretical foundations of participation, local 
organizations, and social learning. 
In this context, the archive study (I started with at the generative learning cycle) 
was important insofar as it oriented the in-depth investigation toward issues of 
potential interest, and the research design, methods, and techniques that should be 
used, which are described in this chapter. 
3.7.2 Personal experience 
As mentioned earlier (cf. Section 3.5), this research draws heavily from my personal 
experience. In this context, "personal experience", argue Denzin and Lincoln (1994b: 
356) "reflects the flow of thoughts and meaning persons bring to the immediate 
situations". Experiences can represent routines or be problematic. They occur within 
our lives. Researchers who relate experiences ususally bring them in the form of a 
story or a narrative. As an important source for this research, as argue Strauss and 
Colbin (1990:35), 
Professional experience frequently leads to the judgement that some feature of the profession or 
its practice is less than effective, efficient, human or equitable. So, it is believed perhaps a good 
research study might help to correct this situation. Some professionals return to study for their 
degrees because they are motivated by that reform ambition. The research problems that they 
choose are grounded in their motivation. 
In the context of this study, I made use of my personal experience and the ones of 
my colleagues who worked and/or were still working in the Planning System of the 
Minsitry of Agriclture and Fisheries. 
Concerning farmers, I tried to bring contrasting views of experience between 
development actions based either on current development thinking or my suggested 
alternative development thinking, based on participation, local organizations, and 
social learning. In the latter case, two groups of farmers were selected, using two 
criteria: (1) Their involvement in these actions; (2) Their experience with other 
previous development actions based on the current development flunking. The first 
group had to satisfy both criteria, while the second needed to satisfy only the second 
criterion. In other selected areas (concerned with other development actions), 
farmers were selected based on their experience with previous and/or on-going 
actions. 
The chosen views of experience are presented through life-histories (see Section 
3.6.5 below) and contained in indicated boxes in the case-study of the development 
action they were involved in. 
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3.7.3 Participant observation 
It is acknowledged that naturalistic observation, being "into" a social situation and 
looking, is a valuable, additional way of gathering material about our social world. 
Many social researchers have been playing this role. Hidden and disguised voyeur 
has been one of the many identities social researchers have been utilizing for their 
investigations (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994b: 354). It involves establishing rapport in a 
new community so as the researcher can learn how people go about their business 
without feeling 'being spied" and can thus intellectualize what he has observed. 
Moreover, it gives an intuitive understanding on what is going on by reducing the 
reactivity of informants when they know they are studied (Bernard, 1988:148). 
During this study, participant observation has been mainly used during the field 
visits I undertook and farmers' meetings I attended, in the cases of development 
actions' areas where I started my investigation some years ago. This endeavour 
helped in fact to evaluate the impact of the project on the farmers' organizations, 
some years after these development actions were terminated. 
3.7.4 Informal interviews 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994b: 353), "the interview is the favourite 
methodological tool of the qualitative researcher". It not only constitutes a 
conversation but the art of asking questions and listening as well. It produces, in this 
situation where answers are given, situated understandings grounded in specific 
interactional episodes. Even though the spoken or written word always contains a 
residue of ambiguity, interviewing is seen by Fontana and Frey (1994: 361) as "a 
paramount part of sociology, because interviewing is interacton and sociology is the 
study of interaction". It can be easily combined with other techniques such as 
participant observation; it even goes hand in hand with the latter. In the new 
directions imprinted by post-modernist ethnographers to interviewing, increased 
attention to the voices and feelings of the respondents and the interviewer-
respondent relation must be observed (Fontana and Frey, 1994:363). 
As a matter of focus, interviewing can take different forms (structured, semi-
structured, unstructured, open-ended...) and concerns individuals as well as groups. 
In the present study, both individual unstructured and semi-structured interviews 
and group interviews were used. 
In this respect, group interviews were used as a complementary source of data, 
but more importantly, they were used as a means of triangulation (Fontana and 
Frey, 1994: 365). They concerned mainly selected planners and development staff, 
and groups of farmers. 
The different interviewed individuals and groups for each case are presented in 
Table 3.7.4(2) below. It goes without saying that some were interviewed 
individually, others collectively, and a few were interviewed in both individual and 
collective manners. 
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Type of Chapter 5 cases Chapter 7 cases 
individual No.l No. 2* No. 3** No. 4 No. 5 No. 6 
Planners at MoA 02 03 03 
LTGC HQ staff 04 
ITGCSetif Station 06 
ITMA teachers 04 
DSAs directors 02 
DSAs staff 04 10 
Private farmers 01 10 10 06 
EACs-EAIs members 10 
French collaborators 03 
CR-HCDS staff 08 04 
Heads of association 02 04 
Commune officials 
Reg. Edu. Acad, members 02 
Education teachers 04 
* For Case No. 2,1 relied on my previous MSc research (MaM, 1994). 
** For Case No. 3,1 used the data from discussions I had in the frame of Cases No. 5 and 6. 
Besides this, I participated in three meetings with pastoralists which allowed me to 
hold group discussions with 20 to 30 pastoralists (Cases Nos. 5 and 6, and 
consequently Case No. 3). 
3.7.5 Life histories 
It is obviously acknowledged the that life-history method is an adequate means of 
penetrating the life-world of actors and understand their worldview. According to 
Francis (1992: 93), 
A 'life-story' is an intellectual construct whose structure and content reflect the priorities of the 
researcher and the images the informant projects back into the past, as much as tangible 
realities. 
Discovering the past helps to understand the present. The usefulness of the life-
history technique critically depends upon several factors. First, the researcher must 
have a thorough understanding of the macro-developments that provide the 
contextual settings of constraints and opportunities within which people act or have 
acted. 
Making use of semi-structured interviews, I have collected elements of life 
histories and written selections of these life histories in the form of a continuous text 
in small boxes that are presented with the appropriate case-study. 
Table 3.7.4(2) - Individuals and groups interviewed during the field work 

CHAPTER 4 
SETTING THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION OF THE ALGERIAN CASE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces in brief the general background of Algeria and, 
consequently, the current situation of its agricultural sector and its related 
development planning and policy-making system. It aims to give an overview of the 
agricultural sector evolution under the different governments that have led Algeria 
since national independence in 1962. 
However, neither the agricultural sector nor its planning system evolved in a 
vacuum. They are both part of the general political and institutional framework that 
influenced and continues to influence both entities. Hence, the goal of this chapter is 
a comprehensive understanding of the features of the different agricultural 
development policies designed and implemented in the name of agricultural 
development, and their consequences for domestic production, "booming' food 
imports, and increased food dependency, and so on. 
In other words, it aims at understanding how an 'agricultural-by-excellence' 
country became one of the first net food importers in the world because of the 
inefficiency of its development actions as results of its development planning and 
policy-making system, and its inherent sectoral delivery system. 
4.2 What is Algeria?1 
4.2.1 General background 
Algeria is the largest of the five countries (including Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia 
and Libya) which form the region of western North Africa known traditionally as Al 
Maghrib (The West). With its 2,381,740 millions km2 of land, Algeria is considered to 
be the second largest country in Africa after Sudan, and the tenth largest country in 
the world. 
The name 'Algeria' is derived from the Arabic name El-Djazair, that represents the 
plural of Jazira, whose meaning in Arabic is 'island' or 'peninsula'. 
To the north, it is 'sandwiched' between the Kingdom of Morocco on the west, and 
the Republic of Tunisia and the Jamahiriya of Libya on the east. On the northern 
part, it has approximately 1,200 km of coastline on the Mediterranean Sea. It is 
bordered on the south, from east to west, by Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Western 
Sahara [see Figure 4.2.1(1)]. Land boundaries total 6,343 km. 
1 This section is written upon information got from different publications of the Office National des 
Statistiques (ONS) as well as from different publications of the Ministry-Delegation of Planning. 
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In terms of geographical position, Algeria is located between 9 ° W longitude and 
1 2 ° E longitude, and between 1 8 ° and 3 8 ° N latitude. The International Meridian ( 0 ° 
Greenwich) passes near Mostaganem, a city on the western part of the coastal band, 
located at 3 0 0 km from the capital Algiers. 
Topographically, a sharp contrast exists between the relatively fertile, 
mountainous, fragmented north and the vast Sahara in the south. The northern part 
of Algeria is dominated by parallel ranges of the Saharan-Atlas mountain system, 
where there are no navigable rivers. In this respect, four main physiographic, 
geographical regions/units can be found, running from north to south: 
Figure 42.1(1) - Map of Algeria 
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1. The Tell region: Consisting of the northern band extending along the coast, 
between 80 and 190 km wide. The majority of the population lives in this region. 
It is composed of hills and valleys where the major part of Algeria's arable land is 
located. The southern frontier of this region is the Tellian Atlas, a mountainous 
chain which ranges from the Moroccan border, in the west, to Cap Carbon near 
Bejai'a, in the east. The highest point is Ouarsenis mountain (1,985 m). Algeria's 
main river, the Chelif, flows from the Tellian Atlas 725 km down to the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
2. The High Plateau: Consisting of a tableland interspersed with large shallow 
basins or depressions where water is collected during the rainy season, which 
become, in the hot season, dry lake beds or salty flats called chotts. The lowest 
point in the country, the Chott Melghir (40 meters below the sea level), is located in 
this region. 
3. The Saharan Atlas: Consisting of an west-to-east expanding mountainous chain 
formed of three components, the Amour mountains in the south-west, the Ouled 
Nail mountains in the centre, and the M'zab mountains in north-east. 
4. The Sahara Desert: The largest region of the country (90% of the total land), 
mostly consists of a desolate flatland covered with gravel but where wide 
expanses of sand dunes are frequently encountered, mainly composed of two 
dune chains called the Great Western Erg and the Great Eastern Erg. In the center of 
the region lies the Hoggar (or the Ahaggar) massif, a volcanic highland of 800-meter 
width and a 3,000-meters height (above the sea level). The highest point in the 
country, that is Tahat mountain (3,003 meters above the sea level), is located in this 
region. The region is well-known for its scattered oasis settlements were dates are 
cultivated and small-scale farming is practiced, mostly for vegetables and food 
crops. The most essential ingredients for the Algerian economy come from this 
region, i.e. oil and natural gas. 
4.2.2 Climatic conditions and main agro-ecological zones 
Climatic conditions in Algeria are decisive elements in the bio-physical environment 
as it directly influences agricultural and pastoral activities. Given its extended 
latitude, Algeria 'touches' on different climatic zones where the climate ranges from 
humid on the coastal band, to semi-arid, arid, and finally desertic, as we proceed 
from north to south [see Figure 4.2.2(1) below]. Starting from the north, the 
temperate zone is characterized by the Mediterranean climate with rare summer 
rainfall. Along the coast, winters are mild and wet while summers are hot and dry. 
On the High-Plateaus, winters are cold and dry while summers are hot. Sirocco - a 
hot, dust- or sand-laden wind is especially common in summer. In the south, winters 
are not too wet but cold, while summers are very hot and dry, except in the Hoggar 
(or the Ahaggar) hills where some summer rainfall of tropical type has been reported. 
The annual rainfall is generally insufficient, and is furthermore irregularly 
distributed in both time and space. 
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2 FAO (1998) estimates this zone to cover 555,000 hectares in 1995. 
Being of a mild climate and taking advantage of the marine influence of the 
Mediterranean Sea, the coastal band of the country gets more rainfall than the rest of 
the country. Annual average of rainfall ranges from 1 , 0 0 0 mm in the Collo region 
(north-east of the country) to 7 0 0 - 8 0 0 mm at Algiers (in the center of the country), 
while it is less than 4 0 0 mm in the western part of the country. On the High-Plateaus, 
rainfall ranges between 2 0 0 to 4 0 0 mm, while the steppe receives less than 3 0 0 mm a 
year. Saharan regions, apart from the Hoggar hills, have an absolute drought almost 
throughout the year, receiving a bit more than 1 0 0 mm per year. 
Considering rainfall, elevation and water availability for irrigation, 6 main agro-
ecological zones can be distinguished: 
1 . The Mediterranean coastal zone, with an annual rainfall range in most parts from 
6 0 0 mm and above 1 , 0 0 0 mm. Intensive (greenhouse) and semi-intensive (open 
fields) vegetable crops are the major farming systems that are found here. 
Sometimes, an intensive dairy cattle farming system, and fruit orchards - mainly 
citrus species - can also be found. 
2. The plateaus and hills zone, with a slope of less than 1 2 % , and of limited area ( 3 -
4 % of the country). This zone is characterized by deep soils and an annual rainfall 
ranging between 3 5 0 to 6 0 0 mm. On the plateaus, food crops such as cereals, 
pulses and forage, and sheep represent the main agricultural activities, while fruit 
orchards and vineyards are the major crops on the hills. 
3 . The mountainous zone, having a great potential for agriculture, where significant 
amounts of snow are frequently reported. The main characteristic of this region is 
the pronounced erosion observed in certain parts and the large acreage of forests 
( 2 , 7 million ha). Low-rainfall adapted species of fruits trees are cultivated and 
traditional breeds of cattle are reared. Family gardens to grow vegetable for the 
household needs - and sometimes for surplus sale - can frequently be found. 
4 . The steppe zone, very expanded, with shallow soils, a degraded vegetal cover, 
frequent frosts in winter and significant heat in summer. The major activity in this 
zone continues to be the extensive model of sheep rearing. However, 
overstocking, vegetal cover degradation, and water deficiency are the main 
constraints. 
5 . The Saharan zone, the largest, desertic area with a rough climate, characterized 
with very low annual rainfall. The oases, representing the only possibility for 
agricultural activities, count for not more than 5 0 , 0 0 0 ha, more or less totally-
irrigated. However, the recent experience of land reclamation with the use of the 
pivot is pushing farmers and investors to occupy an expanded domain for 
agricultural practice outside the oases. 
6. The irrigated land, which is distributed between the different agro-ecological zones, 
where water is available for irrigation, counts for less than 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 ha2. It is in fact 
reserved for intensive and semi-intensive vegetable crops, fruits tree orchards and 
irrigated forages. 
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Figure 4.2.2(1) - Rainfall distribution in Algeria (in mm) 
4.2.3 Population parameters 
The population was estimated to be 25 million inhabitants on January 1990, by the 
National Office of Statistics (ONS). Currently, it is around 29.8 million inhabitants, 
according to the ONS estimation of July 1997. For many years, the annual rate of 
demographic growth hovered around 3% or more, but recent information from the 
same ONS revealed that this rate has dropped below 2.80% [see Table 4.2.3(1) 
below]. 
Table 4.2.3(1) - Evolution of the population in Algeria 
Years 1966 1977 1987 1997 
Number of inhabitants (in millions) 11.9 16.9 23.1 29.8 
Average growth of the decade (in %) 3.40 3.2 3.10 2.80 
Average growth between two consecutive - 3.50 3.34 2.64 
periods (in %)* 
Growth between 1966 and 1997 (in %)* - - - 3.06 
(Source: ONS, 1990; Chapan-Metz, 1993; ONS, 1997) 
* The figures presented in these rows are my own calculations. 
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Table 4.2.3(2) - Evolution perspectives of the population in Algeria 
Item Evolution through the years 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Total population (in 106) 25.010 28.144 31.399 34.969 38.397 
Population growth rate (in %) 2.36 2.19 2.15 1.87 
Fertility rate (in children/woman) 4.30 3.55 3.05 2.63 
Life expectancy (in years) 67.30 69.40 71.50 73.30 
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 55 45 37 30 
Source: World Bank, 1994a 
Life expectancy has significantly improved. According to Chapan-Metz (1993), this 
was 42 years for males and 44 years for females between 1950 and 1955. It moved up 
to 49 years for males and 51 years for females in 1965 and ended up at 65 years to 
males and 66 years to females in 1990. According to World Bank projections [see 
Table 4.1.3(2) above], it is expected to improve and reach more than 73 years 
between 2005 and 2010. Another demographic indicator that is worth mentioning 
here is the fertility rate, that is the number of children born per woman. After it 
reached the mark of 7-8 was reached between the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, this 
indicator declined to 5.1 children per woman and it was only 3.48 in 1997, according 
to the ONS estimate of July 1997. According to World Bank projections [see Table 
4.2.3(2) above], it will decline to less than 3 children per woman between 2005 and 
2010. This marked improvement reflects the major transformations in the health 
sector and the consequences of the 'voluntaristic' welfare policies undertaken since 
independence, more particularly during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
The Algerian population is characterized by a very high proportion of youth. 
Almost two-fifths of the population are below 15 years old [see Table 4.2.3(3) below]. 
According to Chapan-Metz (ibid.), this class was more important in the past, as it 
is related to the fertility rate mentioned above. In fact, 48.2% of Algerians were 
below the age of 15 years in the 1966 census, while this figure slightly decreased to 
47.9% in the 1977 census. According to the World Bank (1994a), it was only 43.66% in 
1990 and decreased to 40.12% in 1995 [see Table 4.2.3(3) below]. 
Seemingly, the proportion of the population under the age 19 years has showed 
signs of decline. It was 57% in the mid-1980s and dropped to 55.13% in 1990 and 
51.67% in 1995, according to the World Bank (ibid.) [see Table 4.2.3(3) below]. 
But all in all, the Algerian population is very young. It is reported that more than 
two-thirds of Algerians are below the age of 30 years (World Bank, 1994a; 
Yacoubian, 1997). These figures represent the trickiest problem that the country has 
to face in the coming years as far as housing, employment, and social protection are 
concerned. 
For 1997, the growth rate was estimated at 2.19%, according to the ONS 1997 estimate. 
If this rhythm continues at the same pace, the population might number a bit more 
than 31 millions of inhabitants by the year 2000, according to the World Bank (1994a) 
[see Table 4.2.3(2) below]. 
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Table 4.2.3(3) - Structure of the population in Algeria 
Unit: million inhabitant 
Age 1990 1995 
class Class total Class ratio Cumulated Class total Class ratio Cumulated 
ratio ratio 
00-04 years 3,828 15.31% 15.31% 3,722 13.23% 13.23% 
05 - 09 years 3,825 15.29% 30.60% 3,767 13.39% 26.61% 
10 -14 years 3,266 13.06% 43.66% 3,803 13.51% 40.12% 
15 -19 years 2,868 11.47% 55.13% 3,250 11.55% 51.67% 
20 - 24 years 2,428 9.71% 64.83% 2,851 10.13% 61.80% 
25 - 29 years 1,890 7.56% 72.39% 2,413 8.57% 70.38% 
30 - 34 years 1,576 6.30% 78.69% 1,878 6.67% 77.05% 
35 - 39 years 1,183 4.73% 83.42% 1,562 5.55% 82.60% 
40 - 44 years 791 3.16% 86.59% 1,168 4.15% 86.75% 
45 - 49 years 777 3.11% 89.69% 777 2.76% 89.51% 
50 - 54 years 721 2.88% 92.57% 755 2.68% 92.19% 
55 - 59 years 524 2.10% 94.67% 690 2.45% 94.65% 
60 - 64 years 438 1.75% 96.42% 489 1.74% 96.38% 
65 - 69 years 357 1.43% 97.85% 392 1.39% 97.78% 
70 - 74 years 236 0.94% 98.79% 298 1.06% 98.83% 
+ 75 years 303 1.21% 100% 328 1.17% 100% 
TOTAL 25,010 100% - 28,143 100% -
Source: World Bank, 1994a, with my own calculations 
4.2.4 Economic parameters 
The Algerian economic model adopted at the time of independence - or, more 
precisely, since the 1971 nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector - is a perfect 
example of the rent-driven economy in which "income is not earned, but derived 
from a gift of nature" and where "revenues are not a gauge of productivity and 
efficiency, but instead flow from the exploitation of a limited natural resource [oil 
and natural gas]" (Yacoubian, 1997). 
Before the on-going reforms started in the early 1990s, the economy was a state-
directed system, where the central government retained ownership of 450 state-
owned enterprises, dominated by the industrial sector - more precisely the 
hydrocarbons (Chapan-Metz, 1993). The distribution of the national G D P among 
sectors is as follows [see Table 4.2.4(1) below]. 
Table 4.2.4(1) - Importance of the different sectors in the national GDP 
Unit: % of GDP 
Sector 1975 1985 1994 1995 
Agriculture 10.5 9.0 10.5 11.3 
Industry 52.5 53.6 49.6 50.7 
Manufacturing 9.1 12.2 10.8 11.5 
Services 37.0 37.4 40.0 38.0 
Source: ONS, compiled by the author 
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Table 4.2.4(2) - Evolution of the hydrocarbons sector production 
Unit: million OEf 
Year 1965 1969 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Oil production 31.4 52.4 82.7 71.0 67.4 72.0 79.0 83.5 
Source: Hireche, 1989 
Table 4.2.4(3) - Evolution of the foreign earnings from oil exports in Algeria 
Unit: US$ billion 
Year 1980 1985 1988 1990 1991 
Total exports 
Oil exports * 
14.965 
12.971 
14.108 
9.668 
9.042 
5.725 
15.002 
9.588 
13.850 
8.464 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total exports 
Oil exports * 
12.924 
7.885 
11.626 
6.902 
10.774 
6.335 
11.863 
7.008 
NA 
8.420 
Source: United Nations, 1997b; World Bank, 1997a 
* Not including natural gas exports. 
Without trying to answer the question: Is the hydrocarbon wealth in Algeria a blessing or 
a curse?, paraphrasing Yacoubian (1997), it is opportune to mention that this country 
owns the fifth largest reserve of natural gas in the world and is the second largest 
exporter. For oil reserves, it ranks fourteenth in the world. 
After having sustained a fair average annual GDP growth in the 1970s (6.5%) and 
the beginning of the 1980s (4.5%), according to Chapan-Metz (ibid.), Algeria has 
experienced a striking, severe period of economic recession due to the 1986 collapse 
of world oil prices. Oil prices fell 70% and hydrocarbons export earnings were 
halved to 32% of the total revenues. Per capita GDP declined from US$ 2,790 in 1987 
to US$ 1,531 in 1995 (United Nations, 1997a: Table 22). This situation indicated the 
danger of promoting a single-resource economy, and "after serving as an icon of 
Third World development during the oil boom years, Algeria abruptly became the 
foster child of disastrous central planning" (Yacoubian, ibid.). 
This dramatic situation muminated "the deeply-embedded inefficiencies and 
mismanagement of Algeria's state-controlled economy" (Yacoubian, ibid.). Recourse 
to short-term loans was taken to cover the imported basic needs of the population 
and foreign debt increased dramatically [see Table 4.2.4(4) below]. 
3 The conventional unit in the oil industry is the Oil-Equivalent Ton (OET) which I translate it from the 
French Tonne Equivalent Pétrole (TEP). 
The hydrocarbons sector represents the backbone of the Algerian economy, 
accounting, respectively, for around 6 0 - 6 5 % of the government annual revenues, 
2 5 % of the national G D P , and more than 9 5 % of annual export earnings, whose 
annual average is between US$ 1 0 to US$ 1 2 billion. Tables 4 . 2 . 4 ( 2 ) and 4 . 2 . 4 ( 3 ) 
hereafter show the output evolution of the hydrocarbons sector, oil exports through 
the years, and how it influenced the country's wealth. Although the overall influence 
of the hydrocarbon industry was positive, especially in sectors related to population 
welfare, it was negative in some economic sectors, especially agriculture. 
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Table 4.2.4(4) - Evolution of the external debt in Algeria (1970-1995) 
Unit: US$ billion 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Foreign debt 0.937 1.233 1.488 2.932 3.305 4.477 5.934 10.318 15.401 
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Foreign debt 17.962 19.365 17.614 16.63 14.902 13.865 15.330 22.651 24.410 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Foreign debt 26.041 27.087 27.896 28.216 27.062 26.033 30.167 32.610 
Source: World Bank, 1988,1989,1997 
However, what changed more dramatically other than the debt is the debt 
service/exports ratio4, which abruptly rose from 32.47% in 1985 to 69.33% in 1988. It 
thus reached an unsustainable level in 1993, Wtting 77.36% [see Table 4.2.4(5) below]. 
Table 4.2.4(5) - Debt service and its debt service/exports ratio in Algeria (1970-1995) 
Units: US$ billion (%fbr Ratio) 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Debt Service 0.044 0.069 0.189 0.300 0.709 0.456 0.773 1.044 1.488 
Exports 1.340 1.173 1.621 2.467 5.621 5.270 5.971 6.733 7.127 
Ratio DS/E 3.28 5.88 11.66 12.16 12.61 8.65 12.95 15.51 20.88 
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Debt Service 2.791 3.854 3.838 4.269 4.462 4.566 4.581 4.681 4.920 
Exports 10.525 14.965 15.581 14.900 14.023 13.919 14.108 9.179 10.511 
Ratio DS/E 26.52 25.75 24.63 28.65 31.82 32.80 32.47 51.00 46.81 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Debt Service 6.269 6.876 8.626 9.071 9.121 8.994 5.149 4.352 
Exports 9.042 10.913 15.002 13.850 12.924 11.626 10.774 11.863 
Ratio DS/E 69.33 63.01 57.50 65.49 70.57 77.36 47.79 36.69 
Source: World Bank, 1988,1989,1997 
As a consequence of this, the government reacted in 1989 by launching a 
comprehensive Structural Adjustment Programme, sponsored by the IMF and the 
World Bank, in order to achieve economic stabilization and introduce market 
mechanisms into the economy. Although it started showing substantial progress 
towards economic adjustment, the reform drive slowed down as a result of the 
political turmoil that started in 1992. 
Given the unsustainable situation of 1993 described earlier, the government 
concluded a one-year standby agreement with the IMF in April 1994, followed one 
year later (May 1995) by a three-year agreement encompassing structural adjustment 
measures. 
These agreements opened the opportunity for the government to negotiate with 
both the Paris Club and the London Club about the external debt rescheduling, 
4 The debt service/exports ratio is an economic indicator to determine the level of indebtedness of the 
country. It shows the proportion of the annual earnings that covers the debt service (debt principal 
reimbursement and interests payment). 
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Unit: AD per US$ 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Exchange rate 494 6.73 8.03 12.19 21.39 22.78 24.12 42.89 52.18 56.19 
Index (1990=100) 41 55 66 100 175 187 198 352 428 461 
Source: United Nations, 1997b: Table 84 
Another particular item of these reforms is the industrial sector restructuration and 
the privatization of the state-owned enterprises. In fact, these enterprises are 
inefficient and created less than half the jobs per dollar invested compared to the 
private firms (World Bank, 1995: 26). According to the IMF agreement, far-reaching 
reforms affected these enterprises but the government was very reluctant "to 
implement the privatization measures that IMF deems critical for a sustained 
economic recovery", given that at least 250,000 jobs were estimated to disappear due 
to these measures (Yacoubian, ibid.). However, the government had no choice and 
started applying these measures in 1996 by sc^tting, as part of its safety net, the Caisse 
Nationale pour l'Allocation de Chômage (CNAC), that is, the National Office for 
Unemployment. 
Although sketchily presented, these reforms did achieve, according to the IMF, 
quite satisfying results at the macro-economic level: (1) The budget deficit was 
brought to 4.4% in 1994, down from 8.7% in 1993; (2) The growth of money supply 
was tightened from 21% in 1993 to 15% in 1994, contributing to the containment of 
inflation despite price liberalization and devaluation; (3) A financial sector reform 
was initiated to apply market discipline to state enterprises; and (4) The rate of GDP 
growth lined up at 4.4% in 1995 [see Table 4.2.4(7) below]. 
It was, in fact, a positive growth rate after almost a decade of economic recession. 
However, many critics observed that it was an external growth (higher oil prices and 
high exchange rate for the US dollar), while prices at the consumer level continued 
which helped lower the debt service/exports ration to 47.70% in 1994 and to 36.69% 
in 1995 [see Table 4.2.4(5) above]. 
This was not as easy as it seems, however. For their part of the negotiations, the 
government obligated itself to fulfill its commitment to the agreements concluded 
with the IMF. Some reforms in the economy had to be undertaken. 
One particular item of these reforms was the adoption of a more realistic 
exchange rate. This meant entering a cycle of currency devaluations with all its 
consequences in terms of prices liberalization and, consequently, their effect on the 
purchasing power of the population. Table 4.2.4(6) below shows the evolution of the 
exchange rate in Algeria during the last six years. The effects of this policy can be 
easily understood if we add to the package the imposed ceiling on government 
wages and the tightened money supply to contain inflation and reduce domestic 
consumption and imports. It is then useless to spend time describing the 
consequences that this exchange rate policy yielded at the social level, given that the 
basic needs of large segments of the population are mostly imported. 
Table 4.2.4(6) - Exchange rate of the US dollar in Algeria (1987-1996) 
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to increase, the purchasing power of large segments of the population deteriorated. 
It is then noted that the macro-economic successes have not trickled down to the 
general population (Yacoubian, ibid.). 
Table 4.2.4(7) - GDP growth rate in Algeria (1987-1995) 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
GDP growth rate (in %) -0.1 -1.6 + 5.0 -1.5 -1.4 +1.8 -1.9 -1.0 + 4.4 
Source: World Bank, 1997a 
4 . 2 . 5 Aalministrative and political structure 
For administrative purposes, Algeria is divided into 4 8 provinces (wilaya in singular 
and wilayate in plural) [see Figure 4 . 2 . 5 ( 1 ) below]. Each wilaya is divided into districts 
{Mm in singular and dairate in plural), and each district is constituted in its turn by 
municipalities or communes (baladia in singular and baladiate in plural). These are 
also the levels of hierarchical stratification in terms of development. In fact, each line 
ministry must have at least an official office at the province level, but many, such as 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, goes down to the municipality level. 
Figure 4.2.5(1) - Map of the 48 provinces of Algeria 
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The maintenance of law and order is the responsibility of the wali at the province 
level, and of the Daïra Chief at the district level. At the municipality level, this used 
to be the charge of the mayor or president of the Assemblée Populaire Communale 
(APC), elected for 5 years through democratic ballot, but for the last few years, this 
task went to the president of the Délégation Executive Communale, a special body co-
opted by the administration after all assemblies elected in the first multiparty 
election of 1990 were dissolved, after the famous Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) 
movement in the country. 
For the purpose of agricultural development, the Direction des Services Agricoles 
(DSA) is the representative, decentralized unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries at the province level. Organized into at least 5 services, it is structured 
downwards into District Sections (Subdivisions), depending on the importance of the 
size of the wilaya. Each subdivision covers a group of baladiate [see Table 4.2.5(1) 
below]. 
However, since the early 1990s, farmer organizations have started to appear and 
Provincial Chambers of Agriculture were settled, one for each xvilaya, culminating all 
with the National Chamber of Agriculture. 
As far as agricultural development is concerned, these new bodies, serving as 
farmers' claims channels, are of a great importance, even though the problem of 
representativeness is put into debate. 
Table 4.2.5(1) - Administration and agricultural sector's structures in Algeria 
Level of Administration Agricultural sector structures 
territoriality structure Administration Farmers' organizations 
National Government Ministry of Agriculture and National Chamber of 
Fisheries Agriculture 
Province Wilaya Direction des Services Provincial Chamber of 
Agricoles Agriculture 
District Daïra Subdivision de l'Agriculture Fanners' associations 
Commune Baladia Délégué Communal Farmers' associations 
Source: field notes 
On February 23,1989, a new constitution was voted by the people and the one-party 
system was replaced by a multiparty 'democracy'. The same constitution was in 
November 28, 1996 in order to 'consolidate' democracy and the multiparty system. 
Since the introduction of the multipartism in 1989, the political structure consists of 
these following complementary layers: 
• the Communal Popular Assembly, as the executive body, at the baladia level, 
• the Wilaya Popular Assembly as the decision-making body, and the Wilaya as the 
executive body, at the provincial level; 
• the bi-cameral (two chambers) Parliament as the legislative body, and the Council 
of Government as the executive body, at the national level; and, 
• the president of the Republic. 
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All the assemblies and the president of the Republic are elected by democratic ballot 
for 5 years. The first multipartist and 'democratic' presidential election took place on 
November 16, 1995 and the new multipartist and democratic National Popular 
Assembly (1st Chamber of the Parliament) was 'democratically' elected on June 5, 
1997. 
The last, but not least, event to mention here concerns the new multipartist, 
democratic Assemblies Populaires Communities (APCs) and Assemblies Populaires de 
Wilaya (APWs) that were 'democratically' elected on October 23,1997, giving birth to 
the Council of the Nation (2nd Chamber of the Parliament), two-thirds of which are 
members elected from elected persons at APCs and APWs, and the remaining one-
third is nominated by the president of the Republic. 
4.2.6 On-going political, socio-economic and cultural settings 
Despite the good results achieved by the reforms, as described above, some striking 
political, socio-economic, and cultural problems remain there and constitute the 
agenda for the coming governing bodies. These are briefly presented hereafter: 
• The economy is still oil-centered, which heightens the country's vulnerability to 
external shocks and fails to address the major structural flaws that plague Algeria, 
such as reducing unemployment through creating enough job opportunities. 
Instead of showing some creativity in an efficient economic policy in order to 
diversify foreign earnings, the regime is still relying on the hydrocarbon sector as 
shown by the multi-billion dollar contracts that foreign companies continuously 
sign with Sonatrach, the state-owned oil company, since 1995 (Yacoubian, ibid.). 
• The economy is plagued by inefficient, state-owned enterprises, especially in the 
industrial sector where output failed by 12% in 1996 while the national GDP 
continued to rise. Meanwhile, these state industries that employed 1.7 million 
workers routinely operated at 35 to 50% of their capacity (Yacoubian, ibid.). 
• Unemployment is very high (estimated in 1996 at 28% by ONS). Jobless people 
count for 2.1 million, among whom 80% are less than 30 years old, while the 
economy created 144,000 jobs in 1995. These figures, susceptible to increase 
through the applications of the IMF-recommended privatization measures, 
frighten the regime that is wary of the potentially explosive response to public 
sector lay-offs (Yacoubian, ibid.). 
• Housing is characterized by a severe shortage as the 1996 housing deficit was 
estimated at 2 million units (World Bank, 1996). As Yacoubian (ibid.) puts it, "with 
a population growing by at least 500,000 each year, the strain of housing is 
unlikely to lessen anytime soon". 
• Although demographic growth has slowed to 2% per year [see Table 4.2.3(1) 
above], the effects of previous higher growth rates are still present in Algerians' 
daily life. In fact, the number of young men between the ages of 15-30 has more 
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than tripled between 1965 and 1990, according to Ruedy (1994b: 82). The 'hittistes'5 
are now facing social problems including truancy, drug abuse and lack of hope in 
the future because of unavailability of job opportunities and shortage of housing. 
• Algeria's rent-based economy always represented a magnet for corruption, as the 
rentier state and its corrupt bureaucracy controls - and continues controlling under 
the umbrella of democracy - the distribution of hydrocarbon wealth. As a 
consequence, many actors in the Algerian economy, instead of focusing on real, 
productive economic ventures, devote their efforts to chasing hydrocarbon rents, 
and compromise non-oil based productivity (Yacoubian, ibid.). 
• Some environmental problems are currently reported in the country. These are the 
following: 
* Soil erosion from overgrazing and poor farming practices; 
* Dumping of raw sewage, petroleum refining wastes, and other 
industrial effluents, leading to pollution of rivers and coastal waters; 
* Mediterranean Sea, in particular, becoming polluted from oil wastes, 
soil erosion and fertilizer run-off; 
* Inadequate supplies of potable water. 
Therefore, as Yacoubian (ibid.) says: 
A burgeoning population, massive unemployment, overcrowded cities, and a dilapidated 
infrastructure have combined with a vastly inefficient economy to create a socio-economic 
catastrophe in Algeria. The past five years of violence only aggravated these deep-rooted 
problems. As most Algerians struggle to meet daily needs, the 'social explosion' scenario of 
rioters taking the streets looms ominously on the horizon. 
It is true that this situation is very worrisome for the evident fact that the Algerian 
underprivileged class, especially the 'hittistes', disgusted by rampant public 
corruption, alienated from the regime to which they "harbour a deep hatred", and 
losing hope in their future, can provide a bottomless pool of recruits for any riots or 
upheavals, according to Yacoubian (ibid.). 
4.3 Algeria post-independence state formation and its development philosophy 
4.3.1 Historical sketch of the post-independence state formation 
In 1962, after seven-and-a-half years of a bloody war against the French colonization, 
which started in 1830 and lasted for 132 years, Algeria recovered its sovereignty and 
a post-independence state apparatus had to take over the colonial governorate. How 
this state was formed in the past and settled in office is considered to be of utmost 
importance in understanding the present life of the country. 
5 The word hittistes represents a French- syntax Arabic word used to describe the disaffected young 
men that "prop up the walls", according to Yacoubian (1997). 
SETTING THE GENERAL CONTEXT 9 1 
This is why I dedded to consider the period of the French colonization as a 
starting point in this section in order to describe the historical process of the 
Algerian state formation and gather enough knowledge about two important issues 
for this study: ( 1 ) The philosophy of development in post-independence Algeria, 
under the one-party system that took place in 1 9 6 2 , and; (2 ) The consequences of this 
philosophy on the agricultural development arena, and its related planning and 
policy-making system. 
Contemporary history of Algeria is very tightly linked to the Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN) evolution. In 1 9 5 4 , this party engaged in a difficult endeavour to 
unify all the Algerian forces, founded upon different ideologies, in the struggle 
against the French colonization. Given the success of this action, the FLN became the 
main opponent to the French colonial state during the Guerre de Libération, which 
started November 1 , 1 9 5 4 . 
However, this organization was far from being a monolith. Already in 1 9 5 6 , it was 
described as a constellation of political and sodal forces representing contradictory 
and dashing interests. While the mission of the FLN was to free Algeria from French 
colonialism and recover its independence, a bureaucracy emerged from this 
organization and developed at the periphery of the first Algerian Gouvernement 
Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA), a provisional in-exile government, that 
was formed in 1 9 5 8 in neighbouring Tunisia. As Bennoune ( 1 9 7 6 : 5 ) reports: 
While the burden of the war was still being carried by the peasantry, these disparate social 
classes [that encompassed the FLN party] were engaged in only silent, internal, factional strife 
and maintained on the surface a working Tioly alliance' of all political tendencies. 
Moreover, Jackson ( 1 9 7 7 : xv) acknowledges that "the fundamental obstacle to the 
movement's political development was divisiveness among the FLN leaders 
themselves". This was mainly due to the way leaders were 'elected' within the 
organization. According to Bennoune (ibid.: 6 ) , at the top, leaders were co-opted for 
their political importance, at the bottom, it rested on local notables rather than on 
real militants. Jackson (ibid.) affirms that: 
Of necessity, the leaders contained their political and personal differences in the confrontation 
against the French. Yet, the latent conflicts were never resolved in wartime and persisted even 
after independence was won. From its inception, FLN adapted the principle of collégial 
leadership. . . . Collective authority was instrumental in regulating the leadership conflicts 
during the struggle. But just before independence, the party movement itself divided into 
opposing camps as different leaders enlisted supporters to compete in a factional struggle for 
power. Consequently, the principle of collective leadership succumbed to factionalism at the 
very time it would have been most useful in promoting the rise of cohesive and representative 
party. 
When Algeria became independent in 1 9 6 2 , the FLN emerged from the war as a 
highly fragmented entity. At the same time, FLN leaders dedded that the party 
should be the national guide and authority of the new political system (Jackson, 
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ibid.: xvi). In others words, the FLN became the only 'engine' of economic and social 
development in the country, although, as Bennoune (ibid.: 5 ) states well: 
Until the Tripoli Program was adopted in 1962 by the National Council of the Algerian 
Revolution (CNRA), the various platforms and the declarations of the FLN contained no 
detailed socio-economic analysis outlining the future political system of the country. 
This decision taken by some leaders without consulting of the rest of the militants 
ended up in "the outbreak of an open struggle in the summer of 1 9 6 2 between 
various factions of the FLN representing conflicting ideological and economic 
interests" (Bennoune, ibid.). 
In summary, after having achieved the very difficult task of unifying all Algerians 
in the struggle against the French to recover the independence of the country, the 
FLN started developing a culture of factionalism, within which certain factions 
started to build up many 'contre-nature' ties with the national bourgeoisie. 
After the departure of the French settlers in 1 9 6 2 , the post-colonial class struggle 
began properly. As Bennoune (ibid., 8 ) puts it, the national bourgeoisie, which was 
in a chronic state of 'under-capitalization', started buying, at low prices, all 
industrial, commercial, and other valued mobile property from the fleeing settlers. 
Within the same context, the landlords and rich peasants desired the possibility of 
purchasing farms from the leaving 'colons', but they did not do so as the agricultural 
labourers barred their way by settling self-management committees (see Box 
4 . 5 . 2 . 2 ( 1 ) in this chapter). Meanwhile, as Bennoune (ibid.) recalls, 
The professionals, educated elements, former colonial civil servants (mostly trained and 
promoted during the war within the framework of the counterinsurgency strategy), FLN 
bureaucrats from the provisional government in Tunisia and Morocco, and some educated 
guerrilla officers occupied the administrative structure of the former colonial state apparatus. 
The territorial organization left by the French was not changed much at 
independence and all communes were administered by appointed 'special 
delegations' (Bennoune, ibid.). 
Inside the administration, the upper echelons went exclusively to people from a 
bourgeois background, either from 'metropolitan' France or among the 'natives' of 
Algeria. The number of civil servants operating in the new state turned around 
5 5 , 0 0 0 - 6 0 , 0 0 0 persons. An official census conducted in 1 9 6 3 revealed that two-fifths 
were Algerians that graduated from the schools of colonial administration and the 
rest were 'chosen' FLN and ALN (National Freedom Army) cadres and/or persons 
recruited after March 1 9 , 1 9 6 2 (cease-fire day). As a result, according to Bennoune 
(ibid.: 8 ) : 
This bureaucracy inherited not only these colonial structures but also attitudes and values 
characteristic of the civil service, which was indifferent and disdainful to the plight of the 
administered population. 
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The decision taken by the FLN leaders to adopt a one-party system engendered an 
internal political crisis within the FLN. According to Bennoune (ibid.: 9): 
This crisis was provoked by class realignment which began in the summer of 1962, both within 
the FLN and the Algerian society at large. Class and ideologies distinctions grew into grave 
contradictions, notably into differences of opinion both between the right and left of the FLN, 
and between different sections of the left. 
However, although the post-independence state had to start under a given political 
leadership, the different political groups did not reach a consensus. By fall, 1962, a 
coalition of disparate factions, coming from heterogeneous social backgrounds, 
allied with the Armée des Frontières and gained power under the leadership of the 
populist Ben Bella. Thanks to some wise personalities in the country and to the 
people that demonstrated in the streets, shouting "sebaa snine barakat"6, a civil war 
was avoided and the new state started functioning according to the Tripoli Charter. 
Until 1965, taking the time to construct their politics and policies around a 
supposedly revolutionary, socialist rhetoric, the political leadership developed an 
extremely populist discourse and was always delaying the required decisions on 
emergent aspects. This did not please the high staff of the army and, after having 
been patients for 3 years, the army generals decided to intervene. 
On June 19, 1965, as Bennoune (ibid.: 9) mentions, a 'coup d'etat' took place and 
allowed the army to take control over the power. This 'coup d'etat' resulted in a 
'worked alliance' between the new techno-bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the army 
which lasted until 1971, when the charter for the agrarian revolution was adopted by 
the political revolutionary leadership. 
At this paradoxical juncture, both political and economic power was the domain 
of the Revolution Council, the main body of the state, while the executive 
administrative power felt upon the new administrative bourgeoisie which re-
established close ties with the old mercantile and rural agrarian bourgeoisie. Having 
at its top a man (late Houari Boumediene) with a great dedication for the 
construction of the country and for the welfare of the people, the state took 
important decisions related to the nationalization of natural resources and the major 
means of production, as well as welfare policies aimed at a fair distribution of the 
national income and resources. This was called 'the decade of real development'. 
However, this could not hide the great paradox of the iron-law that Algeria had to 
suffer under: The danism at the highest sphere of the state apparatus. 
In fact, the regime (or le pouvoir, as it is called in Algeria) that took place at that 
time relied "on two primary sources: The military and a complex 
bureaucracy/security apparatus", meaning that the "real power in Algeria has 
always resided with the military" (Yacoubian, 1997). 
* The slogan meant that seven years of a bloody war against the French was enough, and there was no 
need to fight for power. This was mentioned earlier in section 1.3.1, according to Quandt (1998:22). 
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But this regime that imphdtly inherited the unsolved problems of the ante-
independence era was far from being monoHthic as well. Thus, the 'lutte des clans' 
"served as a constant backdrop to the army's role in Algeria politics" (Yacoubian, 
ibid.). As Yacoubian (ibid.) mentions: 
Lacking indigenous institutions to ground their authority, Algeria's new leaders simply grafted 
their war-time, clan-based network onto the remnants of the French colonial system.... To this 
day, Algeria's leadership is driven by narrow, clan-based interests, and ultimately by a desire to 
stay in power. 
After the death of Houari Boumediene, things started changing at a very high speed. 
The consequences of the iron-law of clans mentioned above became more apparent. 
The pro-capitalist (or better, the rentier) dan consolidated their strength within the 
state apparatus and the FLN party, under the blessing of the powerful generals of 
the army who never sought to govern the country openly. They were thus able to get 
one of theirs - Chadli Bendjedid - into the presidency of the Republic in 1979, and 
started a purge against Marxist-Leninist planners and pro-Boumedienists in order to 
"shift the balance of political forces in their favour" (Pfeifer, 1985: 238). This 
announced the start of the black decade'. 
Preferring as always to stay in the background, ruling from 'behind the curtains', 
the military developed an elaborate state apparatus to execute the military decisions. 
"This vast network [the state apparatus] of security personnel, bureaucrats, and 
public entrepreneurs maintains a symbiotic relationship with the regime, carrying 
out its dktates in return for personal profit" (Yacoubian, ibid.). In this system, the 
president in fad cannot dedde alone and has to only be the public expression of the 
fragile equilibrium of the decision-makers. Some who wanted to rule without 
consultation of the military were pushed out of power. Chadli Bendjedid in January, 
1992, and Liamine Zeroual in September, 1998 are two examples over whom this 
rule was applied. 
In the state bureaucrades, dvil servants come from a variety of background 
factions within their countries, although in the Algerian case, they have a bourgeois 
(or even a petty bourgeois) profile, espedally among those staffing the higher 
positions. This sets a culture of recruitment and promotion conditioned by the 
affiliation to a given faction. In such a context, faction rivalries became basic 
elements of conflicts within and/or between different administrative units. Thus, 
transfers, promotions and other forms of personnel change take place as the outcome 
of internal political processes which are of an informal or 'behind the stage' kind. 
People do not benefit from these personnel changes because of their competence, 
qualification, experience, and slrills, given that family relationships, ideologies 
affiliation and other fartors count for a great deal in such a context (Wallis, 1989). To 
sum up the features of this system, Yacoubian (ibid.) suggests that: 
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Elaborate patron-client networks have developed in which well-connected bureaucrats exploit 
their access to state goods and perks to secure favours from clients. Government bureaucrats 
serve as intermediaries, directing the distribution of goods, state contracts, and (notably) oil 
rents. 
In other words, the state in post-independence Algeria, after being a relatively 
correct form of a developmental and welfare state during the mid-1960s and 1970s, 
became in the early 1980s a true case of what Wiggins (1985) calls the "economy of 
affection". Worse still, Algeria entered the 'decade of political instabiHty' in 1988, 
within which not less than four presidents and seven governments have been in 
office, and many 'models' of consultative bodies were experienced. 
4.3.2 Algerian post-independence state and development philosophy 
After independence, the political and economic orientation in Algeria was basically 
based - at least at the level of official rhetoric and discourse - upon a socialist 
ideology, with a one-party political system as the unique 'source of inspiration' for 
the social and economic development of the country. However, notwithstanding 
what was said by political leaders - that is, Algeria was following a non-capitalist (or 
better, a socialist) model of development - independent Algeria as it evolved since 
the 1960s fit neither the pure 'capitalist' nor the pure 'socialist' model. Yet the pattern 
it manifested, according to Pfeifer (1985: 6), seems to be representative of a particular 
trend easily recognizable among Third World countries at certain periods in their 
histories, that is state capitalism. According to Pfeifer (ibid.: 8), 
Seeking to catch up with the industrial capitalist countries, Algeria followed a development 
path which entails a crucial role for the state and public ownership. Yet which fosters 
institutions such as pursuit of profit and hierarchical social that are typical of other, more 
obviously capitalist societies. 
The model followed by the Algerian political leaders assigned total authority in 
development work to the state through a centralized unit of planning and a large 
state bureaucracy. 
Under this orientation, the state took an active role in directing the economy 
through central planning, investment in infrastructure (transportation, 
communications, and utilities), and even direct investment in manufacturing. It used 
its control over the resources and credit to influence the decisions of private 
enterprises in those arenas which public enterprises did not (or could not) invest in, 
such as light industry, services, and agricultural production. It promoted social, 
educational and welfare policies that aimed at modernizing the labour force. It 
affected income distribution as well, through wage policies and through public 
subsidies for certain consumer goods. It also promoted structural change in the 
agricultural sector through the agrarian revolution. 
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4.3.3 Consequences of state development philosophy on agricultural development 
Though the political leaders were claiming that the model of development was 
socialistic, the real vision of the bureaucratic state was rather more capitalistic as 
high civil servants dealt with the country's wealth as if it was their own. In such a 
'capitalist-oriented' context, as Long ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 0 9 ) puts it: 
Agricultural development entails increasing capital penetration, although it may not lead 
immediately to the formation of a capitalist farming class... It is also frequently marked by the 
bi-polarization of rich and poor farmers implying the marginalization of some producers, 
depeasantization and proletarianization. 
However, one typical characteristic of this mode, according to Long (ibid.: 1 1 0 ) , 
remains its periodic crises which lead to increased unemployment and reduced 
wages. And it is the responsibility of the sole state to design strategic actions to bring 
back profit at its initial level and contain the mass social troubles. On a rural level, 
these crises engender the agrarian crisis which is often characterized by very low-
rate local development, generalized rural poverty, stagnation (or in the worst cases, 
reduction) in crop production and increasing political and social conflicts. 
Furthermore, Long (ibid.: 1 1 2 ) mentions: 
Dominant class interests, represented either directly or indirectly in state power, were critical in 
determining the types of policies adopted and their effectiveness. Stated policies goals often 
concealed other implicit objectives that were logically derived from the dominant charac-
teristics and contradiction in the socio-economic system. 
In this sense, development actions were always designed in such a way that, 
according to Long (ibid.), "the capitalist landed elite and the rural bourgeoisie (often 
in alliance with members of the urban bourgeoisie) received the lion's share of the 
benefits". Moreover, the state has always played a major role in eliminating the 
"remnants of pre-capitalist social relations, which block[ed] the development of the 
forces of production", as it tried to do with the promulgation of the agrarian 
revolution charter. Thus, in such a context, instead of being at the service of the 
people (the majority), the state becomes a more direct instrument of domination of 
the class alliance in power. 
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4.4 The agricultural sector in Algeria7 
4.4.1 General background of the agricultural sector since the independence 
Prior to independence in 1962, Algeria's economy was mainly dominated by 
agriculture for not less than a millennium. It once provided 93% of its agricultural 
requirements. However, with rising oil revenues, especially since 1973, when the 
first oil crash happened, the government embarked on a very ambitious industrial 
programme which transformed the economy to the detriment of agriculture. 
When the agrarian revolution was launched, agriculture was still an important 
sector. However, for many reasons, its output could not live up to the national 
demand. Major factors of this situation were as follows. 
Although some intensification was introduced in the Domaines Agricoles Socialites 
(DASs), i.e. the state-owned and worker-managed farms, the rate of production 
growth for some basic crops did not equal the demographic growth, which was 
extremely high (more than 3% in the 1960s and 1970s). 
Moreover, a fierce - although introverted - 'resistance' to the agrarian revolution 
emerged after 1973 from powerful segments in the country, having strong linkages 
with the regime (or its periphery), which hampered the implementation of the policy 
and negatively influenced agricultural output. At the same time, Algerian 
agriculture is mostly rainfed (irrigated land does not count for more than 3% of the 
total arable land), and rainfall is rather unstable and irregular. Table 4.4.1(1) shows 
perfectly the fluctuations of agricultural production within a given period. 
Table 4.4.1(1) - Changes in total agricultural production (1984-1989) 
Unit: million ton 
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Total production 3.474 5.543 4.185 3.070 3.964 5.246 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Given the tremendous development of the industrial sector and the stagnation of 
agricultural output, the importance of the agricultural sector started declining. Table 
4.4.1(2) shows the decline of the agricultural proportion in the national GDP since 
the nationalization of the hydrocarbons (1971), more precisely since the 1973 oil 
boom. 
Table 4.4.1(2) - Agricultural proportion in the national GDP (1969-1978) 
Unit: % 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
AgGDP 12.4 10.9 9.5 10.0 7.9 6.7 7.8 8.0 7.0 6.7 
Source: Hireche, 1989 
7 This section is written upon information from different publications of the ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries as well as from different publications of the Ministry-Delegation of Planning. 
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However, in order to secure the basic needs of the population, and thanks to the 
1973 oil boom that secured considerable amounts of foreign currency for the 
country, the government was forced to resort to food imports, especially for cereal 
grains, in order to fill in the gap. Additionally, after having been a net exporter of 
high quality agricultural products, Algeria became a net importer of agricultural 
products, mainly because of the inefficiency of the implemented development 
actions and the low input from the state. 
4.4.2 Present real assets of the agricultural sector in Algeria 
4.4.2.1 Land resources and major crops 
Despite the large size of the country (238 million hectares), only 42 million of 
hectares (18% of the total area) are classified as agricultural land resources. Among 
these, Algeria does not use more than 7.5 million of hectares for agricultural 
activities, which represent only 3% of the total area [see Table 4.4.2.1(1) below]. The 
ratio of arable land per inhabitant has decreased from 1.10 in 1901 to 0.60 in 1955 to 
0.32 in 1995 (INVA, 1997: 8). 
Table 4.42.1(1) - Land resources, land use and evolution through the years (1965-1995) 
Unit: thousands ha 
Item Evolution through the years Average 
rate (%) 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
1. Total land 238,174 238,174 238,174 238,174 238,174 238,174 238,174 100.00 
2. Agricultural land 44,167 44,216 43,753 43,830 39,051 38,676 NA 17.75 
3. Annual & 6,784 6,800 7,495 7,509 7,511 7,635 8,029 3.06 
permanent crops 
4. Annual crops 6,203 6,248 6,845 6,875 6,910 7,081 7,519 2.81 
5. Permanent crops 581 552 650 634 601 554 510 0.25 
6. Permanent pastures 37,383 37,416 36,258 36,321 31,540 31,041 NA 14.69 
7. Forest & wood 3,200 3,700 4,122 4384 4,586 4,061 NA 1.68 
8. All other lands 190,807 190,258 190,299 189,960 194,537 195,437 NA 80.56 
9. Non-annual & 231,390 231,374 230,679 230,665 230,663 230,539 230,145 96.94 
permanent crops ** 
Irrigated land 233 238 244 253 338 384 555 0.13 
Source: FAO, 1998 
* 1995 is not included in the mean calculations due to the non-avaUability (NA) of some data. 
** Row 9 (Non-annual & permanent crops) includes the sum of rows 6,7 and 8. 
Table 4.4.2.1(1) shows the land resources in Algeria and their evolution though the 
years. Irrigated land represents an average 0.13% of the total area, 0.76% of the 
agricultural land, and 4.40% of the annually cropped land. 
A confidential report of the World Bank, based on a survey conducted by the 
Algerian organization, the Bureau National des Etudes en Développement Rural 
(BNEDER), revealed that the semi-arid zone (annual rainfall between 450 and 600 
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mm) counts for more than 66% of the agricultural area, while the arid zone (annual 
rainfall between 350 and 450 mm) takes 14% of the same area. 
Within this agricultural area, cereal crops annually comprise nearly 50% of the 
area, while the cereals-based farming systems (including cereals, pulses, forage, 
pastures and fallow) account for more than 90% of this area. Table 4.4.2.1.(2) shows 
these figures. 
Table 4.4.2.1(2) - Supremacy of cereal crops in Algerian agriculture (1975-1995) 
Unit: thousands ha 
Items Variation over the years Average 
1975-95 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Agricultural land (1) 7,495 7,509 7,530 8,098 8,026 7,732 
Cereal crops (2) 3,506 3,717 4,166 3,428 3,174 3,598 
Fallow (3) 3,212 2,981 2,500 3,838 4,038 3,314 
% cereal crops (2/1) 47 50 55 42 40 47 
% cereal systems ((2+3)/l) 90 89 89 90 90 90 
Source: World Bank, 1997b 
It should be noted that cereals provide 80% of the average nutritional diet in Algeria, 
60% of the energy and 70% of the proteins. But despite its large 'supremacy' within 
the agricultural sector and in consumption, the domestic overall production of cereal 
crops remains insufficient [see Table 4.4.2.1(3) below] and does not cover more than 
25-30% of the population needs. 
Equitable access to this strategic food has been maintained for all due to the 
massive imports of cereal grains by the government from the world market. 
Given the amount of foreign currency it annually requires and which the 
government is increasingly unable to mobilize, this dependency became less and less 
easy to sustain. 
Table 4.4.2.1(3) - Cereal production during the 1986-95 decade 
Unit: 1,000 T 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Average 
Production 2,381 2,062 1,034 1,972 1,624 3,808 3,225 1,451 962 2,139 2,066 
Source: World Bank, 1997b 
4.4.2.2 Pasture and rangelands and current carrying capacity 
Pasture and rangelands, the most important part of which is known as the steppe, are 
located between the isohyete 200 mm, as a lower limit and the isohyete 400 mm, as 
higher limit. The importance of these zones is not in their tremendous acreage per se, 
even though they count for more than 30 million hectares (1961-97 average), but in 
the volume of livestock that is living in these zones (35% of all animal resources and 
almost three-quarters of the total sheep flocks). Despite their importance, these areas 
are severely exposed to over-exploitation, resources depletion, and thus, to 
degradation and desert encroachment [see Table 4.4.2.1(1) above, row 6]. 
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" FU stands for the Feed Unit which is a conventional measure used in cattle and sheep nutrition. One 
FU is equivalent to the amount of energy given by one kilogram of barley grains. 
The rangelands are the main feeding source - which is their primary function - for 
animal resources, mostly sheep, that graze in these regions. In terms of capacity, 
over 12 million sheep graze in the steppe rangelands. A recent study has estimated 
the carrying capacity at 525 millions FU per year in 1993, while it was 1.6 billions FU 
in 1978. Meanwhile, sheep flocks increased from 8 rmllion head in 1978 to more than 
12 million head in 1993 (Redjel, 1993; Boukheloua, 1995). At the same time, the 
maintenance requirements for the actual livestock present in these areas was 
estimated at 5.5 billion FU per year, which implies that a huge disequilibrium 
between demand and supply exists (Boukheloua, ibid.). 
At present, it is estimated that an average of 45 FU 8 /ha/year is available, which 
represents 43% of the total diet of the sheep living in the rangelands area (71% of the 
total sheep). The rest of the diet is covered by either feed imports or feeding 
resources coming from other areas, such as barley, hay, stubble grazing, etc. made 
available mainly in the High-Plateaus region. These issues will be presented in more 
details in Chapter 5 section 5.3. 
4.4.2.3 Livestock, cattle, and other animal resources 
Animal resources represent a very important sub-sector in agricultural activity, 
especially for the sheep, whose name 'El-Mel' among Algerian sheepherders, 
middlemen, and specialists means the capital in the Algerian dialectal language. 
Among all other animal resources, sheep take a place of utmost importance in the 
risk management strategies of the farmers. Table 4.4.2.3(1) shows the evolution of 
the animal resources as an important sub-sector of agriculture. 
It is clear that all types of animal resources grew at a constant rate since 
independence, with the exception of camels because of a lack of government support 
towards this sub-sector. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the sub-sector 
gained some attention from the government due to the creation of a specific 
association that could 'speak up' about the role of these animals in the national 
economy (main transportation means for the far remote Saharan areas). The most 
noticeable rate of annual growth concerns the chicken sub-sector which was due to 
the voluntaristic policies to develop this activity in order to provide alternative 
animal proteins for the population at the cheapest price. The other sub-sectors 
received slight support from the state in terms of feed resources, breed imports, 
specific equipment, and technical and health assistance. 
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Item Evolution through the years Mean Growth 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 (1961-97) (1965-95) 
Cattle 602 885 1,002 1,363 1,416 1,392 1,267 1,106 2.94% 
Sheep 5,726 7,788 9,773 13,370 15,660 17,697 17,302 11,860 3.93% 
Goats 1,762 2,581 2,269 2,723 2,688 2,472 2,780 2,445 1.34% 
Camels 176 184 155 149 133 122 126 147 -0.51% 
Chickens 10,600 13,800 16,061 25,000 63,000 74,000 102,000 41,443 10.34% 
Beehives 120 150 180 192 215 245 270 190 2.11% 
Source: FAO, 1998 
According to INVA (ibid.: 11), agricultural animal products count for more than 50% 
of the agricultural GDP during the last decade. They are composed of: 
• red meat, with a production of 290,000 tons, at an average annual growth of 6.1%; 
• poultry meat, with a production of 300,000 tons, at an average annual growth of 
11.1%; 
• dairy milk production, estimated at 1.05 billion liters (to which must be added 4.1 
million tons of imported skimmed milk powder) with an average annual growth 
of 4.8%; 
• eggs, with a production of 165,000 tons, at an average annual growth of 30%. 
Concerning red meat production, even though the annual growth remains 
acceptable for the last decade (4.6% in average), as Table 4.4.2.3(2) shows, the 
production did not cover the deficit accumulated since the time of independence. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the objective of 228,000 tons of the Und 
Quinquennial Plan (1985-1989) was almost achieved in 1990. 
Table 4.4.2.3(2) - Evolution of red meat production in Algeria (1987-1996) 
Unit: thousand metric Ton 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Beef and veal 74 81 85 89 89 108 98 101 101 104 
Mutton and lamb 107 111 129 134 144 155 169 169 170 175 
TOTAL 180 193 214 223 233 263 267 270 271 279 
Annual growth (%) - 7.2 10.9 4.2 4.5 12.9 1.5 1.1 0.4 3.0 
Average growth (%) - - - - - - - - - 4.6 
Source: UN, 1997a: Table 44 
To these resources, we must add the fisheries sub-sector. With 1,200 km of coast on 
the Mediterranean Sea, Algeria could make significant use of potential of fisheries to 
increase its food security. According to INVA (ibid.: 14), the 'fishable' stock on the 
coastal band is estimated at 160,000 tons per year, without including other fishable 
stocks. Meanwhile, the best level of production ever achieved was 135,402 tons in 
1994, known that the average of the 1990-95 period was 101,330 tons'. 
* My own calculations based upon Table 4.4.2.3(3)give a figure of 103,700 metric tons. 
Table 4.4.2.3(1) - Evolution of the animal resources in Algeria (1965-1995) 
Unit: thousands head 
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In terms of fish consumption, the average is estimated at 3.4 kg/inhabitant/year 
which is extremely low compared to the Mediterranean average that totals 12 
kg/inhabitant/year. The main reason for this that can be attributed to the expensive 
price of all different kinds of fish, with a slight exception with sardines. But other 
reasons exist which indicate that the fisheries sub-sector did not develop much in 
Algeria and is still traditionally-oriented. The existence of a powerful lobbying 
group that controls the fish market at consumer expense is a major factor in this 
situation. 
4.4.2.4 Forest and other similar resources 
Notwithstanding their ecological and even economic importance, forests count for 
only 4 million hectares with a forestation rate of 11% of the total northern region of 
the country and only 1.5% of the whole country. 
The main species that can be found in these forests are Pinus alepinsis, Pinus 
maritima, Quercus sp., Eucalyptus. Pinus alepinsis is the most expanded species as it 
counts for more than 20% (881,000 ha) of the Algerian forests. 82% of these forests 
are considered public domain. 
Alfa is another pastoral resource that has an extreme ecological importance but it 
is also important economically for the paper industry. The total area covered by this 
resource represents 2,6 million hectares, but only 450,000 ha are actually exploitable 
for intensive production. 65% of this resource is located in the western part of the 
country (INVA, ibid.: 13). 
4.4.2.5 Water resources 
In Algeria, water resources are of three kinds: Surface water, groundwater, and 
deepwater. Annually, 12 billion m 3 of surface water are provided through annual 
rainfall, most of which flows to the Mediterranean Sea or to the chotts in the Saharan 
desert. Water catchment accounts for only 2 billion m 3 annually through a hundred 
small and medium dams, all located in the northern part of the country. 
1.6 billion m 3 of groundwater are exploited annually over a potential stock 
estimated at 1.8 billion m 3 for the northern part of the country. Alternatively, the 
Saharan desert contains a huge potential of deepwater. The potential stock that can 
be exploited annually is estimated at 5 billion m3. However, its exploitation over this 
norm may reduce the artesian pressure of traditional irrigation schemes such as the 
foggaras. The actual level of exploitation is around 1.5 billion m 3per year to cover the 
irrigation needs of 100,000 ha that are cultivated in these regions out of a potential of 
300,000 ha (INVA, ibid.: 9). 
However, some information indicates that Algeria will face a tremendous 
shortage of water at the turn of this millennium. 
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4 . 5 Agricultural planning and policy-making in post-independence Algeria 
4 . 5 . 1 Introduction 
Agriculture in Algeria presently faces an intriguing dilemma. On the one hand, it 
must keep pace with an increasing domestic demand while, on the other hand, it 
suffers from low performance in terms of productivity. As a consequence, the 
Algerian food situation is characterized by a strong dependency upon the foreign 
market, which puts the country in a very fragile position, as Table 4 . 5 . 1 ( 1 ) shows. 
The government has to yearly allocate U S $ 2 . 5 billion annually to cover its annual 
food imports, which represents not less than 2 5 % of both Algerian total annual 
imports and foreign earnings. For instance, Algeria is the first importer of durum 
wheat in the world, purchasing 5 0 % of the total world trade of this product annually 
(INVA, 1 9 9 7 ) . 
This dependency on the world market may worsen, especially if we have to 
assume that prices of major agricultural products in the world market, and 
competition over the quantity of food available, are expected to increase 
considerably in the near future. 
Table 4.5.1(1) - Level of food dependency in Algeria in 1996 
Product Unit Figures per year Imports 
Consumption Imports part rate 
Cereals and derivatives kg/inh. 185 150 81% 
Pulses and food legumes kg/inh. 8 7 87% 
Milk and derivatives 1/inh. 87 55 63% 
Sugar and derivatives kg/inh. 32 32 100% 
Oils 1/inh 14 14 100% 
Source: INVA, 1997:7 
In fact, in comparison to the voluntaristic policies implemented in the industrial 
sector, Algerian agriculture has suffered from a lack of effective government 
support. The favour shown toward the industrial sector increased throughout all of 
the development plans [see Table 4 . 5 . 1 ( 2 ) below] until 1 9 8 5 , when the decline of the 
agricultural output became a critical issue. 
Looking at Table 4 . 5 . 1 ( 2 ) below, one can easily remark that it is only in the End 
Quinquennial Plan ( 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 8 9 ) that agriculture received more than 3 0 % of the share 
of the total investments allocated for both agricultural and industrial sectors, even 
though this proportion includes all investments planned for the water sector which 
do not benefit exclusively the agricultural sector. 
However, knowing the situation of oil prices in 1 9 8 6 , these funds could never be 
allocated to the agricultural sector and all investments were redirected, mainly 
towards the hydrocarbons, in order to increase exports and thus foreign earnings. 
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Table 4.5.1(2) - Planned public investments in agricultural and industrial sectors 
Unit: billion AD 
Development Sectoral investments Total of 
Plans Agriculture Industry plan 
Value % Value % Value °y 
1st Triennial Plan (1967-69) 1.22 17.9 4.05 59.6 6.8 100 
1st Quadrennial Plan (1970-73) 4.91 17.8 12.34 44.7 27.6 100 
2nd Quadrennial Plan (1974-77) 16.72 15.2 47.85 43.5 no 100 
1st Quinquennial Plan (1980-84) * 65.58 11.7 215.79 38.5 560.5 100 
2nd Quinquennial Plan (1985-89) * 79.20 14.4 173.80 31.6 550 100 
Source: Ministry-Delegation of Planning 
* Including agriculture, forestry, land reclamation, fisheries and the entire water sector. 
However, because of the lack of coherence and clarity, aiming at immediate results 
rather than long-term achievements, and having achieved a very low rate of inter-
sectoral integration between agriculture and industry, agricultural development 
policies played a great role in bringing about this dramatic situation. In the 
following sections, I describe the role of agricultural planning and policy-making in 
this situation. 
4.5.2 A sketchy overview of the agricultural planning and poKcy-making 
4.5.2.1 Introduction 
Between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, most African countries acquired their 
political independence. Governments of these newly-independent countries 
launched policies of economic development focusing to some extent on stimulating 
the agricultural sector. In this order, the post-colonial era of these countries was 
characterized by intensified intervention and control by governments and their 
newly-born para-statal institutions over the agricultural sector (Hinderbrink and 
Sterkenburg, 1985: 73). Algeria is one case among these countries. 
When Algeria became independent in 1962, the state basically relied - at least at 
the level of official rhetoric and discourse - on the agricultural sector to support the 
social and economic development of the country. This is what Mesli (1996: 3), a 
former Algerian Minister of Agriculture, calls "when the word 'agriculture' takes a 
block letter at the beginning" (my translation from French). The great attention paid 
to agricultural commercialization and cash crop cultivation for export was the stable, 
common pattern of agricultural policy in almost all African countries. Instead, 
agricultural policies in Algeria changed considerably over the years and yielded an 
unstable environment for agricultural production. As a result, Algeria became the 
first net importer of durum wheat in the World and the tenth net importer in all 
cereals. 
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For the last three decades, four major periods of agricultural planning and policy-
making can be distinguished: (1) The period between 1962 and 1971; (2) The period 
between 1971 and 1981; (3) The period between 1981 and 1987, and; (4) The period 
from 1987 up to now. A brief presentation of these four periods will be given 
hereafter. 
4.5.2.2 Between 1962 and 1971 
Before independence, the land tenure system of arable land was characterized by a 
dichotomy between the European sector, built upon expropriated land and 
supporting modernized, intensified agriculture using machinery and improved 
seeds and cultural practices, on the one hand, and the indigenous sector, on the 
other, with traditional, extensive, mainly subsistence agriculture. The importance of 
both sectors is shown by Table 4.5.2.2(1) below. 
Table 4.5.2.2(1) - Typology of farms at independence (1962) 
Units: 1.000 ha or farms 
Farmers' Size and importance of the landholdings Total 
nationality <10ha 10-50 ha 50-100 ha > 100 ha typology 
Farm Area Farm Area Farm Area Farm Area Farm Area 
Algerians U 437 1,378 158 3,185 17 1,100 9 1,600 620 7,263 
/o 70 19 25 44 3 15 1 22 100 100 
Europeans U 8 22 6 135 3 190 6 2,040 23 2,387 
% 36 1 25 6 11 8 28 85 100 100 
Total U 445 1,400 164 3,320 20 1,290 15 3,640 643 9,650 
% 69 15 25 34 3 13 2 38 100 100 
Source: Mesli (1996:166) 
After independence, Algeria saw the departure of the foreign settlers who had 
established large estates on the expropriated land, leaving the farms vacant. 
Spontaneously, the agricultural workers that were employed on the colonial estates 
created 'self-management committees' to protect the land, took control over the basic 
means of production, and insured the continuity of the farms' functioning [see Box 
4.5.2.2(1) below]. This movement put political leaders and the government in front of 
a 'fait accompli' and were almost 'forced' to acknowledge 'autogestión' as the model for 
agricultural management and development on the vacant farms, called since then 
the Domaines Autogérés (DAs). But a few months later, the government, likewise 
aiming to contain and control this popular movement, created a National Office of 
Agrarian Reform (ONRA), which appointed technical directors who were supposed 
to "advise the self-managed farms" (Nellis, 1983:148). 
During this decade, the state was almost the only actor in directing the economy 
through central planning, especially after the coup of June 19th, 1965. Among other 
economic sectors, agriculture was still the main sector of the economy and received 
great attention from the government because Algeria relied mainly upon exports of 
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agriailtural products for the implementation of its 1st Triennial Development Plan 
( 1 9 6 7 - 6 9 ) , which mainly concerned the industrial and tertiary sectors. 
In this context, "the bourgeoisie and the landlords realized that the acquisition of the agricultural 
estates, industrial enterprises and commercial establishments abandoned by the settlers, was an 
excellent opportunity for their quick and easy enrichment and the consolidation cf their economic and 
political power" (Bennoune, 1976: 9). Alternatively, feeling the danger of these 'tractations', "the 
agricultural workers took advantage of the vacuum left by the civil war and the departure of the 
European bourgeoisie to bar the way of the native bourgeoisie. They moved simultaneously, and 
without waiting for any directive from above, to take control of the basic means of production and 
land. As early as the summer 1962, the agricultural labourers employed on the colonial estates and 
plantations began taking over control of production, by forming 'self-management committees' to 
protect the land, and to continue production. . . . Thus the big landlords and rich peasants were 
thwarted in their attempt to purchase these lands. . . . These spmtaneously-taken actions by 
agricultural labourers forced the government to promulgate the decrees of March 1963 that were to 
consecrate 'autogestion' as the basis for the economic organization of the country" (Bennoune, ibid.: 
In this context, agricultural policies exclusively focused on 'self-managed' farms. 
Credit was made available through the Caisse Générale des SAPs (CGSAP) and inputs 
were distributed by the Société Agricoles de Prévoyance (SAPs). The Office Algérien 
Interprofessionnel des Céréales (OAIC) and the Coopératives des Céréales et des Légumes 
Secs (CCLSs) were in charge of collecting and marketing cereal grains and pulses, 
and the Office des Fruits et Légumes Algérien (OFLA), with the help of the Coopératives 
de la Réforme Agraire (COREs and CORAs), had to take over the collecting, marketing 
and exporting of fruits and vegetables. To sustain agricultural development through 
promoting new technologies, the government created the Institut National de la 
Recherche Agronomique d'Algérie (INRAA) in 1 9 6 6 . 
As a result, it can be said that during this first period, although the focus was 
exclusively on the ex-colonial estates (which counted for around two-and-a-half 
million hectares and constituted the 'self-managed' sector), Algeria was still self-
sufficient and even an exporter of its agricultural surpluses. Meanwhile, the private 
agricultural sector, mostly located in harsh environments and marginal lands, 
observed a manifest decline due to lack of attention by the government. 
4 . 5 . 2 . 3 Between 1971 and 1981 
The year 1 9 7 1 represents a very important symbol - and even a turning point - in the 
Algerian post-colonial era. The nationalization in February of the remaining foreign 
petroleum interests - which were mostly French - and the launching of the agrarian 
revolution in November closely linked, as we will see later, the agricultural 
development in Algeria to the hydrocarbons context. 
I Box 4.5.2.2(1) - How autogestion became Algerian? 
10). 
L J 
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10 Khammessat was the sharecropping system which allowed a sharecropper (khammes) to get l/5th of 
the harvest in return of the exploitation of the plot he cultivated, the rest automatically went to the 
landlord. 
Launched with great propaganda, the agrarian revolution aimed, according to the 
political discourse, to render justice to the deprived rural populations that were 
expropriated under French colonization. Claimed under the motto of "land belongs to 
whoever cultivates it", the objective of radical transformation of the rural living 
conditions that was assigned to the agrarian revolution was a central symbol of 
Algerian socialism. According to this policy, man-to-man exploitation was over for 
the khammessat10, the indigenous sharecropping system, was banned. The rural 
masses had to obey a collectivist organization of work and living through co-
operatives and villagization (the famous 1,000 socialist villages' programme). 
Agricultural production was organized through Coopératives Agricoles de Production 
de la Révolution Agraire (CAPRAs). In addition to the existing dualism between the 
self-managed and the private sectors, a third sector called 'agrarian revolution' or 
'co-operative' sector was born through nationalizations and donations of land to the 
Fond National de la Revolution Agraire (FNRA), which was redistributed to landless 
'attributaires'. 
A very rigid, monopolistic and mechanistic organization of credit through the 
Banque Nationale d'Algérie (BNA), which was later replaced by the Banque de 
l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural (BADR), created in 1981. 
Input supply and output marketing were organized through the Coopératives 
Agricoles Polyvalentes Communale de Services (CAPCSs), that were established, one in 
each baladia (commune). Their services concerned machinery rental, seeds supply, 
advice, short-term credit over inputs purchase, and coUecting and transferring 
agricultural produce to the provincial Coopératives des Fruits et Légumes (COFELs). 
Even though, CAPCSs were assigned to serve in priority DAs and CAPRAs, they 
were in fact dominated by large landowners and civil servants (Nellis, 1983:152). At 
the higher (national) level of the input supply and output marketing, many public 
enterprises known as the Offices were found. The major ones were the Office National 
du Machinisme Agricole (ONAMA), the Office National des Aliments du Bétail (ONAB), 
the Office National du Lait (ONALAIT), in addition to the previous OAIC and OFLA. 
Their main tasks consisted of international trade (imports and exports) and domestic 
market regulation. 
In terms of technical assistance, the R&D system was reinforced by the creation of 
the 11 Instituts de Développement in charge separately on a commodity-approach to 
develop the main crops, among which were the Institut de Développement des Grande 
Cultures (IDGC), the Institut de Développement des Cultures Maraîchères (IDCM), the 
Institut de Développement des Cultures Industrielles (IDCI), the Institut de Développement 
de l'Elevage Bovin (IDEB) and the Institut de Développement de l'Elevage Ovin (IDOVI). 
As a result, the influence of the agrarian revolution on the agricultural 
development was very limited. This land reform did not impinge upon new job 
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creation, as promised in its charter, nor improved agricultural production. For many 
crops, Algeria had to rely on the foreign market to feed its 'booming' population. 
Many causes can be advanced to explain the 'stimulated failure' of the agrarian 
revolution. Most of the beneficiaries abandoned their plots under the pressure of the 
landlords whose land was partly or totally nationalized, and the abandoned plots 
remained untouched until they were (recently) returned to their initial owners, due 
to the implementation of the 9 0 - 2 5 Law of November 1 1 , 1 9 9 0 . 
Additionally, the 1 9 7 3 oil boom brought considerable amounts of foreign 
currency to the country. Given the level of agricultural production, food imports 
increased and were substituted for national production. 
Another point worthmentioning is the competition of the 'industrializing 
industry' strategy adopted by the government during the same period, which was a 
additional factor that accelerated the rural exodus to the cities. Due to this socio-
economic phenomenon, the agricultural sector lost its best-qualified labour for a 
better offer of salary and working conditions in the industry sector. Even though 
political leaders' vision was based on the mutual integration of both industrial and 
agricultural sectors, the consequence of this was that agriculture not only failed to 
produce sufficient raw materials for the developing industries or enough food for 
the rapidly expanding population, but it also failed to generate an adequate demand 
for industrial products as well (Sutton, 1 9 8 1 : 3 6 4 ) . 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the third phase of the agrarian revolution, which 
was due to start in 1 9 7 5 in the steppe and marginal lands, did not move further than 
its preparation step. As a result, only 1 5 8 . 6 1 4 head of sheep were redistributed 
(Sutton, ibid.: 3 6 5 ) , while the total number of sheep turned around 7 to 8 million 
head. In fact, the big cattle holders who still control the major part of the steppe and 
rangelands - where overgrazing has caused devastating phenomena such as 
desertification and erosion - leave alone their strong influence over the fluctuating 
domestic meat market. 
The general impression of the agrarian revolution is that, due to the interests' 
dualism that existed among post-independence political leaders, on the one hand, 
and the bureaucracy and its allied bourgeoisie, on the other hand, this land reform 
was designed and implemented in such a way that the interests of the latter would 
remain 'intact' and their positions legitimized 
As a result, and in perfect accordance with the Nigerian situation developed by 
Abdu and Marshall ( 1 9 9 0 : 3 1 6 ) : 
The consequences of the oil-led boom served... to undermine the government's commitment to 
increasing production from domestic agriculture. 
Among these consequences, the massive surge of food imports caused by 
overvaluation of the national currency and the increased granting of import licenses 
as a lucrative state patronage and rent seeking should be mentioned. In return, these 
practices completely stifled domestic entrepreneurship within all agricultural sub-
SETTING THE GENERAL CONTEXT 1 0 9 
sectors. Once the Algerian agriculture began to decline, the following period of 
pohcy-making did not change this trend much. 
4.5.2.4 Between 1981 and 1987 
In this period, the government started a new policy aimed at pushing the 
agricultural sector towards better performance. This policy was articulated with the 
following elements: 
• Integration of both DAs and CAPRAs sectors into one sector that would be called 
the 'socialistic' sector; 
• Redesign of the agricultural units whose denomination has since become the 
Domaines Aguedles Socialistes (DASs); 
• Staffing of the DASs with B.Sc. holders (for management positions), technicians, 
accountants, and other staff; 
• Practical framing of other line staff; 
• Liberalization of the non-strategic products marketing; 
• Integration of the private sector into development policy, etc.. 
Many DASs performed very well during this phase in terms of productivity and 
economic efficiency. Credit, input supply, marketing, as well as farm management 
improved significantly, but there was still a strong influence of the state apparatus 
on the overall production. In fact, the annual cultivation plan of the DASs and the 
inherent annual budget were established under a strict central dirigism and 
interference, especially in aspects related to strategic food crops such as cereals. For 
this, an annual national land-use plan was made at the ministry level and therefore 
disaggregated between the provinces. Each province had its annual land-use plan 
made by the ministry and it was the task of the Direction des Services Aguedles (DSA) 
to 'split' it up between the DASs of the province. Once the annual land-use plan was 
made for the DASs, the other documents such the annual budget, the annual inputs 
purchase plan, the annual plan of casual labour recruitment, etc. were elaborated. 
On the other hand, the same period acknowledged a great shift at the political 
level towards the private sector in terms of opening up more opportunities for 
credit, input supply, integration in development programs, etc. 
Although the agricultural sector achieved its best performance since 
independence (best cereal production at that time for 1 9 8 5 and 1 9 8 6 consecutively), 
this period was the final step of the socialistic sector which would be completely 
reorganized in 1 9 8 7 . 
4.5.2.5 From 1987 up till now... 
The 87-19 Law of December 8 , 1 9 8 7 , concerning the socialist sector's reorganization 
was applied as quickly as possible to help forget about the assumed devastating 
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performance of both the 'agrarian revolution' and the 'self-managed' sectors. Around 
2,400 DASs were reorganized into more than 20,000 new agricultural units called 
Exploitations Agricoles Collectives (EACs) or Exploitations Agricoles Individuelles (EAIs). 
These newly-created units have a semi-public status of property, that is, the state 
continues to own the land while the usufruct and investments belong to the 
beneficiaries, which are also transmittable to their descendants. 
Since then, Algeria has been moving through a structural change process at 
political, economic, and social levels due to the establishment of multipartist 
'democracy' and market economy. Prices have been completely freed from state 
subsidies, and marketing and trade have been liberalized. Individual initiative and 
entrepreneurship are highly encouraged through recent legal measures. However, 
among some known interests (implicit and/or explicit), the state bureaucratic 
apparatus shows a clear resistance to these reforms [see Box 4.5.2.5(1) below]. 
Box 4.5.2.5(1) - World Bank conclusions on the Algerian agricultural policies 
The review aimed at assessing the specific issues in the transformation process of Algerian 
agriculture pertaining to agricultural services, and reviewing recent policy developments affecting 
the agricultural sector, in preparation of an eventual adjustment program seeking to induce 
adequate supply response and promote flexibility, efficiency, productivity and stability in 
agricultural production. 
In its conclusions, the review highlights four major constraints in agricultural marketing services. 
These are: 
1. The strong Government market intervention policies implemented through para-statals affect 
short- to medium-term positions taken by private entrepreneurs in the market; 
2. The preferential treatment and monopolistic position of the para-statals in marketing chains, in 
access to foreign exchange and credit, serve as barriers to entry for the private sector; 
3. The poor infrastructure and equipment at the wholesale level, and; 
4. A poor regulatory environment, where some positive developments have been taking place since 
The review discussed also 4 major constraints in input supply and provision of agricultural 
services. These are: 
1. The inability of the public enterprise to adapt in the face of an agricultural sector now composed 
of private farmers; 
2. The maintained privileges of the public enterprise monopolies in access to resources such a as 
foreign exchange, subsidies, credit; 
3. The Government interventions in prices, margins and other controls such as effective 
quantitative restrictions; 
4. The limited involvement and experience of the private sector in these areas. 
Source: World Bank, 1994c 
All the agreements signed with the IMF imposed drastic economic and social 
measures to be undertaken by Algerian authorities. Among all other economic 
sectors, agriculture is presently undergoing a fundamental structural change which 
is supervised - if not controlled - by both the IMF and World Bank. One of the major 
issues that remains on the political agenda is the privatization of state-owned 
mid-1993. 
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agricultural land. For this purpose, the government recently introduced a law in the 
APN (the 1st Parliament Chamber) on the privatization of public landholdings 
through sale or long-term rent. With these last measures on land tenure, the 
government would have undertaken the most important change in the agricultural 
sector since the independence of Algeria. It is the last obstacle to a complete 
liberalization of agriculture which, from the government's point of view, would 
certainly secure more investments in the sector and thus stimulate a great and quick 
improvement in production. However, all powerful social actors (or clans) in 
Algeria, especially the so-called 'famille révolutionnaire'11, are against this law. 
During this phase, the agricultural research and development system was 
reorganized in a way to have better contact with farmers and improve insight on 
their needs, especially through the newly-born professional farmers' organizations 
which now have their own extensionists. The Institut National de la Recherche 
Agronomique d'Algérie (INRAA) got an expanded public mandate to co-ordinate all 
programmes of agricultural research, be they fundamental, applied, or adaptive, and 
the 11 Instituts de Développement were reorganized into 5 Instituts Techniques, among 
which the Institut Technique des Grandes Cultures (ITGC), my present employer. 
Moreover, the Institut National de la Vulgarisation Agricole (INVA) and the Centre de 
Contrôle et de Certification des Semences et Plants (CNCC) were created. In this sense, it 
is assumed the R&D system would develop technologies that could better fit 
farmers' needs and the diversity of their conditions. 
The last event worthnoting in this section is the organization of a National 
Conference on Agricultural Development that took place on June 1996, which 
discussed the Mid-Term Agricultural Development Plan (1996-2000). The official 
report of the conference acknowledged that this plan was based on a participatory 
vision. However, the use of the concept 'participation' in this document needed, in 
my own opinion, a precise conceptual definition from the designers of this plan, as 
this concept, as many other loaded' concepts, may have different meanings to 
different people, depending on their interests in its use. 
However, it is still too early to attempt any comment on this new policy, although 
some signs of subsistence agriculture, due to the removal of public subsidies and 
market liberalization, are reappearing after more than two decades of its 'eclipse'. 
4.5.3 Agricultural policy-making consequences in post-independence Algeria 
After the brief introduction to these different phases, it can be said that the policy-
making process in post-independence Algeria was conditioned by a very strong 
ideological debate coloured with the interests of powerful political clans that took 
control of the state during these different periods. It is true that in any one of at least 
" This clan is the most powerful in Algeria and includes the organization of the veterans of the 
independence war, the organization of the children of the martyrs of the independence war, the 
organization of the children of the veterans of the independence war, and some high officers of the 
army. 
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The farmers' conceptualization of income will be presented in one of the case-studies later. 
the first three periods mentioned earlier that policies were used, depending on the 
ideology and the interests of the political leadership, to maintain and expand or 
radically change current 'status quo', especially in terms of land tenure regimes, in 
accordance with von Benda-Beckmann (1995:55). 
Moreover, the poUcy-maldng arena was so restricted to the powerful clans that 
policies could never achieve their targeted objectives, if there were any, whenever 
these objectives clash with their interests or concern the populace development. 
Moreover, these policies were always designed in such a manner that they never 
threatened these powerful clans' interests (as we shall see in Section 5.1). 
In practical terms, and in line with Hinderbrink and Sterkenburg (1985), a brief 
analysis of the different periods of agricultural poHcy-making in post-independence 
Algeria, as described earlier, would put in perspective the following statements: 
• Agricultural poh\y-making was - and still is in some segments of the sector -
influenced by a strong and intensive government interference which gave very 
little room to entrepreneurship and individual initiative. Confined into a very 
mechanistic top-down process, this interference was based on a stereotyped and 
'uniformized' vision of rural reality and lacked flexibility towards the diversity of 
farm types and production zones. The best example to mention here is the central 
dirigism of the agricultural units that characterized - although differently - the 
different periods of policy-making. 
• Since 1973, after the first oil boom, agricultural poHcy-making was - and still is -
strongly influenced by the availability of foreign currency (mostly coming from 
hydrocarbons exports), world market prices (as compared to domestic prices of 
food crops), and other sodo-cultural considerations. Choices made by the state 
bureaucracy served to a high extent the interests of certain groups rather than 
farmers themselves. This could be perceived by uncovering the hidden agenda of 
the increasing granting of imports licenses mentioned earlier. 
• Agricultural policy-making was one-sidedly oriented towards increasing 
production and was never embedded in a wider approach of rural development. 
Very few development actions, apart from the agrarian revolution, showed low 
interest in really improving the living and working conditions of rural 
populations. In many development actions, the great deal of attention given to 
increasing production rather than farmers' income12 and/or livelihoods explains 
the failure of many of these actions [see Section 7.1]. 
• Agricultural poHcy-making was - and still is - based on a reductionist commodity-
oriented approach underpinning the structural and functional organization of the 
agricultural R & D system which did not fit the farmers' needs. Farmers develop a 
more integrated and system-oriented approach in their production strategy and 
farm management. Such a holistic approach adopted by farmers has always been 
reported by scholars that investigated farming systems, and aspects of innovation 
adoption and technology transfer. 
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Agricultural poHcy-making was usually supported by erroneous agricultural 
research findings which neglected agro-ecological and socio-economic 
circumstances under which farmers' production processes take place. This was 
mainly due to the above-mentioned structural and functional reductionism of the 
R&D system. Lack of knowledge about farmers' strategies to adapt to climatic risk 
and economic uncertainty in the policy-making process led researchers to 
overlook how risk management was a fundamental issue to farmers when it came 
to crop intensification [see Sections 5 . 3 and 7 .1 ] . 
Agricultural poKcy-making was negatively influenced by the huge gap between 
the handsomely phrased rhetoric of development plans, especially in the political 
leaders' discourse, and its implementation as compared to budgetary 
commitments and concrete efforts. As a consequence, this engendered a 
tremendous lack of credibility in politicians and policy-makers among rural 
populations [see Sections 4 . 3 and 4 . 4 ] . 
Agricultural policy-making was - and still is - characterized by low public 
expenditures. Whenever a great effort of investment occurred in agriculture it was 
biased towards sophisticated technology which underpinned the intensification 
model. This model does not apply large segments of the peasantry and their 
conditions, most of whom are located in very harsh environments [see Section 
7 .1 ] . 
Agricultural policy-making was - and still is - supported by a universal and 
Western-biased favouritism towards on projects as a characteristic form of a 
needed external intervention to develop a rural society that is assumed to be a 
traditional society with an inert structure that can only be put in motion by 
outside intervention (Elwert and Bierschenk, 1 9 8 8 ) . 
Agricultural poHcy-making was - and still is - characterized by a striking lack of 
continuity, and attention regularly shifts from one aspect to another. This 'fashion 
of doing things' is supported by an inherent default of political practices which 
pressure politicians to get good results out of any action with a very short term 
horizon (see Section 4 . 5 ) . 
Agricultural policy-making was characterized by a striking lack of participation 
from the beneficiaries themselves. Projects or policies were identified by an 
'external' body that had very little knowledge about the farmers' conditions, 
environments, and wishes. 

CHAPTER 5 
WALKING DOWN THE EMPIRICAL PATH: 
PRESENTATION OF CASES 1,2 AND 3 
In this chapter, I present three case-studies in which I introduce features of 
conventional development thinlcing adopted by the post-independence state and how 
it has particularly influenced agricultural development in Algeria. I shall first present 
the case-studies in this chapter, and then discuss and analyze them globally in the next 
chapter. 
Case-studies can be selected for different purposes. In the context of this work, the 
selection of case-studies conformed to the need to present features that are 
idiosyncratic in each case and confront them with theoretical postulates. These 
idiosyncratic features are traits of real-life events that happen daily in any 
development action. 
I must acknowledge that the first case - which I would rather call a macro case -
represents a mixture between a mere archive review and a historical study. It 
completes the background elements presented in the previous chapter in setting the 
context of Algerian agricultural development planning and policy-making. The 
second case-study takes its foundations from my previous work on the cereal seed 
production improvement policy (Malki, 1994). It highlights the lack of learning from 
previous experiences in the agricultural development planning system and how this 
engenders a futile loss of national wealth in repeating the same errors for many 
years. Finally, the third case introduces the results of research work recently 
undertaken in the frame of a regional project called the Mashrek-Maghreb project, 
conducted between 1995 and 1997 under the aegis of ICARDA and IFPRI, two 
CGIAR-sponsored international centers. It concerns a review of past policies 
implemented in the steppe rangelands in Algeria and how these influenced the 
sustainability of the steppe ecosystem. 
All three case-studies share common traits that are representative of conventional 
development dunking adopted by the state in post-independence Algeria: 
• They were centrally planned in the capital (Algiers), with objectives set without 
consultation of the beneficiaries; 
• Their design was base on a top-down approach, strongly loaded with 
ideologically and politically explicit - but also implicit - goals, in complete 
amnesia of the local sociology and the beneficiaries' knowledge, experiences and 
preferences; 
• They were implemented without a credible and viable monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism in the sense that when re-framing the objectives or reorienting the 
course of actions became necessary, adjustments were not undertaken; 
• They conformed all to a rent-seeking logic rather than a real development logic, 
thus sustaining a pattern of opportunism and parasitism rather than a fair 
laborious process of development. 
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5.1 Case No. 1: The agrarian revolution policy 
5.1.1 Introduction and justification of the case 
In this case-study, I introduce the Algerian state intervention in agricultural 
development through the 1971 agrarian revolution. Such a case, as any land reform 
is a sort of innovative planned action, is very politically connotated as it aims to 
break an on-going status-quo and set a new order. Of course, this is not an easy task 
as far as this kind of intervention breaks the world into two parts: Those who want 
to keep the on-going status-quo intact and those in opposition who want a change. 
And it is ineluctable that the presumably powerful side in the confrontation will win 
the battle. This is what theories may sometimes say but, in practical terms, this is not 
always the case. The supposed would-be losers will not cross their hands, waiting 
passively for the others to ruin their life. On the contrary, they will lobby to maintain 
the status-quo by any means and through any channel, for their own benefit. This is 
exactly what the present case is about to show. 
However, in undertaking such an investigation, it is necessary to place it in its 
own historical dimension and contextual arena. For that, it seems opportune to look 
at two sensitive issues. These are: (1) The evolutionary process of the Algerian peas-
antry over the years, on the one hand; and (2) State formation, and its underlying 
ideology, and how this responded to the needs of the peasantry, on the other. 
In this respect, I think there is no need to talk at length on the second item, given 
that I already described, although sketchily, the process in section 4.3. This case 
represents, in fact, a tangible continuity of this process and an illustration of its 
outcomes. Instead, I shall introduce of the evolutionary process of the Algerian 
peasantry. Given the insight needed to understand the outcomes of the agrarian 
revolution, and the 'technical' requirements of the investigation, it seems there is no 
other alternative but to 'monitor' this process over a long period, which should start 
at least with the beginning of French colonization (1830). The case will thus focus on 
describing the different struggles that emerged between different social actors (be 
they collective or individual) and their interests, and how these struggles shaped 
policy outcomes and, in our case, the agrarian structures. 
But before I begin, I acknowledge this case is peculiar because it is a sort of hybrid 
between a mere archive review and a historical study, as I said earlier, consolidated 
with information from persons that lived the event. Its inclusion in this chapter 
fulfills to the need of completing our understanding about the philosophy of 
development in post-independence Algeria under the one-party system that took 
place in 1962, of which an important part has already been presented in section 4.3. 
Additionally, it is closely connected to the rest of the case-studies presented as far 
as it sets, complementing of Chapter 4, the socio-political, ideological, and 
managerial context for many development actions in Algeria that were undertaken 
through the end of the 1980s. That is why I consider it to be a macro case-study. 
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5 . 1 . 2 Algerian peasantry evolution since the French colonization 
Since 1 8 3 0 , when the French invaded Algeria, it was the peasantry who were the 
most threatened by this colonization. In fact, the political and economic life of all 
Algerian rural communities were affected and conditioned by the nature, form, and 
the degree of French colonization. Since the first day of colonization, peasants 
underwent a series of struggles against land de-possession and spoliation by the 
French army and settlers, which were seen as a general popular resistance to the 
penetration of colonial supremacy [see Box 5 . 1 . 2 ( 1 ) below]. Between 1 8 3 0 and 1 8 4 0 
the French state expropriated 3 , 4 4 5 , 0 0 0 hectares of arable land from Algerian 
peasantry for the benefit of its settlers (Bennoune, ibid.: 1 3 ) . 
Box 5.1.2(1) - Why an agrarian revolution in Algeria? 
Since the beginning of colonization, peasant struggles against land de-possession and expropriation 
were identified with the popular resistance against colonial penetration and hold. This struggle has 
sharpened more and more as the Algerian people faced a totalitarian de-possession enterprise in 
both its means as well as its goals. The colonial policy was not in fact limited to a simple action of 
land expropriation. It went beyond that, aiming to break up the popular resistance to colonialism 
by undermining the organizational foundations of the Algerian society through the destruction of 
its economic and cultural base. Before the conquest, the collective tenure system prevailing in 
agriculture reflected the organization of society. The break-down of collective land, the brutal 
dispersion of the peasant communities had hence engendered the dislocation of the agrarian 
structures, and of the rural society in general. In this context, the struggle for independence was 
closely related to the unanimous will of constructing a new, just society where everyone has a place 
but with a priority to the consecration of the workers' dignity. Inequity in land distribution is the 
main cause of the rural masses' low living standards and their incapacity to transform their 
cultural practices in order to take part in the country's economic development. 
Source: AR charter in JORA (1971) No. 97 of November 30th, 1971, p.1270.1 
As Bennoune (ibid.: 1 3 ) suggests, 
In the 1840s and 1850s, the colonial army resorted to a drastic method of law colonization called 
the 'cantonnement' policy which consisted of three operations: (1) containment, (2) compression 
on the spot, and (3) pushing back. The army proceeded to concentrate the peasants of several 
villages into one smaller geographical radius on which numerous families were contained. By 
such operations the colonial army gained control over the vacated land which was immediately 
transferred to the settlers. After a few years, with the demands of the settlers for more land 
increased, the army was frequently ordered to operate a compression on the spot among the 
already contained peasantry. If the Algerian peasants happened to be located on an area that 
was considered as a perimeter for official colonization, they were merely pushed back 
(refoules). 
1 References used for this case such as JORA were mainly in French. The translation into English was 
done by the author (MM). 
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This process had twofold effect on the native population. On one hand, the old Muslim 'grandes 
families' based on tribal organization were eliminated. On the other, many of the small 
subsistence producers were displaced, first from the better lands of the plains up into the 
poorer mountain lands, then from subsistence farming altogether into wage-labour force. 
In 1863, the French governorate in Algeria applied the Senatus-Consulte. According to 
Bennoune (ibid.; author's italics), its Article 3 aimed to: 
• Delimit the territories of the 'tribes'; 
• Break up every tribe of the Tell (northern Algeria) and other agricultural areas; 
• Constitute individual property and its distribution among the members of the 
douars. 
The delimitation of the tribes' territories undertaken by the colonial state under the 
aegis of the Senatus-Consulte was not intended as an end ver se. Its real objective was 
the introduction of concepts of 'ownership' and 'property' into the reality of the 
community lands. According to Bennoune (ibid.), these measures aimed at achieving 
three goals at the same time. They must first "provoke a general liquidation of the 
soil", that, as a direct result, would "attract and receive immigrants from Europe", as 
a second goal. Finally, they would enable the colonial state "to disorganize the tribe" 
which was seen as the principal obstacle to the pacification of Algeria. 
Simply as a result of the application of the Senatus-Consulte between 1863 and 
1870, Algerian rural communities as a whole lost a national average of 14 percent 
(over one million hectares) of their best arable lands and forests to the colonial public 
domain. It became clear that the colonial policy did not content itself with land 
expropriation but aimed to dismantle the economic and cultural basis of the 
indigenous society by sapping its basic institutional foundations, that is the tribe. 
In 1871, in response to the arbitrariness of these measures, as Bennoune (ibid.: 13) 
recalls, the peasants mounted an insurrection called 'El-Mokrani revolution'. This was 
described as the last major peasant rebellion of the 19th century. However, the 
peasants were defeated, and the French parliament passed the Warnier Law in 1873 to 
speed up the colonization of rural areas. This law, also called the 'colons law', aimed 
both at the suppression of common land and a breaking up the familial holdings that 
remained unpartible. Most of the colons used this law to expropriate land from 
peasants who could not show a 'good title'. The costs of implementing this law were 
solely borne by Algerian peasant collectivities (750,000 gold francs/year between 
1873 and 1887). 
As a consequence of all these measures, by 1954 the Algerian Tell consisted of 
about 20 million hectares of usable land divided as follows: 
• 24,000 settlers owned 3,028,000 hectares (an average of 126 hectares per farm); 
• the colonial public domain controlled 7,200,000 hectares; and, 
• the 'natives' - numbering 8 million individuals - were in full control of only 
7,133,000 hectares (0.89 hectares per individual). 
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As many authors argue, two-thirds of the land left to the indigenous peasantry was 
infertile pastures of the steppe and unproductive plots located on the steep slopes of 
mountainous northern Algeria (Bennoune, 1976:13; Cote, 1976:83). 
While the poor and small peasants were being strongly threatened by 
colonization, other notables, big landlords and rich peasants, known as notorious 
feudals, were serving the cause of colonialism wholeheartedly, in return for keeping 
their landholdings away from expropriation by the French army. Some of them had 
even been given honorific titles like 'Caid' and 'Bachagha' by the French 
administration and granted more land expropriated from small peasants through the 
favours of a colonial government seeking to win over a few strategic native allies 
(Bennoune, ibid.: 14). 
When the struggle for independence was launched in 1954, most of the small 
peasants whose land had been expropriated - either from them or from their fathers 
and grand-fathers - joined the guerrilla insurrection to fight to recover their land and 
to reduce the gap between the differentiated standards of living imposed by the 
French colonialists. Meanwhile, the big landlords and rich peasants, who were not 
deeply involved in serving the colonial state, supported the struggle by however they 
could, as they believed that independence would give them a golden opportunity to 
take control over the colons' landholdings. This was the main contradictory effect 
borne by the struggle for national independence since its inception, where both classes 
had to fight under the same umbrella, the FLN party. 
When independence came, Algerian society inherited, as some observers noticed, 
a very heavy legacy as "colonialism engendered not only rentier and feudal-like 
landlords and an impoverished subsistence agricultural sector, but also the 
capitalist/wage-labour relation in agriculture" (Pfeifer, ibid.: 3). One type of this 
relation was the 'khammessat' where the 'khammes' - a sort of share-cropper who gets 
one-fifth of the crop in return for his labour - was exploited by the absentee landlord 
living in the city. 
5.1.3 Political context and socio-economic conditions of late 1960s 
Given the historical context I described in the previous section, the urge for an 
agrarian reform in Algeria was so obvious that for some it was seen just as a 
continuity of the struggle against French colonization. However, the implementation 
of such a policy waited until 1971. The first question one might ask about the 
Algerian agrarian revolution is: W/zy did the agrarian revolution have to wait until 1971 
to be promulgated and until 1972 to be first applied? To answer this pertinent question, it 
is necessary to turn once again to history. 
According to Jackson (ibid.: 60), the first platform that mentioned the necessity of 
an agrarian reform was the draft of the FLN programme discussed during the 
Tripoli Conference, held on May 27, 1962. "It has been prepared before the 
conference by a group of young militants, well inspired by Marxism-Leninism, 
seeking to formulate an FLN ideology and statement of goals", says Jackson (ibid.), 
120 RE-HUMANIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
in order to orient the action of the party after the independence. This document 
acknowledged that: 
The analysis of the social content of the fight for freedom underlines the fact that it is in general 
the peasants and workers who have been the active base of the movement and who have given 
it its essentially popular character. This statement embodied the first formal recognition of the 
peasant base of the revolutionary war. 
This indicates that a program of agrarian reform would be the first action to be 
implemented after independence in order to compensate the peasants for their war 
efforts. But given the basic antagonism that existed between the various classes, as 
Bennoune (ibid.: 12) suggests, which "originated from the fact that the national 
bourgeoisie, bureaucracy, the landlords and rich peasants in the countryside were all 
favourable to the continuation and development of the capitalist mode of 
production", on the one hand, and the open opposition of this minority by "the 
industrial workers, the permanent and seasonal agricultural labourers, and the 
lumpen proletariat and rural landless peasants as they thought that the continuation 
of a capitalist economy will not offer any prospect of change", on the other. 
Moreover, Bennoune (ibid.) considers that the political climate in post-
independence Algeria was not stable enough to help the FLN party, which was itself 
subject to a deep crisis, to think even about an agrarian reform program. 
Another cause of this delay can be explained, as Le Coz (1976: 8) argues, by the 
unexpected departure of thé colons during the summer of 1962, which created an 
unpredicted vacuum of the colons' domains and encouraged the labourers to 
spontaneously set up their own self-management committees [see Box 4.5.2.2(1)]. 
The obligation to 'digest' and then smoothly control the de facto creation of the self-
managed sector imposed a prudent position of the state towards the rest of the 
agricultural sector and decided to delay the implementation of the expected agrarian 
reform, although the ministry in charge of agricultural development was named 
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. 
After the 1965 coup d'etat, it was the responsibility of the sole Council of 
Revolution - constituted by the military generals - to decide upon the 
implementation of such a policy, i.e. the agrarian reform. However, this body could 
not make such a decision for two major reasons: (1) It was clearly heterogeneous in 
terms of ideologies and interests; (2) The coup d'Etat itself created a generalized 
climate of suspicion among the population. The new executive first started taking 
strategic decisions aimed at nationalizing the natural resources (such as mines, 
hydrocarbons, etc.) and some business services (such as banks, insurance companies, 
etc.) that would bring some confidence of the population towards the new regime. 
Nevertheless, in the beginning of the 1970s, the worsening of the social and 
economical conditions of the peasantry alarmed some members of the Council of 
Revolution and the government cabinet when they realized that the only solution to 
this problem lay in the undertaking of an agrarian reform. 
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More than that, this intervention was mostly needed as the countryside was 
completely disturbed by the 'rural exodus' to cities where neither housing nor 
employment were available in sufficient quantities. This exodus was engendered 
somehow by the very little attention given by the 'political leadership' to the 
agricultural sector in comparison to the industrial one, as it was felt by the peasants. 
The lack of investment in the agricultural sector exacerbated the problems of the 
peasantry, who preferred migration to big urban centers where industrial projects 
offered them much better working and living conditions. However, the speed of 
industrialization at that time could not absorb the overwhelming surge of peasantry, 
and this exodus, if not stopped at the right time, could have counteracted the 
development plans of the 'political leadership'. 
5.1.4 Philosophy, goals, and objectives of the agrarian revolution 
Given all the aforementioned factors, the Council of Revolution decided in 
November 1971 the implementation of an agrarian reform, to which was given the 
title of an agrarian revolution in order to label the change that this intervention would 
introduce in the countryside [see Box 5.1.4(1) below]. 
I Box 5.1.4(1) - General framework of the agrarian revolution | 
The second step of the agrarian revolution will concern land properties and holdings owned by the 
nationals and collectivities. It is of utmost importance that it must not be seen solely as a simple 
nationalization of land. More than that, it should create the conditions for land improvement and 
reclamation at the benefit of the rural masses, who were kept away from progress and 
modernization for a long time, and for the sake of their cultural, economic and social promotion. It 
is for these reasons that the agrarian revolution, beyond the simple preoccupation of social justice, 
signifies a radical transformation of the living and working conditions in the rural world. 
In order to really be a fundamental élement of progress for the most deprived masses, the agrarian 
revolution must give them access to the bulk of progress factors. To achieve this, it combines land 
redistribution with farmers' organization and the gathering of the conditions for their promotion. 
The agrarian revolution, through a double action at the level of production relations and structures, 
can and must reverse the process of land concentration and eradicate the last sequels of 
colonization whose consequences, such as the rural exodus and the increasing economic and 
cultural disparities between urban centers and rural areas, are challenging the development 
strategy of the country. 
The agrarian revolution must constitute a new starting point for the peasant masses, due to a 
coherent and continuous global action upon the human and material factors that impinge upon 
their progress and promotion. 
Source: AR charter in JORA (1971) No. 97 of November 30th, 1971, p. 1270. 
This meant, in practice, that the five million peasants whose monthly income did not 
exceed 170 A D 2 , who were pushed aside after independence, would have a chance to 
2 l U S $ = 4ADinl974 
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have access to modernity, according to the vision of the intended policy. On the 
other hand, it must be realized that, up to 1971, the rural bourgeoisie, with the help 
of its allies in the state bureaucracy, had been successfully blocking any land reform 
to be launched since independence. It was in this crisis-prone context that this inter-
vention was launched. 
Based on slogans like "land belongs to the one's whoever crop it" and "abolition of man-
to-man exploitation", the declared agrarian revolution in Algeria "was intended to 
promote a set of institutional changes that would force agriculture to respond in the 
manner necessary for accumulation in industry and for economic development" 
(Pfeifer, 1985:11) [see Box 5.1.4(2) below]. 
Box 5.1.4(2) - Goals, aims and objectives of the agrarian revolution 
The agrarian revolution aimed to tackle three main factors that were causing the low living 
standard of the peasant masses. These were: 
1. The inequity of land distribution among farmers, characterized by a huge gap where 3% of big 
farmers whose lanholdings outsized 50 hectares owned 25% of the total arable land, and 72% 
small farmers whose landholdings were less than 10 hectares owned 25% of the same land3. 
2. The sequels of colonization that were engendered by the many expropriation measures of the 
colonial state which pushed back farmers to the sloppy hills and mountainous areas, and which 
was articulated by national notables who served as intermediaries of the colonial administration. 
The precarious working conditions of landless farmers who were exploited by absentee landholders 
through a system of sharecropping (khammessat) that was not conducive for a modernized 
agriculture made by these populations during the struggle for independence which was meant for 
them to recover their spoliated land. It is thus a consequent recognition of their historical rights by 
the revolutionary regime which assumed to eradicate any form of man-to-man exploitation, as far 
as it aims at establishing direct working relations on the basis of the slogan: "land belongs to the 
one whoever cultivate it". Major objectives of the agricultural revolution were: 
1. The suppression of all forms of absenteeism and big landholding, with compensation; 
2. The clarification of property rights of small farmers that exploit unowned land derived form 
public (domanial and communal) and private (Arch4 and Habouss) collectivities; 
3. The redistribution of nationalized and donated land to landless peasants with a clear definition 
of the rights and duties of the beneficiaries; 
4. The maintenance and protection of non-exploitative private landholding; 
5. The economic, social, and cultural promotion of the rural masses through the modernization of 
agricultural practices and the transformation of living conditions in the countryside. 
Source: Compiled from AR charter in JORA (1971) No. 97 of November 30th, 1971, p. 1271-76. 
3 In Table 4.5.2.2(1), quoted from Mesli (1996:166), I mention that both classes respectively represented 
during the colonization (Algerian category) 4% for 37% owned of the total land and 70% for 19% 
owned of the same land. 
4 Arch stands for collective, tribal lands found mostly on the central and eastern part in Algeria. They 
have similar legal nature as the Sebaga lands found in some western parts of the country (Mesli, 
1995:36). 
" Habous is a legal status of property related to religious endowments. 
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Intending to bring the agricultural sector in line with the state's overall 
transformation strategy, the agrarian revolution, and agricultural policy in general, 
according to Pfeifer (ibid.), were assigned a complex agenda, with explicit as well as 
hidden components. 
The explicit agenda included, first, the goal of providing a national self-sufficiency 
in terms of the production of basic foods, not only in terms of quantity, but also in 
terms of diversification and provision of raw materials to the would-be food 
processing industries. The beneficiaries of the agrarian revolution and the remaining 
private farmers would be organized into co-operatives, using technical processes 
that raise land and labour productivity and contribute to the growth of aggregate 
agricultural output. This intervention was necessary in order to feed the growing 
urban labour force and to provide inputs to industry, both at low prices. So, 
aggregate agricultural income was expected to rise, nevertheless, as output was 
supposed to increase (Pfeifer, ibid.: 12). 
Concerning the second component of the explicit agenda, Pfeifer (ibid.) argues 
that it concerned: 
The expropriation of 'lands despoiled by colonization' and their redistribution to landless and 
land-poor peasants. This was to entail an end to 'exploitation' of sharecroppers and renters by 
absentee landlords, and thus, a reduction in inequality among segments of the rural population. 
According to Pfeifer (ibid.: 12), the implicit (hidden) agenda of the agrarian 
revolution was the following: 
1. The first element was the unstated but essential requirement that Algerian 
agriculture should become fully commercialized. All peasants and co-operatives 
members would turn their produce over to the market, and then purchase all their 
other needs out of their monetary outcome. This was supposed to increase the 
demand for industrial products, both consumer goods and inputs to agriculture 
such as fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, machinery, etc. In this respect, fertilizer 
provided a prime example of inter-industry and inter-sectoral integration because 
it is a product of the petrochemical industry, itself a spin-off of hydrocarbon 
production and refining. 
2. The second element was the de facto seoiring of non-absentee private ownership 
of land and other means of production, meaning that commercial family farms 
and resident capitalist farms were exempt from the reform. 
3. The third element was the de facto enhancement of wage-labour employment both 
in rural areas, and, more importantly, for the overall development programme, in 
urban industry and services. Labour surpluses would be effectively transferred 
from underemployment in rural agriculture into more productive sectors, such as 
industry. 
But what Pfeifer neglects to mention in the implicit agenda of the agrarian 
revolution is the fright of the peasantry that the regime developed, both because of 
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its mobility and its tough reaction towards an illegitimate force of violence as 
peasants snowed against the French colonial state. This is why the explicit agenda 
for villagization of the peasantry, meant for bringing 'modern life' into the rural 
areas, was in fact guided by a hidden, implicit agenda for reducing the mobility of 
peasants by parking them in these villages which would serve to control the 
peasantry better. The state volition was even more visible in its attempt to 
'sedentarize' the pastoral tribes that were practicing the very old system of 
transhumance known as El-Achdba, through the implementation of the third phase of 
the agrarian revolution [for more details about the state policies in pastoral areas, see 
section 5 . 3 ] . 
5 . 1 . 5 Actors involved in the agrarian revolution's arena 
In this section, I mainly focus on the most important actors that played an active role 
in this policy throughout its 'life', either at the formulation stage or during 
implementation. First, I shall differentiate the interfaces that existed during the 
entire cycle of this policy between politicians and central bureaucrats, on the one 
hand, and between the latter and the local administration, on the other. Further, I 
will include in the picture the beneficiaries of and the opponents to the intervention 
and how they perceived and reacted to this policy. 
As far as I have already described above in terms of the state formation process, 
state and bureaucracy composition, its culture, as well as the interests of its different 
clans and members, there should be no doubt about how and why the agrarian 
revolution had been designed and implemented as it did. To achieve this, I shall 
'decompose' the state intervention in the context of this policy into two different but 
complementary steps: ( 1 ) The policy formulation step and, (2 ) The implementation 
step. This is especially required. As Long ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 1 3 ) suggests, in such an endeavour, 
one needs to investigate 
The social composition of the bureaucracy and the organizational means and sets of interests, 
both bureaucratic and private, that shape the formulation and outcomes of policy. 
5.1.5.1 Political leadership-'military-bureaucratic complex' interface and policy design6 
The reading of agrarian revolution charter showed that the design of the agrarian 
revolution favoured the landless and small farmers, as many observers claimed 
(Jonsson, 1 9 7 8 : 4 2 ) , although some ambiguities were found in the legal texts of the 
policy, such as the 7 1 - 7 3 Ordinance of November 8 , 1 9 7 1 . This was an evident fact 
that Houari Boumediene and some members of the political leadership, alarmed by 
the worsening of the economic and social conditions of the countryside, were in 
favour of a real agrarian reform rather than a stricto sensu land reform. 
61 owe the metaphor of "military-bureaucratic complex" to Wallis, M. (1989:31) 
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However, one must not forget the position of these political actors within a very-
heterogeneous ruling body, the Council of Revolution, which was made of a 
constellation of different visions, ideologies, and interests. In this way, concessions 
had to be made by the reform's adepts in order to avoid the open opposition of the 
conservative clan, which could have had disastrous consequences for the country. 
In this respect, policy was designed so as to not concern the landholders that 
exploited their own lands, although some of them were to be partially nationalized 
when exceeding the 'fourchettes de limitation', the higher limits of landholdings for 
each type of land (dryland, irrigated, planted, etc.). This was one of the big 'gifts' the 
reformers conceded, although their first idea was to nationalize all big landlords 
who bought or acquired the land during colonization, whose majority were 
suspected of having 'collaborated' with the colonial adnunistration. In fact, if these 
owners supposedly possessed land within the same high-quality perimeters as their 
compatriots that were expropriated, one must ask why these were not expropriated 
like their compatriots. Instead, some even increased their holdings during the 
colonial period. Quite an intriguing situation! 
The 'military-bureaucratic complex' metaphor seems appropriate, in my opinion, 
to 'nominate' the Algerian state as the regime relied, as already said in section 4.3, on 
two sources of strengthening and mamtaining power: The military and the state 
bureaucracy. The third part of the regime, which was the FLN party, was used 
mostly as window-dressing to carry the socialist ideology extremely needed for the 
regime to achieve its hidden goals. 
As the term 'bureaucrats' may connotes, it is widely known that senior civil 
servants and business managers require equal knowledge of management, although 
it is widely acknowledged that the former are well-acquainted with the rigidity of 
the administrative world of the civil service bureaucracy. As the French scholar 
Bruno Etienne, cited by Yacoubian ( 1 9 9 7 ) , suggests, the Algerian bureaucracy 
represented "the new notability" which "possess a precious capital: They know how 
the system works". 
However, public administrators have a far closer connection with the world of 
politicians as their role is mainly performed within a political context. In this respect, 
the processes involved in poUcy-making and planning are, to a large extent, of a 
political nature. It is thus obvious to expect, as Wallis ( 1 9 8 9 : 2 2 ) puts it, that: 
All the time policies are being carried out, political interventions would occur. Many 
administrators have found to their cost that to resist these interventions is to invite reprisals 
harmful to career development. 
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that if politicians have their own interests in 
formulating policies - policies and politics are closely interwoven - bureaucracies 
also have their own 'internal polities', and top civil servants have their own 
preferences. 
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The caricatured relationship seen by most people between politicians or, in our 
case, the military, and central bureaucrats is that politicians have, according to 
Wallis (ibid.), the task of deciding which policies should be followed whilst the 
administrator is allocated the burden of carrying out these policies. In fact, "while 
the army remains the arbiter of power relationships, technocrats within the Algerian 
bureaucracy wield inordinate influence in the daily lives of most Algerians" 
(Yacoubian, ibid.). 
In the first place, senior bureaucrats can generally be expected to know more 
about the subject matter of policy issues than the political leader. That is why they 
play a major policy-making role, or at least attempt to do so. 'Beneath a cloak of 
knowledgeability, bureaucrats may well in fact be pursuing their own interests' 
(Wallis, ibid.: 2 6 ) and sometimes can secretly manipulate political leaders in taking 
strategic decisions which merely work for their interests. Another way of having the 
'last word' over the control of the situation is the centralized control over policy 
implementation which they keep within close reach. Ixi this frame, as Nellis ( 1 9 8 3 : 
1 3 9 ) argues, 
Centralization of political and adrninistrative activity is seen as part of a larger process in which 
a coalition of bureaucrats and essentially petit-bourgeois populists have captured the control of 
the post-colonial Algeria state. These policies they put forward - expansion of the central state's 
machinery and control, reliance on para-statal industries, de-emphasize of competing sources 
of interests aggregation and articulation - are unif ormly centralist. 
In this context, military intervention in politics since the 1 9 6 5 coup was not, 
according to Wallis (ibid.: 3 0 ) , confined to seizing power. It is merely a kind of 'tacit 
coercion' used to let compel civilian authorities to behave according to their wishes. 
In this context, the military has operated as a particularly powerful pressure group 
because it possesses the ultimate sanction in the form of its control over the use of 
violence in society, combining two rather contrasting motives. On the one hand, they 
acted to promote and protect their own positions, mainly by holding civilian 
authorities to concessions made to them. On the other hand, they often claim to be 
motivated by the desire to save their country from the chaos and ruin they accuse 
civilian rulers of creating by their lower-equity policies. Although the evidence 
showed that many military regimes had shown a great deal of effectiveness as 
economic developers, they still constituted, with the bureaucracy, a kind of state 
bourgeoisie, closely-tied to the national bourgeoisie, which would control either the 
policy formulation and implementation processes to strengthen their power. 
Notwithstanding this somehow universal picture, the Algerian case presents 
slight differences: ( 1 ) The regime was split between reformers and conservatives; (2 ) 
The head of state Houari Boumediene was, in the context of this policy, in favour of 
the former group. 
To protect their interests and those of their allies, the conservative group could 
have hampered the process of designing and avoided the implementation of the 
policy by overtly opposing it. But given that the heterogeneity of the conservative 
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group itself, and the fact that the rapport de forces was in favour of the reformers, 
opposing openly the agrarian revolution policy could have been seen as challenging 
the top man in the country, and charismatic leader Houari Boumediene. In such a 
situation, they knew they would lead the country to some dramatic consequences 
and would at the end loose the Tjattle', given the great popularity of the leader who 
could have easily manipulated the people against the conservative group. 
They did not openly declare their opposition to the agrarian revolution but tried 
to interfere in the process of policy formulation acting upon the interests of their 
natural allies in rural areas (landlords and rich peasants) in order to secure the big 
commercial farms whose owners were not absent. For the rest, they agreed on the 
intervention, which meant for them a great deal of rural population control by 
moving them into the Villages Agricoles de la Revolution Agraire that would be built in 
the frame of this policy. The services and commodities that these villages were 
supposed to offer were used as instruments of bolstering false hopes among 
peasants that the state would help them enter the 'modern life'. 
| Box 5.1.5.1(1) - Decentralization and participation as implementation 'tools' | 
In order to achieve these objectives [the content of the policy], decisions should be taken with 
consideration of a precise knowledge of local realities: This is possible given that it is at the level of 
the commune that these decisions will be made by all grass-roots institutions of the country with 
direct and majority participation of the peasants that are concerned by the success of the agrarian 
revolution, taking into account the state recommendations. This revolution cannot, in fact, be an 
imposed change on the peasants. It should spring up from a democratic effort of the peasants 
collectivities in order to organized their future. 
The agrarian revolution is an eminently political operation in its foundations as well as its goals, 
which constitutes a fundamental dimension in the construction of socialism. Its implementation 
must consequently adopt the same methods of this construction in our country, i.e. 
decentralization, participation of the beneficiaries themselves, mobilization of all political 
institutions, and adaptation of the technico-administrative instruments (my emphasis). 
Source: AR charter in JORA (1971) No. 97 of November 30th, 1971, p. 1272 and 1277. 
According to some officials that were in office at the Ministry of Agriculture at that 
time, the conservatives succeeded in adding articles and modifying others in 7 1 - 7 3 
Ordinance in order to channel the implementation process in respect of their 
preferences, and over which the central bureaucrats were secretly prepared to play a 
big role. The way they introduced the necessity of decentralization of the policy 
implementation [see Box 5 . 1 . 5 . 1 ( 1 ) above] in the legal text of the agrarian revolution 
was very inteUigent. It aimed to both keep their hands clean from directly 
nationalizing their own allies, and make the process of decentralization fail, being 
convinced of the messy problems that local administrations faced with this policy 
due to the great lack of experienced staff they were facing. 
Moreover, to keep their room of maneuver intact in the implementation of this 
policy, central bureaucrats inserted into the legal framework of the agrarian 
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revolution the right instruments to over-rule the decisions of local executive bodies 
that were the appeal and arbitration commissions settled at the wilaya and national 
levels [see Box 5 . 1 . 5 . 1 ( 2 ) below]. Although these bodies were meant to avoid abuses 
and wrong decisions made at the local level, they were used to protect their allies' 
interests by countering the decisions made at the local level, as we shall see later in 
section 5 . 1 . 6 . 
I Box 5.1.5.1(2) - The appeal and arbitration bodies of the agrarian revolution | 
In order to prevent abuses and deviations that can occur in the course of implementing the agrarian 
revolution, a democratic and efficient system was set up. A right of appeal was acknowledged and 
allocated to every citizen concerned by the agrarian revolution measures, including the issue of 
compensation. This right could be exerted, in primary resort, before the appeal and arbitration 
commissions set up in each wilaya , and, in last resort, before the national appeal and arbitration 
commission. This formula, which did not call for the legal, juridical procedure, was the most fitting 
to the principles on which was based the process of implementing the agrarian revolution. 
Source: AR charter in JORA (1971) No. 97 of November 30th, 1971, p. 1279. 
In summary, it is easy to assume that the agrarian revolution policy was conceived 
in order to bring justice and welfare to the landless and poor peasants by abolishing 
man-to-man exploitation, especially through the absentee big landlords. This was 
backed by some powerful politicians in the ruling body. However, some subtle 
manipulations were present in order to turn the designed policy into a 'stimulated 
failure' during its implementation. 
5.1.5.2 Central bureaucrats and local administration: The implementation interface 
As this policy should have been implemented across the entire country by local 
administrations, a process of decentralizing its implementation to local bureaucrats 
was normatively required. Decentralization could greatly help the implementation 
of the agrarian revolution, according to the advantages enumerated by Shabbir 
Cheema and Rondinelli ( 1 9 8 3 : 1 4 ) . However, decentralization was taken as 
threatening the interests of the conservatives in the ruling group and the central 
bureaucrats, as they might have lost power and control over the resources 
distribution through decentralization. 
Centralization was chosen by the Algerian regime at independence for a variety of 
powerful factors, including history, culture and religion, the colonial experience, the 
constraints of underdevelopment, and the ideologies and self-interest of the 
dominant elite, although there was a usual claim that power and responsibility had 
to be put in the hands of 'the people' (Nellis, 1 9 8 3 : 1 2 7 ) . In the context of the 
authoritarian and self-proclaimed Algerian regime, a concept such as 'centralization' 
is strongly connotated with power relations. It cannot thus be seen as a mere 
organizational pattern upon which planning, decision-making and administration 
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are founded. It was very much "in the self-interest, both political and economic, of 
the elite controlling the post-colonial state" (Nellis, ibid.: 138). In this sense, 
centralization can be a misleading neutral euphemism for anti-democratic rule of a 
clique, a class, an oligarchy or a person, as Nellis (ibid.) suggests. In the Algerian 
context, centralization went beyond that in sustaining the control over the national 
resources of the country and served to develop very corrupt patron-client 
mechanisms of governance. Such a system is always worried by any claim for 
decentralization which would give room for spontaneous initiatives from the 
populace to strengthen its base and demand more balance in the power distribution 
in the society. 
Along these lines, I recall the self-management movement spontaneously imposed 
in the summer, 1962, by peasants, "officially if belatedly embraced by Ben Bella, then 
head of state" (Pfeifer, 1985: 5). The bureaucracy reversed the movement by the 
promulgation of the decrees of March, 1963, on 'autogestion' and the simple creation 
in the same year of the Office National de la Réforme Agraire (ONRA) which appointed 
technical directors to the self-managed farms, ostensibly to advise - actually to 
control - them. This showed how the petty bourgeois technocrats suppressed 
decentralized actions giving power to the peasants and re-framed them into a legal 
statute to better control them (Nellis, ibid.: 148). Even the agrarian revolution charter 
acknowledged these actions in its Preamble as Box 5.1.5.2(1) below shows. 
Those central bureaucrats knew, in fact, that decentralization would run the risk 
of devolving power to the peasants and workers, who are mostly represented in 
elected local administration. So the petty bourgeois central bureaucrats controlled 
the state and had to continue to do so in a centralized manner if they were to 
perpetuate their dominance (Nellis, ibid.: 139). 
In Algeria, after the first local administration units, that is the Assemblees 
Populaires Communales (APCs) were elected in 1967, these bodies were just what they 
appeared - essentially powerless, 'consultative' bodies giving the illusion but not the 
substance of representation and decentralization (Nellis, ibid.: 150). In fact, from 
their inception in 1967 to the beginning of the second phase of the land reform effort 
in 1973, elected APCs virtually lacked any meaningful function. When they deeply 
felt a lack of 'political life' (Wilfrid Knapp, quoted by Nellis, ibid.), they added their 
voice to the mounting movement for decentralization which began in the 1970s. This 
resulted, according to Nellis (ibid.: 140), from the fact that centrally planned and 
implemented policies as pursued up to then did not yield adequate levels of 
economic production and distribution. 
Taking advantage of this opportunity, and anticipating the implementation 
problems that local administration would run into, central bureaucrats attempted a 
highly-controlled process of decentralization to implement the agrarian revolution. 
This included delegation of authority to the communal assemblies, which became 
Assemblees Populaires Communales Elargies (APCEs), to include representatives of the 
mass organizations, like the peasants' union. 
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Box 5.1.5.2(1) - Relation between 'autogestion' and the agrarian revolution policy 
The national independence and the recovery of national resources was translated during the first 
phase of the agrarian reform by the recovery of the colons' domains at the benefit of the labourers 
[of 'autogestion'] which were promoted to the position of becoming producers, in conformity with 
the socialist orientation of the country. The second step of the agrarian reform will concern land 
properties and holdings owned by the nationals and collectivities. 
The first experiment of 'autogestion' coincided with a phase of centralization which had simply 
taken the management prerogatives out of the labourers collectivities. Lack of farm 
individualization, lack of free elections to form the bodies of orientation and management, 
management quasi-directed by the administration transforming the producers de facto as simple 
wage-labourers, confusion of production, inputs supply and marketing functions were the 
characteristics of a period during which the bureaucracy brutally stopped the evolution of this 
management system and sterilized its political, economic and social effects. 
The agrarian revolution is a new, decisive and important step of the agrarian reform, a true 
revolution that sprang up with 'autogestion' which was created by the labourers and consolidated 
these last years by the political power. 
Source: AR charter in JORA (1971) No. 97 of November 30th, 1971, p. 1270,1273 and 1280. 
These bodies had to fulfill the important tasks of deciding which lands were subject 
to nationalization and which farmers would be given plots on the expropriated land, 
as well as apply the norms on land property limitation (Nellis, ibid.: 153). It was the 
first time since independence that a non-national (meaning, non-central) body 
implemented an important decision with enough room to adapt national directives 
to local conditions. But this strategic maneuver from the central bureaucracy was not 
without 'préjugé'. According to Nellis (ibid.: 154), many observers saw that: 
The regime sent this particular issue [the implementation of the agrarian revolution] back to the 
communal level precisely to avoid responsibility for a programme that could have raised 
powerful opposition. 
In this respect, I assume that, given that power relations were in favour of the 
reformists, central bureaucrats agreed with a policy that was imposed on them but 
did not want to get directly involved in implementing it. They anticipated the 
negative results that the decentralization 'experiment' of the agrarian revolution 
would lead to and thus adopted decentralization just to destroy both the arguments 
for decentralization and 'shut the mouths' of the decentralization lobby leaders, on 
the one hand, and hamper the realization of a true agrarian reform which would 
have really impacted their allies, on the other. 
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5.1.5.3 Local administration and peasants face-to-face 
The factionalism developed by the FLN party since the days of the struggle for 
national independence became a culture of all the structural units of the Algerian 
state at whatever level. It is thus easy to notice the same characteristics of this 
factionalism at the APC level, given that the FLN was the exclusive organizer of the 
elections. To give the population a democratic choice, the FLN, although being a 
single party, used to present two or three candidates to run for each position in the 
APC assembly. However, when it occurred that an elected mayor started to develop 
a behaviour that did not fit the FLN 'standards', such as fair and equal treatment of 
all citizens of the commune, this was felt as threatening to the party's interests, 
which decided, as a consequence, to nullify the election through the wali - head of 
the province (wilaya) - who had the legal right to do this, given a report written by 
the party. That happened many times, especially in the APCs. This evidently shows 
that individuals who developed a culture of justice and equity were not allowed to 
take over political leadership in the country in the eyes of the party. This 'new' 
culture was the opposite of the one that the FLN was developing among its units 
and the state bureaucracy. Embracing it would have been seen as challenging the 
power of the party. 
It is the latter culture that led, as Bennoune (ibid.: 1 9 ) puts it, all administrators, 
with few exceptions, to be arrogant and hostile to the population, especially in their 
contact with peasants. Sometimes they exhibited a tendency towards a 
authoritarianism and an inhumane indifference towards the people. The differences 
in attitude, standards of living, and lifestyles between the local administrators and 
clerks and the ruled rural population were very striking. The majority of the 
bureaucrats complained how 'wicked' the peasants were, but never about the 
miserable life this peasantry was leading in the countryside. 
This culture was encouraged by a complex of superiority felt by the 
administrators, although the level of political consciousness of the peasantry was 
certainly higher and relatively more developed than of the local bureaucracy and 
FLN functionaries. The spontaneous action they took in the summer of 1 9 6 2 , without 
waiting for any directive, to set self-management committees and continue 
managing the expropriated land left by the fleeing settlers is a good example of this. 
It is even more meaningful as this happened at the moment the national elite were 
almost leading the country into a civil war just for the sake of governing. 
Thinking of a viable solution for how to 'contain' and control the peasantry, the 
state thought of taking it away from the control the Fédération Nationale des 
Travailleurs de la Terre (FNTT), of the very powerful Union Générale des Travailleurs 
Algériens (UGTA), which was behind the idea of the spontaneous 'self-management'. 
Hence, the regime created the Union National des Paysans Algériens (UNPA), a 
peasants' union under the aegis of the FLN party, and of which everyone who had a 
relation to the rural sector could be a member. 
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It was, in fact, a very subtle, diluting, and filtering operation to get the most 
virulent, 'politicized' peasants away from causing serious 'troubles' within the 
UNPA, and to make it easier for the regime to control all workers by dividing them 
into different organizations. The slogan "divide to reign" still had some adepts. 
The farmers' participation in the bodies of the agrarian revolution as legalized by 
the 71-73 Ordinance [see Box 5.1.5.1(1) earlier] took the form of including some 
UNPA representatives into the Assemblies Populaires Communales Elargies (APCEs), 
which were in charge of carrying out the implementation of the policy locally. In 
fact, "two-thirds of the peasants' union representatives in these assemblies were 
landless farmers or seasonal labourers" (Nellis, ibid.: 153). Again, this shows how the 
design of the policy permitted to undermine, through another process, the peasants' 
virulence when it comes to the farmers' participation in APCEs. This was made 
possible by the evident 'mosaic' of people and interests that composed the Unions 
Paysannes Communales (UPCs), local units of UNPA at the communal (baladia) level, 
and the Faoudjs, the basic cells of the UPCs. Jonsson (1978: 68) argues that many 
shortcomings in the composition of the UPCs were reported. Some members were 
not really farmers, or were big landlords; others did not work in the agricultural 
sector at all; in another case, some members of the Faoudjs did not know each other 
or even knew they were members of a Faoudj. He concludes that: 
It is evident that such an organization as the UNPA... is not adapted to mobilize the poor 
Algerian peasantry, which is the fundamental condition for the agrarian revolution to succeed. 
When the participatory mechanism started functioning during the implementation 
of the second phase of the agrarian revolution, landless and poor peasants tried to 
use it to their benefit to influence the decisions to work in their interests and/or, in 
some cases, to take their revenge over central and/or local bureaucrats and their 
allies. They tried to plainly apply the legal dispositions of the 71-73 Ordinance 
without any derogation, but sometimes they trespassed the rules by purposely 
exceeding the limits of nationalization imposed by the Ordinance. When they could 
do that, they over-limited some big landholders and/or totally nationalized some 
landholders who were not absentees. 
But many decisions made by the APCEs were overruled by the provincial 
bureaucrats, that is the wali and his staff, or, to a lesser degree, by the central 
bureaucrats, through the excessive use of the provincial and national appeal and 
arbitration commissions [see Box 5.1.5.1(2) earlier]. Jonsson (ibid.: 49) mentions that, 
although the rules stipulated that the people sitting on the appeal and arbitration 
commissions should not have any concern regarding land, the big landlords had a 
great influence over these commissions, without sitting on them. As examples, he 
mentions that till December 31st, 1975, no less than 2,850 decisions for restitution 
were made by the so-called commissions. 
If few were accepted, most of these decisions displeased the members of the 
APCEs, especially the landless and poor peasants. In fact, these decisions 
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squandered the already belittled enthusiasm they initially had about the design and 
implementation of this policy, given their natural mistrust of the bureaucracy. I still 
remember the hard words some landless and small farmers used during the heyday 
of the Student Volunteers for the agrarian revolution in 1 9 7 4 and 1 9 7 5 to nominate 
local and national bureaucrats regarding this policy. They were even very skeptical, 
thinking that this policy would resolve none of their fundamental problems in a 
sustainable manner (Bennoune, ibid.: 2 4 ) . 
This is how farmers' participation and centrality of their knowledge, which 
appeared obvious in the beautiful phraseology of the reformist clan official discourse 
[see Box 5 . 1 . 5 . 3 ( 1 ) below], was turned into an elusive dream by central bureaucrats 
and their allies in local admirustrations. 
"No agrarian revolution can occur without considering the peasants' knowledge and wisdom, given 
the actual insufficiencies of studies and experienced staff in the rural areas" (Agrarian revolution 
charter, JORA (1971) No. 97, p. 1278). 
The core of the agrarian revolution is absolutely the peasant's knowledgeability, either the unlettered 
or the literate. If the strength of this knowledgeability is ignored, underestimated, overlooked or 
despised, nothing sustainable can be achieved and failure is warranted. 
Peasant's knowledge is of a same nature as of other persons', although most of us, in front of a 
peasant, silent and dressed in rags, would be tempted, sometimes unwittingly, to feel like better 
endowed with a knowledge made superior by university studies, a diversified and rich vocabulary, a 
talent of handsomely phrased utterances, or even with urban clothes and uniforms, materially looking 
more tidy. 
However, acknowledgment of the peasant's knowledge should conform to a balanced position between 
a blind admiration and a systematic disparagement. 
Many people have talked about peasant's participation in the different operations of the agrarian 
revolution. Can we not say that this formulation is somehow inexact and misleading? Peasants 
cannot participate, they are the main actors. Technical staff, politicians and researchers, we are the 
one who should participate. 
To not believe in the unlettered is a mistake that will result in heavy consequences, and announces the 
failure. Believing in peasant's knowledge, although illiterate, is scientifically right, and the first and 
foremost step towards success'. 
Source: Kergoat, L. (n.d.). 
5.1.5.4 Position of big landlords and rich peasants towards the agrarian revolution 
Before 1 9 7 1 , big landlords played a big role in blocking any land reform to be 
launched since independence, thanks to their allies in the state apparatus. They even 
influenced the state, due to the ties they had with the bureaucracy, to reverse the 
spontaneous decentralized 'self-management' movement in 1 9 6 2 undertaken by 
agricultural labourers to weaken the experience and later take control over the land 
and means of production left by the fleeing colons. They tried all possibilities they 
I Box 5.1.5.3(1) - Centrality of peasants' knowledge in the agrarian revolution 
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had at hand to discourage the labourers in the self-managed farms, using 
propaganda campaigns. 
According to an old farmer who was telling his story of 'autogestiori, many times 
they lit fires in the haystacks or grain barns to discourage 'autogestiori' labourers and 
give up their 'stubbornness' about a supposedly failing movement 
When the agrarian revolution was approved in the early 1970s, the big landlords 
were not bothered by it as they were assured by their natural allies in the state 
apparatus that their interests would not be threatened. They were even able to 
infiltrate and undermine the UNPA to make it 'work' for their interests rather than 
for landless and small farmers. 
Their strength resided in the fact that most of them were affiliated with religious 
circles, having been to the pilgrimage many times and were not afraid to 
instrumentalize the religion in order to protect their position and interests [see Box 
5 . 1 . 5 . 4 ( 1 ) below]. People in Algeria are very receptive to the religious discourse, 
especially in the rural areas. A good example of this is in the on-going violent 
movement of terrorism in the country. 
When some big landlords were partially nationalized by the APCEs, they 
introduced appeals at the province and national levels where their allies acquiesced 
by rejecting the APCEs' decisions and overruling them by restitution decisions. This 
was made possible by to the agrarian revolution charter which gave the wali - the 
province governor - the right to overrule the APCEs decisions. 
It is worth noting that these nationalizations, either partial or total, occurred in 
localities where the big landlords were not well represented in APCEs. Whenever 
they had a 'heavy weight' representation (what a strange paradox!) in APCEs, either 
directly or indirectly, they used their position to influence the decision-making 
process to their benefit in local administration. 
Other ways of influencing the course of this policy were to develop (again) 
propaganda campaigns using mainly religious precepts to dissuade beneficiaries 
from accepting plots and parcels on the expropriated lands. Sometimes they use 
rewards to corrupt the 'attributaires' - the beneficiaries of land redistribution - in 
order to give up working on the land. When those methods did not get the wished 
results, they used a more violent and dissuasive strategy; they organized, according 
to Bennoune (ibid.: 2 4 ) , special bands which came at night knocking at 'attributaires' 
doors to threaten and mtimidate them. Due to this method, but for other reasons too, 
many beneficiaries resigned to work on 'their' plots after having accepted them. 
Although their interests were taken into account at the moment the policy was 
designed by their allies in the state bureaucracy, the big landlords and rich peasants 
wanted to show that they felt threatened by this intervention and responded by 
resisting it wherever and however they could. They were very wary to show their 
extreme anger at and fierce opposition to a 'low-intensity' threat in order to dissuade 
reformist policy-makers to think about policies seeking more fundamental change. It 
was a very good piece of 'comedy' played by highly-skilled actors under the 
direction of highly-qualified 'scenarists'. 
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Box 5.1.5.4(1) - Why does El Hadj Amar disagree with the agrarian revolution? 
El Hadj Amar, 71 years old, is a big landlord who inherited his land from his father. He lives with his 
two wives and 12 sons and daughters in a small village in the wilaya of Souk-Ahras. In 1973, 30 
hectares of his land was expropriated by the APCE and versed to the Fonds National de la Revolution 
Agraire (FNRA). In the same year, a Cooperative Agricole de Production de la Revolution Agraire 
(CAPRA) of 5 beneficiaries was founded on his land which annexed another plot of 20 hectares 
nationalized from an absentee neighbour. He is called El-Hadj because he went to the pilgrimage three 
times, one of the five 'pillars' of the Islamic faith. 
After three cropping seasons, he saw 'his' land left uncropped for 15 years, before it was returned to 
him. He made many claims either at the local, provincial and/or national levels, but nobody seemed to 
have an ear for him. He could not imagine that his land that had produced for centuries could become 
unproductive because of these 'lazy' beneficiaries, as he 'painted' them. "If God would have wanted 
these people to enjoy having land, He could have given land to their ancestors, like me. This is my 
land, I inherited it from my father who inherited it from his ancestors. Lots of people were 
collaborators of 'Franca' [the colonial administration] and their land was intact, not one sq. cm was 
nationalized. They were supposed to be the first concerned by this agrarian revolution, which brought 
only arbitrariness. We are Muslims and I don't think that there is a verse in the Quran that says: 
'Take the land from one to give it to another'. I do not believe that". 
In 1991, his land was returned to him due to the application of the 90-25 Law. He told me once, 
during a discussion we had in his house while he offered a cup of tea: "If the country was ruled by law 
and justice, I would have sued 'El-Houkouma' [the government] and 'El-Dawla' [the state] for 
having taken my land for more than 20 years. Nobody has gained something in this story, neither me, 
nor the state and for sure not the beneficiaries who left my land fallow for more than 15 years". 
Source: field notes 
5.1.6 Some of the policy's results under the microscope 
It is widely known that when a revolutionary group tends to apply a land reform 
policy, the objectives assigned to this intervention are mostly political and social, 
although there are some economic aspects that interfere. That is, this intervention 
would have aimed to develop a sort of social justice which would have helped to 
alleviate rural poverty among poor peasants and, moreover, developed the 
agricultural sector. In the specific case of Algeria, it is in this context that the agrarian 
revolution would have been defined. Unfortunately, though the political leadership 
was so sincere - there is no doubt - about working in this sense, the conservative clan 
of the regime and the bureaucracy interfered in the policy cycle and succeeded in 
'deflecting' the impact of the intervention in order to keep the interests of the 
national bourgeoisie untouched. After the coalition of central bureaucrats and the 
national bourgeoisie, particularly the big landlords and rich farmers, successfully 
blocked all attempts at land reform after independence, they tried to react 
strategically under the pressure of the political leadership in the early 1970s and 
agreed to develop a land reform policy. However, they thought this policy should be 
designed and implemented in such a way that their and their allies' interests would 
remain 'intact', and thought to try - why not? - to weight their positions in 
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controlling the state. That gave birth to a sort of, what Ellis calls ( 1 9 9 0 : 1 9 8 ) , a 
"defensive land reform", which intended to prevent any social change in the land 
tenure system. More than that, it legitimized the land transactions that took place 
during the colonization between the colonial state and/or the French settlers, on the 
one hand, and the national rich farmers, on the other. As Pfeifer ( 1 9 8 5 : 1 9 4 ) 
concluded, 
Through all of this, power relations in the countryside were modified: The commercial family 
farms and their material base were strengthened and the capitalist farms were legitimized, so 
that these groups can now promote their interests directly and openly. There were also some 
real achievements for reform beneficiaries in some communities, but on the whole this did not 
amount to a 'revolution' by or for petty producers and workers. 
According to the legal dispositions of the 7 1 - 7 3 Ordinance, many deviations had 
been reported. Based on the results of a case-study he made of Oued-El-Alleug 
commune (Blida province), located some 4 0 km from Algiers, Mutin ( 1 9 7 6 : 6 6 ) 
argues that: 
It is evidently clear that some landholdings within the commune that should have been totally 
nationalized were just limited [partially nationalized]. 
In accordance with Mutin (ibid.), Pfeifer ( 1 9 8 5 : 4 6 ) argues that the majority of land 
finally reorganized by the agrarian revolution were public [domanial and 
communal] rather than private. Among the latter were some small-scale absentee-
held farms that were concerned rather than directly-worked farms. 
It is worth mentioning a fundamental metaphor in this policy which conditioned 
the implementation process, that is the term 'absentee'. The way the legal text was 
drafted full of ambiguities leaves one to ask the question: How could absenteeism be 
testified to and who had the right and ability to testify to it? The implementation was, in 
fact, influenced by the degree of subjectivity - and then discretion - granted both to 
field implementers (APCEs) and protectors from abuses (appeal and arbitration 
cornmissions) in interpreting which farm was 'nationalizable', which was 'limitable', 
which farmer or landlord was 'exploitant' and who was 'absentee'. 
More important, given that implementation was based on participation of the 
beneficiaries themselves in the agrarian revolution bodies [see Box 5 . 1 . 5 . 1 ( 1 ] , I 
assume that the implementation of such policy was expected to be carried out in the 
spirit of a vendetta by landless and small farmers taking a revenge on the big 
landholders, especiaËy those who were the collaborators of the colonial 
administration. This spirit was even reinforced by the Marxist-Leninist ideology of 
the agrarian revolution taking the stance of a 'dictature du proletariat', which was 
easily perceived in the agrarian revolution charter in the use of French terms such as 
'exploitation', 'rapports de production', 'transformation radicale', 'masses paysannes', etc. 
However, some big farms were nationalized and distributed to some 'attributaires' 
that were organized into co-operatives. Mutin (ibid.) mentions that, in his own case, 
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the big modern private farms that were located in the southern part of the commune 
he investigated were just dismantled. This is in line with Pfeifer (ibid.) who states 
that, to maintain any system as a whole, sacrificing some particular interests may 
sometimes be required. Commercial farms as a group benefited from the agrarian 
revolution, though some individual cases may have suffered from it. She (Pfeifer, 
ibid.: 4 5 ) concludes that: 
Private property in land and other means of production and the capital/labour were carefully 
protected, and this was bunt into the fabric of a 'successful' reform all long. 
Moreover, Mesli ( 1 9 9 6 : 1 3 7 ) mentions that, although the policy was based on 
peasants' participation, the 'attributaires' were never consulted about how their farms 
should be managed. They were led to 'adopt' the representatives that the officials 
had chosen for them. They created co-operatives with other people that were chosen 
by the bureaucrats. The 'attributaires' were not enthusiastic about the proposed 
system of management and organization, and stayed passive. The juncture between 
peasants and the state was biased by decisions in full disharmony with the legal 
dispositions of the agrarian revolution charter. This situation can easily be 
understood by referring to the numerous 'attributaires' that quit their co-operatives. 
5 . 1 . 7 Main interfaces of the agrarian revolution policy 
The design and implementation of the agrarian revolution as described in the 
previous sections attract our attention to two important interfaces whose features are 
mentioned in the case. The first concerns the political leadership under the guidance 
of Houari Boumediéne and the central state in an interface that took place during the 
design phase; the second regards the central bureaucrats and the local 
administration that were linked in an interface that was more concerned about the 
implementation phase. 
In both interfaces, central bureaucrats played an important role, meaning that 
they were crucial actors in the whole cycle of the policy. 
Given the power relations that were present at that time, on the one hand, and the 
ideologies and interests underlying the actions of the different social actors that were 
at stake in the first interface, I assume a strong process of manipulation from both 
the political leadership and the central bureaucrats. The latter manipulated the 
participation of farmers to try to smoothly impose a sort of 'dictature du proletariat' 
which, if succeeded, could reinforce the political leadership's power and 
consequently lead it to undertake other more structuralist policies, and finally win 
its battle over the national bourgeoisie. 
On the other hand, the central bureaucrats manipulated the design of the policy in 
order to ensure their own interests and those of their allies. Their manipulation of 
decentralization was very strategic in undermining both the decentralization process 
and the agrarian revolution. 
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At the second interface, the central bureaucrats behaved in continuity with the 
design stage. By 'offering' the policy implementation to the local administrations 
(APCEs), they offered in fact the poisoned gift which left their hands clean and far 
from any direct opposition to their allies, the big landlords and rich peasants. 
Moreover, they kept a close eye on the implementation process by contiolling the 
appeal and arbitration commissions, which were used as last-resort tools for the 
protection of their interests and those of their allies. 
5 . 1 . 8 Conclusion 
In summary, the way this policy was designed shows a strong similarity with the 
Peruvian example of land reform described by Long (ibid.: 1 1 2 ) where 
The principal rhetoric of this reform was 'cooperativism', 'peasant participation' and 'equity', 
but its impEcit aims were to increase central control over the rural population and dynamize 
the production. 
In line with what Pfeifer mentioned above about the fabric of a 'successful' reform, I 
argue that the agrarian revolution did not fail during its implementation. Its failure 
was already stimulated during the design stage. I thus suggest that the agrarian 
revolution and/or its 'stimulated failure' has helped Algeria's post-independence 
state and its inherent bureaucracy to complete the ambitious enterprise that the 
French colonization started in 1 8 3 0 : The dismantling of the peasantry and, as a 
consequence, the burial of the Algerian agriculture. 
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5.2 Case No. 2: The cereal seed production improvement policy7 
5.2.1 Introduction 
In the jargon of intensive, high external-input agriculture, quality seeds are of 
paramount importance. Their potential and desirable characteristics set the 
attainable level of production, given that other inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, 
and herbicides are just means required to realize the productivity potential of the 
former (Srivastava, 1986: 1). Consequently, availability of quality seeds in sufficient 
amounts for appropriate varieties and cultivars is the basic duty of the seed 
programme (or the seed system) acting in the country. Feeling the importance of 
these inputs, Algerian authorities tried, for many years, to devise appropriate 
measures to improve the national seed production, especially the cereal seeds. 
In this section, I shall present the problématique of the cereal seed system in 
Algeria, how it was developed by the Ministry of Agriculture, how it gave shape to a 
cereal seed system with different - but however complementary - functions, how it 
responded to the needs of its clienteles, and to what extent the underlying policy of 
cereal seed production achieved sustainable results. 
5.2.2 Genesis of the cereal seed system in Algeria 
At the time of independence, when the re-appropriation of the colonial estates 
started, production and distribution of certified (or quality) seeds became a crucial 
factor for cereal production in Algeria. Until then, seed production, if I can call it as 
such, concerned a few colonial landholdings which were used to grow their own 
seeds from the limited amounts of certified seeds they annually purchased from the 
métropole (France). Though these colonial farms used to sell their surpluses of 
produced seeds to other colonial farms, the fellahs - i.e. the native, traditional farmers 
- had no access to these seeds and had to make use of their traditional seeds they 
selected from heterogeneous landraces and local populations or use any 
'commercial' seed they could find in the local market. It must be clarified that both 
sectors (the colons estates and the traditional farms) were very different, not only in 
terms of agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions but in terms of cultural 
practices as well. 
In 1962, when the settlers left Algeria forever, the so-called 'seed system' 
somehow broke down and there were no produced nor controlled seeds during that 
year. The deficiency was so acute and no imports were possible because the local 
varieties grown by the fellahs could not be found abroad, given that they were 
selected from a local material that was completely unknown in other countries 
(Kadra and Aït-Amer, 1979a: 175). 
7 This section relies mainly on my own research (MalkL 1994) which I undertook as a partial 
requirement for my MSc degree at Wageningen Agricultural University (MAKS Programme). 
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In order to solve this problem, or at least reduce its acuteness, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, as named at that time, decided in 1963 to 
undertake a programme of identifying the best fields among those in cereal 
production that could be re-oriented as seed production fields. The seeds harvested 
from these fields were collected for processing and distributed to farmers, who were 
mostly the Domaines Autogérés (DAs). At that time, this intervention was supposed to 
be a temporary measure in the transition of setting up a modern seed system that the 
authorities were thiriking of. However, this remained the only 'seed system' that the 
Algerian agricultural sector had until 1973. During all this time, the majority of the 
farms, especially the private sector, were using, according to some seed specialists, 
very low-quality seeds of an unidentified origin (Kadra and Ait-Amer, ibid.). 
Until 1973, it was in fact the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique d'Algérie 
(INRAA) which had the duty to produce the breeder and basic seeds, while the 
Projet Cereales, that started at the beginning of the 1970s, was in charge of control and 
certification of all seed multiplication from the first to the last generation of the 'seed 
pyramid'. At the same time, the Office Algérien Interprofessionnel des Cereales (OAIC) 
was, through a large network of Cooperatives des Cereales et des Legumes Sees (CCLSs), 
in charge of collecting, processing and marketing the harvested seeds (Kadra and 
Ait-Amer, 1979b: 14). It must be said that the Projet Cereales received a strong 
support from the FAO as the executive agency, and a significant input from the 
CGIAR-system International Center for Maize and Wheat (CMMYT), based in 
Mexico, in terms of technical and scientific assistance. 
According to Kadra and Ait-Amer (1979a: 175), a reorganization of the seed 
system was very much needed at that time. This action took place with the 
implementation of the 1st Quadrennial Plan of Development (1973-77), which 
established the foundations of the cereal seed policy. The measures of this plan 
aimed to: 
1. Identify, with precision, the cereal seed needs and production objectives; 
2. Promulgate the required seed regulations according to universal standards in 
order to guarantee seed control and certification, and marketing in order to 
protect the end-users; 
3. Mobilize the appropriate human, physical, and financial resources to correctly 
undertake the various seed system functions. 
5.2.3 Organization and main functions of the cereal seed system 
By definition, a seed programme is "an outline of measures to be implemented and 
activities to be carried out to secure the timely production and supply of seeds of 
prescribed quality in the required quantity" (Feistritzer and Kelly, 1978 cited by van 
Gastel, 1986:15). Moreover, the term 'seed system', or even the term 'seed industry', 
refers to the entire complex of organizations, institutions and individuals associated 
with or involved in the seed programme in a given country (Douglas, 1989:154). It is 
a complex and integrated organizational system composed of several essential 
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components or functions. These components are strongly inter-related to the extent 
that if one of them is not correctly operating or not operative at all, the whole system 
will be affected and may result in a poor-quality end-product (van Gastel, ibid.: 1 5 ) . 
It is, in fact, the complexity of the whole system and the interdependency of its 
different parts that, to a large extent, determine the quality of the final product. 
According to van Gastel ( 1 9 8 6 : 1 6 ) , the major functions that can be found in the 
seed system are described in Figure 5 . 2 . 3 ( 1 ) below. This model, which reflects how 
the seed system is organized in general world-wide, was used in my previous work 
(Malki, 1 9 9 4 : 2 6 - 3 7 ) which analyzed the Algerian cereal seed system and identified 
the main differences that can explain the low-quality seed that this latter system 
produces. In this work, the main functions that were identified are as follows. 
Figure 5.2.3(1) - Main functions of a seed system 
(Source: van Gastel, 1986:16) 
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5.2.3.1 The breeding function 
Breeding is a basic function that provides the seed system with the basic genetic 
material through hybridization (or crossing) and/or introduction of varieties and 
cultivars from abroad. Although it is a very time-consuming activity and requires 
highly-trained personnel, hybridization is one, but not the only, alternative. Newly 
released varieties and/or advanced and segregating material can also be introduced 
from abroad, especially from IARCs. 
In Algeria, only the Institut Technique des Grandes Cultures (ITGC) has dealt with 
this function since its creation in 1 9 7 4 . Given that breeding is mostly considered as a 
research activity, breeders are sometimes not aware that they are also part of the 
seed system, thinking that seed production activity is the duty of others. This is 
perfectly characterized by the weak relations between the breeders and the seed 
production staff working within the same organization, and sometimes within the 
same experimental station. 
Moreover, the breeding programme, as it was actually functioning for the last two 
decades, was based on a very weak local genetic diversity, for only few crosses per 
year are realized, and for relying more and more on genetic material coming from 
IARCs with a strong orientation towards high-yielding varieties (HYVs). As some 
observers have argued, "we experience [in Algeria] an internationalization process of 
the breeding function with a very high dependency risk" (CUTBAM, 1 9 9 8 : 2 0 ) . 
It is for this reason that the breeding function, and therefore the whole 
agricultural Research & Development (R&D) system, especially the cereal seed 
system in Algeria has been exclusively focusing on high external-input farming 
systems, although the dualistic structure of farm typology, i.e. modern farms vs. 
traditional farms, showed - and still shows - the supremacy of traditional, very 
marginal, fragmented, small farms that are not really the appropriate ones for 
intensive agriculture (Groosman, 1 9 9 1 : 2 5 ) . 
5 . 2 . 3 . 2 The variety testing and release function 
The task of this function is to evaluate new varieties upon some legal standards such 
as uniformity, distinctness, stability, value and quality, and agronomic performance, 
before they are released to farmers. It is a very important function that manages and 
regulates the interface between the breeding and seed growing functions. 
In the case of Algeria, this function did not exist until few years ago. It was the 
creation of the Centre National de Controle et de Certification des Sentences et Plants 
(CNCC) in 1 9 9 4 that gave birth, among others, to this function which did not really 
start until 1 9 9 6 and has yet to develop correctly in order to fulfill its duty. It is 
closely related to the management of the National Register of Varieties. 
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5.2.3.3 The seed growing and multiplication function 
This function can be described as a very long chain of simultaneous actions of 
growing and multiplication, starting from the breeder seeds (1 generation) to the pre-
basic and basic seeds ( 3 generations) to the certified seeds ( 2 generations), which can 
be finally sold to the end-users (farmers). However, seed growing is not an isolated 
activity. It must be supported upwards by an efficient breeding function (or 
programme) which provides the necessary adapted genetic material to be 
multiplied, on the one hand, and downwards by an effective processing activity 
(which includes storage and packaging activities), on the other. It is regularly 
monitored by the quality control function [see section 5 . 2 . 3 . 5 hereafter]. It is for this 
reason that the seed growing function cannot be considered as an independent 
activity but as being part of an integrated whole (Douglas, 1 9 6 9 ) . 
In this function, differentiation between the seed producer and the seed grower needs 
to always be made. The former is in general a private, semi-public or public 
organization that has the entire duty of seed production, while the latter is a kind of 
'professionalized', specialized farmer, of whatever legal status, who grows seeds on 
his farm for the seed producer on the basis of a clearly-defined contract. In the context 
of this function, Van Gastel (ibid.: 1 8 ) mentions that: 
The small amount of breeder seed is multiplied a number of times to produce the large 
quantities of certified seed to satisfy farmer's [end-users] requirements. The breeder seed is first 
multiplied to produce basic seed; this in turn is used to produce certified or commercial seed. 
The quantity of seed and the acreage in the different classes increase at each step. . . . 
Throughout the multiplication cycles, a high level of purity should be sustained to guarantee a 
high quality end-product. The standards for early generations are slightly higher than for later 
generations. 
5.2.3.4 The seed processing function 
This function is very important in the process of producing quality seed. It is based 
on an increased capital-intensive orientation, for being a complex, largely 
mechanized operation using relatively sophisticated equipment (van Gastel, ibid.: 
1 8 ) . According to van der Burg and van der Scheur ( 1 9 8 6 : 1 0 7 ) , when the processing 
is conducted with the right equipment and appropriate methods - and with the 
adequate, qualified staff, I would suggest - it can increase purity and germination, 
decrease the amount of other undesirable seeds, especially the diseased ones, and 
improve the visual, commercial, and planting quality of the seed lot. 
As far as processing and storage facilities are concerned, Algeria did not possess 
any specialized infrastructure at the time of its independence, and the situation 
remained so many years after. Cereal seeds were processed by the Cooperatives des 
Cereales et des Legumes Sees (CCLSs), whose equipment was rudimentary. It was only 
with the First Quadrennial Plan ( 1 9 7 3 - 7 7 ) that the establishment of 2 6 cereal seed 
processing and storage centers was decided. Currently, only 1 2 centers with an 
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overall capacity of 4 2 , 0 0 0 tons have been realized, all of them located in the western 
part of the country (Benadel, 1 9 8 8 : 4 3 ) . The rest of the programme's infrastructure 
was built but the operational equipment is still lacking. 
As a matter of illustration, the level of quality, reflected in high rates of rejection 
decided by the seed quality control function, as we shall see later, did not show any 
significant difference between the three regions of the country (the west which is 
relatively better-equipped, and the center and the east, which are less). 
5.2.3.5 The seed quality control and certification function 
This function is in charge of checking the quality of any seed lot produced in Algeria 
or imported from abroad. Needless to say, this function has to be assigned to an 
independent, public or semi-public institution directly accountable to the Ministry of 
Agriculture while having no contact with the other actors in charge of the other 
functions of the seed system, except the professional, routine contact engendered by 
the carrying out of the control and certification function itself (Douglas, 1 9 8 9 : 1 5 7 ) . 
The concept of quality control is embedded in a series of checks and balances 
intended to maintain a high quality seed, where quality includes both specific and 
variety purities, germination, health, weed seed content, moisture content, and other 
desirable characteristics. It is applied through seed certification mechanisms and 
procedures, whose application is enforced by the seed legislation. As a matter of fact, 
seed certification includes the field inspection, the seed lab testing and the pre-
and/or post-control trial. In the case of Algeria, it includes additional activities 
related to the variety testing and release function and the management of the 
National Register of Varieties [see section 5 . 2 . 3 . 2 ] . 
In Algeria, since 1 9 7 3 and till 1 9 9 2 , the quality control function was assigned to 
ITGC which at the same time was the breeder, the pre-basic and basic seed 
multiplier and producer, and the national seed production planner. This situation, as 
strange and paradoxical as it appeared, influenced to a large extent the level of 
quality of the seeds produced during this period, which was exacerbated by the 
quality of processing and storage [see section 5 . 2 . 3 . 4 ] . Benadel (ibid.: 4 1 ) reveals that 
"the seed produced is generally of mediocre quality and the quality is often rightly 
challenged by users". Given the evoked situation, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries finally decided in 1 9 9 4 to create the Centre National de Controle et de 
Certification des Sentences et Plants (CNCC), an independent organization in charge of 
the seed quality control and certification. After its creation, the CNCC started first 
working on the preparation of the seed legislation, which was promulgated through 
executive decrees in 1 9 9 5 . 
However, some constraints are worth reporting. The lack of qualified and 
certified specialists to carry out field inspections, the lack of trained personnel for lab 
testing, the absence of variety purity and health sections in the three regional labs 
that CNCC inherited from ITGC, and the difficulty of mobilizing the necessary 
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means of transportation to conduct the field inspections every year are the major 
constraints of the quality control function. 
5 . 2 . 4 Other intervening actors in the cereal seed system 
Many other actors intervene either directly or indirectly in the cereal seed system, 
maybe not as main function performers as described above, but whose intervention 
is still very influential and of great importance to the whole system. Among these 
actors, I mention only the most important one: The state. 
Represented in the cereal seed system through the Ministry of Agriculture and its 
different structures, the state has been, up to the present, the exclusive policy-maker 
of the seed system. For a long period, it played an intensive role in attempting to 
develop an as-sound-as-possible and efficient seed system through a continuously-
revisited policy. 
In this respect, the protocol signed in 1 9 8 9 with the EC for funding an important 
project on seed production improvement, and the adoption of a more broader vision 
of how the actual seed organization could be improved were indubitable signs of the 
increasing awareness of the policy-maker vis-a-vis the importance of this system. 
Moreover, the state annually injects a significant amount of subsidies into this 
system in order to keep it 'going'. King ( 1 9 9 1 ) estimated, for instance, the subsidies 
allocated for the 1 9 9 0 - 9 1 growing season for only Constantine wilaya (or province) 
was at 3 3 million AD (almost 1 .5 million US $ at 1 9 9 2 official change rate of 1 US$ = 
2 2 AD). If I add that at least 2 5 to 3 0 wilayate (or provinces) are concerned by seed 
production and thus by state subsidies for seed, it is not difficult to estimate an 
indicator about the amount of these annual subsidies. 
One form these subsidies take is seed price dumping, meaning that farmers pay 
lower prices for seed purchases from the co-operatives (CCLSs), relative to the 
harvest they had to deliver to the same co-operatives. 
Such a measure was supposed to achieve two objectives: ( 1 ) It aimed to encourage 
farmers to buy and use seeds produced by the system rather than to store a part of 
their harvest and use it for the next growing season, given the risk of seed-borne 
diseases that can reduce the yield and may engender the endemic spread of a given 
disease; (2 ) It would help the CCLSs, and thus the state, to improve its control over 
the cereal national production through an expected increase of grain inflow that 
passes through the CCLSs. 
It seems that the cereal seed policy, which was run for more than two decades, 
had swallowed huge amounts of public finance which were derived from the sales of 
cereals the CCLSs traded every year. To mobilize these resources, a special 
mechanism called the 'decret de campagne' was set up, signed every year by the 
President of the Republic, or by the Prime Minister since 1 9 8 9 , and which defined a 
royalty to be levied from the farm-gate price paid to farmers on each quintal of 
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cereals or food legumes produced locally and delivered to the CCLSs. For many 
years, this royalty was set at 15 AD/quintal8 [see Box 5.2.4(1) below]. 
Box 5.Z4(1) - Use of cereal and food legume levies in cereal seed production 
The amount of this royalty is meant partly (0.50 AD) to aliment the administrative budget of the 
Office Algérien Interprofessionnel des Céréales (OAIC) and for the remaining (14.50 AD) to finance 
activities of development, extension and technical assistance, as well as activities of international 
trade, distribution, regulation and sponsorship of farmers' organizations. 
Among the activities that were supported by these resources, the following can be mentioned: 
1. The whole or part of the selection premium paid to seed multipliers above the price for 
consumption grains; 
2. The whole or part of the costs of inputs, infrastructure, goods and means used for seed processing; 
3. The costs related to the introduction of new intensive cultural techniques and/or varieties ; 
4. The costs of experimental trials, activities of diffusion and technology transfer; 
5. The costs of other support activities related to technical assistance and logistics; 
6. The sponsorship of farmers ' organizations activities regarding cereal development. 
Source: JORA (1992) No. 77 of October 26th, 1992, p. 1615.' 
5.2.5 Key elements of the cereal seed production improvement policy 
According to the 1988 CIHEAM study on the cereal seed system, which was 
supported by the EC before it decided to fund an important project on the issue, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries decided to set the quantitative production 
objectives at 70% of the total seed needs for cereal crops. Hence, to sow every year 
some 3.3 million hectares with cereal crops, and at a national average norm of 120 kg 
per hectare, 400,000 tons of seeds were needed. Given that the rate of rejuvenation 
decided by the ministry (70%), the annual production objectives ranged between 
250,000 and 300,000 tons of quality seeds to be produced by the Algerian seed 
system. For some experts, the objectives seemed to be rather very ambitious for a 
system that was in the first stage of consoUdation, and thus should be lowered. They 
tried to convince the niinistry that if seeds produced by the system met the universal 
standards of good quality, they could be used consecutively for at least two or three 
years by farmers, given that cereals are autogamous species, with a very low rate of 
out-crossing. Acting upon these recommendations, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries decided to lower the objective of the rate of rejuvenation at 30% instead of 
70%, producing around 150,000 tons of certified quality seeds. 
To achieve these objectives, many complementary measures were put on the 
agenda, such as improving the personnel's technical ability in the different parts of 
8 For instance, if the farm-gate price of wheat was set by the state at 1,900 AD/quintal, the farmer 
received only 1,885 AD and the remaining 15 AD went the Fonds d'Appui a la Cerealiculture. 
* The reference used here, that is the JORA, was in French. The translation into English is from the 
author (MM). 
WALKING DOWN THE EMPIRICAL PATH 1 4 7 
the system through framing, completing the equipment of the processing centers, 
defining criteria for a more strict selection of farmers for seed production, 
motivating seed growers to work for a better quality, etc. 
However, although much of these measures started being carried out in 1 9 9 0 , 
when the EC project started, it did not influence the quality level of the end-product 
of the system. In fact, a quantitative variable, that is the rate of rejection10, is used 
annually by officials to evaluate the performance of the seed system. For them, this 
indicator illustrates the level of quality reached by the system after 1 9 9 0 , when the 
EC project started [see Table 5 . 2 . 5 ( 1 ) below]. 
Table 5.2.5(1) - Evolution of the rate of rejection of cereals seed plots 
Growing Before the EC project After the 
season EC project 
82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 1991-92 
Rejection (%) 49 36 39 42 39 46 38 39 
Source: ITGC data 
It can be clearly seen that the rate of rejection, which theoretically must not exceed 
1 0 % , is very high and even intriguing. It can even be said that the system is diving 
deeply into an mdefinite mess that I called a 'non-quality vicious circle' (Malki, 1 9 9 4 ) . 
In my opinion, these statistics do not show the reality; on the contrary, they hide it 
very well as far as it does not determinate where the causes of this high rate of 
rejection and thus low quality reside. 
Let us assume that the rejection rate of 3 8 % during the 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 season could be a 
starting point for the EC project, for instance. One can assume that this high rate of 
rejection originated from problems that could be attributed to one or another 
function in the seed system. Consequently, it could be expected that by the 1 9 9 1 - 9 2 
season, the rate would be lower, meaning that these problems were circumvented 
and quality improved. But this was not the case, and given that some functions were 
missing or not correctly operating at that time, it was difficult to declare who was 
responsible for what, or who caused this or that problem. This is why I believe that 
this indicator is highly misleading. Trying to understand this very high rejection 
rate, an analysis of the resources made available to achieve the quantitative and 
qualitative objectives of seed production seemed rather essential. However, having 
studied at length the constraints that confined the system within a 'non-quality 
vicious circle', I will content myself by describing the main issues that deal with this 
policy as a development action that attempted to support the improvement of cereal 
production in Algeria. In the remaining part of this section, I will assess the 
following points: 
10 As a matter of definition, the rate of rejection is a percentage ratio of the rejected seed acreage per 
year compared to the total cultivated seed acreage. The rejection is decided either at the field 
inspection or at the seed lab testing. 
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• the basic foundation of the seed system and its philosophical background, and 
how it influenced the response of the system towards the needs of its clienteles; 
• the general criteria of being elected a seed grower, and the alternative stratagems 
used by 'free-riders' to benefit from the 'gifts' offered by this policy; 
• the relationships between different types of farmers and the cereal seed system 
and what perceptions these types of farmers developed towards this system. 
5.2.5.1 Basic orientation of the seed system and its philosophical background 
Having a strong influence from the Projet Céréales, implemented during the 1970s 
with the support of the FAO and the technical and scientific assistance of CIMMYT, 
the breeding function, and thus the whole seed system, embraced a clear orientation 
towards the Green Revolution paradigm, since 1974, when ITGC was created. A 
strong focus was placed on HYVs, external inputs, mechanization, etc. New varieties 
based on this philosophy were released mainly by ITGC breeders, whose seeds were 
increased through a multipUcation programme yearly planned by the main actors of 
the seed growing function. 
A very active programme of extension and diffusion of these new varieties and 
their underlying technical packages was set up to make these aspects known to the 
Domaines Agricoles Socialistes (DASs), called at that time the 'modern' sector as they 
were settled on the former colons' landholdings, with the best, most fertile land in 
the country. 
New types of varieties, known as semi-dwarf varieties, became the leitmotiv of 
ITGC in the middle of the 1970s and the basis of cereal crop improvement because 
these varieties were adequate for an intensive package (mechanization, high 
fertilizer input, use of herbicides, etc.) with a high yielding potential. Without 
questioning if this model could fit in any agro-ecological zone of cereal production, 
ITGC breeders and developers launched the battle of intensification everywhere, 
even in the private farms when they started to be incorporated in the development 
plans at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Some specialists warned at that time that such a model could not be managed in a 
standardized manner given that the most cereals were grown in risk-prone agro-
climatic areas where farms had neither the required resources for such investments 
nor have the potential to give an acceptable return to these investments. According 
to Mesli (1995: 166), the typology of farms that existed since independence was 
mainly characterized by small farms (less than 10 hectares) that could by no means 
fit the intensification vision [see Table 4.5.2.2(1) in Chapter 4 of this book]. In this 
typology, the European sector (colonial farms) gave birth to the public sector, that is 
the 2,188 Domaines Autogérés (which later became the 3,400 DASs after the 1982 
reorganization of both the socialist and agrarian revolution sectors). In 1987, the 
same DASs were splited up (again) into more than 27,000 semi-public farms (EACs-
EAIs). Meanwhile, 70% of the Algerian farms owned not more that 10 hectares. 
WALKING DOWN THE EMPIRICAL PATH 1 4 9 
Among this class, 1 0 8 , 0 0 0 farms did not reach the level of 1 hectare of land. 
Moreover, only 2 5 , 0 0 0 farms were considered modern (Mesli, ibid.). 
Finally, what this typology does not show is that the total agricultural land owned 
by both sectors (9 .6 million hectares) included more than 2 million hectares of 
collective rangelands (Arch), the rest (7 ,5 million hectares) represented the potential 
of arable land that is suitable for agricultural practice. According to Mesli (ibid.: 1 6 9 ) , 
cereals and cereal-based farming systems (which include cereals as well as fallow, 
feed crops and pulses) represented respectively 5 3 % and almost 9 1 % of this area at 
the time of independence [see Table 5 . 2 . 5 . 1 ( 1 ) below]. Slight changes have really 
occurred within this typology or land-use since then. 
Table 5.2.5.1(1) - Distribution of the agricultural land at the time of independence 
Nature of crops Area in hectares Importance 
Cereals 4,000,000 5 3 , 2 % 
Fallow 2,600,000 3 4 , 6 % 
Pulses 163,000 2 ,2% 
Feed crops 56 ,000 0,7% 
Vegetables 56 ,000 0,7% 
Industrial crops 54,000 0,7% 
Fruit trees 190,000 2 ,5% 
Vineyard 400 ,000 5 , 3 % 
TOTAL 7,519,000 100,0% 
Source: Mesli (1996:169) 
Providing more recent figures, Mesli (1996 : 1 1 7 ) suggests that the 1 9 7 3 census of 
agriculture indicated the existence of 7 1 0 , 0 0 0 private farms in addition to the 
'autogestiori sector. In the former sector, 3 1 0 , 0 0 0 farms possessed less than 5 hectares 
and 1 1 4 , 0 0 0 farms owned between 5 and 1 0 hectares. This meant that more than 
4 0 0 , 0 0 0 farms were considered unfit for the intensive model of agriculture practice. On 
the contrary, these were based on extensive models of farming, practicing subsistence 
agriculture such as cereals-fallow, in most cases, integrated with sheep herding in 
some cases. Yet, only 2 5 , 0 0 0 farms, having 5 0 hectares or more, could be considered as 
modern farms, susceptible to 'absorb' the new HYVs and their underlying technical 
package. 
However, in spite of this evidence, a huge HYVs 'marketing' movement was 
supported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Such a movement succeeded 
in disturbing even the most resistant scientists that warned about the danger of 
pushing farmers to relinquish their traditional varieties and native landraces that 
represented the cherished stewardship of the traditional farmers, with the risk of 
creating an irreversible genetic erosion. 
It is within this context that the cereal seed system started to be organized. In 
order to facilitate the use of the seed produced by the system, the impetus of real 
demand was required. Towards this goal, the state started mjecting huge amounts of 
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subsidies by lowering the price of the produced seed as a means to motivate farmers 
to buy seeds from the CCLSs. In fact, the financial resources were not real public 
subsidies as they were derived from the royalties levied from the farm-gate price of 
locally-produced cereals and food legumes. They were thus not public subsidies but 
farmers' own subsidies. 
In reaction to this stimulus, farmers showed different reactions towards these new 
varieties. Some rejected them blatantly at first sight. However, most of the private 
farmers, who were located in harsh and risk-prone zones, decided to use them, at 
least to get a better, personal insight. After some years of 'trial', they rejected them 
and went back using their old landraces and cultivars. Others continued to use the 
seed produced by the system just because it was economically cheaper. When the 
state applied the Structural Adjustment Programme and consequently liberalize the 
prices of cereal products, seed prices were also liberalized and the total amount of 
annual royalties collected could no longer cover the totality of the required subsidies 
for seeds. Consequently, the price of cereal seeds grew dramatically and most 
farmers became reluctant to purchase and use the system's seeds, retorting to the 
old practice of keeping part of their harvests every year to sow in the next cropping 
season. 
This reaction of farmers towards the seed system must be seen as dramatically 
negative. Some statements can be presented in order to attempt an explanation of 
this situation: 
1. The Algerian seed system was based on a Western-oriented concept of 'quality 
seeds' that can be found in any seed system in the developed world but which had 
neither the same resources to improve the quality of the produced seeds nor the 
same agro-ecological context. Algerian policy-makers adopted the same 
philosophy as in the developed world, decided upon the production objectives in 
a similar way, but forgot to mobilize the same resources to concretize this 
philosophy and achieve these set objectives of production and quality. When the 
seed price was not 'subsidized' any more, the seed system was not able to 
convince its clients to continue purchasing its products at a real market price. I 
assume that the system was not institutionalized enough as its product was 
lacking an acceptable level of quality in comparison to the price they had to pay 
for it since the liberalization of the seed price. 
2. Many observers may argue that farmers stopped using the seeds produced by the 
system because of the price liberalization. Anyway, the case may be true to a 
certain extent. However, most of the time, farmers who were interviewed 
answered that they could not completely rely on the new varieties' seeds 
produced by the system. This is why they could not relinquish their cherished 
traditional landraces and cultivars because of their high potential of adaptability 
to harsh environments and their yield stability, whatever the climatic year can be. 
For them, the new varieties, although they showed better performance in a good, 
rainy year, showed a striking lack of the deemed desirable characteristics of 
adaptability and yield stability mentioned earlier. 
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Following what I said earlier, the breeding function was perceived by many actors as 
part of the research component within a development programme strongly 
embedded in a linear model of technology transfer (ToT model) that completely 
ignores upstream flow of information from farmers to extension and to research, let 
alone the direct flow from farmers to researchers. As a consequence, and in addition 
to the philosophical orientation adopted by the breeding function that I described at 
length earlier in this section, I suggest that the brœding function, and thus the whole 
seed system, worked for not less than two decades in a completely closed vacuum 
and disconnected from farmers' needs, to not say in a complete amnesia of the 
agricultural national history. 
This statement is reinforced by a practical example that I derive from the heyday 
of the intensive model of cereal cultivation developed by ITGC which was far from 
meeting all expected outcomes after more than 2 5 years of public sponsorship. In the 
1 9 9 5 - 9 6 cropping season, which is the best agricultural season of the century, 3 . 5 
million hectares of cereal species were cultivated. However, according to the official 
statistics of the Direction de h Production Agricole of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, only 1 6 7 , 0 0 0 hectares were treated with herbicides ( 5 % of the total) and 
1 0 0 , 0 0 0 hectares were fertilized with nitrogen ( 3 % of the total). The total production 
of cereals was estimated at 4 . 9 million tons. Careful 'meditation' upon this example 
prompts me to ask two questions: 
1. If we consider that the seed production acreage amounts to between 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 and 
2 0 0 , 0 0 0 hectares annually, can we not say that ITGC and the significant public 
sponsorship failed in implanting the intensive model? 
2. If the R & D system was not really 'water-proof against and so disconnected from 
the farmers' real - and not assumed - needs, could it not prevent such a failure? 
5.2.5.2 The general criteria of being elected as a seed grower 
According to a specific brochure entitled "La production des semences certifiées des 
céréales" (ITGC, 1 9 9 2 ) , farmers likely to be selected as seed growers had to meet these 
criteria: 
• They must have one or more accessible plots for seed production; 
• They must have enough tecxinical competence and expertise; 
• They must possess some or all required equipment (seed broadcaster, pesticides 
sprayer, harvesting combine, etc.); 
• They must eventually possess specific equipment for supplemental irrigation; 
• They should subscribe to a contract with a seed producer (ITGC for pre-basic and 
basic seeds, and CCLSs for certified seeds) 
However, in comparison with international standards, these criteria seem 
unconcerned with the important criterion that farmers, according to Termohlen 
( 1 9 8 6 : 2 2 ) , must show some professionalism in seed production, and not be solely 
motivated by the economic aspects this activity can generate. In this particular sense, 
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farmers who are likely to have a strong professional interest in seed growing cannot 
become seed growers as far as they do not possess the required equipment 
mentioned above, if these criteria are strictly followed. Moreover, the possession of a 
harvesting combine as a criteria to be selected as a seed grower is really 
questionable. Knowing the cost of such a machine, it is prudent to question the 
relevance and the rationality of requiring such an investment from a farmer that 
cannot possess more than 1 0 hectares. In fact, the requirement of this kind of 
investment applies more directly to farmers that owned more than 5 0 or 1 0 0 hectares 
of land. Is this not additional evidence that some policies are 'tailored' towards some 
type of farmers? 
This shows, in one sense or another, either wittingly or unwittingly, the bias of 
development planners and development institutions towards rich farmers and 
highly-mechanized farms. It highlights the philosophical orientation of the seed 
system towards a certain type of farm that does not represent the majority of farms 
and the support of a development model that is significantly lacking 
representativeness. Nevertheless, I am not against this orientation as far as seed 
production must be secured and protected from biotic and abiotic stresses, given the 
importance of seeds. Locating seed production within few farms that show a great 
extent of modernization is not a problem per se. The potential danger in this 
orientation is that seed production becomes a referential model of agricultural 
development and through the model of technical assistance its develops and the 
extremely intensive-oriented technologies it produces (HYVs), as was the case in 
Algeria. 
According to some specialists that I interviewed, the process of selecting farmers 
for seed production first and foremost should involve evaluating their competence, 
good morale, professional values and hard working potential. 
However, the reality was different. Farmers were selected upon criteria that fit 
neither the official ones, mentioned earlier, nor the specialists' ones I have just 
mentioned. In fact, during my field research, I was in contact with farmers who 
neither met neither criteria, and who were still struggling to be, by any means, 
selected as seed growers. The most lucky ones had recourse to the use of the famous 
politics - or "politricks" (Paul Richards, 1 9 9 8 : pers. comm.) - of using 'intermediaries' 
to overtake the restrictions the official criteria imposed on them. Is 'quality' really 
linked to professionalization? 
5.2.5.3 The farmers - seed system relations and farmers perception 
It is generally admitted that quality seeds' availability of appropriate and adapted 
varieties are the elements of the raison d'être of any seed system. In this respect, 
farmers, as end-users of this system's products, develop their perception towards the 
system in relation to the quality and quantity of its products. But, given the 
particular context, farmers cannot be represented by one exclusive category. Given 
their degree and type of involvement in the seed system, farmers can be either: ( 1 ) 
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End-users of the seed system, i.e. farmers who are only involved in the use of the 
system's products (seeds); or, (2 ) Seed growers, i.e. farmers who grow seeds to cover 
the needs of the end-users". Whether, a farmer is a seed grower or an end-user, 
differences of perception towards the seed system can be found. 
a). Seed growers', perception, of the, seed, system 
Being a seed grower gave an opportunity to farmers to access a seed multipUcation 
premium that amounted to between 2 0 % (for pre-basic and basic seeds) and 1 0 % (for 
certified seeds) of the official farm-gate price of cereal consumption grains paid to 
farmers. For many farmers, the amount of the seed multiplication premium was so 
motivating and/or tempting that it created a remarkable rush of 'new-comers' 
willing to be selected as seed growers, some of them likely to get 'their share of the 
cake'. 
The importance given to the seed multipHcation premium gave rise to different 
reactions which divided seed growers into two main groups. The first group 
represented 'truly professional' seed growers who saw the premium as a just 
compensation for their efforts, given that seed multipUcation needed additional 
practices and more care and nurturing than consumption grains production, such as 
off-types rogueing, borders clearing, etc. [see Box 5 . 2 . 5 . 3 ( 1 ) below]. 
Si Omar, 55 years old, grows yearly between 100 and 120 hectares of cereal seeds. He correctly applies 
technical recommendations given by ÍTGC staff and is satisfied with their assistance. He believes seed 
production is more than a professional business; it is quite an art. For that, any Algerian farmer 
cannot be a seed grower. 
Mihoub, 35 years old grows yearly up to 250 hectares of cereals seeds. Before he adopted a new 
variety, he first experimented it on his farm for at least two years. For him, there was no problem 
about quality control with the field inspectors but believed there are some 'pseudo seed growers' who 
used illegal tricks to influence or modify afterwards the field inspector decision rather than working 
hard to achieve the required level of quality. 
Si Rachid, 50 years old, yearly grows up to 180 hectares of cereal seeds. He acknowledged that seed 
production expanded steadily during the last five years because of a social phenomenon he called 
'neighbour imitation' (a sort of farmer-to-farmer diffusion process). He recommended that the 
distinguish the 'truly professional' seed grower should be distinguished from the 'free-rider'. He also 
believed pre-basic seed field inspectors were real professionals and knew their jobs, while others lacked 
practical experience and training. 
Source: Malki (1994:40). 
The second group represented the 'free-riders' of the system who tried to benefit as 
much as they could from the seed system through being seed growers but with very 
11 Although this category (end-users) represents both farmers' types, this dichotomy is adopted for 
strategic reason of differentiating the perceptions of the different categories of farmers. 
| Box 5.2.5.3(1) - What do seed growers think about the seed system? 
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little investment on the plots. Two distinct sub-groups can be distinguished among 
this population: 
1. The first sub-group concerned seed growers that were directly interested in the 
premium, farmers in this group tried any stratagem to get their plots certified by 
the field inspectors and thus get the premium. They could even influence the field 
inspector to certify their plots even in case they did not live up to the official 
quality standards. 
2. The second sub-group showed a very well-developed strategy based not only on 
the multiplication premium but on the other advantages seed production offered. 
In fact, all co-operatives (CCLSs) possessed their specific agricultural equipment 
that was supposed to work (upon an extreme priority) on seed multiplication 
plots belonging to farmers who lacked equipment, offered at very competitive 
rent prices, which was another deviation from the official criteria mentioned in 
section 5 . 2 . 5 . 2 . Any farmer who wanted to have access to this offer needed to be 
selected as a seed grower, even though their seed plots would not be certified at 
the end of the cropping season for not meeting the official quality standards. 
This strategy was in fact based upon a very simple economic calculation. Being 
seed growers, they first had access to a younger generation of seeds ( G 4 or Rl for 
farmers selected for certified seeds, and G 2 and G 3 , for farmers selected for pre-
basic and basic seeds), which means greater productivity potential. They then had 
access to better quality, cleaned, processed and chemically treated seeds, which 
meant no- or lower recourse to herbicides. They also had access to rent machines 
from the CCLSs, if needed, for ploughing, sowing, weed control treatment and 
even harvesting at a very competitive price in comparison to the free market. 
They had a great chance to get the premium with a very low investment from 
them, pending that the plots were certified. However, if their plots were rejected 
for not meeting the standards, they would sell their harvest as consumption 
grains. In such a case, they lost the multiplication premium but achieved a better 
gain instead through the better yield the used seeds could guarantee, in addition 
to the lower charge of renting the co-operative's equipment, the saving of 
herbicides' cost (sometimes), and without as much effort as required from a 'truly 
professional' seed grower (especially for off-type rogueing). 
These diverse reactions were always sustained and reinforced by the lack of 
specialized farmers' organizations that could help seed growers organize themselves 
into a more professionally-oriented force. This situation engendered opportunism 
from some seed growers (or pseudo seed growers) of the second group mentioned 
above, which had nothing to do with seed production, - professionally spealdng. 
They could, however, have access to the public resources even before a 'truly 
professional' seed grower. In fact, the politics (or 'politricks') of 'intermediaries' in 
Algeria could develop some specific 'channels' for these types of seed growers in 
order to snatch any public help initially oriented to the 'really professional' seed 
growers. 
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b} End-users.', perception of. the. seed system 
For the majority of farmers, the seed system did not respond to their wishes as it 
focused more exclusively on promoting new varieties (mostly introduced HYVs) 
that were replacing the farmers' preferred old cultivars at an increasing rate [See Box 
5 . 2 . 5 . 3 ( 2 ) below]. From the onset, the seed system was set up according to IARCs' 
orientation, that is, to develop Green Revolution-like packages which were thought 
of as the only alternative for agricultural production development. 
| Box 5.2.5.3(2) - What do fanners think about the seed system products? | 
Over the years, most farmers located in risk-prone areas rejected, either at first sight or after being 
experimented upon, the seed system's product just because its varieties did not meet their preferences. 
In doing so, they avoided relinquishing their old cultivars because of their potential adaptability to 
their agro-ecological zones. Their process of agricultural activity is part of a knowledge process 
wherein knowledge was transmitted between generations mostly through oral communication. The 
old landraces and cultivars they continued using represent the continuity of this knowledge process. 
After many centuries, their conceptualization of resource conservation included domestication of wild 
resources, massal selection, seed multiplication and increase, utilization of the domesticated resources 
in wide-scale cultivation, use for human and/or animal consumption, and storage and/or surpluses 
marketing. So, conservation of resources is strongly connected to the use of these resources. 
The new varieties promoted by the formal, institutionalized seed system were mostly of a high grain 
harvest index and with low proportion of straw for being semi-dwarf. The grain did not meet the 
nutritional qualities required by the household and the straw yield was quite low to cover the animals' 
needs. Moreover, these varieties were mono-variety (composed of only one cultivar) while they 
preferred their mixture of cultivars for reasons linked to their agro-ecological and socio-economic 
conditions. 
L J 
Sources: Malki et al. (1995:81-82); field notes. 
However, for the few farmers that used the seeds produced by the system, they did 
it not because they were convinced of the usefulness of the seeds vis-a-vis the 
productivity of their plots, but because their dumped price, i.e. the price they paid 
for purchased seeds, was much lower than the price they were paid when they 
delivered their harvest to the CCLSs. As a simple remark, the option of using the 
system's seeds was taken to save money by bringing the CCLSs the few quintals they 
used to keep as seeds for the next season and take the same amount from the CCLSs 
at a lower price. Farmers were thus not critically looking to the issue of quality. 
Another psychological consequence some specialists talked about in Algeria is 
that seeds, because of being cheaper, had no or low value in the eyes of farmers, as 
compared with their own harvest. The price dumping was perceived by some 
farmers as the CCLSs just getting rid of their stocks because of a lack of efficient 
communication between both parties. 
For the few last years, the state stopped its support of the seed system as the 
application of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) went on. As a 
consequence, the removal of public subsidies occurred and engendered a significant 
1 5 6 RE-HUMANIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
reduction of seed purchases from the CCLSs, unveiling the lack of interest among 
farmers towards the system's seeds as the price liberalization brought seeds to their 
real economic value, though they have not yet lived up to the quality standards 
established by the official seed legislation. 
5 .2 .6 What can be concluded about the performance of the seed system? 
Supposedly created in order to provide a basic input, seeds, for agriculture 
production improvement and development, whose process is basically founded on 
professionalism, the performance of such a system can be evaluated by two basic 
indicators: ( 1 ) The responsiveness of the system towards its diverse clienteles' needs 
in terms of quality seeds, and; (2 ) The ability of the system to maintain an increasing 
trend of professionalism among the seed growers in order to improve both the levels 
of quality as well as quantity. 
Checking the performance of the system against these two indicators would 
determine the level of sustainable development of the system itself as well as its 
diverse clienteles, and, consequently, the level of the underlying policy's sustainable 
achievements. 
5.2.6.1 Responsiveness of the system to the diverse needs of its clienteles 
The orientation of the Algerian cereal seed system basically focused the activities of 
the system on the intensive model of agricultural development founded upon HYVs 
and their underlying packages. Moreover, the concept of seed quality adopted by 
the Algerian seed system was the one enforced in the developed world. It was in fact 
related to high-yielding, diseases- and pest-resistant varieties that are distinct, uniform 
and stable (DUS). In such a conceptualization, quality stands for a sample (or a lot) of 
seeds that attains universally-known standards like variety purity, health, germination 
power, and vigour. 
However, if this conceptualization fits the production environment of the 
developed world perfectly, it proved to be not adequate for the harsh environments 
and resource-poor areas which constitute the majority of Algeria's production 
environment, as demonstrated earlier by the farms typology [see section 5 . 2 . 5 . 1 
earlier]. 
That the adoption of this orientation was decided upon indicates a neglect of the 
agricultural national history, given the dualism of sectors that always existed in 
Algeria: ( 1 ) The modern sector which concerned the pre-independence European 
landholders (which evolved into the 'autogestion' sector after independence) and few 
large local, indigenous farmers, and; (2) The traditional sector, which became the 
private sector after independence, along with the big indigenous farmers of the 
modern sector. Each of these sectors had its own seed 'market'. The simultaneous 
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existence of two different seed systems in developing countries is not new and has 
been reported by many authors. As Hardon and de Boef (1993: 66) put it, 
Two independent systems of crop improvement continue to exist side by side in most 
developing countries, with their own exclusive linkages for the management of plant genetic 
resources. This includes: 
• A formal institutional system involving IARCs and other regional and commodity-oriented 
centres, national research systems and private industry, linked to farmers through extension 
transfer. The emphasis is on maximizing yields and use of external inputs... 
• An informal system at the farm level using and developing crop diversity through local 
landraces and seed production and distribution at the community level. The major emphasis 
is on yield stability, risk avoidance and low external input farming. 
The present seed system was established during the implementation of the 1st 
Quadrennial Plan of Development (1973-77). It was mostly meant to support the 
development of the 'autogestión' sector and, to a lesser degree, the agrarian 
revolution sector, which were both combined into the socialist sector in 1982. Given 
the evolution of the ideology of planning and pohcy-making of the 1970s, the 
orientation of the seed system could be seen as plausible until 1987. In this context, 
the use of the system' produced seeds by the DASs, like other inputs, was enforced 
by means of administrative injunctions from the Ministry of Agriculture. Whether 
the quality was good enough or not, nobody cared. 
Since the reorganization of the socialist sector in late 1980s, a revision of 
orientation was necessary as the Exploitations Aguedles Collectives and/or Individuelles 
(EACs-EAIs) that were created out of the Domaines Agricoles Socialistes (DASs) 
developed farming strategies that were closer to the private sector rather than to the 
former DASs. Unfortunately, the same orientation persisted unquestioned until the 
last two years. Slight changes are very smoothly being introduced because of the 
price liberalization. 
As a consequence, having lost hope at the beginning of the 1970s that the formal 
seed system would consider their preferences, farmers, especially those located in 
risk-prone areas, and their different organizations have been relying increasingly on 
their own - yet not institutionalized - seed system during the last years. They 
continued using the old, traditional cultivars with longer stalk for the straw rather 
that the semi-dwarf HYVs which stemmed from the focus "on raising the genetic 
yield potential, etc. by increasing the amount of dry matter diverted to harvested 
product and núrúmizing the increase of total biomass production" (Hardon and de 
Boef, ibid.: 64). 
Again, these HYVs needed, as Hardon and de Boef (ibid.: 65) put it, strong 
environmental manipulation through the use of external inputs such as fertilizers, 
herbicides, etc., in order to adapt the growing conditions to the requirements of 
these new varieties. However, in harsh areas where the presence of resource-poor 
farms is the rule rather than the exception, these HYVs have no comparative 
advantages whatsoever in comparison to the old, traditional landraces and cultivars. 
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The choice made by farmers to adopt a given cultivar is guided by different 
parameters which might concern either their agro-ecological conditions as well their 
socio-economic aspects, such as the household's human and animal needs, for 
instance [see Box 5.2.6.1(1) below]. 
| Box 5.2.6.1(1) - Where and why do some farmers get their seeds? | 
When we were visiting a region in the south of the wilaya of Souk-Ahras with an agro-pastoral 
orientation, we found that some farmers cultivate barley for their sheep, using old, traditional 
landraces. Among our group of researchers, a breeder was taking part in the mission. He was 
completely puzzled when one of the farmers started naming the cultivars they use because he had 
never heard or knew the existence of these cultivars. One of the barley cultivars that was known in the 
region was named SEFRA BETZ. When we asked the farmers where they get the seeds of these 
cultivars, one of the farmers replied: "We buy them in the village market, as some farmers sell their 
seed surpluses in the market. Sometimes, if we do not find it in the village market, we borrow some 
seeds from other farmers we know". I asked him if they buy seeds from the CCLS. He replied: "We 
never go to the CCLS ofEl-Aouinet because we cannot find SEFRA BETZ there. The co-operative 
sells only new varieties that we experimented with and found not fit for our region". Our breeder 
could not go back to his station without some samples, which would let him understand what farmers' 
prefered traits are while selecting cultivars. 
During the same period, we visited some farmers in the wilaya ofKhenchela, a more pastoral province 
than Souk-Ahras. While discussing with farmers and an old retired technician, we understood why 
farmers in these harsh areas cultivate a mixture of wheat landraces and cultivars having different 
genotype and phenotype traits. It is a technique that had proven its ability within climatic-risk-prone 
areas to produce a minimal yield whatever the climatic year is. Moreover, the mixture met the 
multiple purposes of using wheat in the household. A cultivar might be good enough for couscous but 
not as good for pasta or cake; another one can be good for bread-making but not as good for couscous, 
and so on. We thus discovered that farmers were just putting an old knowledge in use transmitted 
from generation to generation, and that selection of cultivars is conditioned not only by their potential 
of adaptability to harsh areas but by their fboding capacity and transformation ability as well. 
Sources: Malki et ah (1998:21-22); field notes. 
As a conclusion, I assert that: 
1. Given the differentiation of the agro-ecological and socio-economic aspects among 
the types of farms shown by the typology, differentiation of quality standards 
should have been considered in order to get the concept of quality adapted to the 
diverse environments. The concept of quality should then stand for a guarantee 
that farmers will be provided good-enough seeds for their (s)elected varieties, 
whatever the label of these varieties. 
2. The cereal seed system that was set up at the beginning of the 1970s was 
developed upon an orientation which neglected the real - and not assumed -
needs of the majority of the farmer population. It focused on the foundation of a 
formal institutionalized seed system that was ignoring the informal seed system 
for more than 25 years, ignoring that "co-operation between both systems is 
essential and is in the interests of both farmers and plant breeders" (Hardon and 
de Boef, ibid.: 65). It was certainly not aware that both systems should be seen as 
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lying on a continuum rather than being independent, conmcting and competing 
entities and/or approaches (Hardon and de Boef, ibid.). 
5.2.6.2 Improvement trend towards a professionalization of seed production 
The evidence of the study I undertook on the Algerian seed system (Malki, 1994) 
showed that quality as conceptualized through technical standards and regulations 
enforcing the activity of the seed system can be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for bringing this system about to produce better quality seeds. It has to be 
recognized, in fact, that a seed system is a socio-technological one, which by 
definition required both a material technology (with its standards and norms) and a 
social organization of the people who operated the material (and comply with the 
norms). In such a system, the social organization possessed some social and 
psychological properties that are independent of the demands of the technology 
(Huczynski and Buchanan, 1991: 316). These properties, which are fairly conditioned 
by the cultural and social settings (norms, beliefs, standards, etc.) of the community, 
can in fact strongly influence the performance of the equipment and/or the quality 
of its outcome. 
Consequently, quality appreciation became, despite the naivete of some 
specialists, highly dependent on the ethics of human beings, especially under 
conditions where mechanisms delimiting the responsibilities of each actor were 
lacking, as in the case of the Algerian seed system. In this context, the concept of 
quality, as a mere technical concept, left the place for a social construct, where 
different conditions, such as historical, socio-political and economical ones, had 
considerably influenced the degree of compliance of social actors with the agreed-
upon technical norms. As shown by the Algerian case, the type of regime that was 
established at independence time and the socialist economic model it induced, on the 
one hand, and the monopolistic pattern of goods and services production and 
marketing that grew up as a direct consequence of the socio-political settings, on the 
other, determined the Algerian cultural system of values and social norms which 
completely excluded quality issues. Lack of competition and deficient supply in 
regards to the increasing demand of goods and services engendered the fact that 
domestic markets absorbed products made available by public companies, not 
because of their good quality but because of the unique and insufficient presence on 
the market. In this respect, I suggest that one cannot mention a formal existence of a 
culture of quality within the Algerian socio-economic system, neither at the 
consumers' nor at the producers' levels. 
Given this socio-political and economic context, opportunism developed stronger 
in Algeria, and the seed system could not escape it. Upon the temptation of the seed 
multipUcation premium, an enormous rush of 'new-comers', keen to 'get their share 
of the big cake', took place since the late 1970s. Behaving like rent-seeking 'free-
riders' and motivated exclusively by their own economic interests, most of them 
made use of illegal mechanisms to benefit from the public resources and services 
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made available by the government policy, without any respect of the regulations -
seed quality standards and norms - of the seed system. Therefore, the whole system 
was trapped into a 'non-quality vicious circle'. This situation could occur because of 
or even be exacerbated by the absence of legitimate farmers' organizations that 
would have defended the professional interests of the 'truly professional' seed 
growers or the end-users. 
As a result, many public resources were 'swallowed' by the seed system either 
without being made responsive to the needs of its diverse clienteles nor improving 
the professionalism of the seed growers and their perception of the concept quality. 
5.2.7 Main interfaces in the Algerian cereal seed system 
In the particular case of the Algerian cereal seed system, many social and 
organizational interfaces take place in the contexts of the different functions of the 
system. Given it is not an easy task to go through the whole number of interfaces in 
this study, I will focus on two major ones that have a real impact on the whole 
system. They are: ( 1 ) The breeder - farmer (end-users) interfaces; and, (2) The field 
inspector - seed grower interface. 
5.2.7.1 The breeder -farmer interface 
It is hard to talk about an interface in such a setting, given that it was rarely seldom 
that a breeder discussed the farmer preferences about cultivars and varieties with a 
farmer. Breeders in Algeria considered themselves as part of the National 
Agricultural Research System (NARS) which obeyed to a mere top-down approach, 
without having direct linkages with farmers. However, let us build an 'assumed' 
virtual interface. 
Farmers, as end-users of the seed system product, are divided into two different 
groups: The resource-rich farmers and the resource-poor ones. For this purpose, I 
identify two different forms of the same interface. 
• the breeder - resource-rich farmer interface: Breeders were more keen to develop 
HYVs since the onset of the seed system, given the strong influence of IARCs, 
mostly praising the Green Revolution paradigm. The varieties developed and/or 
promoted by the breeders fit the resource-rich farmers likely to have better access 
to the acquisition of the required inputs and credit from the bank. In this case, the 
interface operated along a continuity between the interests of both parties. The 
only problem faced by the breeders was that this class of farmers was not 
quantitatively very important as shown the farm typology introduced earlier. 
Any positive impact of the breeding function on these farms cannot live up to a 
significant impact on overall national production. 
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• the breeder - resource-poor farmer interface: In the case of this interface, the 
breeder was completely 'hirning his back' on the farmer, given that the varieties 
developed and/or promoted by the former did not meet the agro-ecological and 
socio-economic conditions of the latter. Some breeders believed it was illusory to 
rely on these types of farmers to increase national cereal production. 
Alternatively, these types of farmers, representing the majority in the farm 
typology, had to increasingly rely on their own informal, non-institutionalized 
seed system which was the right instrument to protect their old traditional 
landraces and cultivars from the genetic erosion that swept many others, such as 
the Oasian wheat varieties, for instance. In this case, the interface functioned upon 
a complete discontinuity between the preferences of the two parties. 
5 .2 .7 .2 The field inspector - seed grower interface 
During my work on the seed system (Malki, 1 9 9 4 ) , I suggested that this interface 
took many forms depending on the types of parties that interacted on both sides of 
the interface, which I believe really existed in the field, in contrary to the previous 
interface [see section 5 . 2 . 7 . 1 above]. The interference of 'free-riders', basically rent-
seekers motivated by their own economic opportunistic interests, introduced a 
systematic differentiation in the interface. At least three forms of interface were 
proposed, according to the Brown's "taxonomy" (Brown, 1 9 8 3 ) : 
• A problem-solving interface: In this interface, both parties showed an acceptable 
level of professionalism and considered quality as a main issue for the seed 
system. Their interaction was primarily based on common interests and co-
operation. The pattern of interaction aimed at problem-solving was reinforced by 
circumstances where common interests were perceived as more important than 
conflicting interests (Brown, ibid.: 2 2 4 ) . Such a pattern more often than not 
involved trust and friendliness among social actors on both sides of the interface, 
open and accurate exchanges of information, and largely co-operative tactics 
(Brown, ibid.: 4 0 ) . This was another type of interface, the functioning of which 
followed a continuity between the interests and preferences of both parties. 
• A bargaining interface: In this interface, quality checking was influenced by the 
unwillingness of 'free-rider' seed growers to comply with the official standards, 
and who used different strategies to get their seed plots certified, whatever the 
level of their quality, on the one hand. On the other, the lack of sufficient 
professionalism of certain field inspectors contributed to the abuse. One of the 
tools both parties used was their capacity for bargaining as they had different 
interests and similar knowledge problems, both were lacking professionalism. In 
this interface, the success of one party was perceived as the loss of the other, in a 
way that bargaining underlies a transfer of information in guarded and selective 
terms, and an action to control each other's options without escalating past shared 
limits (Brown, ibid.: 2 2 3 ) . In this kind of interface, suspicion or distrust, guarded 
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or distorted information exchanges, and 'hard-ball' tactics of influence were basic 
ingredients (Brown, ibid.: 4 0 ) . 
• An isolation interface: In this interface, the two parties were from the same board, 
belonging to the state apparatus. Field inspectors were civil servants and farmers 
were represented by state farms. Somehow, they shared similar values: Passivity, 
demotivation, being both parts of a pattern of centralization and hierarchization 
that characterized public administration in Algeria. Both parties preserved a false 
sense of organizational independence, failed to recognize interdependencies, and 
avoided interaction that would produce disagreement and reduce engagement 
that would help them recognize and manage common problems (Brown, ibid.: 
2 2 2 ) . Both parties remained unaware of, or unwilling to address, potentially 
conmcting issues (Gricar and Brown, 1 9 8 1 ; cited by Brown, ibid.: 2 2 3 ) . This was 
very common in the Algerian acbxiinistration context where different interfacing 
departments behaved similarly [see section 4 . 3 . 1 ] . This kind of interface could not 
bring about co-operation between the interfacing parties as neither was concerned 
about the public thing. Social actors in presence neither bargained nor joined their 
efforts to solve problems. Whether the seed system produced enough quantities of 
good quality seeds or failed to do so was not their primary concern. 
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5.3 Case No. 3: The collective rangelands management policy12 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The steppe rangelands in Algeria represent huge territories that can similarly be 
found in other countries. These are mainly used to feed livestock, especially sheep. 
The resources they provide put the local populations in a position of increasing 
dependence, especially within the context of demographic pressure and 
environment degradation and the lack of other livelihood alternatives. 
However, the dilemma of these resources is epitomized by the fact that "the steppe 
rangelands belong to everybody and to nobody at the same time; none has ever taken care of 
it", as Couderc, a French fellow, once said. This quotation summarizes both the 
complexity of the puzzling tenure system and the underlying institutional 
arrangements of the rangelands' exploitation and conservation, as depicted in the 
case of Algeria. According to Nordblom et al. (1995), succession of civilizations (and 
different socio-political regimes) led to unstable ownership patterns in the 
rangelands by throwing out existing governing rules and regulative bodies, and thus 
replacing them by new 'imported' ones. In Algeria, as well as in the rest of the Arabic 
countries, and since the Islamic conquests, only the urban property was privately 
owned; farming land and pastoral areas were the property of the community. 
In the case of Algeria, rangelands are sometimes wrongly 'classified' under the 
authority in charge of the agricultural sector, even though their exploitation, 
conservation, and even development always called upon a specific institutional 
management model because of many idiosyncratic features. Some of these 
characteristics are as follows: 
• Rangelands are always wrongly taken as open-access resources (public or 
common good) to which different social actors have free (unpaid) access; 
• Rangelands usually obey, when the rules are not clearly established, a zero-sum 
game which engender conflicting situations among different highly-strategizing 
social actors; 
• Rangelands have been always subject to state interventions with mitigated results, 
undertaken in ignorance of the history of these areas and without consideration of 
the indigenous settings. These areas were therefore confined into repetitive 
experimentation with different 'imported' collectivist patterns of use and 
management. 
The present case-study intends to describe the situation of the steppe rangelands in 
terms of tenure, access rights, and managing institutions, and the effects these 
aspects, made unstable by the diverse policies and interventions of the state 
12 The study was undertaken under the aegis of the Mashrek-Maghreb Project entitled "Development 
of Integrated Crop/Livestock Production in West Asia and North Africa", in which 8 Arab countries 
(4 from the Mashrek and 4 from the Maghreb) participated with ICARDA and IFPRI, and funded by 
IF AD and AFESD. 
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a Improving food availability was meant as "food self-sufficiency" in the 1970s and 1980s, and became 
"food security" in the 1990s. 
apparatus, on the productivity and the sustainability of these natural resources. 
Moreover, it sheds light on the disastrous effects of state policies in terms of drought 
management in these areas. 
The focus of this case-study is on the basic features of state intervention and their 
(negative) impact on the steppe rangelands. This is intended to give a clear vision of 
how state policies were designed and implemented. One of the basic elements that 
needs to be emphasized is that policy-makers never differentiated between the 
rangelands' specificity and the rest of the agricultural sector in terms of technological 
solutions. More importantly, lack of appropriate knowledge about the processes of 
sheep rearing in the rangelands, and negation of local populations' participation in 
the management and exploitation of these resources, as they had done for many 
generations, played an important role in the increasing degradation in some areas of 
the steppe rangelands. 
As well acknowledged, agricultural development actions as instruments of state 
intervention in Algeria have emphasized technological solutions to improve the 
level of food avaüability13, which are of questionable appropriateness [see sections 
5 . 2 . 5 and 5 . 2 . 6 in this chapter]. Through inappropriate design and implementation of 
these actions, state intervention yielded, directly or indirectly, incentives distortion 
that led to the over-use and thus degradation of the fragile ecosystems of the steppe 
rangelands. 
In order to achieve an elaborated understanding of the issue at stake, I will review 
the state intervention in the steppe rangelands on the following major points: 
• The tenure system and access rights of the domanial and communal territories 
that mostly characterize the steppe rangelands; 
• The institutional arrangements in relation to the enforcement of the tenure system 
and access rights, as well as the management, conservation, and regulation of 
rangeland exploitation and use; 
• The different state policies regarding the improvement of the productivity of the 
rangelands, especially anti-drought campaigns in the steppe rangelands, and their 
effects on the balance between the feeding capacity (supply) and the importance 
of flocks (demand). 
This review will follow an historical as well as a chronological evolution of these 
aspects. But first the importance of the steppe rangelands in Algeria must be 
introduced. 
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5 . 3 . 2 The steppe rangelands and their importance 
5.3.2.1 The spatial dimension of rangeland importance 
Although Algeria is the second largest country in Africa after Sudan with a total area 
of 2 3 8 million hectares, agricultural land accounts for around 3 9 million hectares. All 
kinds of rangelands occupy approximately 3 1 million hectares, while the steppe 
rangelands, the subject of our investigation, represent more or less 2 0 million 
hectares. 
Classified under the aegis of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the total 
rangelands represent 7 8 % of the total area declared as agricultural land, while the 
steppe rangelands represent more than 5 0 % of the same area. 
Rangeland spatial distribution across the northern part of the country, from East 
to West, bears a tremendous testimony to the importance of these areas in modeling 
rural and agricultural development in Algeria. 
5 .3 .2 .2 The economic dimension of rangeland importance 
The rangelands represent the main livestock feeding reserve, as feed availability is 
the primary function of these areas. In terms of 'real' feeding capacity14, over 1 2 
million sheep graze in the steppe rangelands, in the semi-arid and arid zones. A 
recent study has estimated the 'optimal' feeding capacity at 5 2 5 million FU per year 
in 1 9 9 3 , after it was 1 .6 billion FU per year in 1 9 7 8 . Meanwhile sheep flocks which 
were 8 million head in 1 9 7 8 outnumbered the 1 2 million head in 1 9 9 3 (Redjel, 1 9 9 3 ; 
Boukheloua, 1 9 9 5 ) . 
At present, rangeland output is estimated at 4 3 % in average of the total diet of the 
sheep living in the rangeland area (which represents 7 1 % of the total sheep in the 
country). This is the equivalent of the production of 1 4 , 4 0 0 tons of meat per year. 
The steppe rangelands-related activities procure an estimated total annual income 
of 1 2 . 5 billion AD. This income represents an average income of 8 , 5 0 3 AD (US$ 1 3 0 -
1 4 0 ) per capita per year for the total active population of the rangelands areas, 
estimated at 1 , 4 7 0 , 0 0 0 people ( 3 2 % of the total population Uving in the rangelands). 
Again, it represents an average income of 3 , 7 5 0 AD (US$ 5 0 - 6 0 ) per capita per year 
for not less than 7 0 % of the local population15, most of whom engage in sheep rearing 
activities. 
14 The concept of feeding capacity will be used as "real" to represent the real amount of feeding 
demand that is presently acknowledged through the total heads of sheep that are parked in these 
areas (what it is). When use as "optimal", it refers to the theoretical amount of sheep it can feed (what 
it ought to be). 
15 It is reported by these authors that more than 4.5 million inhabitants are Uving in these areas (a bit 
more than 1/6 of the Algerian population), among which 3.2 million live out of the rangelands-related 
activities (sheep rearing mostly). 
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Given its importance to these populations, these figures reflect the low 
productivity of the actual potential of the rangelands. This may be because of the 
unstable conditions of rangelands development, use, and management. 
5 . 3 . 3 The steppe rangelands and their legal status of ownership 
The main characteristic of the rangeland territories is in the unstable tenure system 
and access rights since the different invasions and colonization that Algeria has 
undergone. In the following, I will try to attempt an historical-descriptive overview 
on the joint evolution of the tenure system issues and main points of Algerian 
history. 
5.3.3.1 The historical background of the rangelands ownership 
The history of land property rights in Algeria goes hand in hand with its political 
history. As problematic as it could be, the issue does not exclusively concern the 
rangelands; it is a common feature of any piece of agricultural land in the country. It 
is almost a political issue as far as property is also an important means through 
which positions of socio-political authority are gained. The legitimate authority to 
control, allocate, and exploit land or any other property is one of the most salient 
elements of power through which people can be subordinated at all levels of socio-
political organization (von Benda-Beckmann, ibid.: 5 5 ) . Thus, I undertook a historical 
dimension of the investigation so that the problématique of the rangelands' ownership 
in Algeria may be understood. 
Land ownership represents a major factor in agricultural development which is, 
in the context of this study, the most important feature in any exploitation and 
conservation model of the rangelands. In fact, as the primary source of natural 
resources, land has been the subject of many debates in Algeria since independence 
without a sustainable solution to the problem being reached. According to some 
analysts, the agrarian crisis can be explained by the nature of the Algerian state that 
gained power in 1 9 6 2 and its relationships with the peasantry, as I explained earlier 
[see section 5 . 1 ] . 
Factionalism was a distinct feature within the Algerian state. The debate about 
land was an intensive political matter, engendering substantial conflicts of interests 
which represented, in the context of a self-proclaimed state, an effective way to 
maintain the status-quo, given that the very notion of state intervention is highly 
problematic. 
In order to understand this statement better, I shall describe the historical 
evolution of the different tenure regimes in the rangelands. In this description, I will 
compare the formal regimes (the legal framework or theoretical dimension) with the 
informal rights (the customary framework or practical dimension). 
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5.3.3.2 Formal land tenure regimes (legal rights) 
9). Before the French colonial, state 
The rangelands were considered to be bled jemaa (the land of the collectivity'), mainly 
derived from Arch lands. This means that each member of the tribe had his own 
territory as delimited by the collectivity. In most cases, boundaries were not fixed 
and evolved as the needs of the tribe members changed. This form of property 
guaranteed the usufruct right for each member, but ownership was still in the hands 
of the collectivity, i.e. the tribe. Land conflicts were mediated, judged, and solved by 
the jemaa, a council of elders that decided on the main social and political aspects of 
the tribe. 
This land tenure regime was set for many reasons in order to: (1) Guarantee the 
rights of use and access for each member upon an equitable distribution of the 
available resource; (2) Ensure its sustainabiMty so that no degradation would occur, 
and; (3) Protect the tribe economy. This form of property tenure conformed to a 
socio-political strategy motivated by the tribe's concern about the security and 
survival of its members and territory (Redjel et at, 1996). 
Under the Ottoman empire, the tenure system of the rangelands underwent the 
introduction of a new form of property rights which established the 'Makhzen' land. 
This type of property was allocated to the allied tribes (Raiya) on land expropriated 
from the rebelling tribes, in return for their contribution in tax collection (Mesli, 
1995:35). 
This provided an argument for the disaggregation of the rebelling tribes by the 
Ottoman state and their underlying tenure regimes upon the rangelands. This was 
the first step in a long-term, recurrent process of transformation of the land property 
rights in Algeria, as partially explained in section 5.1. 
¡0. During the Trench colonial, state. 
As stated in section 5.1, when French colonization of Algeria started in 1830, the 
peasantry was the most threatened group by this invasion. In fact, the political and 
economic life of all Algerian rural communities were affected and conditioned by the 
nature, form, and degree of French colonization. From the first day of colonization, 
peasants undertook a series of struggles against land depossession by the French army 
and settlers, as a general popular resistance to the penetration of the colonial 
supremacy (Bennoune, ibid.: 13). 
In the 1840s and 1850s, the colonial state implemented the 'cantonnement' policy 
through military intervention [see section 5.1.4]. Peasants from several villages were 
concentrated into one small geographical radius where many families were relocated 
(or contained). The army gained control over the vacated land, which was 
immediately transferred to the French settlers. 
Attempting to satisfy the ever-increasing demand by settlers for more land, the 
French authorities promulgated an adequate legislation to enlarge French and 
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European settlers' landholdings through land expropriation from the indigenous 
populations. The enforcement of these laws was very violent. 
At that time, the steppe rangelands were mostly the property of communities. They 
were defined either as: 
• Melkw: land held in absolute freehold, rights of ownership and usufruct belonging 
to the individual; 
• Arch, tribal or collective land: land owned by the state with usufruct rights 
belonging to a tribe, with unrestricted grazing; 
• Communal and domanial rangelands: public land owned by the state or the 
'commune' with common open access to resources. 
However, with the sequential application of the Senatus-Consulte, between 1 8 6 3 and 
1 8 7 0 , the Warnier Law, from 1 8 7 3 , and other legal texts that were promulgated by the 
colonial state [see section 5 . 1 . 2 ] , many changes were made in the tenure systems 
which caused the loss of thousands hectares of land and forests in Algerian rural 
communities. 
Tribal response to these measures took the form of many popular revolutions in 
different parts of the country. Although, the colonial state contained these 
movements and achieved its objectives of colonization and land expropriation, it did 
not totally succeed in disorganizing the tribes as planned, which continued to live in 
'hibernation' until independence. 
cj During the vostAndepewience.period 
Since independence in 1 9 6 2 , land has been subject to many reforms and 
reorganizations without achieving a significant evolution in the contribution of the 
agricultural sector, neither in economic growth nor in food security. All these legal 
manipulations of the tenure systems have yielded is an agrarian crisis. In fact, the 
non-determination of appropriate property rights, the practice of individision witliin 
some landholdings, and the undefined legal nature of a large proportion of land 
(autogestión, Arch, etc.) undermined any organized action about land structures, in 
general, and in the steppe rangelands, in particular. 
The problem was more complex in the rangelands because of the lack of an 
adequate, officially acknowledged legitimate institutional framework to regulate the 
exploitation of these resources at the time of independence. In some regions, 
however, independence saw the resurrection of indigenous systems and a return to 
traditional management of rangelands and forms of resources access rights. 
Considered to be a beylik17 where tribes had lost their traditional 'power' over 
rangelands management and control of access rights, resources started to be 
16 Melk stands for a private property of land whose owner has the rights to sell, rent, mortgage, etc. 
17 During the Ottoman period, beylik represented a parcel of land that belonged to the Bey, the head of 
a province. It has a legal status similar to Melk lands but owned by the state. At independence, the 
term took a cultural meaning of an open-access space with no owner, although it was a public 
domain. 
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depleted many years ago as a consequence of various anthropic actions 
(overgrazing, food crop encroachment, etc.). 
Upon independence, agricultural estates established on expropriated land since 
1 8 3 0 were abandoned by the fleeing French settlers. Self-management committees 
were formed by the agricultural labourers in order to protect the land and continue 
production. Later, 'autogestion' was consecrated by the promulgation of the decrees of 
March, 1 9 6 3 . 
These decrees, however, did not concern the steppe rangelands, which were 
overlooked until 1 9 6 8 , as we shall see later in section 5 .3 .4 .2 . In fact, at that time, issues 
of tenure and property rights were too complex; no government would have taken 
the risk to undertake a policy of change. 
In November, 1 9 7 1 , the state launched the agrarian revolution (the 7 1 - 7 3 
Ordinance of November 8 , 1 9 7 1 ) , aiming to readjust the inequalities observed in land 
distribution and, consequently, in rural people's incomes. One of the objectives of 
this land reform programme was the abrogation of all precedent legal and 
customary patterns of land tenure and property rights. The third phase of the 
agrarian revolution, which would have seen the implementation of the Pastoral 
Code (the 7 5 - 4 3 Ordinance of June 1 7 , 1 9 7 5 ) did not advance beyond the preparatory 
stage. 
The intention of this code was to put an end to the legal void of the steppe 
rangelands by organizing the pastoral space into: 
• Zones of degraded rangelands to protect; 
• Perimeters of rangelands dedicated to the settlement of the Cooperatives d'Elevage 
Pastoral de la Revolution Agraire (CEPRAs), and; 
• Zones of common rangelands collectively used (open access) by livestock owners. 
This code, instead of attempting to rehabilitate the indigenous institutions, gave 
birth to a parallel collectivist movement through 'cooperativization'. Each co-
operative (CEPRA) was assigned a delimited territory where grazing was permitted 
for all members of the co-operative. 
In 1 9 8 7 , the tenure and property rights can be divided into four main legal 
categories: 
• The public domain, mainly composed of 1 8 8 Pilot Farms; 
• The privatized public domain, composed of EACs/EAIs; 
• the private properties, traditionally known as Melk; 
• the rangelands, exclusively considered public domain, and over which tribal 
organizations exert a user's right. 
After the dissolution of the CEPRAs in 1 9 8 3 , there was no body of a cooperativist 
nature. Taking advantage of the legal void, indigenous groups such as tribal 
organizations engaged in managing the common rangelands. Property rights were 
discussed and adopted within an indigenous body which decided upon the access 
rights of each member of the tribe. The basic measure of distribution of the collective 
rangelands was El-Hbel (the rope), which determined the dimensions of each 
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household' territory. It was, in fact, a very dynamic measure able to adapt to the 
evolution of the households' number in the community. 
However, in 1 9 8 3 , a new law (the 8 3 - 1 8 Law of August 1 3 , 1 9 8 3 ) gave access to 
individual or collective ownership over public land through land reclamation in the 
arid and semi-arid zones. This law, which imphatly acknowledged customary 
rights, was part of a hidden evolutionary process towards an absolute privatized 
ownership of land. In fact, this evolutionary process was reinforced in 1 9 8 7 by the 
promulgation of the 8 7 - 1 9 Law (of December 8 , 1 9 8 7 ) , which stimulated the 
distribution of rangeland territories located within the former Domaines Agricoles 
Socialites (DASs). Since then, Algeria has been heading towards tremendous 
changes in land tenure patterns due to the establishment of a free market economy. 
Finally, a recent law (the 9 0 - 2 5 Law of November 1 3 , 1 9 9 0 ) has abolished all legal 
dispositions established by the agrarian revolution ( 7 1 - 7 3 Ordinance of November 8 , 
1 9 7 1 ) and allowed the reallocation of the expropriated land to their initial holders. 
None of these successive manipulations in the rangeland legal statute yielded a 
solution to the dilemma of these important resources. They did neither formalized 
their management by a public or semi-public organization nor did they 
acknowledged the indigenous systems that were trying to take care of these 
resources. Nor did the rangelands receive the required attention to control the 
implicit privatization induced by the informal land tenure pattern taking place since 
1 9 8 4 . If not adequately controlled, this process could lead these resources into a 
tremendous irreversible state of chaos. 
5.3.3.3 Informal land tenure regimes (customary rights) 
In contrast to what is represented in the legal framework of land tenure in the public 
sphere, pastoralists and pastoral communities always refer back to their own 
definition of the tenure system they are involved in, commonly known as 'customary 
rights', where the role of indigenous arrangements is central. 
The most predominant customary rights in rangeland territory can be classified 
into the following categories: 
• The Melk land which is a land that belongs to individuals, also recognized by the 
formal legal status of the tenure regime. Very few landholdings of this type exist 
in the rangeland areas, as a consequence of the application of the Senatus-Consulte 
by the colonial state; 
• The 'land of the community' (Arch land) also called bled jemaa, which represents land 
that collectively belongs to the tribe and whose usufruct rights are individually 
owned to the members with agreed-upon boundaries and an individually-
restricted grazing and use; 
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• The collective land (also Arch land), which is land that collectively belongs to the 
tribe with unrestricted grazing rights exclusively allocated to the tribe's members, 
and; 
• The common land (open-access), which is land that belongs to the state and 
commonly used by all neighbouring tribes, without any restriction. 
These different forms of land tenure evolved accordingly with the legal changes. In 
other words, a continuous adjustment of the customary rights was always 
implemented so that the rights of the tribe remained protected, although sometimes 
with slight restrictions. Indeed, the legal land tenure regimes had been of great 
importance in the evolution of the customary tribal rights. On the other hand, most 
regulations since the reign of the Ottomans aimed to de-structure the rangeland 
tenure system from which the tribe derived its power, strength and social cohesion. 
For the tribes, land possession was always of a sacrosanct principle. Mesli ( 1 9 9 6 : 8 ) 
mentions, quoting Frantz Fanon, that: 
For a colonized people, the most essential value, because being the most concrete one, is land, 
the land which ensures bread and dignity. 
Box 5.3.3.3(1) - Applying land tenure regulations without prior knowledge 
Some officials of the wilaya do not acknowledge the presence of the tribes in the context of 
rangelands, even as remnants of the old tribal order. For them, all tribes had been dislocated during 
the colonialization. Although they say this openly because of the state apparatus' 'ostrich' 
behaviour, they surely know that some tribes are still very active. However, where the dislocation of 
the tribe had been successfully achieved, the customary rights evolved towards an individualistic 
pattern and therefore led to recurrent land conflicts, as individual interests emerged in a 
continuous transgression of the collective interests. Nevertheless, this assumption was taken for 
granted by some officials as they generalized it to all steppe rangelands. 
The best example of such an incorrect generalization resided in the application of the 83-18 Law of 
August 13, 1983, that gave right to the wali to guarantee the access to individual or collective 
ownership over public land through land reclamation. The application of this law increased the 
violence of existing conflicts over land and brought to the light some other new conflicts. It was 
reported that after a person was allocated a piece of land by the wali ofKhenchela in the context of 
this law, which was located within a tribe territory. The tribal chief went to meet the wali to explain 
the mistake he made by 'transgressing' the land that 'belonged' to the tribe but the latter, 
convinced that this land was the state's, did not want to meet the tribe chief. After many vain 
negotiations and discussions between the tribal chief and the new owner, a violent conflict burst 
out between them and one of the tribesmen shot the new owner, killing him. Only after the crime 
was committed did the wali decided to draw back from his decision. 
Source: field notes 
Today, the rangeland territory is mostly governed by customary rights. Thus, 
individual, collective and common properties are regulated through informal land 
tenure regimes, but with a tribe that has lost much of its regulatory power due to its 
1 7 2 RE-HUMANIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
non-recognition by the state. The dismemberment of pastoral society and the birth of 
individual 'selfishness' were, at a same time, the main factors and consequences of 
the tribe's power decline. Conflicts over property are becoming frequent; a fair 
system is the only safe way to conciliate between tradition and modernity [see Box 
5.3.3.3(1) above]. 
The legal void in the Algerian legislation surrounding land in general, and the 
steppe rangelands in particular, is reinforcing the social hierarchy by mutual 
recognition and thus enforcement of customary rights. It is estimated that 90% of 
rangelands remain public property while 10% have been somehow privatized 
through this process of informally enforcing customary rights (HCDS, 1991). 
5.3.4 The steppe rangelands and their institutional arrangements 
5.3.4.1 The pre-independence period 
Before colonialization, social organizations, such as the Arch or the Ferka, 
respectively derived from the tribe and the tribe's fraction, were in charge of 
rangelands management. For the sake of a fair and just distribution of the resources, 
the jemaa, a pre-colonial rural socio-political organization, composed of the elders 
and the most literate, especially in religious terms, represented the institutional 
framework wherein all aspects of tenure, property, and access rights, land conflicts 
were discussed, judged, and solved. 
M .During tlw French cohnMMsite 
After the French invasion in 1830, many legal measures were enforced to expropriate 
land from the indigenous populations and redistribute it to the new European 
settlers. Later, when the colonial state discovered the cohesiveness of the tribe was 
closely related to the collective ownership of the land, colonial policy went beyond 
land expropriation and dismantled the indigenous society by attempting to destroy 
the tribe, its basic institutional foundation. Because of the robustness of indigenous 
social organizations (i.e. the jemaa) that took their strength from the way they dealt 
with land rights complexities, the French colonization had to promulgate and apply 
the Senatus-Consulte, which aimed, among other objectives, to blow up the cohesion 
of the tribe, as said earlier [see section 5.1.2]. 
Given the peasants' resistance to the colonial empire penetration and land de-
possession, the colonial state eventually changed its strategy and oriented its efforts 
toward undermining the social and economic foundations of the Algerian society 
and dislocating its agrarian structures. The primary goal, however, was the 
acquisition of more and more land to satisfy the increasing demand from the settlers. 
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The dismantling of the tribes was followed by the replacement of the indigenous 
rangeland management systems by other 'imposed' arrangements, such as the 
Sociétés Indigenes de Prévoyance (SIPs), which became later the Sociétés Agricoles de 
Prévoyance (SAPs). In 1945, the latter institutions were reinforced by the Sociétés 
d'Aménagement Rural (SARs). 
5.3.4.2 The post-independence period 
a).Pr.m.WM.tol971 
At the time of independence, the rangelands were not given much attention by the 
regime, which, for some reason, was not willing to re-establish social local 
organizations in their function as rangelands 'managers'. The rangelands did not 
receive any attention until 1968, as policy-makers were mainly focused on the 
creation (or the formalization) of the 'autogestion' farms. 
A new organizational form was adopted in 1968 with the Associations de 
Déoeloppement de 1'Elevage Pastoral (ADEPs). Hence, 49 ADEPs were created with the 
aim of integrating the rangelands into the 1963 land reform. These new institutional 
entities were mainly settled on the communal and domanial rangelands, and did not 
concern the Arch land. The Sociétés Agricoles de Prévoyance (SAPs) continued 
providing services such as credit and input supply to the pastoral society. 
k).F.romXmjpl983 
With the agrarian revolution in 1971 (the 71-73 Ordinance of November 8,1971), 
experimental institutional settings were established in the rangelands. In 1972, the 
rangelands areas were divided into 5 Zones de Déoeloppement Intégré Pastoral (ZDIPs), 
which were set up to boost the pastoral economy through a 'cooperativist' 
organization. In 1973, the Cooperatives Agricoles Polyvalentes Communales de Services 
(CAPCSs) were created all over the country in order to ensure the implementation of 
the agrarian revolution by providing the agricultural sector with the required inputs 
and assistance. 
In 1975, the Pastoral Code (the 75-43 Ordinance of June 17,1975), promulgated to 
put an end to the legal void of rangelands management by setting up, as said above, 
new organizational mechanisms to look after the pastoral space. The Ordinance 
stated that all steppe rangelands were owned by the state, and were thus part of the 
Fonds National de la Revolution Agraire (FNRA). The exploitation rights of the 
rangelands were exclusively leased to sheep-herders who directly owned the herds 
and whose livelihood depended exclusively upon sheep rearing, provided they 
organized themselves into Cooperatives d'Elevage Pastoral de la Revolution Agraire 
(CEPRAs). 
The social organization of the rangelands proposed by the Pastoral Code was thus 
basically a 'cooperativist' one, based over two different settings: (1) Sheep-owners' 
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co-operatives for the productive rangelands, and; (2) Range rehabilitation 
associations for the degraded rangelands. For the latter, sheep would be provided 
through semi-public agencies when the rehabilitated pastures were declared to have 
a sufficient feeding capacity. 
In this respect, 200 CEPRAs were settled on 431,315 hectares. They concerned 
1,385 beneficiaries and 124,800 sheep (Anonymous, 1988). Consequently, 
collectivization and 'cooperativization' had transgressed the traditional living 
conditions and customary rights of the local populations, creating a climate of 
perpetual conflict between the indigenous settings (tribes) and the CEPRAs. 
In 1979, again another reorganization scheme was implemented in order to 
reorganize the CEPRAs, to improve the performance of the sector, and to solve the 
many land conflicts which appeared since the Pastoral Code was applied. This 
represented in fact an official - although implicit - recognition of the gap between the 
philosophy of the agrarian revolution and reality, especially in the rangelands. 
The state policies concerning the agricultural sector during the 1970s represented 
the strongest state interventions since the independence. Most of the time, new 
institutional arrangements were imposed on local populations, creating many 
confusing, bureaucratic and monopolistic public (and semi-public) organizations. As 
a consequence, a climate of suspicion arouse among pastoralists and sheep-herders 
as well as opportunism, which developed into a framework where illicit privileges 
were 'offered' to the political system's allies. Once this was set as a major cultural 
framework, opportunism for the few meant exclusion for the many. 
p). Frota .IS83. until today..... 
The CEPRAs were dissolved in 1983, leaving the rangelands under the clemency of 
the customary rights that more than 130 years of French colonialism and 20 years of 
independence had not managed to 'erase'. Lack of serious consideration from the 
post-independence state towards rangeland development was in fact a propitious 
opportunity for the informal tenure system to regain its place within the pastoral 
space, but with a potential danger as well, given the decline of the tribe's power. 
Some specialists in Algeria view the rangelands as an 'orphan' who lost both his 
father (the state) and his mother (the tribe). 
As a concluding statement for the present section, the post-independence state did 
not achieve sustainable results in terms of institutional arrangements over 
rangelands management. More than that, there were no remarkable differences 
between the many policies of the colonial and the post-independence states, as they 
both tried to supplant indigenous non-governmental organizations in charge of 
management and conservation of the rangelands by public or semi-public 
organizations, although the reasons for doing so were different. 
In fact, if the colonial state needed to 'destabilize' the local indigenous 
organizations in order to achieve pacification in Algeria [see section 5.1.2.], the post-
independence state, as a self-proclaimed power, had to reinforce and maintain its 
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control over the whole country by replacing all popular organizations by public or 
semi-public (co-operative) ones. One of the principles it had to strictly observe was 
the avoidance of any grass-roots movement that could empower the populace, as 
had been in the 'autogestion' movement of 1 9 6 2 . 
This is what makes some observers say that the post-independence state had to 
carry out to its end the process of dismantling the indigenous organizations started 
by the colonial state in 1 8 3 0 . 
5.3.4.3 Since the beginning of the 1980s: The role ofHCDS 
The creation of a specialized institution in charge of pastoral development was 
mentioned in the First Quinquennial Plan 1 9 8 0 - 8 4 . On page 7 1 of Volume Two of the 
Sectoral Plan for Agriculture, written in March 1 9 8 0 , its name was proposed to be 
the Haut Commissariat au Pastoralisme whose main tasks would be: ( 1 ) To co-ordinate 
the development programmes regarding all systems of sheep husbandry; ( 2 ) To 
guarantee the application of the third phase of the agrarian revolution. 
I Box 5.3.4.3 (1) - The HCDS: Creation, legal framework and tasks | 
In December 1981, the Haut Commissariat au Développement de la Steppe (HCDS) was officially 
created under the tutorship of the Ministry of Agriculture and the agrarian revolution, as a public 
organization having an administrative character but with a scientific and technical orientation. 
According to the Article 4 of the creation decree, HCDS is an organization in charge of 
implementing the state policy in terms of integrated development of the steppe and pastoral zones. 
Many other organizational, technical assistance and relief oriented tasks are defined for HCDS but 
there is no clearly mentioned prerogative about the rangelands management. At most, it can only 
propose regulations regarding conservation and management of the rangelands as well as 
mobilizing the conditions and means to implement the proposed regulations and control the 
application of these regulations (Article 6 of the creation decree). 
Moreover, in order to fulfill its tasks in terms of delivering relief programmes, implementing 
development programmes and controlling the application of the regulations, as mentioned earlier, 
HCDS needed to be reinforced by 4 Regional Commissions (Commissariats Régionaux). These were 
set up at the onset but not longer the Regional Commissioners were dismissed by a decision of the 
High Commissioner, although the nomination and dismissal mechanisms of the Regional 
Commissioners remain to be the promulgation of a Presidential Decree at that time, and an 
Executive Decree today, according: to the creation decree. 
L J 
Sources: JORA (1981) No. 57 of December 15th, 1981, p.1250; field notes™ 
However, setting up the Haut Commissariat du Développement de la Steppe (HCDS) did 
not solve the institutional problem of rangelands management. Its main task was to 
ensure coherence between the implementation of state planned actions and the 
orientation of rangelands development, without having genuine management 
18 The reference used here, that is the JORA, was in French. The translation into English is from the 
author (MM). 
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prerogatives [see Box 5 . 3 . 4 . 3 ( 1 ) above]. This legal incoherence inhibited the 
institution from undertaking an efficient development of the rangelands. 
In summary, the legal void in the institutional framework in rangelands 
management is reinforcing an implicit social hierarchy between different class of 
pastoralists depending on the size of their flocks, supported by mutual recognition 
of customary rights. The expansion of the customary rights, enforced through 
remnants of the tribal order, created a climate of a mutual rejection between both 
formal/public and informal/indigenous types of institutions as well as their 
respective power. They both existed in the pastoral space but neither acknowledged 
the other. Yet, the only loser in this 'soft battle' remained the rangelands. 
5 . 3 . 5 The steppe rangelands and the state policies for productivity improvement 
5.3.5.1 An overview of public investments in the rangelands 
Like the entire agricultural sector, pastoral development received very little 
attention from the state in terms of public investments during the first development 
plans. It is only with the Second Quinquennial Plan ( 1 9 8 5 - 8 9 ) that relatively greater 
attention was given to the region. Needless to say that it is the socio-political 
developments in Algeria since 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 that have put pressure on the Government to 
allocate substantial resources through the Great Works Programme, kind of a high 
labour-intensive public works programme, in order to undertake an integrated 
development programme on the rangelands. In this section, I shall attempt a brief 
documented review of three main periods of state policies since independence. 
(Ú.Frgml9M.toJtetet.C&inq^ 
This period saw the application of four national plans: The First Triennial Plan ( 1 9 6 7 -
6 9 ) , the First and Second Quadrennial Plans ( 1 9 7 0 - 7 3 and 1 9 7 4 - 7 7 ) , and the First 
Quinquennial Plan ( 1 9 8 0 - 8 4 ) , although the first one did not concern the collective 
rangelands much. 
Totally funded by the state, these programmes concerned infrastructures, co-
operatives equipment, water boreholes, roads, plantations, rangelands 
improvement, and forestation. The objectives of these different plans were not 
realized as expected, as their rates of implementation were too low. Moreover, 
having concentrated exclusively on technical aspects instead of frying to set the 
institutional base for a real pastoral development, as it was said in the rhetoric of the 
plans, these actions had very limited impact on the improvement of production 
potential. 
In fact, these actions could have achieved better performance in setting up the 
foundations of a real pastoral development if appropriate organizational 
mechanisms were set up to ensure the sustainable functioning of the realized 
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investment. The very low rate of implementation of the different plans, not more 
than 25%, sheds light on the limits of this kind of actions. As confirmed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, although these programmes observed a good start, the 
engaged expenses did not have a great impact on sheep sector productivity (DGEP, 
1982; quoted by HCDS, 1992: 8). 
When the First Quinquennial Plan (1980-84) was launched, it was decided to 
achieve four major objectives. These were: 
• The rigorous evaluation of the agricultural sector and its performance through the 
different development plans; 
• The reorganization of the whole agricultural sector; 
• The setting up of appropriate institutional instruments to execute development 
programmes in the agricultural sector; 
• The elaboration of a comprehensive and clear agricultural development policy. 
These objectives aimed to increase the national agricultural production, the 
reduction of food dependency on foreign markets, and the improvement of living 
conditions and income of the rural populations, with priority given for the 
development of the steppe pastoral zones. 
Concerning the steppe rangelands, and given the very low achievements of all 
precedent planned interventions, the set of factors limiting the implementation of 
development actions in the steppe regions, and the reported contradictions observed 
in these regions between the reality and the planned actions, represented the basic 
motivations for the policy-makers to create the Haut Commissariat du Développement 
de la Steppe (HCDS) in 1981. The assumed role of the HCDS was thought to be an 
adequate solution to the particular situation that was, according to HCDS (1992:10), 
characterized by: 
• A general - yet not dramatic - degradation of the environment and the steppe 
natural resources; 
• A stagnation and even a regression of the different pastoral produces; 
• A bad situation of existing water infrastructure, in addition to the problem of 
water scarcity itself; 
• A remarkable inefficiency and inappropriateness of support and assistance 
organizations, mainly concentrated in the chief cities of the wilayate (provinces); 
• A weak training and technology transfer system, and; 
• A very low rate of utilization of the important public resources that were 
mobilized by the First and Second Quadrennial Plans. 
However, the achievements of this last planned intervention were not much higher 
as it took HCDS almost the whole period to build up its own capacity in order to be 
able to carry out the huge programme assigned to it in the frame of the latter 
development plan. 
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Table 5.3.5.1(1) - Public investments during Ilnd Quinquennial Plan (1985-89) 
Project type Funded amount Proportion 
(in AD) (in %) 
Production technical assistance 9.000.000 1 
Studies and surveys 94.642.000 10 
Land reclamation (dry and irrigated) 276.032.000 29 
Pastoral works (shrubs plantation) 349.199.000 37 
Small livestock acquisition 17.246.000 2 
Fruit trees plantation 11.101.000 1 
Equipment and infrastructures 184.480.000 20 
Training; 1.500.000 less than 1 
TOTAL 943.200.000 100 
(Source: HCDS data) 
A closer look at Table 5 . 3 . 5 . 1 ( 1 ) above shows that public investments focused mainly 
on rangeland re-vegetation and rehabiHtation, as well as water mobilization through 
well digging and boreholes. These actions amounted to more than 6 6 % of the overall 
public investments during this period, as the table shows. This was in fact motivated 
" The current official change rate in 1985 was US$ 1 = 6 AD. 
b) During the veriodX985r1992 
Given the results of the previous period, a new steppe programme with short- and 
long-term objectives was adopted by the Government on January 2 1 , 1 9 8 5 . It would 
be implemented by HCDS through an action plan that was inserted in the Second 
Quinquennial Plan ( 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 8 9 ) . 
According to HCDS ( 1 9 9 2 : 1 0 ) , this action plan intended to create the required 
conditions for the execution of a true development programme which would 
concentrate on solving the major constraints that had always inhibited the planned 
achievements of all precedent interventions. For the first time, the action plan did 
not concentrate exclusively on technical aspects. In other words, it aimed to set the 
adequate institutional frame necessary for the realization of pastoral development. 
This programme was planned to achieve: 
• The setting of an institutional organization, to be articulated around HCDS; 
• The real impulse of land reclamation through irrigation expansion; 
• The management of rangelands, and; 
• The organization and development of sheep husbandry, through the 
implementation of an ambitious training and technology transfer programme. 
To illustrate, 1 8 5 projects were funded during this period through this action plan 
with an overall amount of 9 4 3 . 2 0 0 . 0 0 0 AD (around US$ 1 5 million)18 and concerned 
1 5 , 0 0 0 hectares. This global amount was dispatched according to Table 5 . 3 . 5 . 1 ( 1 ) 
hereafter. 
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by the double objective of contairiing desertification through rangelands re-
vegetation and the improvement of the pastoral outcome in terms of feed resources. 
Although this effort of investment was acceptable (62,800 AD or more than US$ 
1,000 per hectare), it neither stopped rangeland degradation nor improved their 
productivity. Moreover, it did not realize a true integration of rangeland 
development with a larger and more consequent rural 'dynamique' of pastoral 
development based on local spirit. 
As a result, many constraints negatively influenced the implementation of this 
programme and inhibited the HCDS to correctly execute the development 
programme. The general degradation of the steppe is an evident consequence of this 
and is characterized by: 
• The irrational exploitation and use of the rangelands, exacerbated by low 
productivity and technologies lacking diversification, and the skyrocketing feed 
requirements of the increasing sheep flocks; 
• The important reduction of the vegetal cover, which increased the danger of 
desertification; 
• The anarchic expansion of cereal crops through uncontrolled clearing of pastoral 
areas (barley encroachment mainly replaced during the last years by wheat 
encroachment); 
• The lack of reforestation activities to maintain the already precarious ecological 
equilibrium of the rangelands ecosystem, and; 
• The scarcity of watering points and the degradation of water infrastructures, 
which automatically induced the disappearance of pastoral species, such as 
Artemisia sp. 
5.3.5.2 The particular case of state anti-drought policies 
Anti-drought policies were the instruments most frequently used by the state since 
the mid-1970s. They were designed with explicit objectives to help pastoralists to 
cope with repeated severe droughts but the way they were designed and 
implemented created major, far-reaching problems for the ecosystem. 
In our attempt to understand the characteristics of state drought policies in 
Algeria, it is opportune to begin with an analysis on the drought 'crisis' and its 
recurrence within a given time-span. 
a). Is.drought a constant, variable or an exceptional.phmomenon?w 
Drought is not a new event in the Algerian arid and semi-arid zones. In dryland 
environments, 'crisis' events have existed for a long time and are thus 'normal'. 
Although unpredictable, they were usually expected (Scoones, 1996b: 23). As a 
This section owes much to an unpublished work of Redjel Noureddine written in 1995. 
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matter of evidence, the climatic analysis of a recent decade (1978-1988) for the wilaya 
of Tebessa showed the followings: 
• A periodicity of 1/10 for a rainfall higher than 400 mm (one good year in a 
decade). 
• A periodicity of 2 /10 for a rainfall higher than 300 mm (two medium years in a 
decade); 
• A decennial average of rainfall of 277,38 mm (which means not less than seven 
dry years of an extreme severity in a decade). 
It must be said that the dramatic rainfall situation of Tebessa is assumed to be 
representative of the totality of arid and semi-arid zones of the Eastern steppe 
region, composed of the rvilayate of Khenchela, Oum-El-Bouaghi, Batna and Souk-
Ahras. In this respect, this situation showed in a clear and indubitable manner that 
the presence of drought in these areas is a rule; not an exception. 
Other evidence can be added to understand the randomness of rainfall in this 
region. This concerns the cereal cultivation in these areas which is assumed to be a 
game of chance rather than an agricultural activity. It shows that farmers are used to 
this phenomenon which might yield an acceptable return only three years in a 
decade. 
An analysis of a period of seven years (1980-1988) reinforces the dependence of 
the cereal crops vis-a-vis the random rainfall, and shows the following: 
• One year out of seven yielded a productivity higher than 8 ql per hectare; 
• One year out of seven yielded a productivity between 3 to 8 ql per hectare; 
• Two years out of seven yielded a productivity lesser than 3 ql per hectare; 
• Three years out of seven yielded no productivity. 
Both indicators (rainfall and yield) highlight the regular periodicity of drought in 
arid and semi-arid areas, which provide room for an appropriate long-term policy in 
order to tackle the drought effects on the rangelands ecosystem and the pastoralists 
livelihoods, instead of considering drought as an exceptional phenomenon and 
reacting to it through relief programmes. "Integrating relief with longer-term 
development activities is thus an important challenge", as Scoones (ibid.: 23) 
suggests. 
W. Effectspjanttdrpught.policies on the rangefonds'Jeedingcapacity 
In order to reduce the effects of drought on the livelihoods of sheep owners, the state 
developed, measures known as anti-drought campaigns in the mid-1970s to tackle 
this problem. These concerned the distribution of subsidized imported barley and 
feed concentrates as well as the free anti-helminth vaccination of the flocks. Many 
observers argued that the hidden agenda of these interventions was to reduce the 
mobility of the pastoralists who used to devise, in such situations, fracking strategies 
that helped them move towards areas where feed could be found. This 
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transhumance movement, called El-Achaba (which in Arabic means, 'searching for 
feed'), is based on the mobility of the persons and their flocks. 
As a result, what these measures achieved was an 'artificial' maintenance of the 
flocks to the detriment of the real feeding capacity of the rangelands. However, the 
far-reaching impacts of such policies could not be seen at that time. 
Among the tracking strategies that pastoralists used to devise in a situation of 
severe drought was a systematic de-stocking, which consisted of keeping a 
reproductive core of the flock and selling all the undesirable animals. When the state 
started intervening through anti-drought campaigns, farmers did not see any 
necessity to de-stock their surpluses as far as subsidized feed - mostly imported -
was secured by the state. As Scoones (ibid.: 9 ) puts it, "in North Africa where feed 
grain is heavily subsidized, livestock keepers maintain animals through the 
importation of supplementary feed". 
The increasing flocks became a great danger to the ecosystem in a situation where 
pastoralists felt no concern about the level of rangeland productivity [see Box 
5 . 3 . 5 . 2 ( 1 ) below]. To them, it was the duty of the state to improve the productivity of 
the rangelands. Assistedness was already planting its roots. 
I Box 5.3.5.2(1) - How state interventions exacerbated the ecosystem degradation | 
In North Africa, grain is cheap because of government policy to subsidize basic foods. At one point, 
the price ratio of sheep liveweight to grain in Algeria exceeded 20:1 Although various feeds are 
available, most livestock are not stall-fed. Range still offers the cheapest feed, meat quality is 
improved if animals have exercise and grazing requires less investment than stall-keeping. .. . If 
the animals had to rely solely on range vegetation, most would be long dead but, since part of their 
maintenance requirements is covered by [imported and cheap] grain, they survive to graze the last 
blade of grass of the range. As much as the original vegetation [of the rangelands] is perennial, the 
high grazing pressure affects range yield in subsequent years. In view of the high stocking rates, the 
range can cover an appreciable part of the forage needs only when rainfall is unusually high. Since 
the heavy grazing reduces soil cover, heavy rains [as well as wind] tend to cause greater erosion 
than previously'. 
L J 
Source: Bayer, W. and A. Waters-Bayer (1996: 75) 
As a consequence, sheep flocks boomed within 2 0 years, doubling their initial size 
[see Table 5 . 3 . 5 . 2 ( 1 ) . below], at a time of a tremendous reduction of forage resources. 
In fact, the average range output has dropped from 9 0 5 millions FU (average of 
1 9 7 5 - 8 4 period) to 5 6 3 millions FU (average of 1 9 8 5 - 9 3 period). This situation became 
worrisome if we acknowledge the quasi-stagnation of the natural cultivated forage 
production for the same periods compared. 
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Table 5.3.5.2(1) - Evolution of flocks size in the steppe vs. the national level 
Year Importance of flocks Feed resources * 
National Steppe areas Ratio Forage Range 
Total Pastoral Agropast. Steppe 
Provinces Provinces Total 
Steppe/ 
National 
prod. output 
In 1975 9 ,772 ,550 4 ,285 ,900 3 ,987,830 8,273,730 8 5 % 2 ,060 9 0 5 
In 1993 18 ,664 ,640 9 ,449,200 5 ,667 ,310 15,116,510 8 1 % 2 ,145 5 0 3 
Annual growth + 5.1 + 6.7 + 2 . 3 + 4 . 6 + 0.2 - 2 . 1 
rate (in %) 
(Source: Malki et al, 1997:20) 
* Figures of feed resources are given in million FU. 
It is worth mentioning that the above-mentioned results show, in fact, the extreme 
importance of the steppe rangelands in terms of sheep rearing, although the feed 
problem still represents a real dilemma which puts the livestock sub-sector in a very 
vulnerable situation. 
In fact, feed imports represented an average of 4 9 to 6 0 % of the diet in the steppe 
areas in recent years, and 3 9 % at the national level. In similar vein, rangeland output 
contributed not more than 6 to 2 5 % of the diet in the steppe zones, and 2 1 % at the 
national level. 
In contrast, Table 5 . 3 . 5 . 2 ( 2 ) below highlights in a perfect manner the maximum 
size of the sheep flocks imposed by the ecological conditions and feed availability. 
This was stabilized by a alternate movement of de-stocking the surpluses in case of a 
dry season and re-stocking when the climatic conditions - and thus the feeding 
capacity - improved. This movement could create a great conflict between 
pastoralists if the jemaa was not there to arbitrate and referee the distribution of 
access rights between the members of the social unit (tribe, fraction, household). 
Let us consider the year 1 9 4 5 , for instance, known as the 'year of hunger' in the 
Algerian history. The harvest of cereals represented only 2 5 % of the normal year. 
Given that barley, as a complement of the rangelands input, represented a basic 
source of feeding, it can be seen that the size of livestock herds was reduced by 
almost half in 1 9 4 6 . It is true that a large number of the sheep died due to the 
drought but de-stocking was also there. Moreover, this is corroborated by the 
statistics of 1 9 2 7 , 1 9 3 1 and even 1 9 6 1 , in the same table. 
Looking back to the statistics of post-independence Algeria, there is a linear 
progression which doubled the size of livestock within two decades, with more than 
8 0 % located in the steppe areas [see Table 5 . 3 . 5 . 2 ( 1 ) above]. This progression was 
supported by unsustainable and mcentive-distortirig anti-drought policies that the 
state implemented in its attempt to support the improvement of the steppe 
rangelands productivity. In fact, between 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 9 3 , the average annual growth 
rate of flocks size in the steppe areas (agropastoral + pastoral ivilayate) was estimated 
at 4 . 6 % ( 6 . 7 % in the pastoral wilayate and 5 . 1 % at the national level) at a time when 
rangeland output for the sheep diet was decreasing at a steady average pace of 2 . 1 % 
a year (Malki et al, 1 9 9 7 : 2 0 ) . 
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In the case of post-independence Algeria, problematic situations in rangelands, 
which can be considered as "non-equilibrium" zones, were dealt with through 
bringing solutions that were adequate for "equilibrium" rangelands but by no means 
appropriate for the former. The dichotomy of these two different types of rangelands 
are documented by Scoones (199b: 1-2) and Scoones and Graham (1994:188). 
According to these authors, an equilibrium environment is characterized by fairly 
predictable rainfall patterns, vegetation change, and thus the expected availabüity of 
forage. It has a fixed 'carrying capacity', where the increase in livestock numbers, if 
outnumbering the set 'ceiling' and not checked, can hamper the vegetation process of 
recovery and degradation and/or desertification may occur. Such environments are 
typically found in wetter areas. In contrast, range degradation in a non-equilibrium 
environment is not such an issue. Sparse rainfall keeps vegetation production, and 
therefore livestock numbers, very low through drought impacts or other episodic 
events, so that livestock do not have a long-term destructive impact on rangeland 
resources. Such non-equüibrium environments have highly dynamic ecosystems and 
are mainly found in arid and semi-arid zones where rainfall variability is high. 
Table 5.3.5.2(2) - Evolution of the size of sheep flocks in Algeria under the colonial state 
Year Sheep population Year Sheep population Year Sheep population 
1925 4,605,000 1938 5,965,000 1951 5,321,000 
1926 6,786,000 1939 6,406,000 1952 6,028,000 
1927 5,083,000 1940 6,296,000 1953 6,014,000 
1928 5,614,000 1941 6,150,000 1954 6,009,000 
1929 6,196,000 1942 6,546,000 1955 6,298,000 
1930 7,168,000 1943 5,529,000 1956 6,383,000 
1931 4,671,000 1944 5,832,000 1957 6,632,000 
1932 5,269,000 1945 5,375,000 1958 6,003,000 
1933 5,262,000 1946 2,808,000 1959 5,460,000 
1934 5,512,000 1947 3,145,000 1960 5^60,000 
1935 5,845,000 1948 3,105,000 1961 4,469,000 
1936 6,416,000 1949 3,839,000 
1937 6,416,000 1950 4,541,000 
Source: Mesli (1995:228) 
c) The end of anti-drought policies and wheat price liberalization 
The effects of the wheat price Uberalization, decided by the government in 1995, can 
be understood by referring to the process by which cereals, barley first and wheat 
later, made their intrusion into the rangelands. In fact, after the state decided in the 
late 1980s to progressively reduce and to stop its support of the anti-drought 
campaigns because of scarcity of public resources, feed imports dropped drastically 
and prices were liberalized. Pastoralists found themselves in the emergency to 
devise solutions to meet their feed needs. Most of them worked to clear the marginal 
lands in the steppe areas in order to cultivate barley for their animals. The crop gave 
both cheap grains and straw which could be used as supplementary feed to the 
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rangelands output. Since then, we have started hearing about the phenomenon of 
•barley encroachment' in the rangelands. 
Pastoralists ploughed the marginal lands and the 'cover-crop' dilemma became 
well-known in the steppe areas. This dilemma derived its name from a tillage tool 
pastoralists had to resort to in order to plough their plots, altering the structure of 
the already-problematic shallow soil in these areas and accelerated wind erosion. 
Year after year, barley acreage increased steadily to reach a frightening level, but 
nobody could interfere in this situation. Barley was not subsidized by the 
government anymore and was subject to the mechanisms of a free market, while 
wheat was still receiving a great amount of subsidies form the state. 
Box 5.3.5.2(2) - How planners make wrong assumptions 
When the government decided in 1995 to liberalize the price of wheat and its derived products 
(pasta, semolina, flour) at the consumer level, planners made an assumption that increasing farm-
gate prices for durum and bread wheat would make farmers produce more of these commodities and 
thus substitute local production for the huge quantities Algeria had to import every year. In fact, 
during the 1995-96 sowing season, lots of farmers who used to produce barley reconverted their 
plots into wheat, especially durum wheat because it has higher price. 
In some marginal lands, pastoralists started similarly reconverting their barley plots into durum 
wheat plots and some other started clearing additional land to grow durum wheat. Planners at the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries thought that their assumption was true, that the farm-gate 
price for durum wheat, which was almost twice the barley price, was so attractive to farmers that it 
would explain the reconversion. In response to planners, a hypothesis was formulated by the socio-
economic team working for the Mashrek-Maghreb Project - of which I was part - that the 
reconversion observed, especially in the marginal lands, was mostly influenced by the liberalized 
price of cereal products, more particularly for semolina, at the market level. Some of the planners 
laughed in front of us when we talked about our assumptions. When we presented some of our 
findings, they did not even believe our research, saying that it was done to please some foreigners, 
meaning the lARCs experts. 
Source: field notes 
The application of the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1 9 9 4 , under IMF and 
World Bank 'medication', made things worse for these areas. As public subsidies 
were removed from wheat and the prices were liberalized, we assisted in the 
creation of a great shift in the marginal lands of the steppe areas. Almost all 
pastoralists, especially the small and poorest ones, started cultivating durum wheat, 
replacing barley cultivation. To my great surprise, I heard many officials and 
planners at the Ministry of Agriculture, instead of caring about the smooth process 
of degradation that was dramatically advancing in these areas, saying that the shift 
from barley to wheat was motivated by the farm-gate price of wheat fixed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture at almost 2 times the average price of barley on the free 
market [see Box 5.3.5.2(2) above]. 
When the ICARDA-IFPRI Mashrek-Maghreb Project started its socio-economic 
research component on the effects of policies and property rights on technology 
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adoption by fanners, we, the Algerian team working for the project, decided to work 
in some locations that were largely representative of the marginal areas. Tebessa, 
Souk-Ahras, and Khenchela were three locations where we undertook our research. 
After the RRA exercise we organized with farmers and some development agents 
from the CR-HCDS for the Eastern region just after the sowing season (November 
1 9 9 5 ) , we developed a research action based on our hypothesis that the shift from 
barley to wheat, although as questionable as it was given that these areas were not 
fit for wheat cultivation, were influenced by other considerations that planners did 
not want to discuss [see Box 5 . 3 . 5 . 2 ( 3 ) below]. 
Box 5.3.5.2(3) - How planners stay blind in front of evidence 
In the summer of 1996, even though the favourable and regular rainfall of the season yielded a 
remarkable production of durum wheat, only the 1/3 of the estimated total harvest of durum wheat 
was collected by the cereal co-operatives (CCLSs). Trying to explain what happened, we undertook 
some additional research in order to collect additional indicators which might have a great potential 
to verify our hypothesis [see Box 5.3.5.2(2)]. Fortunately, we found that farmers were keeping their 
harvest to satisfy their households' needs. Additional indicators were found to corroborate this 
statement. They are as follows: (1) More than 2,000 traditional mills were put back to work after 
more than 20 years of stoppage; (2) The public factories that produced semolina declared a decline 
in their sales for at least three months, since the start of the harvesting campaign, and; (3) The 
public factories reduced the semolina price by 30% in August 1996 in order to release their stocks, 
which went back to their initial level in October 1996. 
Putting all these indicators together, and after having some informal discussions with farmers, we 
suggested to planners that our assumption was true. In fact, planners have forgotten that being a 
farmer is only one side of a coin (person). The other side of the coin (person) is that a farmer is also 
a consumer and has household needs to satisfy. When pastoralists decided to reconvert their barley 
plots into durum wheat to satisfy their household needs, they had decided which among their 
households' needs and the sheep demand should be the first priority. When the market could cover 
the household needs at an affordable price, the farm had to satisfy mainly the sheep needs through 
producing barley. At the time, the price of semolina has become unaffordable to them in the market, 
the farm had to satisfy first and foremost the households' needs. 
Source: field notes 
During and after the harvest season (July and September 1 9 9 6 ) , we organized 2 
monitoring visits to the areas where we did the RRA exercise after the sowing 
season and tried to track the itinerary of some samples of the harvested durum 
wheat from the plot to its end-step. We found that most part of the wheat harvested 
in these areas ended up in the traditional mills for transformation into semolina. 
The indicator of the traditional mills was also corroborated by the results of 
research undertaken by the Direction des Statistiques of the Ministry of Agriculture in 
July and August 1 9 9 6 [see Box 5 . 3 . 5 . 2 ( 3 ) above]. 
Trying to understand more about why this was happening, some discussions and 
informal group interviews with farmers revealed that the price of semolina since its 
liberalization was too expensive for the pastoralists. They then decided to grow their 
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own semolina, slightly to the detriment of their animals feed. This behaviour even 
had far-reaching consequences affecting the public enterprises in charge of 
transforming durum wheat and selling semolina [see Box 5.3.5.2(3) above]. 
Our curiosity was really whet by the decision of pastoralists to switch to wheat 
cultivation in order to provide their households with semolina. We questioned 
whether it was economically better to produce semolina by themselves rather than 
to buy it from the domestic market. The results of our investigation, although 
lacking some theoretical foundations, are presented in Box 5.3.5.2(4) below. 
| Box 5.3.5.2(4) - Do farmers obey to some economic rationality? | 
Cultivating durum wheat could provide the grain for the household (transformed by the traditional 
mill of the neighbourhood), and the straw and bran (as by-product of the grain transformation) for 
the sheep basic needs. Trying to understand how farmers came up with this decision, we attempted 
a small economic calculation with the following items: 
• A quintal (100 kg) of durum wheat is paid by the co-operative at 1,900 AD; 
• A quintal of semolina costs 3,000 AD in the local market, after the price liberalization; 
• A quintal of durum wheat can give 75 kg of semolina, the rest (bran) can be fed to animals; 
• A quintal of semolina produced by the farmer himself, including the mill cost, would cost 
((1,900 AD 175 kg) x 100 kg) + 50 AD = 2,580 AD from which we must subtract the price for 
the bran, given that for each quintal of semolina, he will have 33 kg of bran in average, 
estimated at 10 AD per kilo, (thus - 330 AD) 
• The net cost for a quintal (100 kg) of farmer-produced semolina would be 2.230 AD, less than 
70% of the public price. 
This example shows how the scientific-rational model may lead planners to put wrong 
assumptions. It shows also how their self-reference cannot - and should not - be challenged by 
social researchers, which is even worse. 
L J 
Source: field notes 
Given the fact that the household needs competed intensively with the livestock 
needs, pastoralists had to decide what their priority was. This put a great 
responsibility on the pastoralists' shoulders of having decided between feeding their 
animals or providing food for their family, especially when the climate was not very 
reliable in these areas. If the shift from barley to wheat was positively supported 
during the 1995-96 season by a great productivity of pastures and range because of 
the excellent climatic year, it would not be as easy for the farmers to meet both needs 
during the coming years, given the extreme randomness of rainfall in these areas. 
This would even announce more degradation for the rangelands as I assume that 
farmers will have to clear more range in order to solve this feed-or-food equation. 
In conclusion, state policies, kcldng an adequate prior knowledge about the 
different responses that could be anticipated from different agro-ecological zones, 
yielded the (negative) impact I have just presented. 
First, the anti-drought policies of subsidized feed - mostly imported -
implemented since the mid-1970s induced the break-up of the ecological equilibrium 
WALKING DOWN THE EMPIRICAL PATH 1 8 7 
of the rangelands as far as they were seriously at risk from the overwhelming, 
gigantic flocks of sheep in the steppe rangelands. The state withdrawal from 
supporting the feed price engendered an increasing degradation, as pastoralists 
faced the dilemma of how to feed their overwhelming herds without the state 
support, in addition to or even in competition with their household needs. 
Second, liberalization of wheat and its all transformed products, implemented in 
1994, has required farmers to face their own feed-or-food equation, which 
exacerbated the problematic situation of degradation, which is likely to increase in 
the near future. 
^}Th?.antirçalamiti^ 
The anti-drought campaigns proved to be unsustainable mechanisms the state could 
not support after the economic crisis of the late 1980s, given the big oil-crash of that 
period. Other measures had to be devised in order to 'protect' farmers, in general, 
and pastoralists, in particular, from the effects of drought. 
The precariousness of the agricultural activity in arid and semi-arid zones and the 
recurrence of climatic hazards, such as drought, pleaded for the settlement of a 
special fund aiming to support and compensate farmers and agricultural activities in 
general, in order to achieve a recurrent revival of agricultural investments and 
improve production. However, the implementation of such measures should have 
been responsive to the local particularities of the main agricultural zones in the 
country. It observed instead a systematic, standardized approach everywhere. 
The founding of such a fund with the active participation of farmers in the 
mobilization of its resources was a positive decision. However, the implementation 
of the compensation measures on a standardized pattern was actually harmful to the 
rangelands, as we shall see in the remainder of this section. 
As a consequence of the institutionalization of the Fonds de Garantie Contre les 
Calamités Agricoles (FGCCA) in 1990, rangelands acreage and productivity dropped 
considerably for many reasons. Since its inception, on the basis of the Executive 
Decree n° 90-125 of May 26, 1990, the FGCCA had to compensate farmers who 
subscribed to an insurance policy with the Caisse Nationale de Mutualité Agricole 
(CNMA) for their losses in cereal cultivation when caused by some agreed-upon 
natural calamities, such as flooding and drought. 
According to CNMA (1995), farmers of the wilaya of Tébessa, for instance, were 
compensated for the following reasons: 
• The drought of the 1989-90 agricultural campaign; 
• The flooding of the 1990-91 agricultural campaign; 
• The flooding of the 1991-92 agricultural campaign; 
• The drought of the 1992-93 agricultural campaign; and, 
• The drought of the 1993-94 agricultural campaign. 
This section owes much to an unpublished work of Redjel Noureddine written in 1995. 
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As the tables of CNMA ( 1 9 9 5 ) show, compensation by the FGCCA for the 1 9 9 3 - 9 4 
agricultural campaign and for the pastoral wilaya of Tebessa concerned 1 , 6 9 8 farmers 
and almost 2 2 0 , 0 0 0 hectares for a total amount of 7 2 million AD. If we relate this to 
the cultivated acreage compensated by the fund, this would represent 3 2 8 , 8 0 AD per 
hectare, while the optimal level of return upon investment for a hectare cultivated in 
the steppe is estimated to be less than 5 0 AD, in relation to actual costs of inputs and 
labour (Malki et ah, 1 9 9 7 ) . We can assume that these results can be easily 
extrapolated to the whole steppe. 
In comparison, the agro-pastoral wilaya of Souk-Ahras, 7 0 km north of Tebessa, 
benefited during the same agricultural campaign ( 1 9 9 3 - 9 4 ) a compensation of 8 
million AD for a almost 1 6 5 , 0 0 0 hectares. Reported for the cultivated acreage 
compensated by the fund, this gave an average of 4 8 , 5 3 AD per hectare, while the 
optimal level of return upon investment in this wilaya was much higher that the one 
of the wilaya of Tebessa. 
Such an analysis, based on the standardized manner of implementing 
compensation measures without attention being driven to the particularities of the 
local settings and the needed differentiation of the optimal level of return upon 
investment under different environments, shows the inappropriateness of the 
systematic approach adopted by the FGCCA in terms of support and compensation. 
Hence, applying the same mechanisms, especially in the rangelands, is highly 
questionable for various reasons: 
1 . Given that the FGCCA mainly concerned the compensation of cereal growers, 
which is not the first priority in the rangelands, although closely linked to sheep 
rearing, the fund is assimilated to a device that supports a secondary activity for 
pastoralists rather than being a compensation fund for the main activity of the 
pastoral space, that is the production of a cheap feed resources. Cereals play an 
important role in feeding animals, but we saw that the rate of return on their 
subsequent investment was highly affected by rainfall randomness. 
2 . It is not needed to recall the obviousness that drought is a constant variable in 
these areas, and 'guarantee' mechanisms are always devised for an exceptional 
phenomenon, not for a constant variable. It is thus questionable whether 
sustainability of such a mechanism is possible at all at the long run. 
3 . Such devices can, in a context where clearing of rangelands increased after the 
withdrawal of the state from anti-drought campaigns, be seen, in the case of the 
rangelands zones, as the appropriate 'engine' to: 
• Stimulate the clearing of rangelands, thus reducing the pastoral space; 
• Disfavour the real productive zones by instituting a unique, standard 
insurance and compensation rate; 
• Comfort and probably worsen the situation of feed dependency on 
imports; 
• Contribute to the maintenance of the ecological backwardness in the 
rangelands, where annual losses are estimated at 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 hectares per year 
due to natural and anthropic (provoked or stimulated) erosion. 
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?). fflho benefited from the state anti-drought policies. in .the rangelands? 
There is no doubt that these policies benefited pastoralists in general. However, the 
big sheep owners took greatest advantage of them, given their resource endowments 
and the facilities they had access to in the Algerian socio-political context. 
The big sheep owners could use trekking faculties more easily for moving their 
flocks from one area to another, sometimes hundreds kilometers from their initial 
location. They could even use trailer water-tankers to transport water from distant 
locations to their flocks. 
During the anti-drought campaigns, big owners' means of transportation and 
their introduction to the state bureaucratic system secured faster relief for their 
flocks while poorer pastoralists had to queue days and days to get their rations, 
which sometimes did not even meet half the needs of their flocks, as told to me by 
some pastoralists and development agents. 
The most important facet of this situation is that when drought was very severe 
and relief programmes were late in reaching them, small pastoralists were not able 
to cope with their animals' needs and started selling part of their flocks. The big 
sheep owners were always waiting for this situation to buy all the animals the small 
owners intended to sell, given their own facilities for transportation and their easy 
access to subsidized feed. This behaviour was perceived by some observers as an 
appropriate "instrument" to speed up "the process of concentration of stock 
ownership in a few hands" (Bayers and Waters-Bayer, 1 9 9 6 : 7 5 ) . 
In conclusion, state policies supposedly conceived to support the productivity of 
the rangelands and the maintenance of pastoralists livelihoods ended up with a kind 
of either-or results: 
1. Either exacerbating degradation of the already fragile ecosystem of the steppe 
rangelands; or, 
2 . Speeding up the concentration of livestock in the hands of the big sheep owners, 
whose endowment the agrarian revolution [see section 5 . 1 ] tried to limit for 
equity considerations. 

CHAPTER 6 
ON THE FALLACIES OF CONVENTIONAL DEVELOPMENT THINKING: 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF CASES 1,2 AND 3 
The three cases I presented in the previous chapter, though somehow interrelated, 
are representative of the current development vision adopted by the post-
independence Algerian regime. Such a vision assigned the role of the main actor in 
development to the state and its bureaucracy while the beneficiaries had to content 
themselves to being assisted as 'objectified' passive recipients. 
Each of these cases represents one of the facets of planning as social guidance 
developed by Friedmann's typology (1973: 51). In fact, the agrarian revolution case 
describes a typical form of an innovative planned action, while the cereal seed policy 
encompasses a true allocative planned action. Alternatively, the rangelands case 
shows some features of a mixed innovative/allocative pattern type of planning. 
Notwithstanding, each of these cases contains, in my opinion, some features of a 
non-development situation rather than a real development one, given that little 
improvement has occurred in the living standards of large segments of potential 
beneficiaries, especially the poorest ones. However, as Goulet (1979: 557) suggested, 
"although no full-blown theory or policy model can emerge from the small number 
of cases outlined in these pages, some important lessons appear. These are worthy of 
critical reflection". This statement thus sets the context of this chapter. 
The present chapter engages a discussion that intends to test the study's 
hypotheses I adopted in Chapter 3 in the light of the shortcomings of the 
conventional development thinking adopted in post-independence Algeria. 
6.1 Recalling the hypotheses 
In this section, the position that the current vision of development in post-
independence Algeria, as described by the three proposed cases, is not successful 
will be asserted. This will be done through testing the hypotheses in relation to the 
fulfillment of the four fundamental prerequisites (van Dusseldorp, 1992: 12) 
developed in sections 2.2.1 and 3.2. 
Recalling these hypotheses, any development action seeking to achieve its 
objectives, must fulfill the four following prerequisites: 
1. The possibility of formulating a consistent, realistic and durable set of objectives, 
which is acceptable to all, or at least to a large majority of the people who will be 
involved in and/or affected by the planned development; 
2. The availability of knowledge of all the relevant processes and their 
interrelationships which have to be influenced to change the present situation in 
such a way that the objectives will be realized; 
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3. The availability of the means and power to influence these processes; 
4. The political will to use the available means and power, to influence the relevant 
processes in order to realize the desired objectives. 
From the preceding pre-requisites, any development action seeking sustainability 
should verify, in the frame of this study, the general hypothesis (Hg) as shown in 
Box 6.1(1) below: 
| Box 6.1(1) - The general hypothesis (Hg) of the study | 
Participation and social learning increase the probability of the fulfillment of the four prerequisites 
required for a sustainable development action. 
L J 
Given the achievement of this general hypothesis (Hg) is linked to the fulfillment of 
the four pre-requisites mentioned above, I attempted a decomposition of this general 
hypothesis into four hypotheses which were formulated in such a normative way in 
order that the 'positivity' of sustainable development might be strengthened. These 
hypotheses are shown in Box 6.1(2) below: 
| Box 6.1(2) - The four hypotheses (HI - H4) of the study | 
HI - Development objectives are not determined by planners in an exclusively top-down way and are 
always in accordance with beneficiaries' needs. 
HI - Major needs of required knowledge about processes to be influenced by a development action are 
covered by different sources of knowledge. 
H3 - All resources needed for the achievement of the objectives of the development action are available 
and fairly distributed among the actors. 
H4 - The political will to use the required resources for a given development action is concretized in 
order to achieve the formulated objectives. 
L J 
At the third level, each hypothesis was 'deconstructed' into three sub-hypotheses 
[see Figure 3.2(1) in this book]. However, given the context of the case-studies 
presented in the previous chapter, as I mentioned earlier in Chapter 3 [see section 
3.3], I suggest there is no need to test the sub-hypotheses and content myself with 
solely checking the four hypotheses HI, H2, H3, H4 mentioned in Box 6.1(2) above. 
This decision is motivated by the evidence that the failure of the conventional 
development thinking in Algeria does not require such in-depth investigation to 
understand its causes. On the contrary, in Chapter 8,1 need to go into more depth 
and test the sub-hypotheses in order to understand the 'innovations' of the 
alternative development view I am advocating. 
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6.2 Hypotheses' verification 
6.2 .1 Development objectives are not determined by planners in an exclusively top-
down way and are always in accordance with beneficiaries' needs (HI) 
In the sense of the four hypotheses developed above, sustainable development 
requires that problem definition, and development objectives determination should 
be envisaged through a process of increased, active participation of all actors 
concerned with a given development action. This process must give special attention 
to those known as the 'beneficiaries', i.e. those who will be affected, either negatively 
or positively, by the planned endeavour. However, this statement would take the 
form of a rather Utopian discourse in the socio-political context of post-independence 
Algeria, as the three cases presented in the previous chapter showed how and by 
whom development objectives were determined. 
In fact, the three cases present evident similarities in the way problems were 
identified and development objectives defined. If we exclude the ideology-driven 
process of manipulating farmers' participation in the agrarian revolution policy 
(Case No. 1 ) by the reformist 'political leadership', the beneficiaries participated 
neither in the identification nor in the implementation phases. To the contrary, they 
were perceived as passive recipients of those development actions. The strength and 
width of their 'mute' response towards those actions, lacking enthusiasm because of 
their distrust in the state apparatus, was so significant that the authorities should 
have asked themselves whether they were really in a situation to realize their 
presumed cherished slogan of 'A revolution from the people and for the people'. 
The great majority of needy farmers did not openly give their opinion about these 
development actions. They could just not declare their opposition to these actions 
loudly, they could not afford it given the authoritarianism of the regime. It reminds 
me of an Indonesian case where military force was used to coerce farmers into 
cultivating the new IRRI semi-dwarf high-yielding varieties of rice (Soetomo, 1 9 9 2 : 
3 1 ) . Instead of loudly protesting, Algerian farmers expressed their disapproval 
through silence, as 'silence speaks louder than claim', as an old adage says. To overcome 
this, the ruling body, as heterogeneous as it was, enveloped these actions with a 
populist, ideological discourse based on national unity and stability in order to make 
the beneficiaries adhere to the implementation of these actions. 
Strongly inspired by the political orientation adopted by the post-independence 
regime, based on a self-proclaimed ruling body, authoritarianism, and control of 
spontaneous popular initiatives, the process of formulating development objectives 
and planning development actions was restricted to the bureaucratic apparatus of 
planning, which showed a complete obedience to the regime. In the process of state 
formation that took place at independence, and the way the administrative structure 
was organized and staffed, it is not difficult to find an explanation about the 
foundations of this political orientation. 
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The state apparatus was 'installed' in a hurry to replace the dying colonial state 
and was staffed, in most cases, with people lacking the elementary knowledge about 
the functions they had to fulfill. Recalling the 1 9 6 3 census of civil servants cited by 
Bennoune ( 1 9 7 6 : 8 ) , 4 0 % of the bureaucratic personnel were Algerians graduated 
from schools of the colonial administration (mostly trained and promoted during the 
war within the framework of the counterinsurgency strategy, called the Promotion 
Lacoste). The remaining 6 0 % were co-opted FLN and ALN cadres, recruited after 
March 1 9 , 1 9 6 2 (cease-fire day). Consequently, the colonial system did not change 
much and the newly-settled bureaucrats inherited the attitudes and values of the 
colonial system, being indifferent and disdainful to the plight of the administered 
population. 
Although the masses of post-independence Algeria actively participated in the 
anti-colonial struggle, they were denied the right to participate in the governance of 
the country by the newly-settled elite after independence. 
As it might be said, if the colonial state had to 'destabilize' local indigenous 
organizations, such as tribes, to achieve pacification in Algeria, the post-
independence state had to reinforce and maintain its control over the whole country 
by replacing all popular organizations, as Cases No. 1 and 3 show, by public or semi-
public (cooperativist) ones which were in disharmony with the old, traditional 
indigenous settings. Placed under the aegis of popular participation, mass 
organizations, such as the Union Nationale des Paysans Algériens (UNPA) and state-
proclaimed co-operatives were, in fact, appropriate mechanisms for controlling and 
containing the popular voice. In this particular context, co-operatives proved to be a 
"litany of broken promises" as they became monopolies of influential lobbies and lost 
their privileged status as a development instrument to benefit smaller and less 
powerful citizens (Hospes, 1 9 9 2 : 2 4 2 ) . 
On the other hand, it is almost a rule in any revolutionary movement that there 
will always be, as Goulet ( 1 9 7 9 : 5 6 4 ) suggests, elites who assume they know better 
than the people themselves what is good for them. Hence, these elites assumed that 
any alternative development strategies must place decisions in their (the elites') 
hands, even those initial decisions which aim to diagnose the nature and causes of 
their populations' problems. Participation, in the vision of these elites, should be 
understood from the sole perspective that was in line with their tWnking. Any other 
conceptualization of participation that would mean the liberation of the populace 
from the supremacy of the elites is not welcomed and would be fought by any 
means. This was why they are always suspicious about new initiatives and new 
ways of thinking. 
Following this trend, the post-independence state developed a strange paradox. 
For two decades, the political discourse, which followed a socialistic, collectivist 
orientation, served as a 'paravent' to the orientation of the administrative structure 
which was mainly at the service of petit-bourgeois and capitalistic-oriented rural and 
urban elites. 
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In this way, it can be assumed that, as far as the planning of development actions 
and thus the determination of objectives was the duty of the bureaucratic apparatus, 
it was clear that the interests of rural and urban elites would always be protected 
and scrupulously looked after. However, the question arises of why the agrarian 
revolution was planned and implemented when it seems as though it was planned 
and implemented as if it was meant to be a 'stimulated failure', as I stated earlier. 
The answer to this question should not deny the strength of the bureaucracy-elite' 
lobby which was able to develop different strategic reactions to keep its interests 
intact, without having recourse to an open opposition towards the actions of the 
reformist clan of the ruling body, as it was the case of the agrarian revolution. 
Smoothly but surely, this lobby could bow strategically to the pressure of the 
reformist clan but did never broke down. It grew even stronger after it succeeded at 
f making the agrarian revolution fail. 
Since 1962, rural bourgeoisie and rich landlords, co-operating with their 
bureaucratic allies who had infiltrated the state apparatus skillfully, maneuvered to 
avoid a real land reform in Algeria. However, "the arrival of a reform leader with 
deeply felt commitments" (Cleaves, ibid.: 290) after the 1965 coup d'etat, and the 
particular context of the 1970s, created a propitious "historical moment" (Cleaves, 
ibid.) for the agrarian revolution. 
Feeling that overt resistance would not pay, the bureaucracy-elite' lobby adopted 
a precise strategy to interfere with the design and implementation phases of this 
reform policy so as to yield a 'stimulated failure'. 
According to the features that characterized post-independence Algeria, the state 
apparatus represented a closed system (Cleaves, 1980: 284; Heywood, 1997: 340; my 
italics). In such a system, the state became blind to the society which it is a part of. 
However, this was not always true as the state remembered its people when 
elections were to be organized to again proceed to manipulate participation. 
Moreover, in such a system, mass pressure becomes inconsistent with bureaucratic 
norms of deliberation, procedure, and control, given that the norms for promotion 
and recognition make bureaucrats respond, even in a negative way, to superiors' 
aspirations for the image of success, rather than work to satisfy their clients (Cleaves, 
ibid.: 300). This is why bureaucrats never became accountable to all development 
beneficiaries and make them participate in steering the process of development. 
There was no chance to discuss participation in such a system, let alone to 
implement it as a development alternative. 
This mode of functioning, based on the exclusion of the majority of the populace, 
became the underlying philosophy of the state apparatus which always worked to 
reduce popular control over public institutions. Even the popular assemblies, elected 
at different levels, which existed presumably to orient and control the activities of 
these highly-bureaucratized and elite-biased institutions, were left amorphous, 
without political life, as the example of the Assemblies Populaires Communities Elargies 
(APCEs) in Case No. 1 shows. 
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The poorest performance of public institutions can be found in welfare and relief 
programmes, such as the anti-drought campaigns in the collective rangelands 
management policy (Case No. 3). As far as the different ways in which national 
income was distributed sustained and reinforced the existence of such public 
institutions, they decided upon both explicit and implicit criteria that gave citizens 
access to benefit from any state service. Given their ties to powerful segments of the 
population, it is not difficult to guess how these criteria were defined. The 
dichotomy between explicit (usually written) and implicit criteria, and the 
supremacy of the latter, did not allow the explicit criteria to be enforced. It was the 
rule that every time a new regulation or law was implemented, some implicit criteria 
would be defined in parallel. It was always these latter criteria that commanded the 
behaviour of staff working in public organizations, which were always in favour of 
their allies whatever the regulation or law stipulated. 
Moreover, this so-called philosophy did not consider the causes and objectives of 
the struggle against the colonial state. The state apparatus devised development 
strategies while forgetting the causes that caused peasants to fight against French 
colonialism; they always repeated the same errors. As Case No. 3 shows, the colonial 
state employed all measures to disaggregate the tribe because it was the last obstacle 
to the country's pacification. To achieve this, the colonial state found that 
disaggregating the tribe would first need the disaggregation of land, which was the 
source of tribal force, power, and social cohesion. 
In a similar context, the post-independence state knew that governing a country 
in a context hostile to an legitimate regime would not be easy. It would be even 
more difficult if the regime would have given more access to the population to 
control and manage some parts, even the smallest ones, of the country and thus end 
up facing complaints about power distribution in the society. This put the post-
independence state in the position to carry on developing 'imposed' institutional 
arrangements over the rangelands and avoid acknowledgment and recognition of 
the indigenous settings. 
Again, although it is only one case among many similar ones, the cereal seed 
improvement policy (Case No. 2 ) is an illustrative example of the way development 
objectives were defined and the criteria of being eligible to public aid were 
determined. To clarify this, some main issues will be discussed hereafter: 
1 . The policy was designed upon an imported development model that could never 
be successful intra-muros unless it was located in the areas that possess the right 
potential for it. The Green Revolution metaphor, as a model, could not 
accommodate more than 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 to 1 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 ha annually cropped with cereals. 
However, this model became the sole alternative which the entire R & D system 
worked to promote. This was, in fact, the planner's vision rather than the 
beneficiaries' preference that was imposed on the development agenda. Another 
consequence of this model was that it imprinted on most development actions an 
exclusive orientation, while supported by public resources, towards the well-off 
farmers possessing the necessary means to valorize, at best, the intensification 
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model. As a consequence, this imprinted orientation excluded the large majority 
of farmers whose constraints were never solved or tackled by the intensification 
model. This raises a problem of ethics concerning agricultural development, if we 
assert that development is synonymous with improvement of life and work 
conditions and, therefore, with income improvement. It is in consideration of this 
type of perspective that some development theorists call for the promotion of 
participatory models to guarantee more appropriateness and equity for the 
'hitherto excluded' small farmers. 
2. The policy needed a professionally-organized population of specialized farmers 
who demonstrated a professional interest and sufficient knowledge in seed 
production. Given the facilities they had access to in the corrupted bureaucratic 
apparatus, 'free-riders' infiltrated the seed system to gain more than to serve the 
seed 'cause'. Facilitated by the public organizations' acknowledgment of implicit 
criteria instead of the explicit official ones, their infiltration of the seed system 
granted them the benefit of a big reward in return for very little efforts. 
Meanwhile, the real professional seed growers became frustrated because, 
whatever their efforts, the seed system was always confined into a 'non-quality 
vicious circle' [see section 5 . 2 ] . 
3 . The policy needed to induce an end-user seed demand so that seed production 
met the projected levels of use. The state had to annually inject a huge amount of 
subsidies to favour the use of 'quality' seeds. Farmers used the seeds because they 
were neither convinced of that, nor because the quality was good. They used 
seeds because they were priced lower than the price they were paid for their own 
harvest. Consequently, when subsidies were removed and the price liberalized, 
farmers felt little attachment to or gratitude for the 'services' rendered by the seed 
system. The story of cheap seeds took the form of something 'offered' as a gift by 
the state which was counterproductive as it deprived them of the practical 
experience of demanding and receiving these public goods through their own 
pressure and initiative (Cleaves, ibid.: 2 9 1 ) . 
In summary, agricultural development policy-making and planning were plagued 
by intensive government interference with very little room for participation, 
entrepreneurship, and/or individual initiative. Taking advantage of their supremacy 
as part of the state apparatus and a less-organized population, planners and policy-
makers assumed they know, better than the beneficiaries themselves, the objectives 
of social groups whose situation they sought to ameliorate. This situation, although 
founded by some basic concepts mtririsic to the planning philosophy, was 
exacerbated by the political system that came into being at the time of independence, 
and which adopted central planning as a model of development guidance. 
By means of such supremacist behaviour, planners and policy-makers enjailed the 
development process in a very centralized, mechanistic top-down process, based on 
a stereotyped and 'uniformized' vision. Such a vision itself represented one of the 
persistent, salient causes of policy failure, especially in the case of non-mobilized, 
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| Hypothesis HI is not verified because development objectives of the proposed cases were exclusively j 
; determined by the planners in a centralized, top-down way and were not in accordance with the ] 
Ir^lbenegciaries' needs as they were planned in a complete amnesia of theruralareas' history._\ 
6.2.2 Major needs of required knowledge about processes to be influenced by a 
development action are covered by different sources of knowledge (H2) 
In the sense of the four hypotheses developed above, sustainable development 
requires a clear, precise, and complete understanding of the processes a given 
development action seeks to influence in its attempts to achieve the set objectives. 
This can be made possible only when enough required knowledge about these 
processes is gathered from whatever the source. 
As illustrative as it might be for Case No. 1, the charter of the 1971 agrarian 
revolution recognized that "there is no agrarian revolution that can achieve its goal 
without considering peasants' knowledge and wisdom" [see Box 5.1.5.3(1)]. The core 
of the agrarian revolution was supposed to be the peasants' 'intelligence', in a sense 
of wisdom and knowledge, but also social learning. The legislator, following 
instructions of the political leadership, wanted to convince all reluctant planners, 
policy-makers and administrators that if this force - i.e. the peasants 'intelligence' -
was ignored, overlooked, or despised, no sustainable action could be undertaken 
and the failure could not be avoided. 
Furthermore, if we look to Case No. 2, we can certainly assert that if this policy 
was designed in respect and consideration of the peasants' wisdom and knowledge, 
it would never end in failure, neither for farmers (end-users) nor for the seed system. 
The 'intensification' model of cereal crops development was not appropriate for all 
agroecological zones. A minimum amount of field investigation, which could have 
reinforced the planners' learning process, and a bit of participation of local farmers 
from the different agroecological zones would have spared the planners from 
embarking upon a hopeless endeavour such as the Green Revolution-driven 
development programme and its cherished HYVs. It is true, however, that this 
model could fit certain resource-rich agroecological zones, but it certainly was not fit 
for all regions were cereals have been were grown for many generations. 
Additionally, because farmers know each other at the village level, the 
participation of local farmers in defining the criteria for seed grower selection and 
thus could have spared much of the resources' spoiling. 
unorganized populations. With more participation of the beneficiaries and if they 
had learned from their previous experiences, planners could have designed 
appropriate policies that took the behaviour of the beneficiaries over time into 
consideration, rather than according to the policy-makers' own preferences (Cleaves, 
ibid.: 2 8 8 ) . According to Goulet (ibid.), as one Indian revolutionary activist recently 
declared to an author, "development makes life worse for 8 0 % of our people, and 
confirms the other 2 0 % in their selfishness" (Goulet, 1979 :564) . 
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Case No. 3 reinforces the assertion that if pastoralists' wisdom had been taken into 
consideration, planners could have understood the peculiar characteristics of the 
steppe rangelands management that were not only technical or economic, but also 
social and cultural. Rangelands management was based on the monitoring of an 
ecological balance between the feed needs of livestock and the avauability of 
resources in the pastures. A dramatic increase of the livestock population could 
endanger the future of the ecosystem and the sustainabuity of the livelihoods of local 
populations. 
According to Scoones (1996a: 23), lack of knowledge about the processes to be 
influenced by a development action - and maybe other reasons - resulted in state-led 
anti-drought interventions that engendered aid dependency and loss of indigenous 
coping mechanisms. This was achieved because these interventions were designed in 
a complete ignorance of the pastoralists' knowledge about so-called coping 
mechanisms such as tracking strategies. 
The major shortcomings of state-led interventions in achieving the goals of a 
genuine, sustainable and fair development scheme of the steppe rangelands can be 
summarized through the following: 
• A total ignorance - or better yet, a neglect - of the indigenous principles of range 
management, exploitation and conservation; 
• A creation of chaos in the rangelands by transgressing of the indigenous 
philosophy keeping the ecological balance in check. This was achieved through 
the transformation, as a consequence of state policies, of a non-equilibrium area 
into an equilibrium one (Scoones, 1996a: 1-2). Measures oriented towards an 
equilibrium area relied on an unlimited state support which, for many reasons 
that I explained in this book, could not be sustained; 
• A lack of deep and careful analysis of the indigenous tenure systems and a 
disregard to consider some basic principles of management relevant to future 
development; 
• An over-emphasis on imported, imposed organizational arrangements and 
settings that yielded land conflicts between state-imposed, mostly cooperativist, 
institutions and indigenous systems; 
• The use of inappropriate anti-drought measures, mainly seen as relief 
programmes not linked to a long-term development strategy, yielding a 
significant livestock dependency on feed imports (60% of the sheep diet in the 
steppe areas were covered through feed imports, according to Malki et al, 1997: 
20). 
Analyzing the implicit agenda of such development actions, one could conclude 
that these actions - and there were too many policies conceived and implemented in 
a context of total marginalization of the beneficiaries - were always designed and 
implemented seemingly not to achieve the true explicit objectives, but mainly to 
meet their hidden agenda. They were used to justify the 'raison d'Stre' of the state and 
its bureaucratic apparatus in the process of development so as to "increase the 
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1 See Goulet, 1986: 301-2 on the three political, technical and ethical (or humane) in the development 
decision-making arena. 
legitimacy of the state through the supply of resources" (Arce and Mitra, 1991: 4). In 
other words, such policies were used as appropriate tools to seemingly concretize a 
not-very convincing social justice in the national income distribution, which 
succeeded in effectively hiding the process of distributing the national income. 
Any attempt to understand this situation would lead to the philosophy of the 
Algerian state and its bureaucracy, which seems to instill the message: "In the 
process of development, the population is nothing without the state. This is why the 
process of development can be managed only by the state". In fact, passivity and 
self-depreciation, as defined by Paulo Freire (1972: 49) needed to become 
internalized by the population in order to reinforce the presence of the state in the 
process of development and legitimize its permanent intervention, sometimes taking 
the form of intervening for the sake of intervention per se. The worst part is that this 
philosophy thwarted the spontaneous entrepreneurial actions of as well as the rest of 
the population's social life. 
As a summary, as far as agricultural development pohcy-making and planning 
was characterized by a striking lack of participation from the beneficiaries 
themselves, development actions were identified by an 'external' body that had very 
little knowledge about the farmers' conditions, environments, and wishes, or even 
farmers' knowledge and wisdom. However, opening any opportunity for farmers to 
present their wisdom and share their knowledge in the context of the three cases I 
presented would have been perceived as a considerable threat either to the powerful 
lobbies that were controlling the state or to its bureaucratic apparatus. It is for this 
reason that choices made by the state bureaucracy usually tended to serve the 
interests of these latter groups rather than farmers themselves, especially small and 
poor ones. 
Such an opportunity of farmers' participation may also indicate a considerable 
threat to planners who cannot accept any questioning of their own instrumental and 
functional rationality, supposedly based on 'scientific' knowledge but frequently 
lacking a humane (or ethical) dimension1. We need to keep in mind the degree to 
which the bureaucratic staff of the state apparatus was depicted as disdainful vis-a-
vis rural populations. Thus, opening any opportunity for rural populations to 
discuss policies would mean not only discussing the power distribution in the 
society but a systematic behavioural adjustment of the bureaucrats as well. This 
would have empowered the 'oppressed' communities and thus reinforced their 
creative strategizing capacity (Goulet, ibid.: 564), which would lead them to ask for 
more and more concessions from the state and the bureaucracy. 
| Hypothesis HI is not verified because the required knowledge about processes to be influenced by a 
| development action were not covered by different sources of knowledge. It was just not possible for 
| neither the self-proclaimed regime not for its bureaucrats to step down from their ivory-tower and 
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6.2.3 All resources needed for the achievement of the objectives of the development 
action are available and fairly distributed among the actors (H3) 
In the sense of the four hypotheses mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
sustainable development needs not only the mobilization of the required resources, 
either public, semi-public or private, but most importantly their fair and just 
distribution as well. Along these lines, I want to mention that, in many articles about 
development, authors always mention that underdevelopment of countries such 
Algeria is mainly conditioned by scarcity or a total lack of resources. It is very 
seldom, however, that an author explains how these resources became scarce or even 
mentions that when resources were available, they were wasted in futile investments 
or unfairly distributed between different segments of the population. In fact, a 
strong complacency developed - wittingly or unwittingly - among some of these 
authors which kept them from not revealing that resources, even when available, 
were made 'artificially' scarce either by some powerful actors to distribute them 
according to their own preferences and discretion; or because of inefficiency and 
unfairness of their distribution and irrational use in development actions. In fact, 
through employing criteria to harmonize the competing claims of potential resource 
users in order to ensure maximum efficiency of public goods (Friedmann, ibid.: 54), 
planners and policy-makers, and bureaucrats in general decide on access and exit 
according to their own preferences. Knowing whose interests these actors look after, 
it is clear that even in allocative planned actions, the lion's share of resources goes to 
the most powerful actors who are most of time not those truly in need. 
If we look back to the official discourse, the agricultural sector was always given 
high priority in planned development but the mobilized resources did never lived 
up to this utterance. In my personal experience, every time agriculture 'took a capital 
letter at its beginning', as Mesli (1996: 3) said, in the official discourse, I expected an 
increased marginalization of the sector. 
As the three case-studies presented have showed, agricultural poUcy-making was 
always characterized by the tremendous gap existing between the handsomely 
phrased rhetoric of development plans, especially in the political discourse, and their 
implementation as compared to faithful commitments and concrete efforts. 
Among others, Case No. 3 shows this perfectly through the low rate at which the 
different plans and programmes were implemented, although the resources were 
supposedly there. This can only be explained by the centralized administrative 
procedures that ruled the system of funding and disbursement of public resources. 
This is a perfect case of making resources 'artificially' scarce by shackling their 
disbursement to very heavy, long, and centralized administrative procedures. 
Again, as Case No. 1 has shown, the basic resource to be mobilized and fairly 
distributed in the frame of this policy was land. This would have concerned, first 
and foremost, all colons' landholdings and some big holdings of rich landlords, 
which had to be distributed - or better, given back - to landless farmers. As these two 
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types of landholdings were neither explicitly nor implicitly addressed by this 
reform, one could assert that the agrarian revolution was conceived and 
implemented in a such a way that it reinforced the great lack of trust that small and 
poor farmers, in particular, and the populace, in general, developed towards 
politicians and policy-makers. 
Finally, Case No. 2 shows another way of how the targeted objectives of a 
development action were missed because of inefficiency and unfairness in resources 
distribution. In this case, public resources were not only mobilized and unfairly 
distributed but, more strikingly, allocated with priority going to powerful people 
who did not deserve them professionally. 
One of the most important resources for sustainable development is the political 
power which acts as a variable that directly affects implementation due to the 
resources that can be mobilized in favour of or in opposition to a specific 
development action, according to Cleaves (1980:281). 
In fact, resource allocation in the context of sustainable development stipulates 
that a model of future society is formulated that is different from the present one in 
important ways, as Friedmann (ibid.: 54) suggests, and in line with the aspirations of 
the majority. It should aim to break up the existing status quo, which favours only 
the powerful segments of the population and build up and - more importantly -
maintain a new social order that favours the majority. From the foregoing, one can 
derive that development as well as social guidance are political issues. The debate 
over who is able to decide what future is for a given society introduces the question 
of legitimacy, and thus of genuine participation and representativeness. 
In a similar vein, for the sake of achieving the set objectives of development 
actions that can themselves be more or less difficult to implement, such as Case No. 
1, according to Cleaves (ibid.), social actors need to mobilize sufficient power to 
ensure the execution of a policy design. This depends on their influence they can 
exert in the political sphere. 
The common feature of the three case-studies presented resides in the fact they 
were all implemented using public resources. Being embedded in a particular 
political system as described earlier, public institutions had difficulty in mobilizing 
the population around their proposed development agenda, especially the poor 
segments of it, let alone their resources (Cleaves, ibid.: 300). One may ask why I 
should be so critical about a political system that dared to mobilize resources for the 
development of the supposed under-privileged segments of the population. In an 
attempt to answer this question, I would rather acknowledge the fact that the regime 
mobilized some resources, and re-emphasize that my criticisms apply to the way in 
which resources were made scarce by artificial mechanisms, and the way in which 
they were distributed among different segments of the population, giving better, 
wider access to the less needy while denying the adequate access to those in need. 
In this vein, I admit that many authors (Clay and Schaffer, 1984; Long, 1984,1992; 
Arce and Mitra, 1991) acknowledge the potential ability - human agency - of social 
actors to devise strategies that help them create room of maneuver in order to bring 
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about favourable changes and/or outcomes that are in line with their preferences. 
However, in corrupted political and administrative settings, such social processes 
about creating room for change by a social microcosm are sometimes harnessed with 
the intrinsic feature of excluding the needy majority for whom development actions 
are - or should be - meant. 
In summary, agricultural development policy-making and planning in post-
independence Algeria was characterized by a low proportion of investments in 
public expenditures. Whenever a great effort to invest in agriculture occurred, it was 
biased towards sophisticated technology which did not fit large segments of the 
peasantry and their conditions, most of whom were located in very harsh 
environments. Moreover, public resources that were mobilized for a given 
development action were unfairly distributed to opportunistic clients to the 
detriment of the appropriate, needy people. Such a situation led to a lack of 
confidence in the state, and explains people's unwillingness to invest their own 
resources in any development action that is sponsored by the state apparatus. This 
situation shed light on an important sodo-political phenomenon in post-
independence Algeria: The mutual rejection between a state organization serving 
development and the less-powerful of its clients it is supposed to support. 
Hypothesis H3 is not verified because all the resources needed to achieve development action 
objectives were not available, and when available, they were not fairly distributed among the 
actors. Rent-seeking and patron-client relationships favoured less-needy actors and corrupted the 
real sense of development. Moreover, no adequate mechanism was established to include the locally 
available resources. 
6.2.4 The political will to use the required resources for a given development action 
is concretized in order to achieve the formulated objectives (H4) 
In the sense of the four hypotheses to be fulfilled, as developed above, sustainable 
development is strongly linked to power and to sodal justice. Any development 
action that aims to meet the objectives of a pattern of sodal justice requires the 
political will of the ruling body - or better, the powerful actors in the sodety. This is 
essential given that any development action will attempt, in one way or another, to 
disturb a given current status quo, either as an explidt objective or as an implidt 
agenda or even as a side-effed. The linkage, either real or assumed, between 
development and power, and thus politics, is again underscored. Developmental 
work is not - and will never be - apolitical. 
In fact, any development action, especially the one that can be labeled as 
innovative planning, is highly idealistic in its assumptions, the achievement of which 
requires political will to be mobilized. However, sometimes the political will of 
convinced and sympathetic political leaders is a necessary but not a suffident 
condition, as was the case of post-independence Algeria, especially after the 1965 
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coup, wherein the political leadership represented a mosaic of different and 
antagonistic driving forces and interests. 
Although showing planned action differences as being either innovative, 
allocative, or mixed planned actions, the three case-studies presented are examples 
of development actions presumably planned to show more social justice towards the 
non-powerful segments of the population (the landless, the professional seed 
growers, and the small and poor pastoralists), but they mainly benefited the most 
powerful (the big landlords, the opportunistic pseudo seed growers, and the big 
pastoralists). Given that Cases Nos. 2 and 3 can be seen as consequences of a political 
system and its underlying planning apparatus that were reinforced after the 
'stimulated failure' of the policy, as shown in Case No. 1 , it became clear that either 
innovative or allocative planned actions were implemented with the same 
orientation in such a system: Serve, by any means, the less-needy to the detriment of 
those in need, be it individuals and groups. Since the independence, and more 
particularly during the "black decade', all development actions were designed and 
implemented based upon this orientation. 
However, in a society like post-independence Algerian society, lacking 
organizations of civil society, the results would have been the same whatever 
method, form or style of planning was used, given the supremacy of the 
"bureaucratic oligarchy' and the interests it had to serve, protect, and look after. It 
was basically the rule rather than the exception that, in the self-interest of the 
bureaucracy, bureaucrats needed to establish links with the elites who were the best 
organized in the rural areas, having strong connections in the urban centers due to 
the facility of access they benefited from the post-independence state. 
Notwithstanding, a great paradox lies in the issue of political will as a prerequisite 
of sustainable development. Its fulfillment assumes that there is a need for some 
'humanitarian' pity from the powerful towards the excluded. Quite an Utopian 
vision! This seems to resemble what Freire ( 1 9 7 2 : 2 9 ) calls "false charity" (or "false 
generosity"). This only takes place through a process of perpehiating injustice by the 
powerful in order to give meaning and a raison d'etre to this kind of generosity. 
In my opinion, this call for a 'humanitarian' feeling from the powerful seems to be 
a rather perfect illusion that can never yield to the new just social order that is 
required in a context of sustainable development. Such a call requires to make sure 
that the powerful have not completely lost their 'human' (and not 'humanitarian') 
character, as Freire (ibid.: 2 8 ) puts it; otherwise it will be illusory to talk about the 
prerequisites for sustainable development, such as participation, democratization, 
justice, freedom, etc. 
Such an enterprise of recovering lost humanity can only be made possible through 
a process of liberation - or better, self-liberation - of the 'hitherto excluded' which 
means, within the special context of development, a victory over privilege, 
stagnation and dependency (Goulet, 1 9 7 9 : 5 5 5 ) . 
Concerning development, this statement brings to the fore the fact that political 
will as a prerequisite for sustainable development depends on power and how it is 
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distributed among segments of a given political system, given that power 
distribution influences both the content of a development action and the success 
with which this action is implemented (Cleaves, ibid.: 2 8 2 ) . As Cleaves (ibid.: 3 0 3 ) 
suggests, implementation of development actions requires bureaucratic 
responsiveness to the poorest segments of the population and in cases where 
politically dominant groups are unwilling to carry out such an assignment and/or 
try to oppose it, anti-system advocates will try to fill the breach and to manipulate 
the so-called poorest segments. This is exactly what happened in Algeria during the 
last seven years as a consequence of three decades of exclusion. It might be said that 
this situation can be explained through the use of a metaphor of 'marginalized 
energy' which was neglected by the post-independence political system that omitted 
to channel it into sustainable development work and was then used by manipulators 
to push the country into chaos. 
In summary, agricultural development policy-making and planning in post-
independence Algeria worked faithfully toward mamtaining the status quo that was 
inherited at independence and consolidated in society and thus in its political system 
through the design and implementation of most development actions since 1 9 6 2 . 
Elites' interests were always looked after by the state apparatus, although some of 
the political leaders that governed the country since the coup d'etat in 1 9 6 5 until 
1 9 7 8 were truly willing to alter this status quo. However, development actions have 
not achieved the formulated explicit objectives to the same extent as they did in their 
hidden agenda. 
With a minimum of participation from the excluded and a modicum of social 
learning from politicians, planners and policy-makers, mobilization of the required 
political will as a prerequisite for sustainable development would have improved. 
This was necessary not only to mobilize and use the needed resources for achieving 
the objectives of development actions, but to fairly distribute them among needy 
beneficiaries. However, some powerful actors, blinded by their interests and guided 
by rent-seeking as pattern imposed by the post-independence political system were 
not aware of the far-reaching consequences of their persisting exclusion policy' for 
the country and the population. 
Hypothesis H4 is not verified because the political will to use the required resources for a given 
development action is mobilized in order to achieve the formulated (explicit) objectives. Blindness 
of powerful actors imposed by their interests threatened the political will shown by some political 
leaders. 

C H A P T E R 7 
B A C K T O T H E E M P I R I C A L P A T H : 
PRESENTATION OF CASES 4 , 5 A N D 6 
In the previous chapters, I presented three cases-studies related to the mainstream 
top-down, non-participatory, conventional development thinking that was adopted 
by the post-independence state in Algeria. I discussed their philosophical and 
theoretical foundations, and asserted the irrelevance of this dunking for the post-
development era. 
In this chapter, I will present three other case-studies which will be analyzed and 
discussed. These cases have been selected for their idiosyncratic features which will 
be used to confront theoretical postulates with real-life events that happened daily in 
any development action. The underlying criteria recall the main theoretical 
foundations of my development vision which are based on participation of the 
beneficiaries, either direct (individually) or indirect (through representative local 
organizations), and on social learning and how new knowledge can enhance the 
achievements of a development action, either at the planning, implementation or 
evaluation stages. All cases relied particularly on a strong mechanism of 
participatory evaluation that gave room to the beneficiaries to discuss and comment 
on development objectives and strategies, and thus propose their own vision. 
Among these cases, the first one focuses more on a participatory monitoring and 
evaluation model (M&E) that took shape throughout the chronological evolution of 
the development action itself, and shows the effects of this model on the planning 
and implementation of the project's activities. 
The second case introduces a new vision of how implementing a development 
action using public means and resources to create a truly participatory sustainable 
development. Moreover, this case shows that public bureaucracy is not a monolithic 
block and that there can be civil servants are ethical and moral and who consider 
development from another point of view with different values. 
The third case, the most innovative in terms of development, introduces a vision 
of a genuine grassroots participatory development with very limited external help. It 
is in fact innovative at least at three levels: (1) It developed on the spot, in the field, 
through a trustful partnership strengthened through the second case mentioned 
above, and aimed at complementing this case; (2) It concerned the education aspects, 
especially of those who represent the future generation of pastoralists, i.e. the 
primary school pupils living in the steppe rangelands areas, and dared to enter the 
world of national education as an original experiment which was gratefully 
acknowledged by the local and regional policy-makers, and; (3) It did not rely on 
public funding resources to start the basic activities, even though some resources for 
practical field-work exercises were mobilized through a public agency. 
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7.1 Case No. 4: The cereal production improvement project 
7.1.1 General outline about the project 
As I have already described in Chapter 4, Algeria has become since independence 
one of the biggest cereal net importer countries in the world. Many policies on cereal 
crop improvement has been implemented since the beginning of the 1970s, which 
didn't stop the deterioration of this situation. In fact, cereal production stagnated 
while, under demographic pressure (population growth more than 3% a year during 
the 1970s), domestic demand was booming. Imports had to fill the gap between 
domestic demand and supply, given that cereal grains represent a major food staple 
for large segments of the population [see Box 7.1.1(1) below]. 
I Box 7.1.1(1) - How important are cereals in Algeria? | 
Cereal crops are of paramount importance in Algeria, either at political, economic, social, or 
nutritional levels. They represent a very old tradition in agricultural practice, especially for wheat 
and barley. Any farm, whatever legal status it could have, incorporates at least one of these two 
species in its annual land-use plan. 
Algeria's total arable land area is estimated around 7.5 to 8 million hectares. Each year, Algerian 
farmers cultivate an average of 3.5 to 4 million hectares under cereal crops, even though domestic 
production does not actually cover more than a third of the total needs. Cereal crops count for almost 
50% of the annually cropped land. However, the cereal-based farming systems, including food 
legumes and/or forages in addition to fallow, count for more than 90% of the total arable land [see 
Table 4.4.2.1(2) in Chapter 4]. 
The average production of the last 10 years has never gone beyond 2 million tons a year, which 
represents at maximum 30% of the domestic needs [see Table 4.4.2.1(3) in Chapter 4]. 
Observation of time-series related to cereals productivity in Algeria has revealed that within 10 
years-range, the highest performance of the national average productivity was 845 kilograms per 
hectare, while the lowest was 411 kilograms per hectare. 
Cereals at the same time represent 80% of the average food diet, 70% of the total amount of proteins 
in the diet, and 60% of this diet in terms of calories. 
In spite of this strategic importance, Algeria is one of the ten most major cereal net importers. 
Algerian imports of cereal grains count for not less 70% of the domestic needs. This situation 
^ visualizes very well the vicious circle of extreme dependency which the country is locked into. 
Source: field notes 
Given this problématique, the situation became unsustainable after 1986 when the oil-
prices crashed, and solutions had to be found. In this context, in October, 1986, after 
an intensive discussion between development and international co-operation experts 
from both countries, France and Algeria governments agreed to co-finance a project 
on cereal production improvement in the province of Sétif (19) in central eastern 
Algeria [see Figure 4.2.5(1) in this book]. 
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The region was well chosen, for it was one of the most productive cereal zones in 
the country for centuries. It used to be called the "breadbasket of the Roman empire". 
Located in the semi-arid High-Plateaus ecological zone with at least a 900-meter 
elevation, it is characterized by tough and cold winters and dry and hot summers. 
The so-called project was supposed to provide solutions to the technical 
weaknesses reported for cereal production processes among what was known at that 
time as the Domaines Agricoles Socialistes (DASs), i.e. the state-owned and workers 
self-managed farms. Its main focus was on setting up a high-productivity 
agricultural technology system linking generation, diffusion, and utilization of 
innovations. Based on this orientation, three components constituted the basis of the 
project: 
1. The Innovation Generation (IG) component; 
2. The Diffusion and Training (DT) component, and; 
3. The Seed Production (SP) component. 
Figure 7.1.1(1) - Basic items of the project's underlying philosophy 
(Source: this study) 
As Figure 7.1.1(1) above illustrates, the interdependency between the three 
programmes resided in the underlying philosophy that the IG component would 
generate new technologies (develop cultural practices and/or release new varieties) 
adapted to the harsh - though sometimes extremely differentiated - environments of 
the project area. These technologies would be diffused into the farmer's context 
through the DT component. In case new varieties would be developed by the former 
component and in case their diffusion would be successful, these new varieties would 
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first be passed to the SP component to get them sufficiently increased diffusion to 
eventually meet the farmers' demand. As the development agent - farmer interface is 
extremely important to the outcome of the project, training on specific topics would be 
provided to development agents in order to improve the quality and productivity of 
the interaction at this interface. 
7.1.2 Major actors and executive partners of the project 
From the outset, implementation of the project involved both long-term expatriate 
French experts with great experience in R&D and Algerian staff from different 
organizations. 
The Algerian partners were: 
• The Institut Technique des Grandes Cultures (ITGC) Algiers-based headquarters was 
the executive agency of the project, which channeled the Algerian funds, and was 
thus the main co-ordinator and evaluator of the project; 
• The HGC Sétif-based station for the three components and for the monitoring of 
the project; 
• The Direction des Services Agricoles (DSA) of Sétif province for the DT component; 
and, 
• The Coopérative des Céréales et des Légumes Secs (CCLS) of Sétif for the SP 
component. 
The French partners were: 
• The Caisse Française de Développement (CFD), channeling the funds from the French 
government; 
• The consultancy bureau FERTILE for the IG component; 
• The Atelier Départemental de Développement Agricole (ADDA) of the Chambre 
d'Agriculture des Alpes de Haute-Provence for the DT component; and, 
• The Groupement National Interprofessionnel de Semences (GNIS) for the SP 
component. 
For the Algerian part, it was the first time - since the common R&D approach has 
been put aside for many years along and replaced by a mere commodity approach -
that a project was conducted on a multi-disciplinary development perspective, 
linking research to development. Since then, this type of federative project, as it was 
named at that time, became the new development paradigm among ITGC staff and 
within the Ministry of Agriculture as well. 
However, the project team concentrated on the technical issues of cereal crop 
improvement without acknowledging the socio-economic dimension of the context 
of such a development action. 
Financial resources came from both Algerian and French parties. In contrast to 
other projects, the budget of this project was not fixed from the outset for the whole 
duration. On the French part, there was an initial allocation of 6.458.000 FF at the 
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level of the Caisse Française de Développement (CFD), which served for the start of the 
project. Every phase would have its budget. When this initial allocation was over, 
the project team, depending on the results and decisions of the evaluation meeting, 
would introduce a demand for additional funds either to the CFD if the allocation 
was still available, or to the Comité Mixte Algéro-Français des Projets, if the amount 
deposed at the CFD was over. In the fourth phase (Act IV), the project benefited 
from another allocation of funds which amounted to 3.753.000 FF. 
For the Algerian part, the project started with an initial contribution of 2.500.000 
AD from the CCLS de Sétif, which was refunded by the Office Algérien 
Interprofessionnel des Céréales (OAIC). This covered the first and second phases. 
Another contribution of 3.018.000 AD came from the government (Ministry-
Delegation of Planning and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) and had to cover 
the last two phases. 
The details of these funds is given by Table 7.1.2(1) below. 
Table 7.1.2(1) - Detailed funds allocations of the project's different phases 
Phase Algerian contribution French contribution 
(in AD) (in FF*) 
1st Phase (Act I) 2.500.000 4.200.000 
2nd Phase (Act B) 
3rd Phase (Act IB) 3.018.000 2.258.000 
4th Phase (Act IV) 3.753.000 
TOTAL 5.518.000 10.221.000 
Source: ITGC 
*In the late 1980s, 1 FF was roughly equivalent to 0.80 AD. 
7.1.3 Chronological evolution of the project 
Before starting a descriptive 'journey' into the evolution of the project, it is useful to 
mention that the official document signed by both French and Algerian governments 
(which was the sole project document at the starting point) decided to launch the 
project first for an initial phase of 18 months. This phase would determine the course 
of the project for other eventual phases. Implicitly, the duration of the project was 
meant to be longer, but how the future of the project would be structured would be 
decided during the evaluation session that would be held before at the end of the 
initial phase. 
The overall objective of the project was the improvement of cereal production in 
the region, but no detailed plan of action was provided to the field implementers. 
Both authorities agreed to leave this to the specialists, who would propose the 
course of action after they gathered a comprehensive understanding, and thus 
knowledge, during the initial phase. 
NOTA: The grey area represents the French part of the project, while the white area concerns the Algerian part. 
Figure 7.1.3.3(1) - Configuration of the project during Act III 
(October 1989 - September 1990) 
Figure 7.1.3.4(1) - Configuration of the project during Act IV 
(October 1990 - September 1992) 
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7.2.3.2 Act I: January 1987 - June 1988 
The project started in January, 1987 on its first 18-month phase. Three French 
expatriates settled down in the ITGC Sétif station, and the Algerian-French team 
started working, backstopped by short consultancies from highly-experienced 
French scientists and/or ITGC headquarters staff. 
This first phase mainly aimed to investigate, in depth, the different constraints 
that negatively influenced cereal production in the project area. During this phase, 
the configuration of the project was as Figure 7.1.3.1(1) shows. 
An evaluation session took place at the end of the phase in September, 1988, at 
ITGC headquarters, gathering together Algerian actors and French partners. The 
outcome of this evaluation were as follows: 
• A documented analysis of the agricultural technology system within the project 
area was presented by the Algerian-French team, discussed and approved by the 
participants. This analysis acknowledged that, for any development action to be 
successfully undertaken, there had to be a trustful interface between farmers and 
development staff. It mentioned the striking evidence that, in the region, 
development agents were not adequately prepared to work in this 'new' context, 
and needed thus to be accordingly trained before the project would undertake 
any activity towards the other side of the interface, i.e. the farmers' community. 
• The linkages between research (ITGC) and technology transfer (DSA), described 
as very weak, needed to be strengthened through, among many other measures, 
the establishment at the ITGC station of a small team chaired by an ITGC staff, 
and included the French expatriates of both IG and DT components, and both 
ITGC and DSA development staff involved in the project. This team would be in 
charge of editing reports and brochures that could be used to 'transform' the 
scientific findings into an 'accessible-to-farmers' message. 
• The Seed Production (SP) component needed to be stopped because it was 
premature to think about increasing seeds of the new varieties as far as the 
investigation revealed that the problem was no longer the availability of new seed 
varieties, but mainly the lack of adoption of these varieties by farmers. In fact, 
ITGC has been on breeding new high-yielding semi-dwarf cereal varieties 
working for more than 15 years and posses many of this kind. 
Moreover, given that there was an on-going negotiation at that time between the 
Algerian authorities and the European Community for funding a specific project 
on cereal seed production improvement, there was no need to duplicate efforts in 
that field as far as the model of organization that would emerge from the would-
be EC project could easily be replicated in the Sétif region. 
According to this evaluation, there was decision made to extend the First Phase for 
an additional 10-month period so that the capacity of the development agents to 
build and maintain a trustful interface with farmers could be improved. 
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7.1.3.2 Act II: October 1988 - August 1989 
During this phase, a significant emphasis was placed on development agents' 
training in order to help them improve their performance at the interface with 
farmers. But before starting this training programme, an attempt to design a new 
Provincial Development System was undertaken by a joint ITGC-DSA team. This 
sought to incorporate entities working locally in the fields of research, extension, and 
education, and their inherent articulations and linkages. 
Analysis of this proposed system revealed that there was a need to incorporate an 
agricultural education centre, the Institut de Technologie Moyen de l'Agriculture 
(TTMA) of Sétif, to secure the fulfillment of the training needs. The configuration 
during this phase changed to be as Figure 7.1.3.2(1) shows. 
Moreover, participation of farmers themselves in the project needed to be 
mobilized in a representative way, which will be examined later. 
At the grassroots level, the project introduced the 'one-development-agent-for-
one-commune' slogan. The Délégué Communal (DC), as he was called, was a DSA 
development agent who should be discharged from all aolministrative business in 
order to exclusively focus on development activities within a commune. Each DC 
had to identify a group of farmers to start working with as a pilot unit in order to set 
up a trustful interaction. 
For this purpose, all DCs attended a cycle of short training seminars (4 seminars 
of 2-3 days each) during this phase. This training programme provided them with 
the required skills of a real development agent. It should be mentioned that the 
theoretical foundation of this programme was based on the philosophy of the 'linear 
model' of technology transfer. 
Many aspects such as farm management, communication techniques, farmer file-
keeping and so on, were introduced to the curriculum of this programme. It served 
as a pilot model and aimed to build up a final version that would be used in other 
similar regions. It was therefore based on the very active participation of the DCs 
themselves whose input was highly appreciated by the French expatriates. 
Additionally, training activities were held in France. These mainly concerned the 
researchers/experimenters and the staff affiliated with the team in charge of editing 
brochures and buUetins. Themes related to experimental designs based on farmers' 
constraints and expectations as well as communication methods and writing styles 
were developed. 
On another field, and in anticipation of the coming phases, the project started 
very smoothly, developing activities with farmers. In this respect, representatives of 
French farmers' organizations visited Algeria to establish a forum of experience 
exchange with their local counterparts. 
At the end of this phase, an evaluation meeting took place in September, 1989, in 
the project area. Some new actors, such as development staff of DSA, teachers of 
ITMA and invited farmers, attended the meeting along with the previous year's 
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participants. The evaluation came up with very interesting conclusions. Some of 
them were as follows: 
• During the two-and-a-half years of its existence, the project had given enough 
attention to the first side of the development interface (researchers and 
development staff). In the future, the project must basically focus on the farmers' 
side of the interface. 
• Some activities undertaken by the DT component through the new Provincial 
Development System proved to be highly instructive and were discussed in-depth 
within this evaluation meeting. The focus was on how to get ITGC researchers 
more involved as subject-matter specialists (SMS) in solving farmers' problems in 
a more 'développement à la carte' way. Participants in this meeting adopted a new 
model of farmers' support and assistance, known as 'personalized monitoring'. 
At the end of the evaluation, some activities, mostly oriented towards the farmers' 
side, were scheduled for the coming phase which was decided to last until the next 
September (one year). Among the planned activities, the following are worth to 
mention: 
• A programme of demonstration plots and field-days on improved cereal crop 
techniques would be conducted by the DCs, with the help of the DT component, 
especially the French expatriate who proved to be a very experienced man on 
development issues1, and other Algerian scientists. 
• One or two visits of Algerian farmers to France would be arranged, in order to 
complete the forum of exchange that started earlier in Algeria with the visit of 
representatives of French farmers' organizations. 
• A group of DCs would visit their French counterparts to be inspired by their 
working and organizational methods. It was decided to choose the best ones in the 
project area, in order to reward them for their hard work. 
• The new semi-private collective and individual farms (EACs-EAIs)2 should be 
included in the project in replacement of the dissolved DASs. 
7 .1 .3 .3 Act III: October 1989 - September 1990 
This phase proved to be one of the most important steps in the project. It was the one 
which gave a new orientation to the project and put the project on a more 
'organismic' track in comparison with other 'contemporary' projects that ITGC dealt 
with or was dealing with at that time. 'Organismicity' resides in the in-built 
flexibility mechanisms which made the project able to adapt to new situations in 
very dynamic environments. 
1 In fact, when his contract was over, ITGC decided to enroll him in the EC project on a similar 
diffusion programme oriented towards seed multipliers. 
2 These new farms were known as Exploitation Agricole Collective (EAC), and as Exploitation Agricole 
Individuelle (EAI). The proportion is 75% of the new farms for the former, with 3-5 members, and 25% 
for the latter. The State still is the owner of the land. 
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In fact, conceived, as said before, as a means of bringing solutions to the technical 
weaknesses of cereal production processes in the DASs, the project could have been 
closed up at that moment as far as the existence of such farms was no longer possible 
in Algeria. Due to the implementation of the 8 7 - 1 9 Law concerning the 
reorganization of public agricultural sector, the DASs were divided into EACs-EAIs. 
The status of these new farms was completely different from the former as far as the 
civil, economic, and financial responsibilities were no longer the state apparatus' 
business. Instead, they were the obligations of the collective or individual ownership 
of the usufruct of these farms, given that the state remains the owner of the land. 
During this phase, the project undertook initiatives to prepare for a complete 
switch from the DASs to the EACs-EAIs by including some of these new farms in the 
project network. This changing environment helped to increase the awareness of all 
actors involved, be they collectively or individually, upon the necessity to also 
include some private farms, given that some similarities were assumed to be found 
between these latter and the EACs-EAIs. In fact, most of the actors involved in the 
project were undoubtedly convinced that the strategizing capacity of the new EACs-
EAIs would resemble the private farms more than the former DASs. In this regard, it 
was necessary for them to understand the way private farmers made decisions and 
managed their farms, which have been completely left out for more than 2 5 years, by 
the socialistic development thinking of the state agencies. Of course, this does not 
mean that the development of the DASs over the years followed the principles of a 
sound and rational approach, yet they received most of the attention from the state. 
After the decision to integrate these new farms into the project, the configuration 
of the project became as Figure 7 . 1 . 3 . 3 ( 1 ) shows. 
At the end of this phase, the feeling among all project actors was that the project 
should no longer focus exclusively on increasing cereal crop productivity through 
the introduction of new, improved, high-yielding technologies. From then on, the 
project should aim primarily at getting farmers better organized to influence 
development and solve their problems. The idea was to discover the best 
organizational mechanism to help them pull down and steer the state services to 
adequately respond to their needs. As Cernea ( 1 9 8 4 : 1 9 2 ) suggests, 
Intensified agriculture cannot occur without intensified human organization. 
The evaluation held at Sétif in October, 1 9 9 0 , yielded three very important outcomes 
that dedicated the project's future undertakings towards a more 'social-engineering' 
orientation. The most important outcomes are briefly mentioned hereafter: 
• After all the activities undertaken by the project towards scientists and 
development staff, and the visits of Algerian farmers to France, who were very 
enthusiastic since their return, it was time to 'construct' an improved development 
interface with the necessary condition that farmers get organized to set their own 
development agenda. Under farmers' suggestion and pressure, project staff 
decided to schedule some initiatives to be undertaken with farmers in the next 
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phase to facilitate the formation of new forms of farmers' organizations. It has to 
be said that these initiatives did not please the leaders of the Union Nationale des 
Paysans Algériens (UNPA), created during the one-party-system. This would also 
have required adjustments by the development agents. Since the DCs were 
trained for working with organized farmers and exchanged experiences with their 
French counterparts, they could initially keep up with these changes, yet it was 
too early to assess, given that it was only through practicing in their own context 
that they could learn how to adapt to this new situation. 
• The evaluation by the DT component team, especially by the French expatriate, of 
the demonstration plots and field-days programme undertaken by the DCs 
helped understand the reaction of farmers towards the project's recommendations 
better. First of all, it appeared that cereal crop improvement actions could not be 
isolated from the overall farm and its farming system(s). As a consequence, this 
called upon the project team to include some activities about livestock husbandry 
and nutrition and potato cultivation in the DT action plan for the next phase, 
although these activities needed the intervention of two other ITGC sister 
organizations, that are respectively the Institut Technique des Elevages Bovin et Ovin 
(ITEBO) for the livestock activity, and the Institut Technique des Cultures 
Maraîchères et Industrielles (LTCMI) for the potato activity. 
• Secondly, it appeared that improving any aspect of the farm would first require 
an investigation of the farm and its inherent farming system(s), which could not 
be undertaken in a mono-disdplinary pattern and/or in the absence of sodal 
scientists. It was then stated that the projed's future activities must comply with a 
systemic (and thus mmti-disdplinary) approach, therefore integrating research on 
the lacking dimension of socio-economic variables. 
• Moreover, to overcome problems that had recently appeared among some 
development organizations in Sétif province (reduced contribution of DSA 
development staff under the pressure of UNPA, which opposed the idea of 
creating new farmers' organizations), it was dedded to expand the project 
activities to two other neighbouring provinces (Batna and Bordj-Bou-Arréridj). 
These three points set the agenda for the next phase, which was dedded to be longer 
than usual (2 years). It needs to be mentioned that sodo-economic variables, as 
referred to in the second evaluation outcome mentioned above, were mostly 
perceived by ITGC natural sdentists, such as breeders and experimenters, as 
economic elements only. This was also true for some decision-makers in ITGC and 
the Ministry of Agriculture. 
I had to personally question people many times when they talked about, for 
instance, socio-economic studies, asking them to what extent the intended sodo-
economic studies were socio- and economic at the same time, and not only economic. 
I even asked them where sdentists with an academic degree in sodo-economics 
could be found, and in which university were these people educated. People were 
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frequently puzzled responding to these kind of questions, as they took the concept 
of 'socio-economy' for granted. 
7.1.3.4 Act IV: October 1990 - September 1992 
Finalizing the decision to expand the project activities into two other neighbouring 
provinces consumed a large amount of the implementers' energy and time during 
this phase because of the originality of the project's strategy (farmers' participation, 
creation of new farmers' organizations, exclusive role of DCs on development issues, 
etc.). 
However, the expansion of the project to other provinces coincided with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries application of the 1990 Executive Decree, 
which gave freedom to farmers, among other citizens, to organize themselves into 
free associations. This process was completed by another Executive Decree 
promulgated in early 1992 regulating the settlement of the National and Provincial 
Chambers of Agriculture [see section 4.1.5]. 
In this respect, the project configuration had changed again and became as Figure 
7.1.3.4(1) shows. 
During this phase, some field-days and visits to ITEBO and ITCMI experimental 
stations and pilot farms on livestock husbandry and nutrition and on potato 
cultivation were undertaken, as demanded by farmers themselves during the last 
phase. These activities concerned the Sétif province only and were organized by the 
DCs and the DT component, under the indirect supervision of ITEBO and HCMI, 
which were not directly involved in the project and intervened in these activities 
only upon the demand of the ITGC Director General. However, the socio-economic 
research did not start due to lack of clarity and co-ordination of the subject by the 
project team. 
Nevertheless, this phase seemed very laborious in terms of activities and yielded 
highly-impressive outcomes which I think are worth reporting, according to the 
evaluation meeting discussions: 
• This phase showed how diverse responses came from similar entities vis-a-vis the 
same stimulus. In fact, the DSA of Bordj-Bou-Arréridj managed to assign a DC to 
all communes of the wilaya within the first year of its involvement in the project, 
and provided them, at the wilaya expenses, with a motorcycle each, while the DSA 
of Sétif was still waiting after no less than five years for the project to provide its 
DCs with means of transportation, as it did in 1991. This was an additional point 
which legitimized the expansion of the project, showing that a state bureaucracy 
was not a monolithic block. 
• It also showed how farmers of the Sétif wilaya were very enthusiastic about 
founding the first farmers' UNPA-independent association in the country after 
they visited their French counterparts. From the outset of the movement, before 
this phase had started, UNPA firmly opposed even the idea of settling new 
independent configurations among the farmers' population. But the moment 
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UNPA leaders saw that the movement was on the right track and became 
finalized when the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries announced the 
establishment of the National and Provincial Chambers of Agriculture, they 
strongly lobbied the movement in order to control it for their own exclusive 
benefits. For this reason, they preceded the movement in other regions and 
provinces, and former UNPA leaders were placed at the top of the newly-founded 
farmers' organizations. However, this was fortunately not the case in the project 
area, where the leadership of all newly-settled farmers' organizations was 
awarded to people who had always been very critical of the non-
representativeness of UNPA and the unscrupulous practices of its leaders in 
general (be they at the local, regional or national level). 
An evaluation meeting was held at the end of this phase in September, 1992, and a 
few decisions were made: 
1. The project's first period (1986-1992) needed to be closed, given that some French 
and Algerian procedures related to project planning and funding needed to be 
respected. 
2. An ex-post evaluation of the whole period should be conducted, upon the terms 
of reference that were already prepared by the project team. 
3. A new project (second period) would be designed upon this evaluation's 
conclusions. 
At that point, some indicators had been developed for the new project. Proposed to 
be of a 5-years duration, split up into at least two or three phases, the project would 
strengthen the capacity of the newly-set farmers' organizations to design their own 
development agenda. It was provisionally entitled "Sustaining Farmers' 
Organizations Claim Capacity in Sétif Region". The proposed project was 
welcomed by the Comité Mixte Algêro-Français de Projets, which agreed to co-fund it 
according to the indicative budget that was discussed and adopted at the evaluation 
meeting. 
The new project was in fact scheduled to start in early 1993 after the project's first 
period ex-post evaluation would be over. Unfortunately, the security situation 
rapidly declined in Algeria and neither the ex-post evaluation have taken place nor 
the new project started. This shows how development co-operation is sometimes 
hampered by the sodo-political conditions in a given country. 
7.1.4 Project configurations and actors involvement 
As it would have been already noticed, different actors were involved in the 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the project's first period (1986-1992). 
But what was peculiar about this project was the fact that actors' involvement was 
not as static as a conventional, blue-print project would have been It kept changing 
adequately as the project evolved. When changes in the project's environment were 
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noticed, these were immediately taken into consideration in order to adapt the 
project to its new environment [see Figures 7.1.3.1(1), 7.1.3.2(1), 7.1.3.3(1) and 
7.1.3.4(1) above]. 
However, as in 'multiple realities' situations, it was opportune to uncover the 
opinions of these different actors involved in the project through interviews of 
planners, researchers, extensionists, farmers, donors, etc.. Being more numerous, 
farmers outnumbered the rest of the interviewees. 
For the Caisse Française de Développement (CFD), the basic partner channeling the funds of the 
French government, the project was quite an innovation from the methodological point of view. 
CFD was even very keen to 'capitalize' on the experience through a scientific publication. 
FERTILE, which was dealing with many other projects in French-speaking Africa, wanted to 
develop an extrapolable model out of this project, and put much more effort and resources into it 
than the TTGC-FERTILE contract stipulated in order to facilitate the evolution of the project. 
For the Atelier Départemental de Développement Agricole (ADDA), the project was a good 
initiative for developing a training module for development agents and see it work on the field. It 
has to noted that the French expatriate delegated by ADDA to the project played an active role in 
this achievement. After having delivered a satisfactory motion about him, the Institut Technique 
des Grandes Cultures (LTGC) recommended that he should be recruited by the EC Seed Project in 
Constantine province. The man was recruited in early 1993 and then replicated the training 
module in the neighbouring province. 
For the French government in general, the project was a real success and deserved funding for its 
continuity. 
Present once in the 1990 evaluation meeting, an official from the CFD Paris headquarters told me: 
"I think that we face a new animal of project, looking very flexible and moving like a snake towards 
its destination, without having a precisely-and-by-advance fixed one. It's quite original to me 
having been working for almost three decades with projects but I see a big danger for such a kind of 
animal; it can end-up everywhere but nowhere too. Because of this, we have to be very careful. " 
Source: field notes 
If the project received an excellent mark on the French side [see Box 7.1.4(1) above], 
even though some dangers may have hampered its desired course, on the Algerian 
side, the appreciation was somehow mitigated among the different actors at the start 
of the project. In fact the satisfaction of the technical staff [see Box 7.1.4(2) below] 
developed after the first two phases (Acts I and II) was faced by a complete 
disapproval from farmers who were not directly involved in the project. Their 
disapproval concerned the technological orientation of the project [see Box 7.1.4(3) 
below]. 
| Box 7.1.4(1) - What did the French partners think of this project? 
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| Box 7.1.4(2) - Algerian staffs opinion of the project | 
The Algerian staff involved in the project was, in general, very enthusiastic about the 
innovativeness of 'their' project in terms of incorporating stepwise the changes of the project's 
environment. Some of the following statements are appropriate indicators to show the atmosphere 
the project set in the region and how this was transmitted in the feelings and acts of different 
technical actors. 
Researchers published many publications and articles from their findings, while developers 
continuously produced brochures and bulletins about the technologies developed by TTGC station. 
The development team, a 'merger' between TTGC station staff and DSA staff, tried their capacity of 
abstraction in designing a theoretical model of the Provincial Development System, which was 
discussed and re-discussed many times for improvement. 
Planners at TTGC headquarters and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries were very keen to 
develop their 'offensives' against the Ministry of Planning to have the additional funding needed 
for the project allocated on time. 
Top managers at TTGC and some directors of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries praised the 
project for linking research to development and developed the slogan of a federative project' as a 
model taken out of this project and recommended that agricultural projects work on this basis. 
Source: field notes 
I Box 7.1.4(3) - Private and EACs-EAIs farmers' initial opinion of the project | 
The discussions I had with some farmers that disagreed with the project's technological orientation 
were very informative and demonstrated that their perception of the cereal production process was 
closely linked to the issue of annual rainfall, which they considered as the most limiting factor of 
cereal production. It was in fact recognized that scarcity and erratic distribution of rainfall was the 
essential factor that influenced farmers to limit their adoption of improved technologies for cereal 
production. Consequently, farmers adopted very extensive (law investment with acceptable return) 
'packages', characterized by poorly prepared seedbeds, hand-seed broadcasting, very law amounts 
or no fertilization, no herbicides use, etc.. The most important thing, however, is that farmers used 
their own landraces in terms of seeds, instead of adopting improved high-yielding varieties (HYVs) 
because these were seen as less responsive to their conditions. Moreover, they crop land once every 
two years, leaving it fallow for the next year, with fallow used as a main basis for livestock rearing. 
Once the project started its activities, the assumption was that cereal production in the region 
could be developed only with the intensification model, promoted through the use of HYVs, mainly 
known as semi-dwarf varieties, supported by a high consumption of external inputs. 
Even though farmers developed a positive perception toward this model in terms of land 
productivity, as they saw through the demonstration plots, they recognized that they could not 
make use of this model because of the rainfall problem they recurrently face. Moreover, they could 
not relinquish their 'traditional' practices because of a very simple fact: Their cereal-fallow biennial 
strategy, integrating livestock, is based on an indicator called income, to the contrary of the 
planner whose indicator in crop improvement is yield [see Box 7.1.6(1) below]. 
As one of my interviewees said: "I just cannot imagine myself investing all my savings in autumn 
to assume getting it back the next summer, knowing all the recurrent climatic risk I am living with 
in this area". Most farmers interviewed thought that, from the outset of the project, researchers and 
^ extensionists were trying "to bring the water-stream upwards with their loose hands". 
Source: field notes 
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Evidently, planners, researchers, and extensionists were very satisfied with the 
project, for they considered it a real innovation in terms of development activity and 
international co-operation for development. Notwithstanding, some farmers did not 
understand why the project was investing in an intensive technology of cereal 
cropping that, although very productive in rainy years, does not suit the local 
conditions of their arid and semi-arid zones. Unless water is available and irrigation 
equipment is affordable, supplemental irrigation, for instance, as recommended by 
the project, cannot be thought of, given the conditions of their farms. 
However, after the first and initial opinion developed by farmers after the first 
two phases, farmers became more positive about the project as it incorporated the 
environment's changes as it evolved and made room for their direct and active 
participation [see Box 7.1.4(4) below]. 
In fact, after they started participating in evaluation meetings, and benefited from 
new knowledge, after their field visit to France, for instance, farmers started feeling 
more concerned about the project and their opinion towards it improved 
tremendously. 
Box 7.1.4(4) - Private and EACs-EAIs farmers' opinion change about the project 
Since the start of the project's third phase (Act III), farmers began to take part in multilateral 
evaluation meetings and actively participated in criticizing the project's activities, making 
suggestions or proposing ideas to be considered during the planning of new phases. 
Further discussions with French farmers and Algerian development agents led farmers to 
understand the necessity of becoming better organized in professional terms. New forms of 
professional organizations were necessary to participate in setting the development agenda. 
One of the indicators that could show their 'ownership' of the project is the way they reacted very 
enthusiastically in creating their first UNPA-independent association in Sitif province (and the 
first farmers' association in the whole country) without paying attention to the pressure the 
UNPA local leaders were putting on them. 
As one of the farmers participating in the 1990 evaluation meeting told me: "In this project, I 
benefited from a visit to France where I saw a goat rearing farm. For many years, I have been 
interested in setting up a similar unit in my farm. Now, with some farmers, we will create a goat 
rearing farmers' association and ask the state to import improved goat breeds that we will increase 
here in the region. With this we can improve the availability of animal products in the market. And 
besides, this king of livestock does not ask for a high proportion of farm-external inputs such as 
imported feed concentrates". 
Source: field notes 
The position of the UNPA local leaders was made very clear from the first phases of 
the project. In fact, after having participated in the 1989 evaluation meeting, they 
refused to attend the next two meetings, thus putting pressure on the project team to 
drop the idea of creating new farmers' organizations. This was in fact perceived by 
them, as they once said openly, as a denial of their legitimate mandate of peasantry 
representation [see Box 7.1.4(5) below]. 
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Box 7.1.4(5) - UNPA local leaders' perception of the project 
For the UNPA local leaders, farmers' participation in the project, which stimulated farmers to create 
their own professional organizations did not to please them. This way of thinking was not in line 
with the 'culture' of this politically-oriented organization. Created by the FLN party in 1974, 
among other mass organizations, UNPA was explicitly meant to 'politicize' farmers' and develop 
their level of ideology. However, its implicit hidden agenda was to control and 'canalize' farmers. 
UNPA local leaders opposed even the idea of talking about creating new forms of farmers' 
organizations, let alone the fact of creating them. 
When I Questioned some of the local UNPA leaders on their opposition to the setting up of new, 
professionally-oriented farmers' organizations, they replied that it was just an unnecessary 
redundancy that would lead to the division of peasants' for their better control and containment 
by external agents (?). They said they would never accept this, and perceived this project even as a 
threat to their power and authority in the province. 
Nevertheless, when the idea gained some strength, these leaders were the first to lobby for their 
election to at least the farmers' organizations executive committees, or better yet, as chairpersons. 
It was not IF YOU CANNOT BEAT, JOIN THEM any more, but IF YOU CANNOT BEAT 
THEM, TRY TO BE THEIR LEADER 
Source: field notes 
7 .1 .5 The project's main development interface 
Being development-oriented, the project had to articulate its intervention at the main 
interface that was central to its performance, i.e. the Délégué Communal (DC) - farmer 
interface. However, I assume that this interface did not exist from the beginning of 
the project for the simple reason that the Domaines Agricoles Socialistes (DASs), 
certainly being farms as entities, cannot be taken as farmers as they were staffed by 
agricultural labourers (or workers) who did not perceive these farms as their own 
'thing'. Thus, it is useless to try to conceptualize the DASs labourers as farmers, 
although their activities were based on some farming features (land, machinery, 
inputs, livestock, cattle, etc.). This summarizes the whole story of 'autogestion' in 
Algeria [see Box 5 . 1 . 5 . 2 ( 1 ) earlier in this book]. 
It was only when EACs-EAIs and private farmers were incorporated in the 
project, on the one side, and the DCs started to be trained to build up such interfaces, 
on the other, that a real development interface started taking form. It is for that that I 
will focus mainly on this interface to describe how it evolved, and what its influence 
was on the evolution of the project. 
As mentioned earlier, some farmers were very disappointed by the technological 
orientation of the project before they were incorporated into it. From the outset, the 
interface was undermined by this opinion they had about the project. However, the 
specific teaming of the DCs and the visit farmers had with their counterparts in 
France played a great, positive role in bringing the two sides together to collaborate 
and redefine the dynamics of the interface. 
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Hereafter I will introduce three items of this interface: ( 1 ) The opinion of a 
farmers' group on their collaboration with the DCs [see Box 7 . 1 . 5 ( 1 ) below]; (2 ) The 
opinion of a DCs' group about their work with the farmers, especially the private 
ones [see Box 7 . 1 . 5 ( 2 ) below]; and, ( 3 ) An original aspect of this project which resides 
in a development agent who was trained by the project as a DC and later founded an 
EAI, and who could give the feeling of both having been a DC as well as becoming a 
farmer that worked with the project [see Box 7 . 1 5 ( 3 ) hereafter]. 
Box 7.1.5(1) - Private and EACs-EAIs farmers' opinion on collaboration with DCs 
"At the beginning, we were not happy with the technological orientation of the project, as we saw 
ourselves excluded de facto from such an orientation. "When you do not possess the basic requirements 
for such an improved technology that the project was promoting at the beginning, you know in 
advance that you will not be part of that project. Always the DASs, throughout the years. These 
'domaines' swallowed too many funds for nothing. 
When the project invited some of us to the TTMAfor the first gathering of the project team in 1988, 
we hesitated to join but at the end decided to observe what would be presented. When they presented 
the DCs, we thought, ironically: "Again, we will talk about délégués". But when our DCs started 
visiting us regularly and discussing some technical issues about cereal production, some contact was 
being established. This contact was strengthened after the visit to the French farmers and the 
consequent discussions we had with them. 
When some of us attended the evaluation meeting for the first time in September 1989, we were 
amazed by the degree of flexibility shown by the project and how the project team incorporated our 
suggestions when planning activities for the coming phase. 
Since that time, our collaboration with the DCs increased and concerned diverse issues about the 
whole farm and not only cereal production. Many times, we discussed about whether getting 
organized into associations can help us to orient state projects towards our needs. After two years of 
discussion, some of us decided to create the first association of cereal producers in the country. Others 
decided to create an association of goat rearing farmers. Others did not want to face the pressure of the 
syndicate (meaning UNPA)." 
Source: field notes 
On the other side, the work of the DCs towards the DASs was easily done due to 
their experiences with theses farms. But when private farmers were incorporated by 
the project, they were afraid for many reasons. They were apprehensive because 
these farmers were very critical (but seen as stubborn by the DCs) about the state 
projects, co-operatives and bureaucrats, given their past different experiences with 
the development state apparatus, such as the agrarian revolution, for instance. 
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| Box 7.1.5(2) - DCs' opinion on collaboration with private and EACs-EAIs farmers | 
"When we were chosen by the DSA to work for the project, we thought that it was as we usually do 
with the DASs and above that we could benefit some visits or training courses in France. But when 
the project started after September, 1989, switching to EACs-EAIs and private farmers, some of us 
were a bit anxious, especially about private farmers, given their perception of anything that is public 
and state-related and known their initial perception of this project. We started our experience with 
them very prudently because we did not wanted it to be a failure. Given the atmosphere set by the 
project, we want to achieve something positive. 
Our contact with farmers differed a bit whether we were with EACs-EAIs or private farmers. But 
after two years of work together, both sides felt more comfortable in our regular contacts. In 
comparison to our experience with the DASs, we learned new things from the private farmers and we 
were more cmvincing on some aspects that we proposed to farmers. Now thanks to the project, they 
have their own associations and we are very happy for such achievements, although we felt very 
threatened by UNPA leaders sometimes. 
Due to their new professional organizations, farmers reinforced the discussions we had with them and 
even channeled them to the capital through the National Chamber of Agriculture. The only thing we 
hope is to start the new project so that we can help farmers consolidate their new 'constructions' in 
the future." 
Surely the contact with the French system of development and French farmers' organizations 
influenced the appearance of this new pattern of collaboration between DCs and farmers. 
Source: field notes 
One peculiar dimension that I want to introduce about this interface is the case of a 
Délégué Communal ( D C ) that started working with the project in 1987, significantly 
benefited from his experience with the project, and founded an EAI in 1990. 
I Box 7.1.5(3) - An initially-DC, presently-EAI owner's opinion about the project | 
The man was a BSc holder, with a post-graduate diploma from France. He worked for some years as 
teacher in the Institut de Technologie Agricole where I received my own BSc and ended in the DSA of 
Sétif province as a development agent. When the project started in 1987, he was among the first DCs 
that were chosen by the DSA. He was very critical of some aspects of the project but he actively 
participated in the design of the new Provincial Development System. He was very active during the 
visit of the French farmers to their counterparts in 1989 in the project area, stimulating local farmers 
to question their French counterparts about their experiences in establishing their own organizations. 
Although trained in a French university, the man mastered a good knowledge of local culture which 
allowed him to speak with farmers and play the role of interpreter during that visit. 
In early 1990, he decided to found an EAI and thus became a farmer. In his new occupation, he became 
very critical (in positive terms, of coursé) about the project and always put new ideas on the 
evaluation meeting agenda. He played a very active role in stimulated his fellow farmers to create the 
cereal producers association, although he was once insulted by a UNPA local leader. 
He states his opinion about the project as follows: "I have been involved in many development 
projects. They were all conforming to the same methodological pattern but, given my experience, this 
project is rather original. I had never worked or even heard about a project like this one for it kept 
changing when the environment changes and everyone hasasayinthe planning of its activities''. 
Source: field notes 
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This diversified interface between DCs and farmers played a great role in orienting 
the project activities, as several discussions that took place between the two parties 
at the interface level were brought to the evaluation meetings for discussion among 
participant members. Several decisions made during these meetings had their 
origins in the interface itself, although it is also true that some decisions were 
proposed by other actors not involved in the interface itself. 
7.1.6 Effects of M&E system set by the project 
Although the project did not follow its normal course of action as had been decided 
(continuation for a second 5-year period), and left some issues pending and open-
ended, it really had some positive effects in the field, which are summarized in the 
following: 
1. Reorientation of the project's development strategy: When it became more 
participatory, the project offered a propitious opportunity for merging farmers' 
knowledge and development practitioners' knowledge. During their free, trustful 
interaction with DCs, farmers opened a valuable opportunity for the latter to 
better understand what motivated their 'on-going' cultural practices, and thus 
their decision-making process which is rather farming system-based. Moreover, 
they understood the necessity of becoming better organized to participate in 
setting their own development agenda and pull down and steer agricultural 
development public services. These elements played a considerable role in 
reorienting the project's development strategy, adjusting it to the diversity of 
farmers' conditions it was dealing with. 
2. Creation of the first farmers' organizations in the country: Since 1974, it was the 
UNPA, a more poHtically-oriented organization in its essence, which received the 
blessing of the FLN to represent the farmers, even in professional terms. As all 
other similar mass organizations acting under the aegis of the FLN, it served as a 
frame for opportunists to use the organization to represent their own interests. 
Since the time that the project team had introduced the idea of creating new, 
professionally-oriented farmers' organizations in the region, UNPA local leaders 
firmly and openly opposed the project. But this did not discourage some farmers 
from carrying on the struggle for the idea and got the first farmers' association 
created in the country. Since then, National and Provincial Chambers of 
Agriculture were set and consequently opened a new frame of debate in terms of 
farmers' representativeness, that is, professionalism. 
3. Farmers - development agents relationships: The evolution of the project helped to 
reinforce and improve the quality of relationships between farmers and 
development agents in the domain of development. The main project's activities 
that directly and consequently influenced this were the sustained support and 
training of DCs for a real profile of 'Agent de Dévéloppement' and the installation of 
new forms of farmers' representation in the project's region. These new 
developments helped to establish a real development interface between farmers 
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Box 7.1.6(1) - Farmers' conceptualization of income 
According to farmers' conceptmlization of income, securing a sustainable income in the harsh 
environments where they are located requires them to design strategies based on risk management, 
and accordingly reduce investments. 
For them, income, as a return from investment, is the result of the balanced trade-off between 
expenses and revenues. Sustainable income can be secured through producing more, but this 
necessitates more investment, which is possible only in conducive, low-risk environments. It can 
also be secured through maximum reduction of expenses and avoid gambling on their very harsh, 
high-risk environments. Given their limited amount of resources, they prefer to opt for the second 
strategy. 
A good example of this strategy is livestock rearing on fallow, producing meat at a very-low cost. 
Instead of using more intensive techniques of cereal cropping which would thus require more 
external inputs such as HYV seeds, mechanization, fertilizers and herbicides, farmers leave their 
plots fallow every other year. The land rests and accumulates water reserves for the next cropping 
season, which makes a higher yield than the same land cropped every year. Moreover, the 
spontaneous weeds that develop on the resting land serve as free feed for the sheep, which makes 
meat production cheaper. Given the meat price at the market level, this cropping system is more 
profitable to farmers located in harsh environments. 
It is this centrality of fallow in farmers' reasoning that made certain researchers at YTGC have 
innovative ideas and think about experimenting fallow improvement techniques and identify what 
their effects would be either for livestock rearing and/or cereal crops. 
Source: field notes 
and development agents, on the one hand, and to reinforce the farmers' 
participation in development actions, on the other. Moreover, information flow 
and knowledge availability and use improved at both levels of DCs and farmers. 
A good example of this is the farmers' conceptuauzation of income, hereafter 
introduced in Box 7 . 1 . 6 ( 1 ) below. 
4 . Farmers' yield improvement in the project zone: Taken as measurable indicators 
(although also considered to be indirect ones) of the effects of the M&E 
mechanisms of the project, not only did cereal yield increase ( 2 0 % more between 
1 9 8 7 and 1 9 9 2 in the province average yield), but other crop yield (such as potato) 
and livestock outcome improved as well. These increases were the result of better-
oriented assistance from development agents to farmers, and a direct 
participation of farmers in setting the priorities of development assistance. For 
cereal crops, the yield improved not because farmers adopted the improved 
technologies initially recommended by the project, although some of them 
meeting the required conditions did. The improvement came from the fact that 
the project reoriented its strategy towards the farmers that could not adopt the 
improved technologies. For instance, disserrunating information on fallow 
improvement techniques yielded a better outcome for both cereal crops and 
livestock. 
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7.2 Case No. 5 : The rangelands regeneration and conservation project3 
7.2.1 General outline about the project 
The steppe rangelands are huge expanses of flat territory, located between the 400 
mm and 200 mm isohyets. Since colonization, they have been represented through a 
vivacious cliché depicting them as le pays du mouton' (Boukhobza in AARDES, 1978: 
1) or 'Bled El Ghanem' (Mesli, 1996: 131; Couderc, 1976: 95), both meaning, either in 
French and/or Arabic, 'the country of sheep'. The importance of these areas has 
already been presented in section 5.3 of this study. 
Given their importance, these areas were subject to diverse and numerous policies 
that the state undertook since independence, supposedly for their development. 
However, it is argued, according to Redjel and Boukheloua (1996: 7), that these 
policies were based on a vision that rangeland development is an exclusive state 
obligation. This vision aimed to continue the destruction of both pastoral culture and 
communities as indigenous institutions in regulating the rangelands; a vision the 
French colonial state started developing many decades earlier. In fact, post-
independence state interventions in these areas were always based on the 
implementation of 'imported' management and exploitation mechanisms, such as the 
Association de Développement de VElevage Pastoral (ADEPs), the Cooperatives d'Elevage 
Pastoral de la Revolution Agraire (CEPRAs) and other similar 'tools' which could not 
match the indigenous system [see section 5.3]. 
As a result of a lack of grounded knowledge about the socio-cultural aspects of 
access, use, and management of the rangelands, state policies had, in contradiction of 
their purpose, far-reaching, negative consequences. Degradation of the rangelands 
has increased because of two main factors: (1) The anthropic degrading actions over 
the rangelands that were perceived in many parts as open access resources ('beylik') 
because they lacked a real 'owner'; and (2) The break-up of the natural balance 
between the feed needs (flocks size) and the feed supply (forage avaüability). These 
consequences were exacerbated by the 'open access' character of the range, as the 
indigenous institutional arrangements were not officially recognized, as well as by 
the anti-drought state policies carried out since the mid-seventies [see section 5.3]. 
In order to reverse or at least slow down the process of degradation in the 
rangelands, the Haut Commissariat du Développement de la Steppe (HCDS), a public 
organization in charge of steppe rangelands development and improvement [see 
section 5.3], in continuity with the policy conducted before, started a new pilot 
action on rangelands regeneration and conservation in 1992 based on a new 
approach: The active participation of local populations and pastoral communities 
[see Box 7.2.1(1) hereafter]. However, taking into consideration the above-mentioned 
3 The study was undertaken under the aegis of the Mashrek-Maghreb Project entitled Development of 
Integrated Crop/Livestock Production in West Asia and North Africa, in which 8 Arab countries (4 
from the Mashrek and 4 from the Maghreb) participated with ICARDA and IFPRI, with funding from 
IF AD and AFESD. 
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1 
situation, and taking advantage of the sodo-political context of the early 1990s 
(multiparty 'democracy', freedom of assodation, etc.), H C D S attempted to develop a 
very innovative strategy which rested on: 
• The partnership between public agendes and local populations in the conception, 
implementation, and evaluation of development actions; 
• The implication of local populations in development management through legal 
contractualization of the partnership; 
• The responsible involvement of local populations in the perpetuation (recurrence) 
of the rangelands natural function, and; 
• The consideration by the public agendes of the pastoral tradition and the local 
specificities, given that communities devise different strategies and mechanisms 
in terms of range access, use, and management that are location-specific. 
I Box 7.2.1(1) - The problématique of the steppe rangelands in Algeria 
Since independence, the rangelands do not belong - in practical terms - to a 'real' owner. During 
colonization, they were allocated - or better, re-allocated - to the tribes by the Senatus-Consulte of 
1863. In fact, the application of this law resulted in the delimitation of the territories of 709 tribes, 
although the land was considered inalienable and the tribes had no real officially-acknowledged 
property right over them (Bennoune, 1976:13). Upon independence, they were made part of the 
public domain while the tribes could still use and manage them with a customary tenure system. 
Since independence, the Algerian state undertook too many policies attempting to improve these 
areas in terms of both institutional arrangements as well as technical assistance [see section 5.3 of 
this study], which did not achieve much, as their biggest problem of Arch (tribal) lands has 
remained unsolved. This type of collective property represented a particular form of land tenure 
which was in harmony with the Algerian society of the 17th century. For some reasons evident in 
the Senatus-Consulte of1863 [see section 5.3], the French colonial state did not recognize this form 
of property, and the post-independence state did not change much in the colonial policy, according 
toMesli(1996:124). 
Given this attitude towards the recognition of an old, indigenous land tenure system and its 
relation to the indigenous institutions in charge of access regulation, use, management, and 
conservation of common resources, the steppe rangelands suffered the break-down of a long-lasting 
and monitored natural balance between sheep flocks' size and feed availability in these areas. As a 
result, degradation, and even desertification in some parts, is there, although not dramatic yet. 
More importantly, population livelihoods could face some problems in the future and no longer be 
^ secured if sustainable solutions cannot be found. 
Source: field notes 
Given the good achievements of this new approach, the government decided to 
injed more resources into the steppe areas in 1994 through the adoption of the Great 
Works Programme for the Steppe [see Box 7.2.1(2) below]. 
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I Box 7.2.1(2) - Brief description of the Great Works Programme for the Steppe 
The programme concerns 18 steppe and/or agro-pastoral provinces. Its major objective is to reset 
the economic and ecological functions of the rangelands. It encompasses four highly integrated 
major components, which concern: 
• The protection and preservation of the rangelands' fragile zones from the 'threat of 
desertification' through the restoring of their natural balance; 
• The conscientization of local populations on the benefits of fodder shrub plantation, through 
extension activities, to improve their living environment, their feed availability and the 
sustainability of their ecosystem; 
• The improvement of rangeland productivity and the orientation of local populations towards the 
adoption of less-degrading farming systems; and, 
• The creation of job opportunities and the promotion of income improvement measures. 
The quantitative objectives of the programme for the period 1994-98 are as follows: 
• Absorption of unemployment through creation of '8,000 job opportunities per year. 
• Restoration of100,000 hectares of rangelands through fodder shrub plantation. 
• Natural regeneration of700,000 hectares of rangelands through protection fences. 
Source: field notes 
It has been reported that the government, fearing that the on-going security 
conditions could be worsened by the unemployment of the young men in these 
areas4, placed a high priority on the allocation of money to this programme in order 
to create imminent jobs for these people. A good indicator of this resides in the fact 
that the programme anticipated its start in October, 1994 while the decision of 
funding of the Ministry of Planning was signed in December, 1994. In common 
procedures, however, projects do not start until the evoked decision is signed. 
Through this programme, the Eastern Regional Office of HCDS, based in Tebessa, 
succeeded in funding a four-year project (1994-98) on rangelands regeneration and 
conservation encompassing 5 provinces of the eastern region: Oum-El-Bouaghi (04), 
Batna (05), Tebessa (12), Khenchela (40), and Souk-Ahras (41) [see Figure 4.2.5(1) in 
this book]. The main characteristics of the project area are presented in Table 7.2.1(1) 
below. 
4 It has been reported that many youngmen, lacking hope in their future because of unemployment 
and unsatisfaction of other social needs, had been enrolled by the terrorist fundamentalist movement 
that is bleeding Algeria since 1992. 
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Table 7.2.1(1) - Main characteristics of the project area 
Units: Vfhafor area, ltf heads for sheep, l(f FU for feed5 
Wilaya Territorial statistics Feed statistics 
Baladia Total Range Sheep Needs Production % 
Area Area flocks cover 
Oum-El-Bouaghi 09 619 51 342 243 78 32 
Batna 09 1,204 175 370 334 70 21 
Tebessa 28 1,350 718 766 360 62 17 
Khenchela 12 981 480 332 256 66 26 
Souk-Ahras 08 436 33 no 184 38 21 
TOTAL 66 4,590 1,417 1,920 1,377 314 23 
Source: CD-HCDS data 
It is obvious that the feed shortage is quite significant, given that the project area 
does not cover more than a quarter of the needs of its sheep flocks. For instance, 
Tebessa has the largest range area and the highest number of flocks but covers only 
1 7 % of the feed needs. 
The objectives and the budget of the project are presented by Tables 7 . 2 . 1 ( 2 ) and 
7 . 2 . 1 ( 3 ) below. 
Table 7.2.1(2) - Quantitative objectives of the project for 1994-98 
Wilayate Pastoral plantation Fenced Well creat * Job Total 
Collect Individ. Total areas Dig. Equip. creation funds 
(ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) (unit) (unit) (day) (ltfAD) 
Oum-El-Bouaghi 2,100 900 3,000 5,000 5 10 65,220 46,799 
Batna 1,700 700 2,400 15,000 5 9 63,208 41,155 
Tebessa 7,000 3,000 10,000 18,000 13 23 218,536 152,445 
Khenchela 5,250 2,250 7,500 15,000 10 15 165,380 114,402 
Souk-Ahras 3,500 1,500 5,000 7,500 5 10 107,220 74,780 
Total 19,550 8,350 27,900 60,500 38 67 620,064 429,580 
Source: CD-HCDS data 
* Created wells were planned on a normative depth of SO meters each, meaning the total depth was planned to be l$00 meters. 
As the budget shows, pastoral fodder shrub plantation for both collective and 
individual forms of intervention [see Box 7 .2 .1 (3 ) ] represents nearly 90% of the costs, 
while the rest is divided between fenced areas ( 3 . 7 % ) and well-digging and 
equipment ( 7 . 5 % ) . 
5 FU stands for the Feed Unit which is a conventional measure used in cattle and sheep nutrition. One 
FU is equivalent to the amount of energy given by one kilogram of barley grains. 
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Table 7.2.1(3) - Distribution of the project's budget among the main components 
Unit: Iff AD 
Wilaya Plantation costs Fenced Well creation costs Total 
Collect. Individ. Total area costs Dig. Equip. Total costs 
Oum-El-Bouaghi 32,918 8,071 40,989 1,310 2,000 2,500 4,500 46,799 
Batna 26,648 6,278 32,925 3,930 1,800 2,500 4,300 41,155 
Tebessa 109,725 26,904 136,629 4,716 4,600 6,500 11,100 152,445 
Khenchela 82,294 20,178 102,472 3,930 3,000 5,000 8,000 114,402 
Souk-Ahras 54,863 13,452 68,315 1,965 2,000 2,500 4,500 74,780 
TOTAL 306,446 74,883 381,329 15,851 13,400 19,000 32,400 429,580 
Importance (%) 71.3 17.4 88.8 3.7 3.1 4.4 7.5 100 
Source: CD-HCDS data 
Taking some lessons learned from the pilot action begun in 1992 into consideration, 
the Commissariat Regional of HCDS (CR-HCDS) proposed to diversify the forms of 
project intervention [see Box 7.2.1(3) above] and based the strategy of the project 
upon a participatory approach, which consisted of: 
• The regular consultation and participation of pastoral communities in the project 
implementation to achieve a sufficient level of consciousness on conserving the 
ecosystem and maldng a better use of the natural resources; 
• The active participation of the local communes (baladiate) through the allocation of 
some to-be-rehabilitated perimeters and the use of their material resources to 
achieve an integration between public organizations and attain the set objectives 
at a lower public price without useless redundancy; 
• The undertaking of an adult educational programme aiming to stimulate a true 
dynamism of local development which could enliven the economic and social 
functions of the rangelands; 
• The contractualization of the relationships between HCDS and pastoralists, either 
collectively and/or individually, in order to sustain the committed investment. 
In addition to job creation, which is the most important expected outcome, the 
intended effects of the project were tremendous. They were as follows: 
1. Improvement of rangeland productivity by increasing the annual uptake from 60 
FU/ha to 600 FU/ha through fodder shrub plantation; 
2. Containment of the desertification menace through a direct intervention on the 
vegetal cover and the implementation of a programme of substitutions; the latter 
will be based on the introduction of less-desertizing, more income-generating and 
appropriate farming systems, given the specificities of the different types of 
rangeland exploitation; and, 
3. Valorization and enhancement of the pastoral communities' role in rangelands 
management and conservation through establishing pastoralist organizations, on 
the one hand, and the establishment of a user-license fee which would be paid to a 
Fonds National du Dêveloppement de la Steppe to be created, on the other. 
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In this view, a mechanism of recurrence would be put in motion to sustain the effects 
of on-going public investments and bring about management and conservation 
autonomy to the pastoral communities. 
I Box 7.2.1(3) - Forms of intervention of the project | 
As far as fodder shrub plantation is concerned with range revegetation and rehabilitation, the 
project intervention will take two different forms: 
1. The collective form: Consists of intervening on perimeters allocated by the local communes for 
revegetation and rehabilitation. Such perimeters must belong to the public domain and preferably 
not be assigned to private usufructaries, and whose function must be strictly pastoral. In certain 
situations, where usufructaries are present on the perimeters, the project would recommend a 
warranted commitment of the pastoral communities to respect the technical conditions of 
management and use of the rehabilitated perimeter. If degradation happens again, it would be the 
obligation of the only usufructaries to assume responsibility for it. 
2. The individual form: Consists of intervening on the basis of contractual agreement on private 
holdings, acknowledged as such and not being subject to litigation or conflict. In this case, the 
project provides pastoral plants, such as fodder shrubs, and technical assistance, while the 
beneficiary would guarantees the planting and cultivation of the plants, according to the 
agreement. In this form, some 'in-nature incentives' are given to the beneficiary on the basis of the 
success rate of his planting [see Box 7.2.4.1(2)]. 
L J 
Source: field notes 
However, to achieve these effects, the project designers assumed that some 
additional measures needed to be taken at the central level (Ministry of Agriculture, 
government). The most important of theses measures was the promulgation of a 
specific legal text, preferably a law, that would define the legal and institutional 
framework of the main socio-economic functions of the steppe rangelands. 
Moreover, the role of these areas in regulating of the natural/ecological equiHbrium 
of the whole country should be acknowledged as well. In fact, the rangelands 
represent a sort of buffer-zone (or barricade) against the desertification of northern 
Algeria, and, if presumably, these areas succumb to the desert, it is very probable 
that the whole country will be desertized, given that the distance between Algiers 
and the nearest 'border' of the steppe zone is about 1 5 0 - 2 0 0 kilometers. 
7 .2 .2 Project context and adopted strategy 
The project started in 1 9 9 4 in continuation of the pilot action that was launched in 
1 9 9 2 . The project's context was characterized by a policy of foreign trade 
liberalization, the adoption of a market economy model, and the application of 
structural adjustment measures, in accordance with the one-year stand-by 
agreement signed in May, 1 9 9 4 , by the government and IMF, followed later by a 
three-year extended facility agreement signed in May, 1 9 9 5 . 
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The implementation of the 1987 public land reorganization and the 1990 law of 
land orientation engendered a revival of the pastoral traditions that were in a sort of 
'hibernation' since independence. Since then, customary rights of rangeland 
exploitation regained their place in the centre of the decision-making arena of the 
steppe rangelands and the traditional, indigenous institutions were strengthened in 
their old role of regulating users' access to the range. In fact, this role never 
disappeared; it was just not acknowledged and was frequently and purposely 
overlooked by public agencies. 
This revival of traditional institutional arrangements sustained by the socio-
political context of the early 1990s, became a new principle for HCDS in the design 
of development actions. These have since been based on a fundamental conciliation 
between rangelands function in terms of farming systems and the respect of the 
pastoral culture that places indigenous institutions at the centre of the decision-
making arena in these areas [see Box 7.2.2(1) below]. 
I Box 7.2.2(1) - The adopted strategy of the project 
In comparison to previous development actions that the steppe rangelands underwent after 
independence, a significant shift took place in the development strategy adopted by HCDS and thus in 
its development programmes. The newly adopted strategy intended to: 
• Develop new organizational mechanisms that ensure a continuous and regular communication 
process between development agents and pastoralists; such mechanisms aimed to introduce 
fundamental changes in the way development agents and pastoralists usually interacted. 
• Take advantage of the different competencies that are present at the development interface; these 
are wisdom, experiences and knowledge of the pastoral communities, and the theoretical and 
practical knowledge acquired by the technical staff and build upon this interaction to achieve 
sustainability. 
• Facilitate a smooth and progressive adoption by the pastoralists of alternatives and sustainable 
technologies made available by development agents. 
However, these items of a new development vision required a systematic adherence to the pastoral 
communities, either individually and/or collectively, especially vis-a-vis the adoption of the fodder 
shrub technology both for the conservation and sustainable exploitation of their ecosystem and the 
sustainable improvement of their livelihood and living conditions. In this vein, such an intervention 
needed to be supported by convincing discursive practice and behaviour by the development agents as 
well as concrete technological solutions to be evaluated in the field by pastoralists themselves instead 
of the 'dirigist' way that was commonly used in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In the words of the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner, the project aimed to re-localize development 
through improved communication between the stakeholders and reduce the interference of what he 
calls the 'remote-controlled agriculture'. 
L 
Source: field notes 
2 3 6 J^-HUMANIZTNGTHEDFA^OPMEOTI^OCESS 
7.2 .3 Configuration of the project and actors involved 
In Figure 7 . 2 . 3 ( 1 ) below, I attempt to describe the configuration of the project 
schematically, depicting the major actors involved in the implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of the activities. However, to simplify this figure, I 
avoided representing the five DSAs of the wilayate involved in the project. Instead, I 
represented two types of relationships between the DSA Directors and the CR-
HCDS Regional Commissioner: The first one (with bold line) represents a strong 
linkage based on collaboration, while the second (with dashed line) represents a very 
weak linkage based on limited interaction [for an explanation, see Box 7 . 2 . 5 . 4 ( 1 ) 
hereafter]. 
Depending on these types of linkages, the interaction between the CR-HCDS staff 
and the DSA staff at the interface with the pastoralists will take three different forms. 
These are: 
• Indirect and hierarchical (line 1 ) : CR-HCDS staff discusses the set objectives with 
DSA staff but does not intervene in the implementation of these objectives; it is 
the duty of the only DSA staff; 
• Direct and mono-stractural (line 2 ) : CR-HCDS staff directly intervenes in their 
pastoralists' network without the agreement of the DSA staff; 
• Direct and multi-structural (line 31: CR-HCDS staff and DSA staff intervene 
together in a 'joint-venture' team with the pastoralists. 
Figure 7.2.3(1) - The project configuration 
1 2 3 
r 
v. 
P A S T O R A L I S T S 
J 
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7 .2 .4 Major achievements of the project 
First of all, the project started by gathering the CR-HCDS staff and some individual 
pastoralists, heads or representatives of customary indigenous institutions and 
heads of local communes to attain altogether a consensus on the problématique of the 
rangelands. The discussions took two days and a visualization method was used in 
order to help all participants understand and internalize the discussions of the 
meeting. After that, the discussed problématique was documented and presented to 
the participants in a second meeting for re-examination and adoption. The adopted 
problématique is presented in Figure 7 . 2 . 4 ( 1 ) below. 
Figure 7.2.4(1) - Factors causing the problem situation in the steppe rangelands 
(Redjel et al. 1997:6) 
^ ^ a t u r a l resources d e p l e t i o j ^ ^ 
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Table 7.2.4(1) - Brief description of the quantitative results of the project (1994-97) 
Wilayate Pastoral plantation Fenced Well creat * Job Total 
Collect Individ. Total areas Dig. Equip. creation funds 
(ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) (unit) (unit) (day) (103AD) 
Oum-El-Bouaghi 2,290 445 2,735 2,000 4 3 92,740 42,813 
Batna 1,177 23 1,200 13,000 2 1 43,064 22,398 
Tébessa 719 3,905 4,624 0 10 4 52,731 37,035 
Khenchela 5,712 1,239 6,951 1,000 7 3 194,329 99,740 
Souk-Ahras 1,163 3,176 4,339 500 6 2 66,039 44,458 
Total 11,061 8,788 19,849 16,500 29 13 448,903 246,444 
Realization rate 57% 105% 71% 27% 76% 19% 72% 57% 
Source: CD-HCDS data 
After these meetings, the project team, consisting of CR-HCDS staff and DSAs 
staff, started putting together and operationalizing the strategy developed earlier 
and decided to steer the project activities towards three levels of intervention: 
1. Intervene at the level of vegetal cover through fodder shrub plantation, either in 
collective and/or individual form [see Box 7.2.1(3) earlier], and following the 
participatory approach. 
2. Intervene at the level of substitutions by introducing some alternatives that are 
less demanding on the rangelands but more income-generating and appropriate. 
Otherwise, the intervention at the former level would be hopeless. At a maximum 
of every five years, the government (or public agencies) should start the same 
process of range revegetation. 
3. Intervene at the software level in order to conscientize, educate, and train local 
populations on how and why better rangeland exploitation and management is 
strongly conditioned by their behaviours and thus by their role, either collectively 
or individually, in conserving these natural resources. This latter type of 
intervention seeks not to teach pastoralists these aspects but only to stimulate 
them to actively play the role their fathers and grand-fathers were used to for 
centuries. 
A mid-evaluation meeting took place in July 2nd and 3rd, 1997 at the CR-HCDS 
(Tébessa) which I was supposed to attend but for personal reasons I could not. In 
this meeting, the achievements of the project were reviewed and discussed. 
Hereafter, I introduce some of the major results the project achieved. In quantitative 
terms, the results were quite satisfactory in comparison with the planned objectives. 
Table 7.2.4(1) below describes these achievements. 
Some results remain very interesting in terms of efficiency. For instance, the 
project realized 29 wells, amounting to 76% of the objectives with only 54% of the 
planned total depth. Moreover, 71% of fodder shrub plantation objectives were 
realized and 72% of the planned employment was attained. 
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All these results were achieved with only 57% of the planned total cost of the project, 
which shows a great mastery of the project and thus an efficient management of the 
public funds, contrary to what commonly happens in state interventions. 
However, some results are still low and explained by the low procedures of 
tendering for the well equipment (19%), which was mainly decided at HCDS 
headquarters. For the fencing areas, the low realization rate (27%) is explained by the 
reticence shown by the project team to again go into this kind of activity which 
moves the local population out in order to rehabilitate the perimeters. 
This technique has been used several times in the past without achieving the 
expected results. When the perimeter is reopened for grazing, a 'tragedy of the 
commons' is likely to happen again. But the project team had to include the objective 
of 60,000 ha to be fenced only for the reason of getting the project funded, given that 
some 'big shots' in HCDS headquarters still believe in the fencing technique. 
On the other hand, the public cost was lower than planned because of the active 
participation of the beneficiaries. The total costs shown by Table 7.2.4(1), above, 
represents only 80% of the total cost of the realized investment; the remaining part of 
the costs came from the pastoral communities (18%) and the local communes (2%). If 
the active participation of the local communes was motivated by the job 
opportunities the project offered for their young populations, the pastoral 
communities actively participated through the funding of some items of the 
investment because they were convinced by the project team to 'own' the project. It 
was true that these communities that were thwarted many times in the past could 
not believe in 'smooth' and 'massaging' discursive shows, but for once they started 
really believing in this project, given the morale of the CR-HCDS and the strong 
dedication of his staff [see Boxes 7.2.5.1(1) and 7.2.5.3(1)]. 
Participation of the pastoral communities was concretized in both direct and 
indirect ways. As a direct participation, 3,311 pastoralists (12% of the whole pastoral 
population of the project area) participated in carrying out the project activities. Each 
of them, concerned about fodder shrub plantation, either collectively or individually, 
mobilized himself and his family members as labour to plant and nurture the 
pastoral plants provided by the project. 
As indirect participation, 18 pastoralist associations were created to represent the 
communities towards the project and the CR-HCDS, and attend the project 
meetings. The idea of creating these associations stemmed from the project team in 
order to prepare the local populations for the 'after-project' phase. In order to avoid 
the failure of this experiment, the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner proposed that 
each association should espouse the boundaries of the traditional, indigenous (tribal) 
institutions in order to avoid clashes and complement them by focusing on technical 
aspects related to the range use, management, and conservation. 
Moreover, participation of other public institutions was very high. 57 local 
communes (90 % of all communes of the project area) consequently supported the 
project and actively participated by mobilizing their material resources, such as 
lorry-tankers for water transportation, etc. 
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However, some constraints encountered by the project need to be mentioned. The 
centralization of the funds management at the HCDS headquarters was 
inappropriate to the nature of the project's activities and its expanded area. If it is 
undeniably true that the project created real job opportunities, salaries and wages, 
however, took too long to be paid to the beneficiaries, given the mentioned 
centralization pattern. 
7 .2 .5 Actors' perception of the project 
Many actors intervened in this project, but the success of its activities remain 
significantly influenced by some peculiar ones. One must assume it is difficult and 
even hazardous, in fact, to tie the results of any project to the performance of an 
exclusive actor, as far as I consider sustainability as the autonomy of a development 
action from any given influence. I assert, however, that this project owes much to the 
great competence of the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner himself, and thus the 
hard working of his staff members. 
This was even evident in my discussions with some other actors of the project. 
Every time I asked a question about the project, my informants started answering 
my question but then unconsciously digressed in the discussion to aspects related to 
the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner and the way he managed the project. It was 
likely that the man and the project could be easily linked together, or were the same 
entity. 
7 .2 .5 .1 The CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner 
It is rare to meet someone like this man, who is the embodiment of competence, 
knowledge, morality, and equity. It was even more intriguing that he worked so 
hard without gaining any advantage from his administrative position, his salary 
being similar to a common development agent, having the degree of Ingenieur d'Etat. 
In fact, the man developed a great balance between his own adnunistrative 
position, which systematically conferred power over the resources allocated to the 
project on him, and his good contact with his staff. He kept consulting his staff and 
carefully listened to anyone's ideas [see Box 7 . 2 . 5 . 1 ( 1 ) below]. 
On the other hand, he is very well-known among the pastoralists, collectively or 
individually in both the project area and his mandated area. He was shown a great 
reverence and recognition for his competence. He was very knowledgeable about 
their culture and history, and recited the Senatus-Consulte of 1 8 6 3 by heart. 
Moreover, he was known to be difficult to corrupt, as he never agreed to be 
complacent in order to please others. 
The project was of great importance to this man because he strongly participated 
in its conception and design, especially in the way he gathered all stakeholders to 
elaborate the diagnostic that grounds the descriptive, substantive theory of the 
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project. He investigated in depth, with the intensive participation of a core of 
pastoralists, the problématique of the rangelands [see Figure 7 . 2 . 4 ( 1 ) earlier] and 
elaborated, with the same group, a prescriptive theory for the project based on a 
three-level integration, among which a paradigm of substitutive conservation is being 
conceptualized [see Box 7 .2 .7 (1 ) below]. For him, such a project would be 
unsuccessful outside this conceptualization of the rangelands problématique, and 
without simultaneously integrating the three levels of intervention mentioned 
above. 
It is the so-called Mashrek-Maghreb Project that has offered me the propitious opportunity to visit 
the Rangelands Regeneration and Conservation Project in Tébessa, and to closely look at the 
development work the CR-HCDS Regional commissioner is doing in the region. 
Graduated in 1991 as a Master of Sciences in Agricultural Engineering from Colorado State 
University, the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner possessed some charisma that let him be the 
kind of person that nobody can resist listening to when he speaks. It was reported that Mesli (cited 
many times in this study), during his visit to the region as a Minister of Agriculture some years 
ago, had to ask for a chair and sit down when the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner started 
talking. It is clear that the discourse of this man is so captivating even for a minister. After this 
event, Mesli asked him, through his cabinet staff, to move to the Ministry at Algiers and offered 
him different positions there, but he politely declined all of them. 
I visited the project and was really impressed by the tremendous amount of work the man carries 
out on a daily basis, not only in terms of physical efforts but in the context of a truly sustainable, 
participatory development as well. His refined conceptualization capacity led him to develop a 
practice of substitutive conservation [see Box 7.2.7(1) below], and we are both currently working 
to shape its theoretical contour. 
During field visits, when we were both with farmers, I noticed he never said a word on behalf of 
the project beneficiaries, he just let them speak for themselves. When I asked him a question about 
the project, he always replied politely by asking the question to the pastoralists themselves as he 
believes they know a lot about it. 
When I knew that the man was paid as a common development agent, I became surprised and asked 
him why he declined the offers made earlier by the Minister of Agriculture. He convincingly 
replied: "Agricultural development is in the field not in the office, and my place is in the field of 
development. Agriculture cannot be remote-controlled." 
Source: field notes 
Once, we were visiting a pastoralist in his farm. During the discussion we were 
having with the farmer, I asked the Regional Commissioner a question about how 
many hectares the farmer planted with fodder shrubs. He reminded me that the 
question should be directed to the pastoralist himself because we were on his farm 
and he is the only one who steers the development process of his own farm. I was 
more impressed later when I discovered that he knew the answer. 
Box 7.2.5.1(1) - The Regional Commissioner and his meaning of development 
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7 .2 .5 .2 The CR-HCDS staff 
As someone who has been working for a long period within the Ministry of 
Agriculture, it was the first time that I was facing a situation where the example of a 
public agency leader positively influences the performance of the staff, although the 
socio-professional problems this staff encounters are tremendous (low salary, bad 
working conditions, low morale, lack of motivation from the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries, etc.). 
The CR-HCDS employs a multi-disciplinary team composed of 2 MSc holders (the 
Commissaire Regional (CR) and the deputy CR) and 4 - 5 Ingénieurs d'Etat (higher than 
BSc), at the main office in Tébessa. This team was complemented in the field by a 
team of 1 0 staff members, mostly of a Technicien grade, in order to carry out the 
activities. The mandated area covers around 4 million hectares of steppe rangelands, 
making each one of the team members travel at least 1 , 0 0 0 km a week. 
I Box 7.2.5.2(1) - How do the CR-HCDS staff members react towards the project? | 
For many of the CR-HCDS staff members, the project is not perceived as different from what they 
regularly do. It is just continuity for them, even though they believe, that with the project, they are 
put under close scrutiny by all stakeholders (government officials, HCDS high staff, DSA Directors, 
pastoralist organizations, local communes, etc.). This places a high pressure on them and they take 
this project more as a challenge because previous similar actions have been total failures. They know 
that the project calls on hard work and continuous efforts, but this does not discourage them. 
As one of them said to me: "When you work with a person like our Regional Commissioner, you 
cannot sit all day in your office without doing something, as many DSAs staff do, for instance. You 
are inclined to work and work hard because your boss is an example for you. The way he talks to you 
never makes you feel second rate. At the beginning of the work relation, he talks to everybody as he 
would to a responsible, mature person. Later, if you do not live up to his standards, he changes his 
way and considers you as lacking responsibility to yourself and your duties. It is the latter way that he 
treats our zootechnician (young woman) friend". 
To all CR-HCDS staff members, the Regional Commissioner is the perfect example of the hard 
working chief, an example that is rarely found in Algeria these days. Although, he shows some 
restraint when evaluating them, they all believe this is the right way for their carrier; they all 
believe in working hard for the project and learn more through their daily interaction with their chief 
and/or with the pastoralists. As one of the staff members once told me: "I learned more about 
agriculture with the pastoralists than in school. In the agricultural high school, they teach us how to 
teach farmers while here I discovered that I am gaining more knowledge than I am in fact giving to the 
pastoralists". In contrast to that context, some of the staff members said to me, with a strong sense of 
humour: "We should not have accepted being assigned to the CR-HCDS because we have learned the 
'wrong' things; how to work hard under any condition, for instance. Meanwhile, other colleagues who 
graduated with us and were assigned to other organizations, such as DSAs, are just relaxing in their 
offices ail a day without bothering about their salary." 
Source: field notes 
Each of them tries to meet the standards of the chief by working hard and trying to 
keep up to date and committed to his assignments [see Box 7 . 2 . 5 . 2 ( 1 ) above]. 
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However, there is the exception of a zootechnician woman who was not integrated 
into the team even though she worked there for at least four years. She lacks a sense 
of initiatives and ideas, and cannot handle difficult assignments. 
7.2.5.3 The pastoralists of the project area 
During my field work, I had to interview some pastoralists about the project and the 
CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner and staff members. I had never in my 
professional life heard farmers talking so positively about a project which they 
considered to be 'theirs', and about the people that worked for that project, who they 
considered to be working for their own (the pastoralists) development [see Box 
7 . 2 . 5 . 3 ( 1 ) below]. 
In many similar field visits, development agents take visiting people to 'model' 
farms, i.e. where there are only positive results they can show about their work. 
Once these visitors would begin a discussion with a farmer, the development agents 
would talk more than the farmer himself, sometimes even inWbiting him from 
speaking frankly. In the case of this project, I could choose my interviewees and 
informants at random; every time I was talking with a pastoralist, the CR-HCDS 
Regional Commissioner (or his staff members) kept quiet and did not talk. 
From the onset, this behaviour raised some doubts in my mind as, in a country 
like Algeria, it is not easy to believe at the first glance what people say. When a 
statement is too broad, one becomes more suspicious about it, given the culture of 
fallacies developed by the regime. For instance, if one popular march is organized by 
ordinary people to show support for the president of the Republic on a specific issue, 
one can believe in the spontaneity of this march. But if too many popular marches 
are organized within the country at the same time for the same purpose, one is very 
suspicious about their spontaneity. 
After I visited all the selected informants, however, the pastoralists' thoughts 
made me believe that what was said about the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner 
and the way he managed the project could be true. However, as a matter of 
^angulation, I had to look for some appropriate indicators to confirm the 
pastoralists' views. 
One of the appropriate indicators was the level of realization achieved in fodder 
shrub plantation. In fact, plantations of Opuntia sp. (Cactus shrub) reached 1 , 2 0 0 ha 
in one year ( 1 9 9 6 ) within a single commune of the Souk-Ahras province. This 
achievement was attained although some people, either for the sake of an easy 
criticism or by jealousy, launched a campaign against the CR-HCDS Regional 
Commissioner based on a rumour saying that the man was "polluting the steppe 
rangelands with Opuntia". 
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| Box 7.2.5.3(1) - Pastoralists' opinion of the project and the executive agency 
Given their past experiences with state agencies, farmers were very skeptical about the project from 
its outset. After three decades of collaboration with public agencies, they became very doubtful 
about these organizations which, in their opinion, were corrupt and served exclusively privileged 
farmers' interests. 
After some time, they discovered some new qualities in the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner 
which tempered their skepticism towards the project and, by association, towards civil servants. His 
advice that they should organize into new representative farmers' associations resulted in the self-
funding of their associations by transferring 4% from their net income of Opuntia fruits (Cactus 
figs) sales, as they had no recourse to public subsidies as many associations legally do. These are 
some indicators of that change. 
One day, due to complex financial procedures in the public sphere, the CR-HCDS could not repair 
a project water-tank trailer that was regularly used by pastoralists to water their new fodder shrub 
plantations. Convinced that it was not a lack of will from the Regional Commissioner, they 
spontaneously decided to repair it at their own expense. 
Again, during afield day, the CR-HCDS staff invited some pastoralists to watch a video tape on 
the use of young Opuntia pads for feeding their livestock, edited by the CR-HCDS itself. 
Pastoralists were very enthusiastic about the tape and asked the CR-HCDS Regional 
Commissioner if the development of similar tapes was possible for other subjects of interest to them. 
As the lack of a video camera was the limiting factor, they decided to participate with 100,000 AD 
in order to buy the item for the CR-HCDS. Recently, they made a similar decision to buy a portable 
computer for the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner. 
Most of my interviewees, especially farmers and development agents, were unanimous about the 
qualities of the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner, first as a person, then as a development agency 
manager. A president of a farmers' organization told me: "Unless he is on a mission or ill, he is in 
the office every day at 7:30 and supervises every activity of the CR-HCDS. For professional 
matters, he travels hundreds of kilometers every day to check things. If I need any information or 
help, I can have it even through a phone call, unless he is away on a mission or a training course. 
This man is really different than other officials we have had to deal with for many long years. To 
meet them, one had to queue from 8:00 until they come to their office only from 10:00 onward. And 
lucky the one who could find them and luckier if he could meet one of them". 
Source: field notes 
* I owe this word to N. Boukrouh. He used the word in an article he wrote in El-Watan daily 
newspaper in July 1998 to describe the population of privileged persons that sustain the on-going 
political regime in Algeria. 
Another indicator resides in the opinion of the DSA Directors itself. In Algeria, 
where the bureaucratic apparatus is mostly staffed by 'privilegentsia'6-hnked 
incompetent people, it is rare that someone is well-known because he does a hard 
and good work. In contrast, a culture of labeling others as incompetent to better hide 
their own is very common among these people. In this vein, the refusal of three DSA 
Directors to be interviewed about the project [see Box 7 . 2 . 5 . 3 ( 1 ) below] can only be 
explained by the fact that the way the project was managed really did 'shake up' the 
actual status-quo in the region. 
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7 .2 .5 .4 The staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and its decentralized structures 
The DSAs of the five wilayate involved in the project responded differently vis-a-vis 
the project, either at the level of the directors or the technical staff which was 
involved in the project implementation. Some of them, such as Oum-El-Bouaghi and 
Souk-Ahras really did work hard to achieve the set objectives and consequently 
achieved 9 1 % and 8 7 % of their planned total plantations. Meanwhile, others were 
just taking it as a normal undertaking, as were the many similar failures they had to 
deal with for several years. However, the wilaya of Khenchela achieved 9 3 % of its 
planned total plantations because of the intensive work of the CR-HCDS staff that 
was positioned there. Yet, the presence of the whole CR-HCDS in the wilaya of 
Tébessa did not help them latter to realize more than 4 6 % , far behind the wilaya of 
Batna which realized 5 0 % . This shed some light on the quality of the relationship 
between the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner and the DSA Director in this wilaya. 
The DSA Directors are the only ones to decide how deep the involvement of their 
staff is in a given project, due to reasons that can assumed or even clearly uncovered 
[see Box 7 . 2 . 5 . 4 ( 1 ) below]. 
Thus, if any DSA technical staff shows devotion and/or willingness to collaborate 
within a project, they will be thwarted in many different ways when this is not the 
will of the DSA Director himself. The last thing to do to discourage these personnel 
is to not provide them with means of transportation when they have to do field 
work for the sake of fulfilling their commitment to a given project, or to join a 
meeting of another project, or even overwhelm them with extraordinary tasks so 
that they lack time for a project's assignment. 
After all, being myself one of the Ministry of Agriculture staff, having long 
practical experience with the functioning of the DSAs and the Ministry itself, the 
reaction of the DSA Directors was not new and was very understandable to me. 
Their reaction was motivated by the fact that if this project succeeded, it would not 
only reveal many errors committed in the past in these areas in the name of steppe 
rangelands development, but it would also empower the local populations to 
negotiate the development agenda, since they would have a successful experience to 
refer to. 
Moreover, it will reveal that the technical staff in the Ministry of Agriculture can 
achieve positive results if the work context is conducive, meaning that the boss is the 
first one to 'get his hands dirty'. The success of this project can in fact confirm the 
very popular French saying that, in Algeria, "there are not bad soldiers but bad generals". 
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| Box 7.2.5.4(1) - What do some DSA Directors think of the Project? ~1 
For the project as well as for other regular activities, the CR-HCDS develops professional links 
with the five DSAs of the project area, all being public organizations and civil service units. The 
former is a co-ordinating agency of pastoral development at the regional level. The latter are 
intervening units in agricultural development at the wilaya level; they have the duty to co-ordinate 
all activities related to rural and agricultural development that takes place within the territorial 
boundaries of their wilaya. In such a project, this poses a problem of institutional competence as far 
as a given wilaya is concerned. And given the innovativeness of the CR-HCDS in this project, this 
made the situation more complex. 
Three out of the five DSA Directors refused to be interviewed. I assume they were not happy with 
the performance of the CR-HCDS in this project and saw me as a close friend of the CR-HCDS 
Regional Commissioner. 
The remaining two thought similarly. They considered that the project was doing quite a good job 
but did not appreciate the strict way the CR-HCDS allocated the project resources, such as well 
location, on purely technical matters. Many times, they tried to ask the CR-HCDS Regional 
Commissioner to allocate this resource for that location, the latter referred them to papers they had 
already sent him to finalize the project document, with no mention of such a need. In other words, 
the fact that the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner stuck to their initial requests that were 
elaborated in the presence of pastoralists' representatives did not please them, as it reduced their 
room for manoeuver in steering the project towards their own preferences. 
While looking for feed back from the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner about what the DSA 
Directors said, he bluntly told me: "These people wanted to use the project resources, being public 
resources, in order to manipulate local populations to vote for the regime's candidate during the 
1995 presidential elections. This was done before, but now we are supposedly in a multiparty 
democracy, and as public administration, we should be neutral. I do not want to be used in 
campaigning for any candidate or party. This is the main foundation of their problem with them". 
In 1998, the five DSAs of the project region coalesced and wrote a report to the Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries about the situation of the project and mentioned the problem they faced 
with the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner. During his visit to the wilaya ofKhenchela (one of 
the five wilayate of the project area), the minister alluded to this problem in an open, official speech 
which pushed the man to ask for a meeting with the minister but he refused. As a consequence, the 
man felt very discouraged but never resigned. For him, it would have been abdication in front of 
these incompetent DSA Directors. 
Source: field notes 
Finally, as being part of the picture as a researcher, I shall attempt a brief appraisal of 
the project [see Box 7.2.5.4(2) below]. The aim is to show the originality of this 
project, in terms of approach and strategy of rural and agricultural development in 
general, and pastoral or agro-pastoral development in particular. 
However, the so-called originality of this project has to be seen in the Algerian 
context, and was significantly conditioned, as I demonstrated earlier, by the 
exemplarity of the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner as well as by the hard work, 
strong commitment, and dedication by his staff to the project. 
J 
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I Box 7.2.5.4(2) - The researcher' 's own appraisal of the project 
The case-study describes a typical picture of the state withdrawal from the position of being the unique 
implementer of development actions as it was for no less than three decades, even though some public 
organizations are still intervening in this project. In fact, it is in contrast to the state interventionism 
that was strongly present in post-independence Algeria and which resulted in a sort of development 
characterized by: 
• A pastoral community rejection by of technological 'solutions' advocated/sponsored by the state 
• An accentuation of the rangeland degradation caused by the irrational exploitation of rangelands 
that were denied an appropriate institutional management mechanism; 
• An exclusive concentration on the technical dimension in the technology generation process and/or 
in the institutional dimension without paying enough attention to the socio-cultural and economic 
aspects which affected the resilience ofdevelopment actions in the long run, especially with the first 
attempts of fodder shrub plantation. 
The new vision of development was based on a 'shared responsibility' between the development 
agency (the state) and the pastoral communities, which was strengthened through 
'contractualization' of the collaborative relationships. An original feature was that it took into 
consideration the lessons learned from previous state interventionism failures within the same areas 
[see section 5.3]. 
Source: field notes 
7 .2 .6 The project's main development interface 
The main interface in this project is the one that takes place in the field between 
development agents and the pastoralists. However, as Figure 7 . 2 . 3 ( 1 ) above shows, 
this interface was far from being unique. In fact, the same interface took at least three 
different forms, each achieving different outcomes: 
1. The best form was the direct and mono-structural (line 2 ) , where the CR-HCDS 
staff had to intervene directly with pastoralists, like in Khenchela. As a result, 9 3 % 
of the set objectives of fodder shrub plantation were realized. 
2. The second best form was the direct and mmti-structural (line 3 ) , where CR-HCDS 
staff and DSA staff both intervened in a 'joint-venture' team with the pastoralists. 
The results were quite significant ( 9 1 % for Oum-El-Bouaghi and 8 7 % for Souk-
Ahras). 
3 . The weakest form was the indirect and hierarchical (line 1 ) , where realization of the 
set objectives was the duty of the DSA staff only. The results were rather low (50% 
for Batna and 4 6 % for Tébessa). The morale of the DSA staff played a significant 
role. 
The different forms that this interface has taken describe how the level of 
commitment and dedication of the technical staff, sometimes highly conditioned by 
the morale and values of their chiefs, influence the outcome of a development action. 
As many references present bureaucracy as a homogeneous social system where 
agencies; 
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Table 7.2.7(1) - Comparative costs per hectare of fodder shrub plantation 
Items Private Collective rangelands state 
farms Mechanized Manual companies 
Cost per hectare (in AD) 1 0 , 0 4 1 1 3 , 9 7 5 2 0 , 5 3 0 4 2 , 9 6 0 
Rate of saving (in %) 7 7 6 7 5 2 0 
Source: Redjel and Boukheloua (1996:14) 
• A progressive behavioural and mentality change by the pastoral communities 
towards their responsibility in 'their' rangelands. There was a complete shift from 
causing the degradation of the rangelands to an active participation in attempts to 
rehabilitate the degraded rangelands through fodder shrub plantation, either 
individually and/or collectively. The best evidence to support this statement is 
the incredible growth of the area planted with fodder shrubs on private farms in 
the Eastern region of the country [see Tables 7 . 2 . 7 ( 2 ) and 7 . 2 . 7 ( 3 ) below]. In 
comparison, the number of farms that planted fodder shrubs based on contractual 
agreement [see Box 7 . 2 . 1 ( 3 ) earlier in this section] moved from 1 0 farms (with 2 0 
ha planted) in 1 9 9 2 / 9 3 to 2 , 0 5 0 (with 4 , 4 3 8 ha planted) in 1 9 9 5 / 9 6 , and then 
rapidly increased to 3 , 1 8 3 farms (with 8 , 8 8 3 ha planted) in 1 9 9 7 / 9 8 in the project 
area. 
values and norms are shared by all its members, this interface shows that it is 
misleading to continue considering that any bureaucracy represents a homogeneous, 
monolithic block where all members think and behave the same way. 
7 .2 .7 Field effects of the project 
Based on the achievements of the project, and more particularly on its participatory 
approach, the programme reinforced the spirit of active participation among rural 
populations in the implementation of the scheduled activities, through collective 
responsibility within the collective rangelands, and through contractualization with 
individual households. According to Redjel and Boukheloua ( 1 9 9 6 : 1 0 ) , the adopted 
type of 'contractuaHzed' partnership achieved the following: 
• A description of the main foundations of a new paradigm on substitutive 
conservation [see Box 7 . 2 . 7 ( 1 ) below] which should be the basis of any 
intervention in the steppe rangelands in order to bring about the required balance 
between the feed demand (the size of the flocks) and the supply (the feeding 
capacity). Yet, this paradigm still needs to be elaborated upon at the theoretical 
level. 
• A significant savings in state investment costs: The cost for one hectare of fodder 
shrub plantation decreased by 5 2 % in the collective rangelands and by 7 7 % on 
individual private farms, as compared to the state companies [see Table 7 . 2 . 7 ( 1 ) 
below]. 
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Planted species of fodder shrubs were Atriplex halimus, Atriplex canescens, Atriplex 
nummularia, Atriplex leucoclada, Atriplex semibaccata, Acacia cyanophylla, Acacia 
ebernua, Medicago arborea, Gleditchia trianchatos, Elaeagnus angustifolia, Retatna retam, 
Opuntia ficus indica. The latter species experienced a great expansion as it can be 
used for many purposes [see Table 7 .2 .7 (3 ) and Box 7 .2 .7(2) below]. 
Box 7.2.7(1) - The concept of 'substitutive conservation' 
Understanding the concept of substitutive conservation, as a prescriptive theory for rangeland 
conservation, requires the understanding of the problématique of rangeland dégradation. As the 
'problem tree' developed by the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner shows [see Figure 7.2.4(1)1, 
rangeland degradation was influenced by agricultural policies and regimes of land tenure and 
property rights. Although these influences can be termed indirect, they influenced the behaviour of 
pastoralists (anthropic action), leading to degradation when their livelihood was endangered. 
Pastoralists sometimes developed strategies and/or farming systems that can perform well in the 
short term but are highly degrading in the long run. 
A good example of such state policies is the anti-drought campaigns the government has sponsored 
since the mid-1970s. As a consequence of these campaigns, the natural balance between the feed 
needs of the flocks and the feeding capacity of the rangelands was broken and an artificial 
maintenance of an ephemeral balance took place through the injection of subsidized feed into the 
region. Before the anti-drought campaigns, pastoralists used to operate, in dry years, a systematic 
de-stocking, through marketing all surpluses and keeping only the reproductive core. After the 
anti-drought campaigns were started, almost all animals were kept because feed was abundant and 
cheap, thanks to the state. Farmers resorted to this practice especially when animal sales market 
prices were not in their favour. 
When in the mid-1980s the state was not in a position of sustaining its anti-drought campaigns 
any more, pastoralists found themselves with a tremendous feed problem and resorted to an 
intensive, ever-degrading use of the rangelands, first through intensified grazing until over-
grazing engendered almost irreversible degradation, then through clearing the range to grow barley 
for their livestock, as subsidized imported barley ceased to be provided by the state. 
To reverse this phenomenon, the project needed to tackle many issues simultaneously, taking the 
three following principles into consideration: (1) Revegetation of degraded rangelands will have no 
effect without participation of the pastoralists; (2) Revegetation of degraded rangelands without 
reconsidering the total number of sheep relative to the feeding capacity of the rangelands will not 
give sustainable results; and, (3) Reconsideration of the total number of sheep will have no effect if 
income-generating substitutive solutions are not found. These three principles are the basis of the 
substitutive conservation paradigm of which aims to reset the natural balance between the flocks' 
feed needs and the rangelands' carrying capacity without threatening pastoralists' livelihood and 
living conditions. 
Source: field notes 
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Season Number of farms per category Total Average 
planted planted area 
0-5 ha 5-10 ha 10-20 ha >20 ha Total area per farm 
1992/93 season 10 - - - 10 20 2.00 
1993/94 season 249 - - - 249 500 2.01 
1994/95 season 720 19 2 - 741 1,522 2.05 
1995/96 season 1,026 17 5 2 1,050 2,396 2.28 
Total 2,005 36 7 2 2,050 4,438 2.16 
Proportion (%) 97.80 1.76 0.34 0.10 100.00 - -
Source: CR-HCDS data 
Table 7.2.7(3) - Recent statistics on shrub plantation in private farms of the project area 
Wilayate Commune Fodder shrub plantation (in ha) Beneficiaries 
Opuntia Others Total % 
Opuntia 
Number Average 
land/benef. 
Oum-El-Bouaghi 08 407 53 460 88.48 222 2.07 
Batna 04 20 06 26 76.92 10 2.60 
Tébessa 23 3,821 191 4,012 95.24 1,616 2.48 
Khenchela 11 979 219 1,198 81.72 687 1.74 
Souk-Ahras 04 3,059 128 3,187 95.98 648 4.92 
Total 50 8,286 597 8,883 93.28 3,183 2.79 
Source: CR-HCDS data 
• An increased participation of pastoralists in co-financing development actions 
through funding the purchase of small but significant items that can serve to their 
own benefit. 
| Box 7.2.7(2) - Why Opuntia sp. made pastoralists so enthusiastic? 
Even though an obstructing rumour was launched in early years of the project, Opuntia shrub 
plantations were spreading at a rather steady rate, especially on the private holdings [see Table 
7.2.7(3) above], where involvement was based on a contractual agreement between CR-HCDS and 
land 'owners'. This pastoralists' enthusiasm about the plant can be explained by its capacity to adapt 
to the arid environments as well as its multiple uses. 
In fact, the fruit, being very nutritious, may be sold in the local market for human consumption or 
exported. The plant gives two harvests a year. It also can be transformed into jam. Selling the fruit by 
itself provided a good-enough income for pastoralists during the last years. 
The Opuntia's annual 'racquet' (or pad) can also be sliced and fed to the sheep. It is nutritious, rich in 
water, and with low fibers content, which makes the intake (the rate of nutrients transformed) 
relatively higher. It can be easily combined with other feed resources to balance the diet. Additionally, 
it stabilizes the soil against water- and wind-erosion, and when it grows older, it decomposes into 
organic matter to enrich the fragile soils of the arid areas. It can even be used in cosmetics and 
pharmacy. 
L 
Source: field notes 
Table 7.2.7(2) - Area planted with fodder shrubs in the private farms (1992-96) 
Unit: ha for area 
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7.3 Case No. 6: The rangelands population education project7 
7.3 .1 Introduction and justification of the project 
The problématique of the steppe rangelands in Algeria [see Figure 7 . 2 . 4 ( 1 ) in this 
chapter] represents a typical situation of "multi-causality" (Lewins, 1 9 9 2 : 2 7 ) , where 
many factors or causes intervened in shaping human behaviour which yielded the 
degradation and depletion of natural resources. At the centre of this problématique, 
anthropic actions of clearing the range to expand cereal crops and over-grazing were 
influenced by different causes, mentioned in Figure 7 . 2 . 4 ( 1 ) . Resolving the situation 
would require not only the tadding of the effects of the intervening causes 
simultaneously, but also a necessary change in human behaviour as well. It is thus 
useless to conduct actions to revegetate and rehabilitate the range if additional, 
complementary actions inducing behavioural change are not undertaken [see Box 
7.3 .1 below]. 
In this respect, the CR-HCDS organized a meeting in November, 1 9 9 5 , of the main 
stakeholders involved in the Rangelands Regeneration and Conservation Project 
presented in the previous section. Convinced of the theoretical, logical foundation 
developed in this project, the CR-HCDS staff made a proposal to carry out a pilot 
action on population education (both adult education and pupil education in the 
primary schools). This pilot action intended to increase the pastoralists' awareness 
about the crudal role local populations can play in the conservation and 
management of their immediately surrounding ecosystem. 
Referring to the problématique mentioned above, the CR-HCDS Regional 
Commissioner saw that degradation was influenced by anthropic actions which are 
indubitably induced by several causes that can be either development (such as policy 
ones), organizational, legal, climatic, or even actions aimed at mamtaining livelihood 
sustainabüity. Thus, some on-going activities of the so-called Rangelands 
Regeneration and Conservation Project (Case No. 5 ) would yield better outcomes if 
implemented in an integrated and holistic way. This should be emphasized even 
more if attempts to bring about sustainable solutions of the problematic situation are 
planned. 
Linking his proposed educational action to the Rangelands Regeneration and 
Conservation Projed, the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner argued that the 
proposed action would focus not only on consdentization of the actual generation 
that is presently exploiting the rangelands. It should also try to prepare the coming 
generation (the pupils in the primary schools) to take over the activities of the 
present generation (their fathers) in due time in such a way that an appropriate 
pattern of use, management and conservation of the rangelands would be 
developed. 
7 This case represents field-work summarized in a paper by Redjel, N.; D. Boukheloua & M. MalM 
(1997), published in Dryland Pasture, Forage & Network News, Issue n° 14, December 1997. 
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Box 7.3.1(1) - Majors criticisms towards past development actions 
For three decades, steppe rangeland development programmes focused exclusively on structural (or 
'hardware') aspects and considered measures that solved only the symptoms (natural resources 
depletion and degradation) and not the causes (the anthropic actions and their underlying 
determinant factors). Very little attention was paid to the socio-educational and institutional (or 
'software') aspects. The planners saw pastoral communities, either individually or collectively, as 
mere objects of development intervention. Pastoralists, as any other development recipient, could 
just be 'programmed' to follow the instructions of a modus operandi developed by planners in order 
to achieve the objectives set for projects and programmes. In this vein, there was no need to develop 
'software' activities to conscientize, train, and educate people about they could become active 
players in the preservation of their ecosystem. 
Past experiences in rangeland development programmes in Algeria mainly consisted of 'imported' 
rehabilitation schemes characterized by an exclusively technocratic vision that imposed a state 
rangeland development orientation. This vision paid no attention to pastoral communities needs, 
cultural legacy, traditions and knowledge. Instead of improving rangeland productivity through 
appropriate mechanisms of exploitation, management, and conservation, these interventions 
resulted in increasing desertification through the break-down of the natural equilibrium of the 
ecosystem that in the past had been balanced by strategies and measures applied and legitimized by 
pastoral communities (see section 5.3 of this study). 
In most development plans, resource allocation for 'software' activities was extremely low. For 
instance, the Second Quinquennial Plan (1985-89) for steppe rangelands development allocated 
only 0.16% of the allocated funds to such activities. 
Source: field notes 
7 .3 .2 Theoretical background of the project 
Learning from past experiences to avoid the misuse of on-going investments [see 
section 7 . 2 ] , a new, original development action aiming to educate local populations 
was initiated, based upon the following slogan: "Rangelands are the wealth of the 
generations, their conservation means the recurrence of life". 
The design of this project was based on an integrated approach that intends to 
reverse, over the long run, the negative effects of previous anthropic actions. As an 
important component in the strengthening of the Great Works Programme for the 
Steppe, given that rangeland rehabilitation, exploitation, management, and 
Contrary to the tradition of past state interventions in these areas, the 
stakeholders adopted the CR-HCDS proposed educative action as a complement to 
the rangelands regeneration and conservation project [see section 7 .2 in this chapter], 
using the lessons learned from these past experiences. 
However, the originality of this action resides in the fact that it was decided on 
the spot, in the field and not in a planning office. It started without public funds and 
the stakeholders, principally the pastoralists, mobilized the required resources to 
carry out the project. 
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conservation cannot be realized without initiating the next generation into caring for 
the 'legacy' that will be inherited from the present generation. 
In this way, the educational action aimed to set up a three-level interactive and 
communicative model between the different actors in charge of ensuring a 
sustainable development of the rangelands [see Figure 7 . 3 . 2 ( 1 ) below]. This model 
encompasses two complementary integrated sub-models: 
1 . The first sub-model (two vertical grey rectangles) can be described as a two-level 
interactive process of conscientization between the development agents of the CR-
HCDS and the actual pastoralists, on the first level, and of education and training 
between the primary school teachers and their pupils (the next generation of 
pastoralists), on the second level. 
2. The second sub-model (a blank horizontal rectangle) represents a communicative 
platform between the present pastoralists (pastoral communities, households, 
individuals exploiting rangelands), on one side, and the future pastoralists (pupils 
of the primary schools, children of the actual pastoralists), on the other, facilitated 
by CR-HCDS staff members and the primary school teachers. 
Figure 7.3.2(1) - Interactions between different sub-models and levels of the 
interactive/communicative model of pupil education 
(Source: this study) 
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7 .3 .3 Evolution of the project and major achievements 
7.3.3.1 Taking the first steps of the pupil educational action 
The educational action concerned the education of the current adult generation of 
pastoralists, in order to facilitate their organization into professional associations 
and intensify their active role in rangeland access, use, management, and 
conservation. Additionally, it concerned the next generation of pastoralists in their 
conscientization, awareness about the surrounding ecosystem and the danger of 
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continued degradation to prepare them for a more active role in rangeland 
management and conservation than their parents are presently doing. 
Unlike the first component, the second component of the educational action - the 
one dealing with the primary school pupils - encountered constraints because the 
primary school teachers were not prepared to undertake such an experiment, as the 
nation-wide curriculum for primary school education was elaborated in the capital 
and distributed to schools and teachers all over the country. Before the Haut Conseil 
de I'Education began adjusting it last year, the curriculum was characterized by 
extreme standardization. One can find the same programme taught wherever 
schools are located. 
It is not the purpose of this study to talk at length about the dramatic educational 
situation in Algeria. However, I will content myself by saying that it seemed very 
strange and intriguing to see pupils in the Saharan desert or in the remote 
countryside areas taught a curriculum which introduces to them the Mediterranean 
coastal ecosystem or the mountainous ecosystem while they were not made familiar 
with their own, immediate ecosystem. 
Some initial steps have been taken by the CR-HCDS staff to remedy this situation. 
These concerned: 
• The preparation of a manuscript to be later edited as a booklet and distributed 
among the pupils, the content of which aims to give the primary school pupils 
basic insights into the surrounding ecosystem, the relationships between their life, 
their animals, and the ecosystem, and how the sustainabüity of their livelihood 
depends upon the sustainabüity of their ecosystem. 
• The organization of a meeting with the Regional Director of the Educational 
Academy, which supervises the wilayate of the project area, to discuss the 
proposal of the pilot action and the content of the booklet. Issues about the 
numbers of schools, classrooms, and pupils to be involved in the first phase of the 
pilot action were also discussed. The decision was made to set up a small team 
composed of staff members from CR-HCDS staff, the Regional Educational 
Academy, and the EcoZe Normale Supérieure of Constan tine. This team would be in 
charge of defining the pedagogic approach for this project [see Box 7.3.3.1(1) 
below]. 
• Once the Regional Educational Academy agreed to begin the first phase in the 
1996-97 season and the schools were identified, the teachers were asked to 
comment on the booklet's content and form. 
• Once the booklet was reviewed and finalized, the preparation of the teachers was 
started through pilot exercises with selected pupils and the CR-HCDS staff 
members, in order to rehearse the content and the course presentation. 
• After the teachers were made familiar with the new content, the school yard was 
prepared to host the practical field-work of the pupils. 
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Box 7.3.3.1(1) - Basic logical foundations of the pupils education 
In order to achieve its objectives, such an educational programme should aim to develop a dialogue 
interface between the primary school pupil and his immediate environment. In such a dialogue, 
pupils need to ensure a correct understanding of the world surrounding them, its basic functions, 
its constraining factors, and the processes reinforcing its resilience. Thus, understanding, 
reflection, visualization and learning by doing become basic elements of such an action. 
Although it started with the CR-HCDS staff, not sufficiently knowledgeable about the didactic and 
pedagogic aspects, the proposed course was further developed with specialized staff from the 
Regional Educational Academy and the Ecole Normale Supérieure of Canstantine, especially in the 
pedagogic aspects. 
It was designed upon a learner-centered, participatory approach based on a process of reviewing, 
reflecting upon, and applying what was learned. It was participatory because the teacher-pupil 
interface, where the pupil is a passive recipient of knowledge, was replaced by a new interface where 
the teacher facilitates a pupil's self-learning. 
Pupils were kept active in the learning process, which was basically action-oriented and experience-
building based, and stimulating communication and group interaction. In this respect, the 
classroom, where theoretical foundations were learned and debates organized, was complemented in 
first by the school yard, where practical assignments (fodder shrub plantation) were carried out by 
the pupils. Next, the area surrounding the household where the pupil lives replaced the school yard. 
This approach was chosen by the pedagogic team for its ability to enhance effective skill transfer 
and consequently induce appropriate attitudinal and behavioural change from the pupils. 
Source: field notes 
7.3.3.2 Preparing the pupils' educational activities for the first 1996-97 season 
Before the start of the pupils' educational course, further preparation was made at 
the beginning of 1996. This concerned the following items: 
• Arabic edition of a booklet for pupil education, entitled: Elementary Notions and 
Equations on the Steppe Environment, published by the CR-HCDS with the financial 
contribution of pastoralists and the support of the primary school teachers. The 
publishing enterprise contributed by prmting the booklet cover for free. 
• Preparation of the supply of fodder shrubs, pastoral seeds, and fruit trees 
seedlings by the CR-HCDS to secure the practical field-work of the pupils. The 
CR-HCDS staff had to prepare the seedlings in their nurseries. 
• Design and production of awards, prizes, banners and tee-shirts to be distributed 
to the pupils. The awards and prizes will be distributed to the best pupils after the 
evaluations, while banners and tee-shirts are used as slogan-carriers. 
7.3.3.3 Facilitating the organization of pastoralists into associations 
The goal of the first part of the educational action, focused on the actual generation 
of pastoralists, was to consdentize them of the role they have to play in using and 
conserving the rangelands, especially the collectively-exploited range. This was not 
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an easy task, given that many attempts at this kind of 'collectivization' were vainly 
undertaken by farmers in general, and pastoralists in particular, under pressure of 
the state apparatus. Various 'imported' patterns come to my mind, such as ADEPs, 
CEPRAs [see section 5.3], tested in these areas without showing the slightest success. 
This legacy had to be overtaken and it was the object of this educational action to 
rouse the pastoralists in giving a more official form of their partnership with the CR-
HCDS. 
I Box 7.3.3.3(1) - What motivated pastoralists to found their own associations? | 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, mimy farmer organizations have been established in Algeria in 
the context of the new socio-political environment and the 1990 Executive Decree allowing free 
association. However, according to some pastoralists, these organizations did not live up to their 
expectations inasmuch as most of them were induced by the state bureaucracy, which cannot be 
trusted. Additionally, most of these organizations were led by former leaders of the famous Union 
Nationale des Pausans Algériens (UNPA) and were seen only as means of perpetuating the control 
of the peasantry by the privilegentsia and the state. 
Notwithstanding this lack of trust in public agencies, the CR-HCDS, taking advantage of the 
trustful partnership he and his staff had developed with pastoralists, suggested the pastoralists 
organize themselves into associations to formalize their partnership in the steppe rangeland 
development, more particularly in areas where the rangelands are collectively owned, managed, and 
exploited. . 
L J 
Source: field notes 
The first association, that was the Association de Producteurs de Figues de Barbaric, was 
set up in late 1995 in the baladia of Sidi-Fredj (wilaya of Souk-Ahras). This association 
became thoroughly involved in the rangelands regeneration and conservation 
project [see section 7.2]. After initial reluctance, pastoralists showed some interest in 
the way this association was participating in setting the development agenda in 
collaboration with the CR-HCDS and started creating similar associations [see Box 
7.3.3.3(1) above]. Presently, 18 pastoralists' associations have been created and are 
working as acknowledged partners of the previous project [see Box 7.3.3.3(2) below]. 
Some associations, for instance, participated in mobilizing financial resources for 
development activities, such as: 
• Covering the costs of pubUshing the booklet conceived for the educative action of 
the primary school pupils (see section 7.3.3.2 above), which amounted to 70,000 
AD. 
• Repairing the equipment of common wells that were dug and equipped by the 
CR-HCDS some years ago. 
• Buying a video camera for the CR-HCDS in order to produce more extension-
oriented video tapes. 
• Buying a laptop computer for the CR-HCDS to help its staff work during field 
visits, for instance, when evaluating the success of seedling plantations. 
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Box 7.3.3.3(2) - New associations profile and use of contractualized partnership 
Based on the tribal tradition and intentionally espousing the old tribal confines, the new pastoralist 
associations in the eastern steppe region developed in a rather steady way. Some are used to revive 
and 'resuscitate' the indigenous arrangements that were in charge of range access, use, and 
management. Others are in charge of new tasks such as professional aspects of agro-pastordlism, 
agro-sylvo-pastoralism, or pastoralism, and develop new objectives of partnership with public 
development organizations. 
Since the birth of such organizations, interaction between development agents and pastoralists 
changed significantly from the strict 'dirigism' that it was imprinted with during the 1970s and 
1980s. Presently, development agents discuss the alternatives they have at hand with the members 
of each association and present the conditions required for each alternative. It is up to the 
association members to decide which alternative they will go for. They have the right to reject 
proposals, but once they agree upon a given alternative, they will have to assume some 
commitments to ensure the sustainability of the public investment. 
After some initial discussions about the desired partnership, both parties, the association and the 
CR-HCDS, sign a contract where obligations and duties of each party are clearly stated. However, 
the 'contract' formula was not taken seriously in the beginning, and some associations failed to 
fulfill their duties according to the signed contract, still thinking of a complacent state bureaucracy. 
These associations ended up in court, and had to pay back the CR-HCDS the entire amount of the 
realized investment. 
Source: field notes 
7.3.3.4 Educating primary school pupils in understanding their ecosystem 
The objective of this action was to bring primary school pupils to a level of positive 
thinking about rangeland conservation and efficient use. The desired outcome is to 
induce appropriate changes in the actual negative anthropic behaviour and 
mentality towards the pastoral resources upon which the sustainability of their 
livelihood depends. Schools were chosen during this pilot activity from the ones that 
are set in the neighbourhood of the rangelands revegetation and conservation 
project activities [see section 7.2], and where the teachers have agreed to collaborate 
with the CR-HCDS. 
As Table 7.3.3.4(1) shows, the first phase of the pilot action started with 5 schools 
in 3 different wilayate (provinces) of the project area and concerned 209 pupils from 
the 6th to 9th grades out of 421 enrolled in these schools. The attendance was lower 
than expected for objective reasons such as the weather, and the insufficient number 
of class sessions (6 sessions for each school on average). Theoretical in-class sessions 
were always followed by practical field exercises, such as fodder shrub plantation, 
maintenance, and exploitation. With this field work, the school yard became the 'lab' 
for the pupils. 
A booklet [see section 7.3.3.2 above] funded by the pastoralists themselves, either 
individually or collectively through their associations, was distributed to the 
primary scholars to drum up interest in this new, original course. 
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Table 7.3.3.4(1) - General evaluation of the pupils' education for the 1996-97 season 
Wilaya School School pupils Level of understanding 
Concerned Attended Tested > 60% 60-40% < 40% 
Khenchela Boufissane 62 62 - - -
H. Gousset 45 30 - - -
Souk-Ahras Cheguaga 53 32 16 3 7 6 
O. Abid 49 35 13 4 4 5 
Oum-El-Bouaghi B. Chergui 213 60 23 4 10 9 
Total Number 421 209 52 11 21 20 
Percent 100.00 49.64 24.88 21.15 40.39 38.46 
Source: CR-HCDS data 
Looking at Table 7.3.3.4(1), it is worth mentioning that the pupils had no background 
knowledge about the ecosystem they were living in and were innocently ignorant of 
its fragility and vulnerability. They had great difficulty assimilating the course 
material: Almost 79% of the 52 pupils tested failed to answer more than 60% 
(considered as a good level of understanding) of the examination questions related 
to the basic environmental concepts and equations taught in the course. This 
confirmed the statements that were made after the consultations between the C R -
H C D S staff and the teachers, which revealed a lack of familiarity of the pupils with 
their surrounding ecosystem, which guided both the conception of the booklet and 
the choice of the pedagogic/didactic method. 
No matter which cause led to this situation, the extreme gravity of the problem is 
indicated. Today's ignorant pupils will be tomorrow's main cause of desertification 
aggravation. This is also the consequence of the pastoralists' lack of concern about 
their ecosystem, thus making them unable to transfer a greater concern to their 
progeny about their ecosystem. 
In spite of this, the scholars developed a great interest in taking care of the plants 
through the practical exercises of fodder shrub plantation in the school courtyard 
and their plantation around the schools and sometimes near their houses. According 
to Table 7.3.3.4(2) below, 84% of the planted seedlings were successful. It should be 
mentioned that these native species were and still are destroyed by the pupils' 
parents either by over-grazing or by increasing arable land to grow barley for their 
sheep. Moreover, two fodder shrub nurseries were installed by the pupils in two 
different schools and produced 300 pastoral plants, nearly returning the same 
number of plants provided one year before by the C R - H C D S . 
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Table 7.3.3.4(2) - Evaluation of the pupils' practical field-work 
Wilaya School Number Distributed plants Success Shrubs nurseries 
of Fruit tree Fodder rate Installed Plant 
pupils seedlings shrubs (%) produced 
Khenchela Boufissane 62 10 80 85 01 90 
H. Gousset 30 - 60 - -
Souk-Ahras Cheguaga 
O. Abid 
32 
35 
15 
10 
70 
70 
90 
80 
-
Oum-El-Bouaghi B. Chergui 60 10 100 80 01 210 
Total Number 209 45 380 84 02 300 
Source: CR-HCDS data 
Many primary school directors in the region, as well as the director of the Regional 
Education Academy and his subordinate staff, became more enthusiastic about the 
idea and the action started to expand, with increased numbers of baladiate, schools 
and pupils, as Table 7.3.3.4(3) shows. 
For the 1997-98 season, 18 schools were involved with a three-fold increase in the 
number of pupils attending both class and field-work sessions over the previous 
year. More than 5,000 fodder shrubs and 700 fruit trees were planted by the pupils 
and, more interestingly, 138 head of small livestock were distributed to the best 
pupils, preparing them to transfer their field-work exercise from the school yard to 
their household surroundings. 
Table 7.3.3.4(3) - Evaluation of the pupils' education for the 1997-98 season 
Wilaya Number of entities involved Sessions Supplied resources 
Baladia School Pupil Assistant Class Field Fodder Fruit Small 
work shrubs trees livestock 
Oum-El-Bouaghi 02 04 100 03 05 09 100 170 20 
Batna 01 02 60 02 08 400 64 
Tébessa 03 03 222 03 09 19 2,278 170 
Khenchela 03 05 209 04 11 12 1,708 160 26 
Souk-Ahras 03 04 157 03 06 12 826 140 92 
Total 12 18 648 15 31 60 5,312 704 138 
Source: CR-HCDS data 
Two evaluations were undertaken after both the first and second classroom sessions 
where basic notions were taught by a joint team of CR-HCDS staff and school 
teachers. The results of these evaluations are given in Tables 7.3.3.4(4) and 7.3.3.4(5) 
below. 
Both tables highlight that some improvements were made compared to the 
previous year [see Table 7.3.3.4(1) earlier]. Almost two-fifths of the evaluated pupils 
obtained a mark higher than 8, and mree-fifths obtained a mark of 7 or more. In 
terms of understanding the basic concepts taught by the new course, more than half 
of the pupils evaluated demonstrated a good understanding of the concepts; an 
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average score of 70% demonstrated a fairly-good ability to manipulate the basic 
environmental equations through practical examples. 
The results of the practical field work were highly satisfactory, as the seedling 
success rate was more than 90%. 
Table 7.3.3.4(4) - Evaluation of the pupils' level of understanding after the first class 
session of the 1997-98 educational season 
Wilaya Number of entities Level of mark Pupils showing a 
involved (on 1-10 scale) good understanding 
Baladia School Pupil > 8 7 -8 < 7 Concepts Equations 
Oum-El-Bouaghi 02 02 57 06 13 38 15 20 
Tébessa 03 03 220 67 61 92 117 128 
Khenchela 01 01 97 80 10 7 88 83 
Souk-Ahras 03 03 80 22 20 38 33 57 
Total 09 09 454 175 104 175 253 288 
Proportion (%) - - - 39 23 39 56 63 
Source: CR-HCDS data 
Table 7.3.3.4(5) - Evaluation of the pupils' level of understanding after the second class 
session of the 1997-98 educational season 
Wilaya Number of entities Level of mark Pupils showing a 
involved (on 1-10 scale) good understanding 
Baladia School Pupil > 8 7 -8 < 7 Concepts Equations 
Oum-El-Bouaghi 01 01 28 26 02 27 28 
Tébessa 03 03 227 55 63 109 97 156 
Souk-Ahras 03 03 71 17 09 45 26 57 
Khenchela 01 01 76 52 12 12 68 68 
Total 08 08 402 150 86 166 218 309 
Proportion (%) - - - 37 22 41 54 77 
Source: CR-HCDS data 
7.3.3.5 Facilitating a communicative platform among generations of pastoralists 
In addition to evaluating the pupils' assimilation of theoretical content, sessions to 
evaluate field work were also organized. 
The fodder shrub plantation realized by the pupils was evaluated by the creation 
of a forum comprised of all actors presented in Figure 7.3.2(1), i.e. the CR-HCDS 
staff, the school teachers, the pastoralists, and the pupils. Discussions wit±iin this 
'forum', which sometimes extended into the households (fathers and children 
discussing problems of their environment), created a true communication platform 
between the actual generation of pastoralists and the future one. Yet, it is too early to 
advance conclusions about the results of this action, but some assumptions 
developed the fact that an evident 'prise de conscience' is really there, according to the 
words of some pastoralists [see Box 7.3.3.5(1)]. 
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Box 7.3.3.5(1) - How do some pastoralists evaluate the pupils education action? 
The education action introduced some original aspects during the first year (1996-97) that no one 
was prepared for. Some improvements were introduced during the second season of the experiment 
(1997-98), such as the way of presenting the basic environmental notions, the mechanisms of 
evaluation (base on marks rather than on qualitative estimation of the level of assimilation), and 
the involvement of the pastoralists in the process of evaluation. According to the pedagogic team, 
this latter measure was introduced because of its double effect: 
1. It enhances the communication process between the fathers and the children; 
2. It induces, as an indirect consequence, a reinforcement of the necessity to adopt behavioural 
changes by the evaluator, i.e. the pastoralists. 
Some pastoralists were very skeptical about this measure, which would put them in front of their 
children as stubborn, as farmers might be described. However, after the two sessions of practical 
field-work evaluation that followed the theoretical content ones, the head of a pastoralists' 
association told once the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner, with a great sense of humour: "Si 
Mohamed, you have been putting some controllers in our households [meaning the educated 
pupils] who are always telling us how should we do things. Do you want to bring about a 
revolution in our region or what?" But, more convincingly, he recognized later that: "The results 
of this action will take time to be made visible, but I am sure that our children will harvest 
something out of what we are doing these days ". 
Source: field notes 
7.3.3.6 Convincing local policy-makers of the required changes in national curriculum 
A review meeting with the director of the Regional Education Academy and his staff 
was organized by the CR-HCDS in September 1 9 9 7 after the end of the first year 
( 1 9 9 6 - 9 7 ) of the pilot action. Results were presented, constraints were discussed, and 
future perspectives of the action were presented by the Regional Education 
Academy. 
In this respect, it was decided to continue the first phase for two more year. At the 
end of the third year, the Regional Education Academy will organize an official 
evaluation meeting to which officials of the Ministry of National Education and the 
High Council of Education will be invited. In the meantime, the Director of the 
Regional Education Academy has promised to send a report about the layout of the 
'experiment' to both the Minister of National Education and the Chairman of the 
High Council of Education. Before the end of the second year, the CR-HCDS 
Regional Commissioner received promises of needed support, not only for the 
continuation of the experiment, but also its incorporation into the regular curriculum 
to be taught in similar areas. 
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7 .3 .4 The project's main development interfaces 
Unlike the previous cases presented in this chapter (Cases Nos. 4 and 5 ) , the 
educative action developed three different interfaces, as shown in Figure 7 . 3 . 2 ( 1 ) 
earlier, each having its own particularities: 
1 . The CR-HCDS staff - pastoralist interface: As far as the social actors are 
concerned, it is almost the same interface developed in Case No. 5 which 
supported the direct and monostructural intervention of the rangelands 
revegetation and conservation project (see section 7 .2 .6 ) . In this project, however, 
this interface was oriented more towards social engineering, i.e. conscienrizing 
pastoralists about formalizing the partnership with the CR-HCDS through a 
better form of organization. 
2 . The primary school teacher - pupil interface: It is a new arrangement of the old 
interface where pupils were passive recipients of a top-down learning through an 
inductive education model. In the new form of the interface, the old image of the 
teacher giving a course was replaced by a facilitator stimmating pupil's self-
learning, the latter playing an active role in his/her own education. 
3 . The pastoralist - pupil interface: It is the innovation of this project which 
establishes the foundations of a future social platform for negotiation and 
decision-making about resources use and management (Roling, 1 9 9 4 ) . It is still too 
early to presuppose the results of such an arrangement, however, as the action is 
still in its 'experiment' stage. 
The most original aspect of these three interfaces resides in the way they 
complement each other and are different parts of a holistic interface that brings face-
to-face interaction the public development organizations, mtervening upon an 
integrated pattern, on one side, and the beneficiaries of development who, via the 
right organizational mechanism discovered how to make space for their own 
development agenda on the other. 
Nevertheless, I would advance that although originality exists in this project, it is 
an action whose sustainabuity somehow remains questionable for two main reasons. 
First, will the education action succeed in raising the future pastoralists in the light 
of the projected vision of the rangelands' sustainabuity, given the required 
empowerment of the pupils within the households? Second, will it expand to similar 
areas satisfactorily, given that the steppe rangelands count for millions of hectares, 
and given that mamtaining its success in a small pilot area would resemble just like a 
'spit' of rehabiHtation into an ocean of degradation? 
C H A P T E R 8 
O N A N A L T E R N A T I V E D E V E L O P M E N T V I E W A N D O U T C O M E S 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF CASES 4 , 5 AND 6 
After having critiqued the conventional development thinking adopted by the post-
independence Algerian state in Chapter 6, and in sequence with the three case-
studies presented in the previous chapter, I now intend to 'evaluate' these cases in 
the light of the hypotheses I have proposed in chapter 3. At the same time, I will try 
to consolidate the foundations of the alternative development I am advocating in the 
contexts of participation, local organizations, and social learning. 
Nonetheless, I must again assert that, according to Goulet (1979: 557), although no 
full-blown theory or policy model can emerge from a small number of cases, some 
important lessons appear to be worthy of critical reflection. Thus, I do not pretend 
that a new vision of development will emerge from these cases, but theoretical 
contributions will be extracted out of their emergent properties. These are not new at 
the level of universal thinking, but they certainly represent innovations in the 
Algerian post-independence context. My concern here is that those who are 
criticizing plarming and suggest it should be transferred to the humanities' museum 
without proposing a viable alternative behave, in my opinion, like a doctor who tells 
his patient who has a headache to cut off his head. Radicalism does not solve human 
problems. 
In this respect, this chapter focuses on the verification of the set hypotheses of the 
study in the light of the presented cases. 
8 .1 Introduction to the study's hypotheses 
In this section, an alternative line of thinking for sustainable development, as 
supported by the three cases of the previous chapter, will be asserted through testing 
the hypotheses developed in sections 2.2.1 and 3.2, and reintroduced later in section 
6.1 of this book. 
There is no pretension that the three case-studies presented in the previous 
chapter are perfect examples of the complete fulfillment of the four hypotheses 
adopted for this study. This can be only achieved in the case of a very idealistic 
model which is rarely encountered in daily life. However, the main issue here is that 
one has to determine, at the onset of a given planned intervention, the actual 
situation of the evoked prerequisites, and to be aware that part of the planned 
activities are directed to the best optimization of these prerequisites. 
In this vein, these cases describe situations where social and human aspects, if 
taken into consideration, can increase the probability for the fulfillment of these pre-
requisites of successful development suggested by van Dusseldorp (1992:12). 
Moreover, according to Figure 3.2(1) in this book, verification of the fulfillment of 
any hypothesis among the four mentioned above requires first and foremost the 
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understanding and verification of the fulfillment of its three sub-hypotheses. This is 
what the following sections are about, wherein hypotheses testing, in contrast to 
Chapter 6 , will go one level lower by testing the three sub-hypotheses of each 
mentioned hypothesis. 
8.2 Development objectives are not determined by planners in an exclusively top-
down way and are always in accordance with beneficiaries' needs (HI) 
8 .2 .1 Genuine active participation of beneficiaries at earlier stages in the process of 
planned development improves problems identification and objectives formulation 
(Hll) 
Sustainable development requires that the orientation of a given development action 
- that is the problems it seeks to solve and the objectives it aims to achieve - must be 
accepted by all actors affected by this action. This statement puts the four major 
following issues into debate: 
1. How the dialogue about the orientation of development and the acceptance of this 
orientation by all actors be organized? 
2 . Who has a 'right' to take part in this debate? 
3 . Whose opinion among all participants has to be considered? 
4 . How are potential conflicts between 'basic" and "communal linking loops" (van 
Dusseldorp, 1 9 9 2 : 3 9 - 4 5 ) of the different actors mitigated in this debate? 
Answering these questions would lead the debate into a discussion about 
participation and how this concept - and way of thinking at the same time - would 
influence the orientation of a given development action. 
In the three cases presented in the previous chapter, setting the mechanisms of a 
large and active participation of all actors, such as the private farmers in the cereal 
production improvement project (Case No. 4) who were 'hitherto excluded', has 
prevented the waste of development efforts and helped orient the direction and 
approach of development which in return yielded more adherence from the 
beneficiaries as they felt more concerned about 'their' development. 
In Case No. 4 , the process of reorientation of the project's strategy through the 
participation of farmers in evaluation meetings and the creation of farmers' 
organizations in order to participate in a more organized way are good examples of 
the evidence that participation improves the outcome of a development action. This 
achievement meant to help the beneficiaries make room for themselves to partake in 
problems identification and objectives definition. Even though the project started 
with objectives set by planners, beneficiaries' participation in the evaluation 
meetings, and to a lesser extent in the implementation, gave them a valuable 
opportunity to re-plan the objectives of the development action and revisit the way it 
was implemented. 
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This is even more evident in the partnership framework developed by the CR-
HCDS and the pastoralists through 'contractualization' in the rangelands 
regeneration and conservation project (Case No. 5), where development objectives 
were negotiated and agreed upon before both parties signed the contract. 
In Case No. 4, farmers' participation, even in the middle of the project cycle, given 
that this project is based on a multi-phase pattern, allowed that problems 
identification and development objectives be revised and reassessed during the 
evaluation meetings. This helped the project to be properly reoriented and turned it 
into a model of développement à la carte. Thus, developing project monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms as basic instruments of a process of social learning, giving 
way to the farmers' knowledge to be put into discussions during evaluation 
meetings, played a significant role in improving problems identification and hence 
the definition of development objectives. 
Moreover, starting with a preliminary discussion about the problématique that the 
project would tackle in a meeting that gathered all potential stakeholders, such as in 
Case No. 5, has shown the influence exerted on the implementation of the project 
activities and the subsequent, highly significant results it achieved by the time of the 
mid-term evaluation. The enthusiastic reaction of the pastoralists towards the 
technology of fodder shrub plantation shows how their participation in the first and 
second meetings about the problématique, and the trustful collaboration developed 
between CR-HCDS staff and pastoralists, made the implementation easier and 
smoother. One can easily assume that their participation in the previous meetings, 
encouraged by the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner, made the project fit their 
needs. However, the great problem that arises here is that the success of some 
development actions depends largely on one or a few people, which could threaten 
the sustainability of these actions. 
Participation created the possibility to make people consensually agree about a set 
of objectives for the simple reason that the alternatives offered to farmers were very 
few. Although being diverse in terms of projects they had in mind, farmers and 
pastoralists presented in the case-studies of the previous chapter were all located in 
very harsh, arid, and semi-arid areas where livelihood alternatives were very 
limited. The livestock-cereal integration, was augmented by potato crops where 
water was affordable, as in Case No. 4, and/or the pastoral activity of raising sheep 
on the rangelands, given the necessity that these resources must be made 
sustainable, as in Cases Nos. 5 and 6, remain almost the sole alternatives available 
that rural populations can afford in these areas. So, this is what made all 'their' 
projects interlock without a need of a strong mediation mechanism (Long and van 
der Ploeg, 1995: 67), in comparison of what could have happened if these farmers 
were situated in more resource-rich areas. In their actual context, farmers and 
pastoralists could easily find 'their' projects reflected in the interventions indicated in 
the case-studies as their participation in problems identification and objectives 
definition shaped somehow these interventions and made them fit their own needs 
to a large extent. 
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In other words, the solution to rangeland degradation as in Cases Nos. 5 and 6 
was beyond the reach of any single social actor (pastoralist). It needed the 
combination of the efforts of many social actors (pastoralists, CR-HCDS staff, DSAs 
staff, etc.) to overcome the effects of this problem which hampers the livelihoods of 
some of them. Borrowing the concept of "hnking loop" from van Dusseldorp (1992: 
39-45) [see section 2.4.4 in this book], I suggest that a "communal hnking loop" was 
set in these areas in response to many similar "basic linking loops", and taking the 
form of a "formalized linking loop" proposed by the CR-HCDS, as reflected in Case 
No. 5. However, when this first "formalized linking loop" was determined to be 
unable to provide all the needed sustainable solutions for their problematic 
situation, social actors decided to complete it with another "communal" and thus 
"formalized lmking loop", the rangelands population education project (Case No. 6). 
Nevertheless, access to a forum where problems identification and objectives 
formulation, and participation to supposedly orient these issues towards the needs 
of the beneficiaries, is not sufficient per se. It needs to be complemented by a 're-
équilibrage' of the actors' interaction in the development decision-making arena by a 
democratized pattern that gives equal right to all actors in this arena. 
8.2.2 Genuine active participation of beneficiaries secures a required equilibrium of 
different rationalities in the development decision-making arena (H12) 
According to Goulet (1986:301-303; my italics), and as mentioned earlier in this book 
[see section 2.8 in this book], each development action brings into interaction in one 
way or another, three different rationalities: The political, the technical and the ethical 
(or humane), each of them trying to approach the others in a triumphal (superior), 
reductionist fashion. In other words, each tries to get the others to adopt its own 
favoured ground rules of dialogue. In most cases, this situation creates in most cases 
a conflict situation which can end-up with bad decisions being made. It goes without 
saying that this identifies the orientation and true meaning of participation among 
the 'hitherto excluded when a given rationality - other than ethical (or humane) - tries 
to use this concept as a means for mamtaining the on-going status-quo in its favour. 
Sustainable development requires not only the participation of the three 
rationalities in the decision-making arena of a development action, but also 
necessitates a real equilibrium and dialogue between these rationalities. This 
anticipates the resolution of potential conflict situations which hamper the 
development action and mainly occur when one rationality has recourse to force or 
violence to make another rationality comply with its desires and wishes. 
Situations described in the case-studies highlight how it is very possible to build 
the required consensus and equilibrium between the three rationalities when the 
political actor (political rationality) is not systematically supported and blindly 
followed by the technical actor (technical rationality), and/or when the latter allies 
with the beneficiaries (ethical - or humane - rationality) to work for the beneficiaries' 
interests, as it happened in Case No. 5 and, to a lesser degree, in Case No. 4. 
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However, the philosophy of any development action to be carried out in such harsh 
environments must be recalled here. This philosophy recommends to work in 
accordance of the beneficiaries' needs, as not working in this sense would exacerbate 
the problem of environmental degradation, as was demonstrated in the problématique 
of Case No. 5. In fact, if the political actor (political rationality) succeeded in 
dominating the management of rangelands, as it did following independence [see 
section 5.3] without appropriate institutional mechanisms to regulate access, use, 
and conservation of the range, it would be hopeless for the development agents 
(technical rationality) to bring pastoralists (ethical - or humane - rationality) to adhere 
to the process of revegetation with such an active participation. 
This became possible only with a new pattern of dialogue started between the 
technical and ethical rationalities that can influence the orientation of development, 
given the required blessing of such a dialogue pattern from the political actor 
(political rationality). This new pattern of dialogue brought the development staff 
(technical rationality) to co-operate with farmers and pastoralists (ethical - or humane -
rationality) towards the latter's own interests, using convincing discursive and 
competent manner rather than trying to enroll them in state development actions 
through force or coercion. This was not achieved without encountering problems 
from other actors that were found - maybe partially but certainly - among the 
political actors (political rationality), such as DSA directors. 
Moreover, the new Provincial Development System, settled by Case No. 4 (Act II) 
and the similar mechanisms set up by either Cases Nos. 5 and 6 are good examples 
of this new pattern of dialogue which avoided reductionism and/or linearism in 
development. This resembles very similar to what Goulet (ibid.: 305) suggests, that 
what is needed for sustainable development is a new model of authentic dialogue 
where exchanges of views and experiences are circular and reciprocal, and by no 
means vertical and reductionist [see Figure 8.2.2(1)]. 
Figure 8.2.2(1) - Interaction of three rationalities in a development action 
(Source: Goulet, 1986:305-306) 
WHAT IS 
Vertical Pattern: Reductionism 
WHAT OUGHT TO BE 
Circular Pattern: Mutuality 
Political OR 
Ethical 
Technical 
Political 
OR 
Political 
Technical 
ASSUMPTION 
Each rationality seeks to assert itself and win assent 
from others as to the priority of Its goals and approach 
ASSUMPTION 
Any form of knowledge Is partial and risks mistaking ttsslf 
for the whole, or dominating dlsooorae with other forme. 
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In such a situation of equilibrium, a mutually respectful discourse among diverse 
rationalities rests on a postulate gained from an evident experience of exchanging 
views and experiences so that the mutual understanding about the world around us 
might be improved. This equuibrium would result in an active respect for other 
views. This can be the only proper stance of development, given that development is 
eternally locked in a world of multiple realities, and would always remain 
compartmentalized if this perspective is not considered and implemented. 
But participation in problems identification, objectives definition, and the 
presence of a 're-équilibrage' of the actors' interaction in the development decision-
making arena are not enough for sustainable development, as these measures could 
be seen as gifts from the powerful actors to buy acquiescence from the weakest, and 
thus perpetuate the status-quo with little change. Permanently mamtaining these 
trends and reinforcing involvement of the beneficiaries in development actions 
require a sense of 'ownership' to be developed by these latter through the 
perpetuation of an increasing feeling of genuine participation in (self-)development. 
8.2.3 Objectives are formulated for increasing people's genuine active participation 
in their (self-)development (H13) 
Sustainable development requires social actors who are more keen to carry out the 
uninterrupted, permanent process of self-promotion by themselves. In this way, a 
process of beneficiaries' participation should be embedded in a self-sustaining cycle 
where the more participation is applied in development actions, the more it 
reinforces the active participation of the beneficiaries and the more it deepens its 
roots into the mentality of all actors. This reinforcement, as necessary as it is to 
achieve sustainable development, is especially emphasized for those who were 
'hitherto excluded' or taken as passive recipients of development. It is true that 
participation has a corollary in self-sufficiency and self-help, in opposition to 
assistedness and dependence on the state, as Nelson and Wright (1997a: 3) argue. 
The example of the pastoralists in both Cases Nos. 5 and 6 describe in perfect 
sequence this process: 
1. Pastoralists agreed on the development agenda by setting contractual 
relationships with the CR-HCDS; then, 
2. They founded their own associations, independent from the state-linked UNPA; 
and finally, 
3. As a consequence of active involvement and ownership, they started funding 
some activities. 
As a résumé, I propose that, according to Goulet (1979: 556), non-coerced, volunteer, 
genuine participation can only occur when all concerned parties can mobilize a 
decent sufficiency of goods which they need to feel fully human In other words, 
material well-being opens up possibilities for further development and consequently 
reinforces genuine participation. 
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Hypothesis HI is verified to a large extent because development objectives of the proposed cases 
were not exclusively determined by the planners in a top-down way but through a mutual dialogue 
between planners, implementers, and beneficiaries, and were in accordance with the real 
beneficiaries' needs. Although the objectives of some development actions were planned at the 
central level, they were re-planned at the local level during its implementation and/or through 
evaluation. 
8.3 Major needs of required knowledge about processes to be influenced by a 
development action are covered by different sources of knowledge (H2) 
8.3.1 Recognition of the importance of beneficiaries' knowledge in their (self-) 
development provides additional knowledge that is essential in the development 
theater (H21) 
Successful and sustainable development can occur only if all required knowledge 
about any process to be manipulated is gathered a priori. But, "knowledge is never 
complete and action is always necessary" (Korten, 1980, cited by Scoones, 1996a: 6). 
According to my suggestion about embedding the implementation of a development 
action into a learning process when this latter is based on a multi-phase pattern [see 
section 8.2.1 above], an additional part of the required knowledge can also be 
secured during the first steps of the project implementation, as shown by Case No. 4. 
In this way, participation appeared to be a good means of additional knowledge 
mobilization as far as it serves as a forum for free expression where the 'hitherto 
excluded' can express their feelings and provide their wisdom for project input to be 
used by others (planners, implementers, development agents, etc.). This additional 
knowledge is even more necessary as the planning of development actions is 
frequently based on "assumed causalities" (van Dusseldorp, 1995, pers. comm.), as 
Uphoff (1992: 397) mentions that "blueprints would not succeed because the 
situation was inherently uncertain and relations of cause and effect were 
probabilistic and contingent". 
Until 1992, private farmers, especially small-scale, and/or even the DASs, never 
had a chance to sit with technical staff or members of a project team during 
evaluation to express their opinions and to talk about their knowledge and wisdom. 
Once this so-called forum of expression of the 'beneficiaries' was created by some 
projects, objectives of development actions were reviewed and/or courses of actions 
modified in order to meet the desired goals set by the problématique as seen by the 
beneficiaries which the project had to tackle. Consequently, elements of the strategy 
to be adopted by the project were discussed, as in Case No. 5. 
Moreover, after this so-called forum was created, a genuine dialogue took place 
between farmers and development agents, reinforced by trustful interaction at the 
interface. Since then, exchange has been very fruitful, especially for development 
agents, as it appears that cultivation of cereal crops are not important per se for 
farmers, i.e. for their agronomic and/or economic aspects, as demonstrated in Case 
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No. 4,. But they are also of utmost importance as a basic feed source (straw) for their 
sheep. It was made clear that farmers design their strategy with the whole farming 
system in mind, that is a holistic vision. At the same time, planners and development 
agents viewed cereal crops as the first priority of the project, which was a rather 
reductionist vision. 
Above all, development agents and planners based their crop improvement 
strategy on yield, while farmers base their strategy on the extreme priority of income, 
which included their consideration of animals that needed to be fed. As matter of 
fact, farmers thought, in their conceptualization of income, that reducing the 
investment costs in the high-risk environments they live in was considered as an 
income improvement. A good justification for this is that fertilizer use was never 
enthusiastically adopted by farmers, although the decision was made to encourage 
this use through a short-term and zero-interest credit scheme provided by their 
CCLS co-operatives. 
This additional knowledge was needed to reorient the project, which then steered 
its intervention towards the farming system instead of trying to improve the crops 
while ignoring what was going at the farm level. 
Similarly, Cases Nos. 5 and 6 set up an adequate dialogue framework between 
development agents and pastoralists which helped the former to design their actions 
based on the knowledge gathered through discussions with pastoralists, especially 
pertaining to how rangelands were managed by indigenous institutions and how 
this way of managing the collective rangelands was less damaging for the 
environment and the natural resources. Thus, it became clear that any development 
action aimed at stopping degradation and natural resource depletion, which 
exclusively focus on activities of revegetation and/or fencing, would be hopeless 
unless appropriate (but not imported) institutional and managerial mechanisms for 
access, use and conservation of the rangelands were set up. 
Nevertheless, acknowledgment and consideration of the beneficiaries' knowledge 
will not achieve much per se unless it is incorporated into an overall process of 
setting up a permanent forum of mutual dialogue and learning aimed at producing 
corrective measures for development actions. 
8.3.2 Building a development interface based on dialogue and mutual learning 
produces the adapted knowledge required for processes to be influenced in the 
development theater (H22) 
The conventional philosophy of development is based on the postulate that planners 
and politicians assume they know what is good for the populations they have to 
plan and decide for. They assume they possess all necessary knowledge for planning 
and steering development and do not feel a necessity to 'triangulate' their 
knowledge and/or to exchange views and experiences through mechanisms of 
participation. However, there is evidence that many development actions conceived 
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on the basis of this thinldng did not achieve more than exacerbating the bad 
conditions of the beneficiaries these actions were planned for. 
On the contrary, sustainable development, especially in harsh areas where 
unpredictability and uncertainty prevail, requires that a process of mutual dialogue 
and learning between all actors of a development action is established. In the three 
cases presented in the previous chapter, the setting of a negotiation platform 
between the different actors of a development action has provided an adequate 
framework of mutual learning and dialogue in order to ensure adaptive 
management. The latter relies on principles and guidelines that will be used with 
great flexibility and a continuous process of learning. Its main foundation is that it 
accepts that "uncertainty and mdeterminacy are fundamental and central" (Scoones, 
1996a: 6). 
The many discussions I followed in the field, within the frame of Cases Nos. 5 and 
6, between pastoralists and development agents, reversed the information flow from 
the latter to the former, as it is in conventional development thinking in post-
independence Algeria. They brought lots of information to the development agents, 
as was indicated by the development agents themselves. The way these pastoralists 
discussed some issues and respond to questions was very interesting. For instance, 
when asked if privatization of the rangelands would solve the problem of 
degradation, they said: "Anna mlekna el ma mamleknach ettrab" (which means "our 
strategies are guided by water and not by land"). This means is that, in some specific 
cases, rangelands cannot be privatized and should remain under the ownership of 
the community. For them, some types of rangeland cannot be put into boundaries as 
far as, in some regions, it is the flooding of spring streams that determine the 
distribution of rangelands between the members of the community. So, the scheme 
cannot be fixed in space but it is as dynamic, as the water spring streams keep 
moving year after year. 
In another example, when asked why they annually sow their land with cereals, 
even though drought is always present, which lowers the probability of having a 
good harvest every year, they say "El harth douam oue essaba aouam" (which means 
"we sow our plots every year but we harvest a good yield only in some years"). Such a 
saying highlights the randomness of yield in such environments of rainfed 
agriculture that is highly correlated to the randomness of the climate. But in doing 
so, they sow their own seeds, which are made of a mixture of landraces, instead of a 
monoculture based on rIYVs and certified seeds as recommended by development 
agents. The rationale behind this practice is that whatever the climatic year, they can 
harvest sometihing, given the different traits of the cultivars in their mixture, while 
monoculture can give a good yield only when incidence of biotic and abiotic stresses 
is limited. 
In doing so, they perpetuate the use of an old knowledge, which is part of a socio-
cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation through proverbs, 
popular songs, and other social practices. Notwithstanding this popular culture that 
is present in all agricultural areas throughout the country, with some slight 
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differences between the regions, development agents recommend standardized, 
supposedly 'plastic' technologies that are supposed to increase productivity 
everywhere. I was told by a development agent that he spent three (3) years in 
working with pastoralists before he could understand the basics of their 'language'. 
This shows how it is difficult to realize a dialogue between actors who speak 
different 'languages', although this dialogue is extremely necessary for sustainable 
development. 
Another example of such a platform of mutual dialogue and learning is presented 
in Case No. 6. This concerns the evaluation group set up to evaluate the practical 
field-work of the pupils and which included development agents, school teachers, 
pastoralists and pupils themselves. As a matter of continuity, this evaluation exercise 
even penetrated the pastoralists' households where pupils applied what they were 
taught in school. As a consequence, a platform of mutual dialogue and learning was 
set up in the household between the father and the son or, more specifically, 
between the actual and future generations of pastoralists. As a matter of fact, some 
pastoralists claimed, in a very humoristic way, that the project had put some nasty 
ideas in the minds of their children which created some problems in the households 
between the fathers and their sons. In their meaning, the project taught the pupils 
how to negotiate with their fathers about the sustainability of 'their' ecosystem 
instead of blindly taking for granted their parent's view. 
Another example of such a framework of mutual dialogue and learning took place 
in the same project (Case No. 6 ) , between the CR-HCDS staff and the Regional 
Education Academy staff. After some hesitation on the latter part, the Academy 
Director and his staff encouraged the rapid expansion of the experiment in its second 
year ( 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 ) and promised that the results of the 'experiment' would be reported to 
the higher, central level of the national education system. 
Those different frameworks of mutual dialogue and learning completely reversed 
the situation of the conventional flunking of development wherein planners do not 
feel necessary to learn or even communicate with people they plan development 
actions for. 
Going back to the three rationalities mentioned in section 8 . 2 . 2 above, their 
equilibrium in a development action leads to a positive interaction of the different 
types of knowledge underlying these rationalities. The different types of knowledge 
will interact in way to bring complementarity and achieve mutual dialogue and 
learning in a sphere where no practitioner of a given knowledge will feel excluded 
or marginalized. Any kind of knowledge of whatever status, if not acknowledged to 
be partial, introduces the risk that its users (or advocates) develop a sense of self-
sufficiency or self-reference. This can be dangerous for the learning process that 
should be part of any development action seeldng sustainability 
Yet, acknowledgment and consideration of the beneficiaries' knowledge and the 
building of a forum of mutual dialogue and learning can only be effective if these 
actions aim to increase the efficiency of the set learning process through the use of 
the lessons learned from past experiences and anticipate future problems. This can 
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only be achieved when the so-called learning process takes its momentum in 
steering the development action towards the desired goals and in maneuvering 
against the constraints that can be encountered. Notwithstanding this, some informal 
evidence exists about situations where farmers participate and give their opinions 
but nothing is changed in the development action. 
8.3.3 Recognition of local/indigenous knowledge by other actors involved in the 
development theater increases the efficiency and effectiveness of the learning 
process (H23) 
When participation develops into alternative thinking in development actions, 
errors, if any, are accepted as part of a trial-and error pattern, and the centrality of 
uncertainty about the future is acknowledged. Errors are thus made visible and 
courses of action are corrected on the spot, at the right time. When monitoring and 
evaluation are undertaken in a participatory manner, an in-built learning process 
takes place and development actions are correctly steered towards the needs of the 
beneficiaries. This refutes the long-standing assumption that Western science and 
technology, in the sense of scientific-rational planning and blueprint plans, that 
engulfed the development process in the past, can provide remote-planned solutions 
for conditions of high unpredictability and immense variability (Scoones, 1996a: 7). 
However, a real learning process is the one that strikes a cadence when it steers a 
development action efficiently towards achieving expansion. Case No. 5 shows this 
well. 
In fact, when pastoralists participated in the elaboration of the problématique of 
their situation, they understood perfectly how other causes beyond their reach can 
affect their areas either directly or indirectly, and sometimes translated this into their 
own behaviour. In doing this, they made the task of development agents easier, and 
facilitated the adoption of alternative technologies that take the particularities of 
their conditions into account. As a matter of fact, the understanding of their 
problématique requires that pastoralists develop, first of all, a capacity for self-
reflecting upon their living conditions with the help of CR-HCDS staff as facilitators. 
The consequence of this exercise was that pastoralists started to feel more concerned 
and developed a sense of ownership towards the development action and decided to 
work for their own development (or better to say, self-promotion) with the help of 
the CR-HCDS staff. As Goulet (1979: 556) says, the main source of alternative 
development strategies remains the inventiveness of human communities when they 
devise strategies to cope with nature. 
j Hypothesis HI is verified to a large extent because major needs of required knowledge about 
J processes to be influenced by a development action were covered through the complementarity of 
j different sources and types of knowledge. However, as knowledge can never be wholly complete, an 
j in-built learning system in a development action can bring about some flexibility into the 
\..?®.9}ufion..9fsuch an action and secure the achievement of the set objectives ataleastcost. 
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8.4 All resources needed for the achievement of the objectives of the development 
action are available and fairly distributed among the actors (H3) 
8.4.1 Genuine active participation of beneficiaries opens better opportunities for the 
'excluded' to benefit from the resources made available via development actions 
(H31) 
In its social dimension, sustainable, participatory development would require a self-
sustaining trade-off between the system of public resources distribution and access, 
and the basic needs of different segments of the population. If more resources are 
allowed for the less needy segments at the time when the more needy people are 
receiving less or nothing at all, it is quite illusory to think about sustainability, given 
that acquiescence from these latter segments and their support of such a pattern of 
resources distribution are illusory. 
One of the typical characteristics of development actions in the context of post-
independence Algeria is the transformation of development logic into a rent-seeking 
logic, which engendered an extremely unfair distribution of the public resources by 
the use of largely developed patron-client mechanisms and the expansion of 
corruption [see sections 1.3. and 4.3]. In this way, each beneficiary with the privilege 
of being enrolled in a development action would rather seek how many resources he 
could snatch out of this action rather than how much he should contribute to this 
action to participate in the development of his farm or household. A logic of 
opportunism developed vis-a-vis public resources, based on the spreading culture of 
the 'rentier' state. 
In the agricultural sector, the state had created the Union Nationale des Paysans 
Algériens (UNPA) which was mostly infiltrated by opportunistic 'pseudo-farmers' 
and/or agricultural labourers in order to implicitly perpetuate this 'culture of non-
development', reinforce the pattern of rent-seeking, and sustain state control over 
rural populations. 
When some concerns were raised about the necessity of more professionally-
oriented farmer organizations, leaders and advocates of UNPA were aroused by 
interference in their own 'business', which could end up with a reduction of their 
control over the agricultural sector and induce a redistribution of public resources. 
Case No. 4 and, to a lesser degree, Case No. 5, described these aspects in the 
previous chapter. However, when the concretization of this idea was on its way, 
many leaders of UNPA local and regional structures succeeded in getting the 
leadership, or at least having a seat in the executive councils, of these new 
associations, but fortunately not in the project region. It happened exactly as van 
Dusseldorp (1981: 81) predicted when he warned about the ways participation at the 
local level can be manipulated. 
Other examples in the case-studies presented follow this trend closely. However, 
this did not discourage some pioneers, such as the CR-HCDS Regional 
Commissioner, to go against this trend and attempt to develop, with the co-
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operation of farmers, a real logic of development, even when public resources were 
involved. They preferred to 'swim upstream' instead of maintain the logic of rent-
seeking practices, which benefited only the powerful segment of social groups (the 
privilegentsia). In this sense, the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner faced enormous 
problems and pressure from some DSA directors, and even some officials from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, because of this new, fair and just way of 
distributing public resources, a behaviour not in line with the 'usual' practice. 
In doing so, he meant to 'open up' a closed system (Cleaves, 1980: 284; Heywood, 
1997: 340; my italics), that monopolized economic and social power in society and 
retained full discretion over policy initiatives, and the policies of which generally 
responded to the interests of the group that dominated the government machinery. 
However, the opening of resource use opportunities for the 'excluded' may not 
suffice in conditions of economic recession or when resources become increasingly 
scarce, especially when the goal is autonomy and independence from the state. There 
is thus a need for a complementary action of mobilizing additional local resources, 
principally from the beneficiaries themselves. But this would require the 
development of trust and accountability between the beneficiaries and the 
development executive agency. 
8.4.2 Genuine active participation of beneficiaries secures a better involvement of the 
latter in local resources mobilization and their fair distribution (H32) 
Sustainable development requires a setf-susteining process that makes beneficiaries 
autonomous in terms of financing development instead of a continuous dependence 
on 'mendicancy' and assistedness. This is now a new vision of development in post-
independence Algeria, wherein the state was seen for three decades as the unique 
provider of resources for development. Counting on oneself is the new leitmotiv of 
such a development (or self-promotion) vision. 
However, trust is needed to bridge the differences between the development 
agency - be it public, semi public or private - and the development beneficiaries. In 
the context of the Algerian bureaucracy, it is not an easy business for farmers and 
pastoralists to trust any staff from public agencies for many reasons that have been 
already described in this book. 
Notwithstanding this, the cases presented show some examples where local 
populations started playing an active role in mobilizing additional local resources 
for development actions after they developed a sense of trust towards the 
development agency. Cases Nos. 5 and 6 show how pastoralists, either individually 
and/or collectively, mobilized significant amounts of their financial and material 
resources to support development actions implemented by the CR-HCDS, after they 
gained trust in the Regional Commissioner and his subordinate staff. Of course, 
some traits indubitably influenced this situation, such as the morale and probity of 
the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner and the hard work carried out by his staff 
daily. However, this was not unproblematic for the latter, who were faced with great 
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Table 8.4.2(1) - Realization rate at the mid-term evaluation of Case No. 5 (1994-97) 
Wilayate Pastoral plantation Fenced Well creat * Job Total 
Collect. Individ. Total areas Dig. Equip. creation funds 
(ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) (unit) (unit) (day) (103AD) 
Oum-El-Bouaghi 109 49 91 40 80 30 142 91 
Batna 69 3 50 87 40 11 68 54 
Tebessa 10 130 46 0 77 17 24 24 
Khenchela 109 55 93 7 70 20 118 87 
Souk-Ahras 33 212 87 7 120 20 62 59 
Total 57 105 71 27 76 19 72 57 
Source: This study1 
Nevertheless, providing resources for the 'excluded' and mobilizing additional local 
resources should not be seen as temporary results of a given development action. Such 
endeavours must be seen as opportunities to sustain genuine participation through 
developing a sense of 'ownership' of the beneficiaries' development for such similar 
development actions. This ownership is the acceptance by all beneficiaries that 
genuine participation depends on their will not only to mobilize their own resources 
for the development actions but to admit also a fair distribution between all 
beneficiaries. 
8.4.3 Availability of resources and their fair distribution sustains the genuine active 
participation of the beneficiaries in their (self-)development (H33) 
In the case of post-independence Algeria, an egalitarian society emerged at the time 
of independence and the state took a great responsibility in stiatifying this society 
(Quandt, 1998:110). One of the mechanisms that was used in this endeavour was the 
pattern of resource distribution. We all know the results of this approach, based on a 
rent-seeking logic in the field of development, but the huge gap that was created 
between the rich and the poor within three decades of independence must be 
mentioned, which is still growing, especially since the Structural Adjustment 
Programme was implemented. 
Some of the case-studies presented in the previous chapter highlight these issues. 
In Cases Nos. 5 and 6, pastoralists experienced difficulties trusting the CR-HCDS 
Regional Commissioner and his staff from the beginning, when the pilot action 
started in 1992, as a result of their previous experience with the state bureaucracy in 
charge of development. At the beginning of this collaboration, both parties were 
1 Calculations made upon Tables 7.2.1(2) and 7.2.4(1) brought in section 7.2. 
pressure and resistance from the technical staff of DSAs of the wilayate of Tebessa 
and Batna, where were located the lowest realizations of Case No. 5, as the results of 
the mid-term evaluation demonstrated [see Table 8.4.2(1) below]. 
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very cautious. But when pastoralists experienced the new vision developed by the 
CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner on the way development can be managed in 
accordance with their preferences, they began to trust the agency more and showed 
no hesitation to participate in funding some activities of development, very slowly at 
the beginning but more actively later on. 
In this respect, sustainable development requires that beneficiaries take the real 
'ownership' of development actions. The best way, in my opinion, to achieve this is 
to participate directly in the whole cycle of a given development action. Genuine 
participation in such a context takes the form of partnership, as shown by Cases Nos. 
5 and 6, and, to a lesser extent, Case No. 4, where different actors hold dialogues, 
determined the common views through consensus of what development should be 
and shared the costs of development in the light of an equitable distribution of the 
benefits. Mobilizing local resources by the beneficiaries themselves should be seen 
from this angle. As a consequence, the process of participation becomes more and 
more sustained and consolidated, and not only taking the image of a 'political 
luxury' used now and then, especially when social turmoil begins. 
One of the consolidating forces of this process of participation resided in the 
incremental involvement of the beneficiaries in some projects as individuals, then 
founding their new independent associations [see section 8.2.3] and finally 
participating in funding some development activities as follows: 
1. Pastoralists put their own resources toward mamtaining the functioning of their 
associations, instead of depending on public subsidies as many associations do; 
2. They participated in CR-HCDS equipment repairs (trailed water-tank), even 
though they were public property; 
3. They bought a video camera and a portable computer for the CR-HCDS in order 
to improve the quality of the organization output and make it fit to their needs; 
and, 
4. Finally, they mobilized some of their own resources to publish a booklet that has 
been - and will be - used as a didactic support in the educational action of the 
primary school pupils (their children), i.e. the future generation that will take 
charge of their own legacy. 
Anyone who followed these development actions, especially Cases Nos. 5 and 6, 
would see a kind of self-strengthening process of genuine participation. The more 
important of these was the financial contribution from the pastoralists, either 
individually and/or collectively, the more participation became active, increased in 
significance and expanding, and the more pastoralists felt an increasing 'ownership' 
of the development action. 
Hypothesis H3 is verified to a large extent because all resources needed for the achievement of a 
development action objectives were available and fairly distributed to the dissent of some 
opportunistic rent-seekers. However, participation of beneficiaries with their own resources had 
palliated any shortcomings from the state apparatus and improved the accountability of the 
i i lSS^SE?!^ 
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8.5 The political will to use the required resources for a given development action 
is concretized in order to achieve the formulated objectives ( H 4 ) 
8 .5 .1 Genuine active participation of beneficiaries requires their increased 
involvement at all levels of the development decision-making arena ( H 4 1 ) 
Conventional development thinking, combined with the authoritarian character of 
the regime, made its development actions less accountable to local populations, and 
ignorance of local conditions led to a lack of commitment on the part of the intended 
beneficiaries (Feeney, 1 9 9 8 : 9 ) . But sustainable development requires strategies that 
are more inclusive for the beneficiaries (Feeney, ibid.: 1 0 ) , either at the level of 
human involvement as well as the use of knowledge. Participation is one of these 
strategies. 
Participation in development actions can be part of a broad sense of public 
participation' which can be defined, according to Feeney (ibid.), as an opportunity 
for citizens and public and private organizations to express their opinions on policy 
goals or to have their priorities and needs integrated in decisions made about 
development actions. 
Moreover, participation has played a significant role in increasing public 
awareness and concern about development, more particularly on social, ethical and 
environmental issues. 
These 'theoretical' statements, which can be found in a great number of references, 
were, to a large extent, supported by the cases presented in the previous chapter. 
Case No. 4 shows how stepwise, year after year, and phase after phase, the 
involvement of the beneficiaries increased steadily through, among others, their 
participation in the evaluation meetings. It has to be said that these evaluation 
meetings were really a decision-making arena and not only a review of the results 
and a proposal of recommendations as a conventional evaluation would be. 
Moreover, in Cases Nos. 5 and 6 , awareness of the actual and future pastoralists 
was increased to the extent that they started feeling concerned towards 'their' 
surrounding ecosystems, and undertook actions to rehabilitate and preserve them. 
In these terms, participation should lead to the ownership of the development action 
which goes hand in hand, especially when the environment is concerned, with the 
renowned slogan "Think globally, act locally". 
More than that, Case No. 6 shows an mteresting example of development that 
Ackoff ( 1 9 8 4 : 1 9 5 ) describes as learning and as helping people how to learn for 
themselves. Pupils are educated not only about the preservation of their ecosystems 
but about negotiation tricks as well. This process of emancipation will prepare them 
to enter in negotiations with any body who might threaten their ecosystem, and 
consequently, their hvelihoods and living conditions. Participatory development 
transforms the previously passive human beings into active subjects creating their 
own history (Goulet, 1 9 7 9 : 5 5 6 ) . 
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But achieving this increased involvement of beneficiaries in the decision-making 
arena needs a great change in the political system of an authoritarian regime. This 
requires, in fact, a real process of democratization of social life. 
8.5.2 Democratization of social life sustains a genuine active participation of 
beneficiaries in their (self-)development (H42) 
If we attempt to go through the concept of democracy and its relation to 
participation, we find that this concept is strongly related to the extent human rights 
are secured and respected within a given society. It is not an idealistic view to say 
that genuine participation goes hand in hand with the practice of the basic 
democratic rights of a person, be it moral or physical. These rights, which represent 
the conditions for popular participation, are freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of opinion and 
expression, the right of all to take part in the government of their country, and of 
equal access to public services (De Gaay Fortman, 1993:14). 
De Gaay Fortman (ibid.) compares these rights to the old Roman rule "Quod omnes 
tangit debet ab omnibus approbari" (which means "what touches all has to be approved by 
all"). If any decision is about to be made and its effects will affect given segments of 
the population, it is an ethical necessity to open up opportunities for these segments 
to be part of and/or influence such a decision. It is in this respect that some voices 
arose in Algeria when the government decided to sign a SAP agreement with IMF, 
saying it had to be put to a popular referendum. 
In Algeria, the creation of free, independent (not under the UNPA umbrella) 
farmers associations became possible since the early 1990s, encouraged by some 
reasons related to the political situation described earlier in this book [see sections 
1.3 and 4.3]. More than that, this associative movement can also be seen as part of the 
consequences of the economic chaos of which the population started feeling the 
effects in the mid-1980s and which gave rise to the popular uprisings of October 
1988. Following that, a multipartism democracy was declared by the new 1989 
constitution, and the freedom of association, among other democratic rights, was 
recognized and legalized. 
Case No. 4 shows that the region of Sétif was the first province in the country that 
saw the creation in 1991 of an independent farmers' association after four years of 
'social engineering' work of the project. In the last run, this movement yielded the 
creation of the National and Provincial Chambers of Agriculture which gave the 
right to farmers to participate in the political decision about the agricultural sector. 
Of course, the representativeness of these associations is still questionable, but it has 
to be remarked that none could have imagined that, before this movement started, 
private farmers, other than UNPA leaders, would participate in meetings at the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and at the Directions des Services Agricoles 
(DSAs) at the province level, when important decisions concerning the agricultural 
sector are taken 
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Case No. 5 shows other kinds of associations that were successfully created 
because they were not clashing with the remnants of the old tribal order. The 
pastoralists' associations that I visited (and met their leaders) in the Eastern Steppe 
Rangelands were more representative as they were small-scale, their members 
belonged to the same tribal fraction, and their leadership democratically elected as 
testified by the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner and his subordinate staff. Every 
year, they actively participated in setting the action plan with the CR-HCDS. These 
associations are completely different, in 'organic' terms, from the ones promoted by 
the state since independence for being more cosmopolitan, aiming at dissolving the 
tribal barriers. This cosmopolitanism was a favourite tool of an illegitimate state in 
its attempt to stratify the society and build up an 'artificial' national unity. 
Participation gives citizens - acknowledged as members of the civil society, 
particularly the poorest - a chance to not only discuss development plans with 
government officials and donors, but to devise strategies of action as well. 
Participation is then both a development tool and an essential component of the 
democratization process (Feeney, ibid.: 10). It is for this purpose that a contingency 
of development aid imposed by donors on recipient countries to promote democracy 
and respect for human rights has become a new support for participatory 
development, as Feeney (ibid.: 12) suggests. 
In fact, there is a kind of dialectic of mutual reinforcement between participation 
and democracy. Participation requires democratization of social life to be played in 
its entire, genuine role. On the other hand, genuine participation is the indicator of a 
process of democratization, and the instrument that is needed for this process to be 
reinforced to the point of irreversibility and to avoid situations of 'democracie de 
fagade'. Participation is thus the concrete side of a conceptualization of democracy on 
the basis of Abraham Lincoln's definition "Government of the people, by the people 
and for the people" (De Gaay Fortman, 1993:10). 
However, achieving increased beneficiaries' involvement in the decision-making 
arena through a real process of democratization of social life will not suffice to 
guarantee a democratized access to public resources. In fact, such a process of 
democratization should be crowned by an institutional process of decentralization to 
strengthen a 'democratized' access and use of resources. 
8.5.3 Political will to use the required resources for people's development is secured 
through decentralization of the decision-making (H43) 
After independence, Algeria adopted a centralized economic planning system for 
many reasons that were understandable at that time. As paradoxical as it could be, 
the national political leadership wanted to give it a popular participatory 'face' 
through the elections of Communal, Provincial and National Popular Assemblies 
(APCs, APWs and APN). After almost three decades, 'popular-disguised' 
centralization, both with top-down, dirigist intervention and strong state control 
through a huge, inefficient bureaucratic apparatus and para-statals, undermined by 
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rent-seeking and corruption, yielded the results that I have presented at length in 
Chapter 4. Nevertheless, many people, either in the Algerian political sphere and/or 
the bureaucracy, still believe that centralization brought positive results and good 
achievements. In a sense, one has to be fair with the post-independence state in 
his/her analysis. In the case of Algeria, there were both positive achievements and 
negative results, but the balance is leaning towards the latter. 
Since the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, another pattern of a more 
efficient development planning and administration approach came into being as 
society moved towards a pluralist democracy and a market economy. Consequently, 
the government smoothly endeavoured a process of decentralization, without 
calling it as such and without defining the objectives of such a process. In this 
respect, development planning and administration are presently still in the 
transition phase. Decisions and plans can be made both local and regional levels and 
then aggregated at the national level - this is well described by Case No. 5 - but 
financial management is still centralized. It is said that the decentralization of this 
should be the next step in the government process. As a matter of fact, we recently 
received at ITGC some instructions about preparing our nine experimental stations 
to take over the headquarters tasks of finance and budget management from 1999 
onwards. 
It is in this context that the CR-HCDS could manage to design its own project 
(Case No. 5) with its own vision on development based on 'contractualized' 
participation. Once the project was adopted by the HCDS and the whole Great 
Works Programme accepted by both the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and 
the Ministry-Delegation of Planning, the CR-HCDS received a notice indicating the 
amount of resources allocated for the project. The implementation started by the CR-
HCDS and decisions about the distribution of the available resources were made 
locally, based on the discussions between development agents and pastoralists. 
However, when it came to execute the financial disbursements, the CR-HCDS had to 
rely on the HCDS headquarters who followed a centralized procedural system 
which, although less dramatic than some years before, is still hampering the conduct 
of development actions. Even the delay of paying wages and salaries of project 
employees I mentioned in section 7.2.4 could have created a delay in the project 
activities, if the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner and his staff did not convince 
them to continue their work. Similarly, the acquisition of equipment for the wells 
dug by the project was delayed because of the low process of tendering that was 
centralized at the HCDS headquarters. Both examples can be seen as negative effects 
in this transitional period of the decentralization process. 
Nonetheless, it has to be said that resources of the project were fairly distributed 
by the CR-HCDS, though some DSA directors tried to influence it by redirecting the 
process of resources distribution in 1995 and 1997, aiming to influence the scheduled 
political elections. This explains the motives of the 'alignment' of some DSA directors 
in order to create problems for the CR-HCDS Regional Commissioner with the 
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
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Even though it can not be advanced as a robust theory, decentralization of 
resource management at the local level helped people to improve the access of the 
excluded to public resources through a democratized access, supported by the 
morality of the head and staff of the executive agency. 
j "Hypothesis H4 is verified to a large extent because the political mil to use the required resources \ 
| for a given development action was concretized in many ways in order to achieve the formulated j 
j (explicit) objectives. But this political will was not a gift from the powerful, given that external j 
j and internal pressures for change were behind this, although some powerful actors tried to \ 
USSHTE^StS an& maneuver to maintain them-goingstat^-qwjor aslong^asvossMe^ ] 
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A F T E R T H E O B S O L E S C E N C E O F T H E C O N V E N T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T 
T H I N K I N G , W H A T C O M E S N E X T ? 
In the previous chapters, I introduced two different sets of development actions 
designed and implemented in post-independence Algeria under different socio-
political settings. Both sets were tested against a number of hypotheses (and sub-
hypotheses for the second set presented in Chapter 7) that I derived from four pre-
requisites for sustainable development (van Dusseldorp, 1992: 12). The aim was to 
fix the same criteria of comparison in order to demonstrate where the differences 
between the two proposed sets of case-studies are located. 
In Chapter 6,1 assert my dissenting opinion about the conventional development 
thinking adopted by the post-independence state in Algeria, and showed the 
shortcomings of this philosophy. It is not necessary to recall the disastrous results of 
this extremely exclusive development vision sustained by a 'rentier' state which 
favoured exclusion of the many for the profit of the few. However, in Chapter 8 ,1 
shed some light on the basic 'items' of an alternative development view based on 
participation, local organizations and social learning, and showed how this view made 
development actions more responsive to the needs and preferences of the 
beneficiaries. It is thus time in this chapter to round-up the research process by 
answering the general research and sub-research questions I formulated in Chapter 
3. Moreover, I shall sum up the insights that I derived from this work in the form of 
recommendations, and highlight the main differences between these two 
development visions. 
The motive of writing this chapter in a way so that the implications for policy and 
planning should be highlighted is motivated by my conviction that something needs 
to be done about the instrument of development, i.e. the project, not only as a 
concept but surely as a development tool. This is even more important for the 
research process itself in order to avoid an open-end story, given that "analysis of 
pressing practical problems without producing a workable prescription seems 
academically epicurean" (Smith, 1988). 
In this order, after answering the research question and sub-questions enunciated 
in Chapter 3, I shall revisit some concepts which constitute the conceptual 
framework I designed in Chapter 2. Finally, I shall conclude this chapter with a 
general discussion on the post-development era, given that significant evidence 
exists which supports that the conventional development dunking of post-
independence Algeria, as an absolute view of progress and modernism, is gone 
obsolete. 
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9.1 Rounding-up the research process: The answer of the research questions 
9.1.1 Recalling the research questions 
Insofar as I mentioned in Chapter 3, the main condition of making the outcome(s) of 
a development action as sustainable as possible remains the fulfillment of the four 
pre-requisites mentioned in sections 2.2.3 and 3.2 and their related conditions. 
However, I underscored that the sustainability of the outcomes of a given 
development action is posited here as being in line with the interests of the 
'excluded', the disadvantaged segments of the population that are supposedly 
labeled the 'development beneficiaries'. 
Hence, I mentioned in Chapter 3, the pre-requisites and conditions of 
sustainability rely to a large extent on the centrality of the beneficiaries' knowledge, 
and the importance of participation of these beneficiaries in their (self-)development. 
It was thus opportune to problematize how the lack of beneficiaries' participation 
and their knowledge in steering a given development action towards their needs 
and preferences can have a negative impact on the sustainability of development's 
outcomes. Thus, I proposed a reformulation of a primarily-suggested research 
question as follows: 
How can beneficiaries' participation and knowledge improve their steering of a development 
action toward the target of yielding sustainable outcomes? 
However, although I considered that beneficiaries' participation and knowledge was 
a necessary condition for a sustainable (self-)development, it was not a sufficient 
condition yet, given that the so-called beneficiaries are not completely independent 
yet vis-a-vis other potential actors acting in the development theater. They are, in 
fact, still strongly depending on actors that were - and still are - self-referent for 
being self-impressed by their rationality and the 'scientificaUty' of their knowledge, 
such as planners, researchers, and development staff. Availability and consideration 
of beneficiaries' knowledge in the process of planned development would mean very 
little if its importance is not really acknowledged, and its use in the development 
field is not considered, by these latter actors. In general, I suggested that without 
learning from the past failures they planned, implemented, and evaluated, and/or 
from on-going development actions, it proves elusive to open a debate with these 
actors on issues like beneficiaries' participation and knowledge. In this context, I 
stated that beneficiaries' participation (either individually and/or collectively 
through local organizations) and knowledge, as essential features in the 
development theater, cannot much improve the present situation of development 
actions if not sustained by a social learning process that is acknowledged and 
supported by all actors whose interests are at stake in the development theater. 
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Hence, I suggest the final formulation of the research questions as Box 9.1.1(1) below 
shows: 
I Box 9.1.1(1) - The general research and sub-research questions of the study ] 
GQ. How can the (direct and indirect) participation of the beneficiaries and the social learning ability 
of diverse actors acting in the development theater secure sustainable achievements of a people-
centered planned development action? 
Ql. To what extent and when is participation of the beneficiaries required in order to steer 
development actions towards their (sélf-)devélopment? 
Q2. Which role(s) can local organizations play in the beneficiaries ' steering of development actions? 
Q3. Which mechanisms are required to make monitoring and evaluation play the role of a learning 
process in steering development actions? 
Q4. Can the design of a practical methodology be proposed according to the issues advocated in this 
study, such as participation, local organizations, and social learning? 
Q5. What might be the shortcomings of this methodology and what political, institutional, and socio-
cultural pre-requisites are needed for such a methodology to work? 
9.1.2 Answering the sub-research questions 
9.1.2.1 To what extent and when is participation of the beneficiaries required in order to 
steer development actions towards their (self-) development? 
Before answering this question, I first need to mention that a large community of 
development practitioners and thinkers would agree on the three following 'facets' 
of the conventional thinking of development as it has been applied during the 'age of 
development' (Sachs, 1992b) by the post-independence Algerian state, and which can 
be characterized as follows: 
1. When development created wealth (mostly derived from the oil rent), the poorer 
and weaker segments of the society where excluded from the distribution of this 
wealth, or, as in very few cases, benefited very little from it. 
2. When the 'screw' of public expenditures was turned, supposedly because of debt 
crisis and austerity, but really because of bad governance, the richer and more 
powerful segments of the society were 'protected' from the austerity programme, 
or, as in very few cases, withstood it with very limited damage. 
3. When popular uprisings took place against the injustice of the distribution of 
wealth, since October 1988, or the austerity measures, it was solely the populace 
that was the first and the last to pay the tribute. 
These so-called facets introduce one of the basic contradictions found in the 
development philosophy applied by the post-independence state in Algeria. The 
distribution of the created wealth concerned only the few, while the support of the 
austerity measures implied by the Structural Adjustment Programme mostly 
2 8 6 RE-HUMANIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
concerned the many. A slight measure of ethics and equity would have dictated that 
the ones who benefited more from the conventional development iminking should 
have been the ones that would have supported the required austerity more. 
In this order, I dare to suggest that a genuine sustainable development that met 
an appropriate trade-off of the "critical triangle of sustainability" (Oram et ah, 1998: 
1), as mentioned in section 2.2.2. in this book, would have surely yielded better 
outcomes by being more responsive to the needs of this society and benefited 
equitably to all members of this society. Hence, it would not only have made the 
'developing society' of Algeria autonomous towards the IMF and the World Bank, 
but it would have also engendered a fair distribution of whatever result the 
development process produced, i.e. the created wealth would have been equally 
distributed among all members of society and austerity, if any, would have been 
equally supported by all members too. 
However, this 'model' would have been easier to apply if mechanisms of 
participation, among others, were set up in order to allow each member of the 
society to have, either directly or indirectly, a say in decisions that affect his/her 
present life and future. 
Why, however, did participation become so important in the post-independence 
Algerian context? As the comparison of the two sets of the development actions 
presented in Chapters 5 and 7 demonstrated, participation would have taken the 
following different connotations that I shall try to review hereafter. 
First, in the context of post-independence Algeria, a self-proclaimed, authoritarian 
state adopted not only a political monopoly by setting up a one-party system in 
1962, not taking the dissenting opinions of its constituencies into consideration, but it 
also established, as a consequence, an economic and social monopoly that carried out 
the process of development. A logic of clientelism, rent-seeking and opportunism 
was thus developed as the culture of the state apparatus, with all the waste of 
national wealth that it induced. As a result of this 'culture', according to Quandt 
(ibid..: 116-117), 
What was once a relatively egalitarian society with a strongly egalitarian ethos has become 
much more differentiated and stratified. . . . During the 1980s estimated income distribution 
showed that Algeria's lowest 40% of households received about 18% of its income. The top 20% 
was almost seven times better off than the bottom 20%. . . . Other countries with less wealth 
actually did better in producing human development' with their resources.... It also shows a 
typical pattern of oil-rich countries' failure to translate that wealth into social progress. 
In such a context, a process of genuine participation in the design, implementation 
an evaluation of development actions, which would have undeniably born an 
expansion into the sphere of public affairs, would have sustained transparency and 
thus accountability of the state apparatus towards its constituencies. It would have 
helped to avoid transforming the 1970s welfare state into the "black decade' rentier 
one. 
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Secondly, in the context of post-independence Algeria, policy-makers and 
planners made themselves stubbornly self-referent, having no need to evaluate their 
policies or to listen to other opposing views. This arrogant behaviour prevented a 
real learning process from taking place, and produced a Structural Adjustment 
Programme with an inherent austerity in a country that can easily be labeled as one 
of the richest ones of the African continent. A genuine participatory mechanism in 
this context would have facilitated a better steering of development towards the 
needs of all members of the society, especially when acknowledged and supported 
by politicians, poKcy-makers and planners. 
Third, in the context of the post-independence Algeria, the agricultural R & D 
system developed and implemented its development agenda in an extraordinary 
amnesia and ignorance of what characterized the agricultural sector in Algeria. The 
cases of cereal seed improvement (Case No. 2) and of collective rangelands 
improvement (Case No. 3), presented in Chapter 5, describe how these development 
actions started and where they ended up. The slight participation of the clients of the 
seed system, and/or the populations living in the rangelands in setting up the 
research agenda would have helped avoid such distinguished failures and a waste of 
public resources. 
Fourth, in the context of post-independence Algeria, and especially during the 
'black decade', the authoritarian, 'rentier' state, having disrupted dialogue with its 
constituencies and undermined by the interests of its different clans, developed 
exclusion either as a development model and as a culture of behaviour towards its 
constituencies. This was the 'summit' of the negation of the citizenship concept. In 
this frame, participation, as the consecration of citizenship as a unique reference to 
state-society relationships, is synonymous with taking part in any political decision-
making arena, as suggests Quandt (1998:4), 
It is through political action that trade-offs among competing values are made in societies. And 
it is through political institutions that the rules for acquiring and using power are established. 
The establishment of participatory mechanisms would have been made possible only 
if the two most dominant rationalities in the development decision-making arena, 
that are the political and technical ones, allied together to evaluate their development 
philosophy. In doing so, they could have considered the limitations of their own 
vision, and showed their willingness to reinterpret their own reading of reality in the 
light of alternative readings (Goulet, 1986: 305) that such genuine, sincere 
participatory mechanisms would have allowed. Consequently, this would have 
meant more room for the third rationality - the beneficiaries' ethical or humane one -
to play its required role for a more successful, sustainable development. By reversing 
the reductionism and abdication that generated poor development decisions, the 
equilibrium of the three rationalities in the decision-making arena tends to promote, 
as Goulet (ibid..) suggests, 
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An active examination of the epistemological assumptions, procedural preferences, and criteria 
for norm-setting which place their stamp on all disciplines or special rationalities. 
In the Algerian context, participation became an unavoidable mechanism at the 
moment the gap between the rich and the poor, although relatively insignificant at 
independence, increased drastically, as mentioned earlier in this section and section 
4 . 3 . 1 , and became unbearable. There is no doubt that this gap was an outcome of the 
conventional development drinking adopted and implemented by the post-
independence state. The underlying process of widening this gap took the form of a 
social deprivation of the many through an irresponsible management of natural 
resources, in addition to the problem of degradation, and the exploitative use of 
national economic growth through an unfair distribution pattern imposed by the 
few. The call for participation was made louder during the popular uprisings of 
October, 1 9 8 8 , but the pouvoir remained deaf to this call. 
In fact, the pouvoir in Algeria, blinded by the interests of its different lobbying 
groups, remained unwilling to change its policy and carried on controlling any 
participatory attempt that would give voice to the 'hitherto excluded', enforcing its 
stance through mtimidation and reprisals. Instead of true popular reforms, it 
adopted in 1 9 8 9 , under the pressure of the reformist clan in the regime, a 
democratization process that would, in the sense of the pouvoir, set up a 'window-
dressing' multipartism which would maintain the status quo. According to Quandt 
( 1 9 9 8 : 1 4 9 ) , widening of its 'popular' base through a 'manipulated' democratization, 
the regime thought it might be able to survive longer and thus stand any upheaval. 
Genuine participation has to be embedded in a self-sustaining process not only to 
liberate one's self from the so-called complex of dependency, passivity and 
assistedness, but also to consolidate the process of self-promotion. It is propitious to 
recall here how the spontaneous popular action undertaken by the agricultural 
labourers in the summer of 1 9 6 2 , solidifying participation in their own way by 
prodaiming 'autogestión' without the guidance of any political leader, made the 
ruling body worrisome about such an initiative. It did not take long for the same 
ruling body to find a way to wrap this action in a legal frame - the famous decrees of 
March, 1 9 6 3 - in order to better control it. Genuine partidpation could not match 
with the 'ambition' of most of the clans that were controlling the post-independence 
state. 
It is then from this sole perspective that I recommend viewing and applying the 
concept of partidpation in its wholeness. Any other conceptualization of the concept 
outside this vision would maybe borrow the name of genuine partidpation but 
neither the content nor the meaning. As a matter of evidence, the way partidpation 
had been truly conceptualized in the Agrarian Revolution Charter (see Case No. 1) 
had nothing to do with the way it was implemented in the field, taking the form of 
mampmating a given social group in order to reinforce the political power of a given 
dan in the ruling body. 
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It is very important to identify one unique conceptuauzation of partidpation, 
given that such a concept, like many others that can be found in the development 
jargon, is a ship that sails under different flags. According to my attempt to 
operationalize partidpation [see section 2.6.1 and Table 2.6.1(1)], the fad that 
benefidaries dedded for their destiny from the first step of appraising a problematic 
situation that needed a development intervention - that is, the diagnosis of the 
nature and causes of this problematic situation they faced - gave partidpation in the 
field of development its true sense, its genuineness. Consequently, thus established, 
partidpation will not only help steer development towards yielding an effident, 
sustainable outcome, but induce the development of a feeling of ownership of the 
development action by the benefidaries, who have not hesitated since then to 
mobilize additional resources and invest their own. 
9.1.2.2Which role(s) can local organizations play in the beneficiaries' steering of 
development actions? 
The debate about genuine partidpation and its positive effed on development does 
not need to be further demonstrated, espedally if we agree that it is a basic human 
right to dedde one's own destiny within a given sodal order. However, 
organizational and functional mechanisms to bring genuine partidpation into being 
still need to be devised. 
It is obvious that dired partidpation of any ador involved and/or concerned by a 
development action is the best requirement in a context of equity and social justice, 
espedally under authoritarian regimes such as the post-independence Algerian one. 
However, this cannot be the appropriate way everywhere, all times. Even if it were 
the most appropriate, it is certainly the most costly and thus the less sustainable. So 
the need for collective bodies that represent a group of actors having and/or sharing 
similar interests remains, and the issue of local organizations remains necessary to 
be considered in a logic of partidpation. 
The issue of local organizations in the sense of this book was not seen in the light 
of the so-called mass organizations that developed under the one-party system to 
pass on and disseminate the political and ideological discourse of the ruling regime. 
Rather, it was perceived in the light of professional interest groups that constitute, in 
civil society, one of the major linkages between the government and the governed, 
between the state and the society. In the case of Algeria, such groups boomed after 
the 1990s as an outcome of the popular explosion of protest in October 1988 against 
the politics of exclusion and bad governance since independence. As Quandt (1998: 
10) puts it: 
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It is often believed that the key to democracy is the existence of intermediate groupings -
beyond the family and tribe, but short of the state itself - where people with common interests 
can come together to pursue their goals. These voluntary associations, it is argued, create trust, 
educate in the ways of coalition building, and provide a laboratory for nurturing values 
conducive to democratic governance. . . . Civil associations develop once restraints are lifted 
and can play an important role in shaping a new order. The existence of a relatively free press 
in Algeria is one of the most impressive examples of how these new groups can forge strong 
sense of their identity. 
It is in this sense that fanners, taking advantage of the democratic opening that took 
place in the early 1990s, created their new, independent professional associations 
that freed them from the supremacy of the Union Nationale des Paysans Algeriens 
(UNPA). This was a general movement that took place among segments of the 
population seeking to reinforce and strengthen their participation in the political, 
economic and social life of their society. In this particular situation, Quandt (ibid.: 
155; quoting Przeworski, 1991:58) argues that: 
Wherever authoritarian regimes have begun to liberalize, 'the first reaction is an outburst of 
autonomous organizations in the civil society. Students associations, unions, and proto-parties 
are formed almost overnight' The authoritarian regime can try to prevent such autonomous 
groups from forming, but it cannot crush the underlying sentiments that give rise to them. As 
soon as the opportunity to organize and express oneself arrives, hundreds of thousands of 
people are ready to take advantage of the new environment. 
It is thus evident that to actively participate in their own (self-)development, it was 
of utmost importance that farmers were made aware of and convinced that "the 
kingdom of freedom is within them" (Goulet, 1979: 565). As a consequence, they 
needed to liberate themselves from the complex of assistedness, passivity, and self-
depreciation which reinforced the position of the adepts of conventional 
development thinking, and perpetuated the 'culture of development-as-state-
charity', as cherished by the UNPA leaders. As Goulet (1979:555) suggests: 
Within the special context of development, liberation connotes a victory over privilege, 
stagnation and dependency. . . . A second feature of liberation is the sustained effort to 
overcome the political and economic constraints which block a people's creativity. Creativity is 
frequently stifled to such a degree that a community comes to depend on outside groups to 
define its own needs or goals. 
But liberation in itself has no meaning per se. The important issue then becomes not 
freedom from what but freedom for what? The only alternative answer is freedom to 
fulfill oneself, either personally or collectively, in order to pursue human 
development. Ultimately, therefore, liberation is for development: for full, 
comprehensive human development (Goulet, ibid.: 556; his italics). 
It is in this perspective that farmers and pastoralists decided to create their own 
organizations in order to strengthen their partnership with the development 
administration system and participate in steering the process of development. These 
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assodations were freed from the systematic, strid control of the state by putting 
them away from the UNPA control, and were set for the sole professional purpose of 
carrying out their own development activities. 
Farmers' associations are a "powerful instrument of action" (Alexis de Tocqueville, 
quoted by Heywood, 1997: 252), as they offer an opportunity to people to come 
together to pursue shared values, interests and norms. Their main task is to exert 
pressure and influence over the poHcy-making and planning process, as regards the 
interests of their own constituendes. Since 1992, they have developed into a stronger 
'federative' body which possesses a legitimate representation at the national level. 
The government has become inclined to consult them for their spedalist knowledge 
and information that assists in the formulation of a workable policy (Heywood, ibid.: 
255). 
The case of the common rangelands is one that is relevant to the debate about 
local organizations and their role in development. For many centuries> indigenous 
arrangements played a role in common rangelands management, use, and 
conservation, arbitrating access rights and mediating conflicts. By means of 
complementary interventions and a continuous process of dc^legitinuzation, the 
colonial state, as well as the post-independence state in Algeria, attempted to 
dismantle these indigenous arrangements in order to pacify colonized Algeria for 
the former, and to avoid sharing power with its constituendes, for the latter. The 
results of these policies are well known [see sections 5.3 and 6.2.2]: 
• Transformation of most common rangelands into open access reserves, where 
degradation and sometimes desertification reached a worrisome level; 
• Increase in land conflicts that are no longer mediated by indigenous arrangements 
because of the lack of recognition from both the state and the individuals inside 
and outside the communities living in these areas. The mediating power was 
strongly competed, and thus negated, by the judidal courts settled in the dries 
before and after the independence; 
• Design and settlement of new, imported (cooperativist) arrangements for the 
management and use of these areas, which appear to be inappropriate and often 
clash with the indigenous settings. The result is an institutional/organizational 
void which leaves the rangelands without a real owner and/or manager. 
The success of the new pastoralists' assodations that were created within the context 
of Cases Nos. 5 and 6 presented in this study (Chapter 7), can be attributed to the 
respect of the tradition of the pastoral communities, among other things, which 
showed deference to a more community-oriented organization. It was the key 
element in the rangelands regeneration and conservation projed (Case No. 5) not 
only in the process of expansion and adoption of the fodder shrub plantation 
technology and cheap feed production improvement, but also in the mobilization of 
additional resources to carry out development activities. Such organizations owe 
their strength to the successful, ingenious merging between two types of interest 
groups. These are, according to Heywood (1997:253): 
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1 The theory of a development action encompasses, I suggest, the substantive, procedural and, to a 
lesser extent, social theories developed during the design of the action and the production of its 
document (McConnell, 1981:14). 
• The communal groups: Embedded in a social fabric, in the sense that membership 
is based on birth, rather than recruitment, such as families, tribes, castes and 
ethnic groups. 
• The assoriational groups: Characterized by voluntary action and the existence of 
common interests, aspirations or attitudes. 
Again, the case of the common rangelands in Algeria pleads for estabh^hing local 
organizations and investing them with power to manage these resources. This is 
true, as the state property regime in this case shows a perfect example of what 
Bromley and Cernea ( 1 9 8 9 : 2 5 ) call "the state's reach exceeding its grasp". It shows 
how the state had taken on far more natural resource management authority than it 
could be expected to effectively carry out, but with its own hidden reasons, of 
course. Such a type of tenure regime has consequently eroded the ability of the 
traditional structures and turned down efficiently managed territories into degraded 
pastures. 
Given the immensity of the Algerian territory, I assert there is no way a 
centralized state based in the central capital, sometimes thousands of kilometers 
away from the place were natural resources are degraded or subjected to conflict, 
can manage, and more importantly, conserve these natural resources. It is thus 
pleading for recognition by state officials of what benefits these areas, and the people 
living in these areas, can get out of reviving the traditional structures or institutional 
arrangements empowered by acknowledged regulations to manage and conserve 
these areas. 
9.1.2.3 Which mechanisms are required to make evaluation play the role of a learning 
process in steering development actions? 
Answering this question requires me to first reformulate it as another pair of 
questions: ( 1 ) Does evaluation sustain social learning in development actions? ( 2 ) How does 
evaluation as a social learning improve the planning and administration of development? 
Before referring to the empirical material I presented in both Chapters 5 and 7 , 1 will 
first take a short cut on the available theoretical meanings I have at hand. 
It is opportune to begin by recalling that, in development actions, evaluation aims 
to mobilize valid, timely, and relevant information and knowledge about the 
implementation of the activities, the effectiveness of resource use, and the 
appropriateness of the theory1 [see section 2 . 5 . 2 ] designed for the evaluated 
development action. It should be seen, in my opinion, as an appropriate means to 
supports learning and help devise corrective measures. However, evaluation has 
been used in too many development actions as solely an aclministrative procedure. It 
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never went further than writing evaluation reports based on the rate of realization of 
some basic indicators like the level of expenses in the allocated budget. In other 
cases, evaluation was conducted in respect to some format and method which did 
not produce the needed information to undertake corrective measures. 
Having long been method-driven, evaluation did not meet the expectations of the 
different actors of a development action. Chen ( 1 9 9 0 : 1 8 ) acknowledges that 
evaluation became a set of predetermined steps of a research process applied 
uniformly and mechanically to any development action without reference or concern 
to the theory of the evaluated development action, its settings, its actors, etc. This 
"black box evaluation", as Chen calls it, focused mainly on the overall relationship 
between the inputs and outputs of a development action without concern for the 
transformation processes that occurs in the middle locus of this 'black box'. Above 
that, this type of evaluation was not sensitive to the political and organizational 
contexts of input and output it was embedded in and never questioned the 
relationship between the planned outcome and the achieved result. 
In this context, a shift from a method-driven evaluation to a theory-driven 
evaluation is strongly recommended. The search for an approach that re-connects 
the design and planning phase witlun the development action cycle, on the one 
hand, and the implementation phase, on the other, is highly underscored. This can 
materialized through the provision of a substantive knowledge able to explain why 
and how the outcome of a given development action was obtained. I would say that, 
in this way, the utility of such evaluation, as Rossi explains in the preface of Chen's 
book, remains in bringing together, within a unified scheme, the concerns of all 
actors of a development action (Chen, ibid.: 9 ) . The mechanisms of evaluation set by 
the three case-studies presented in Chapter 7 are appropriate examples of this 
conceptualization of evaluation. This should be seen, in fact, as a continuity of the 
process of beneficiaries' participation in the phase of setting up the development 
objectives. In this view, the diagnosis of the situational problems and the setting of 
the development objectives (or agenda) can be assimilated as basic elements of the 
development action theory Chen mentioned in his conceptualization of evaluation. 
Chen (ibid.: 3 9 ) argues that a development action represents a purposive and 
organized effort which intervenes in a given social process in order to solve a 
problem or to provide a service. How the efforts should be organized and how these 
efforts lead to the desired outcomes imply a general guidance or theory, as a set of 
interrelated assumptions, principles, and/or propositions, frequently implicitly and 
unsystematically stated, to explain or guide this development action. As I already 
mentioned in section 2 . 5 , this theory has two dimensions: ( 1 ) A descriptive (or 
scientific/causative) dimension; and, (2 ) A prescriptive (or practical/normative) -
dimension. Given that any development action gathers together different actors, 
having different interests, preferences and concerns, it is obvious that this diversity 
is likely to be found in the process of evaluation (Chen, ibid.: 4 2 ) . 
Hence, incorporating the theory of a development action into the process of 
evaluation can improve the sensitivity of this action to planning, goal clarification, 
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implementation, beneficiaries needs, and even social change theories in general 
(Chen, ibid.: 2 9 ) . In this context, any method devised for evaluation should not be 
seen as an end, but rather as a means for facilitating knowledge development (Chen, ibid.: 
3 0 ; my italics). 
In a similar vein, Guba and Lincoln ( 1 9 8 9 ) go further in their proposal of what 
they call the "fourth generation evaluation" paradigm which corrects the vision of 
evaluation as being a mere scientific process. Conceptualized in such a scientific 
manner, evaluation misses completely its fundamentally social, political, and value-
oriented character (Guba and Lincoln, 1 9 8 9 : 7 ) . Instead, a new approach based on the 
key dynamic of negotiation is strongly recommended (Guba and Lincoln, ibid.: 8 ; 
authors' italics). 
Inspired by a constructivist orientation, some basic principles that characterize the 
proposed approach are as follows: 
1 . The full participative involvement of all actors in the entire process of evaluation. 
2 . All actors are welcomed as equal partners in every aspect of the evaluation 
process (design, implementation, interpretation, and resulting action). 
3 . All actors are accorded a full measure of political parity and control. 
4 . All actors are accorded a full measure of conceptual parity as they are all free to 
share their constructions and work towards a common, consensual, and more 
fully informed and sophisticated joint construction. 
5 . All actors are treated as humans, not as subjects of experimentation or objects of 
study (Guba and Lincoln, ibid.: 1 1 ; authors' italics). 
Moreover, the role of the evaluator induced by such a conceptualization is larger, as 
he/she facilitates the setting of a dialogue between all actors, and is seen, according 
to Guba and Lincoln (ibid.: 1 0 ) , as "the orchestrator of the negotiation process". 
After having presented the theoretical meanings of evaluation as conceptualized 
in the sense of this study, it is opportune now to reinforce the links that exist 
between evaluation and social learning. According to Kolb ( 1 9 8 4 : 1 ) : 
Human beings are unique among all living organisms in that their primary adaptive 
specialization lies not in some particular form or skill or fit in an ecological niche, but rather in 
identification with the process of adaptation itself - in the process of learning. We are thus the 
learning species, and our survival depends on our ability to adapt not only in the relative sense 
of fitting into the physical and social worlds, but in the proactive sense of creating and shaping 
these worlds. 
In the sense of this book, evaluation, as a mixture between a Chen's theory-driven 
conceptualization and a Guba and Lincoln's fourth-generation one, is an appropriate 
means of social learning in the sphere of development. It sets, in fact, the learning 
environment in which different actors interact in a free and open atmosphere, and 
"where inputs from each perspective could challenge and stimulate the other" (Kolb, 
ibid.: 1 0 ) . Dialogue and mutual learning take their place in such a context and bring 
different ideas and visions into being that can merge into consensual constructs, as 
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the three case-studies Nos. 4 , 5 and 6 showed. Potential conflicts that might exist 
between different actors must not been perceived as obstacles in the process of 
evaluation as I have defined it above. 
It is in this context that appropriate corrective measures to adapt or reorient 
development actions are taken, given that, according to Kolb (ibid.: 1 1 ) : 
Learning can occur only in situations where personal values and organizational norms support 
action based on valid information, free and informed choice, and internal commitment 
The differentiation of the proposed empirical material presented in this study into 
two distinguished sets of case-studies was meant to present first material (Chapter 5 ) 
where evaluation was completely neglected or sometimes, when considered, focused 
on some particular quantitative indicators, such as the level of expenses, or what we 
used to call objectifs - realisations'. It was also meant to compare the effects of 
evaluation on development actions in the other set of the empirical material 
(Chapter 7 ) , and how it permitted the undertaking of corrective measures at the 
right time. In bringing all actors involved in these development actions together, and 
by shortening the phases to be evaluated, the three case-studies showed the positive 
effects of embedding the chronological evolution of a development action into a 
permanent and repetitive process of evaluation and social learning. 
In other words, evaluation is a provider of knowledge at the right time in order to 
undertake the right action. It thus substantiates that social learning is the surrender 
of knowledge to creation. 
9.1.2.4 Can the design of a practical methodology be proposed according to the issues 
advocated in this study, such as participation, local organizations, and social learning? 
The three case-studies presented in Chapter 7 support, to a large extent, the basic 
foundations of an alternative development view seeking sustainabuity, based on the 
three advocated 'building blocks', i.e. participation, local organizations and social 
learning. However, it must be said that the results of these three single cases cannot 
provide much more than a modest, tentative contribution to improve development 
planning in Algeria. By no means does this indicate a pretension from the author to 
extract some theoretical generalizations in the form of a methodological approach, at 
least not for the time being. 
Nevertheless, I will derive from the elements of these cases some general features 
on how to make development planning more responsive to local populations in 
order to improve their Uvelihoods and living conditions at the least cost. Yet, these 
propositions still need to be worked out in the field of development in order to 
arrive at the point of designing a proper methodology, which I proposed to name 
the Participatory Organismic Multiphase Project (POMP). The basic elements of this 
'package', that I propose to call the Ten Commandments of an alternative development 
view with the ALTERNATIF motto, are presented in Box 9 . 1 . 2 . 4 ( 1 ) below. These 
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would represent the basics of a planner who adopts social learning as a philosophy 
of planning and transactive planning as his/her professional approach. 
Box 9.1.2.4(1) - The Ten Commandments of an alternative development view 
CI. Allow your clients all needed room to bring in their experiences. 
C2. Learn from your clients their preferences before you set the development objectives. 
C3. Turn long-term plans into many successive short-term phases. 
C4. Elaborate the plan cf action of each phase in the light of the evaluation of the previous one. 
C5. Respect and acknowledge the legitimate representatives of your clients. 
C6. Notify your clients in concrete ways that their views are always considered. 
C7. Allocate resources on the basis of the planned actions and observe their fair distribution. 
C8. Turn your profession into planning with your clients instead ofplanning for them. 
C9. Incite your clients to evaluate the phases of development actions they are involved in. 
CIO. Formulate, with your clients, a clear and understandable theory on which you base your action. 
The three 'building blocks' mentioned above are not new in the human history, in 
general, and/or in the Algerian history, in particular. 
Concerning participation, and local organizations as means for indirect 
participation, one does not need to dig very deep into the Algerian history, nor to 
dive into the memory of the indigenous settings, such as tribes, fractions, villages, 
and so on, to find the existence of many participatory patterns of decision-making, 
resource management, access and regulation, conflict management, etc. In fact, the 
foggara, a management system of indigenous irrigation schemes that can be found in 
the Sanaran oases; the jemaa, an indigenous governance and conflict resolution 
system that could be found in almost all Tell tribes and villages; and the touiza, an 
indigenous system of mutual help in the community are few examples among many 
others of such patterns where genuine participation occurred before the modern 
state took place after the colonial period. 
Again, social learning was the predominant philosophy that guided the progress 
of human-beings since the appearance of the first man on this planet. One can recall 
that it is the fire in the forest that gave the enjoyable taste of cooked meat to the prey 
man used to eat raw. When he discovered the flint (firestone) and could light a fire, 
man made use of his new knowledge and started cooking his prey instead of eating 
it raw. 
These statements, although bearing a philosophical content, support the three 
'building blocks' of an alternative, sustainable development as being highly 
compatible with the human nature. This nature relies on an agency that, I suggest, 
stands sometimes far from a strict scientific-rational model of behaviour that 
impinged upon the conventional development tiiinking adopted by the post-
independent state in Algeria. That is why my ambition - although being a legitimate 
ambition of a development practitioner rather than of a pure academician - to call for 
a re-humanized development thinking is made stronger by the aforementioned 
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compatibility. This call should thus be seen as a fair 're-sourcement' of development 
into the origins of human-beings and human nature. 
Because of this, it seems that development actions need to be embedded in a very 
integrative, ^determinate process of human emancipation, based on a permanent 
and efficient mechanism of social learning. This process can only be made of a 
recurrent flow of events that sustain the complete humane development in such a 
way that any action must aim to achieve a part of the global objective of this process, 
that is bransforming human beings into active actors making their own decisions. 
In other words, the global objective of this process should aim to teach people how 
to move from their position of being Objects - which are known and acted upon - to 
a new activist position of being Subjects - who know and act upon (Freire, ibid.: 2 0 ) . 
Accordingly, any development action which aims, either explicitly or impUcitly, 
to perpetuate the passiveness and/or assistedness of its beneficiaries cannot achieve 
development, and creates instead a situation of non-development. New approaches 
need to be devised, of course, but any prescription should consider the necessity of 
helping disadvantaged (because oppressed) groups to free and to emancipate 
themselves from the triple bondage of misery, dependency, and passivity. This is far 
from being an easy endeavour and can only be realized if plarining moves diversity 
to the center. In other words, this means that the planning philosophy and methods 
that emerged with the industrial era need to be revisited and adapted, and 
democratization of the society and social life considered. 
According to Boukrouh ( 1 9 9 5 ) , taking advantage of their experience with the 
industrial era and its results, societies and their populations that adopted the current 
development thinking some decades ago are preparing themselves to walk into the 
Third Millennium with a complete new vision. Thanks to the efforts, disdpline, and 
perseverance of millions of human-beings, humankind is marching towards a new 
era where man will again sit in the center of the universe, more than he did in the 
past. In this context, global planning that promoted quantitative methodologies in 
international circles, should stop confusing the ultimate beneficiaries of development 
actions - people - with numbers (Cleaves, ibid.: 2 9 4 ) . 
Hence, as much as the industrial era required massification, centralization, 
standardization, and uniformization, the post-industrial world needs variation, 
adaptation, flexibility and de-massification. This reinforces the diversity of opinions 
and visions, and thus the necessity of participation. 
As much as the industrial universe was the effect of a deterministic vision based 
on order, synchronization, repetition, mechanization of processes and 'robotization' 
of behaviours, the post-industrial world needs to be founded upon a vision of 
freedom which induces initiative and entrepreneurship, fluidity, exchange, 
communication, rapidity, and increased information. This reinforces the centrality of 
knowledge, and thus the necessity of social learning. 
As much as the industrial era required encapsulation of populations in 
megalopolitical cities, fabric-schools, huge factories, mass organizations and political 
parties to better control their movements, the post-industrial world needs more 
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individual responsibility in self-promotion, more free choice, more adapted 
education and information, more personalized leisure, and more convivial 
organizations and political parties whose strategies will essentially be based on 
communication. This reinforces the necessity of dialogue and mutual learning, and 
thus the required reform of the planning system. 
As much as the industrial era was characterized by heavy - or hard - technologies 
(mining, mechanics, chemical industries, etc.) and needed a disciplined, docile, well-
ordered and impecunious man, the post-industrial era will be characterized by light 
- or soft - technologies (computer, communication, biotechnologies, etc.) and will 
require a better-informed, creative, open-minded, precise and highly-competent 
man. This reinforces the dialectical link between development and human 
emancipation. 
For these reasons, bureaucratic organizations in "closed systems" (Cleaves, 1 9 8 0 : 
2 8 4 ; Heywood, 1 9 9 7 : 3 4 0 ; my italics), such as the post-independence Algeria case, 
need very deep reforms. These needed reforms would help public organizations 
devise means and ways to assimilate new information while designing and 
implementing development actions, and to learn from its beneficiaries, who should 
no longer be seen as objects but as active subjects with a great strategizing capacity. 
Having said this, I suggest that keeping the conventional development thinking 
adopted by the post-independent Algerian state alive, in addition to the socio-
political features of Algeria as mentioned in this book, in order to keep intact the 
interests of the privilegentsia intact, would lead the whole country into a tremendous 
chaos, more harmful than the one that this country has experienced during the last 
years. 
Thus, it is for these reasons that I believe it is extremely necessary to design an 
appropriate methodology aimed at realizing the assumed alternative development 
view. 
9.1.2.5 What might be the shortcomings of this methodology and what political, 
institutional, and socio-cultural pre-requisites are needed for this methodology to work? 
Before answering this question, I shall first refresh the memory of the reader by 
recalling the linkage between the sphere of development and the practice of politics 
in general. According to Heywood ( 1 9 9 7 : 3 8 1 ; my italics), 
In a sense, policy is the aspect of politics which concerns most people. In crude terms, policy 
consists of the 'outputs' of the political process. It reflects the impact of government on society, that 
is its ability to make things better or to make things worse. 
This statement makes it clear that development planning is a field where it is 
impossible to draw a distinct, discernible boundary between politics and 
development. More importantly, it makes clear that whatever approach and 
methodology we adopt for development, it does not change the fact that 
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development planning and poHcy-making remain embedded in a process that is, to a 
great extent, political. For any approach and methodology that is adopted, most 
shortcomings He in the political sphere that 'envelop' the planning system, without 
overlooking, of course, the inherent weaknesses and shortcomings that lie in the 
conceptual foundations of the adopted approach or methodology. 
Thus, I shall first draw a parallel between the three rationalities that must set up 
an equilibrium within the development decision-making arena and their different 
constituencies, on the one hand, and the substantive, procedural and social theories 
in, of and for planning, elaborated earlier in section 2 . 5 . 2 in this book, that shape the 
planning process, on the other hand [see Figure 9 . 1 . 2 . 5 ( 1 ) below]. This will allow me 
to highlight where the required adjustments He in order to make this alternative 
development view work. 
Figure 9.1.2.5(1) - Linkages between actors involved in the decision-maldng arena and 
their influences over the planning process 
Source: this study 
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROCESS 
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Figure 9.1.2.5(1) highlights the interrelations between the actors involved in the 
development decision-making arena and the influence they exert(ed) on the different 
theories in, of and for planning. The initial image of the development planning 
process under the post-independence regime exclusively concerned three main 
actors or groups of actors that provided the essential elements of the theories needed 
in order to put the planning process into motion. These are: 
1. The politicians in power (or the political regime) which determined the issues 
related to the social theories for planning. 
2. The planners and pohcy-makers (or the planning system) which determined the 
approaches, styles, modes and procedures, and other issues related to the 
procedural theories of planning, for a system with a great political dimension. 
3 . The technical staff of development (or the R & D system) which determined the 
content of development actions or the substantive theories in planning. 
Having this said, the major adjustments in the political-institutional sphere for the 
alternative development view to work particularly concern these groups of actors. In 
the following, I introduce some recommended adjustments that are a minimum of 
prerequisites for this purpose. 
(0. M. the.pQHtical sphere 
In order to make the reader aware of the adjustments of the political sphere in order 
to make this alternative development view work, I attempted to map the different 
cases brought forward in this study and view them along the historical background 
of post-independence Algeria (see Figure 9.1.2.5(2) below). 
Figure 9.1.2.5(2) presents the dichotomy existing between the case-studies 
presented in Chapter 5 and those presented in Chapter 7. The former represent the 
era of the one-party system and the 'black decade' (before 1988), while the former 
represent the democratization era in post-independence Algeria (after 1988). 
This figure bears some features that highlight the relation of the political sphere to 
the development decision-making arena and the supremacy of the political decision 
over the orientation of development, especially in the one-party system era (before 
1988). For instance, the agrarian revolution policy (Case No. 1) had been 
immediately terminated after the death of Houari Boumediene, a charismatic 
political leader who was in favour of this policy. Meanwhile, the two other cases of 
the same era continued for a relatively longer period without any opposition, given 
that it was mostly in favour of the landed and pastoral elites. 
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In Chapter 2, I attempted the conceptualization of a development action and its 
context as the development theater [see section 2.8]. Given the results of the 
investigations undertaken in the frame of this study, I introduce hereafter a 
configuration of the development theater during both the one-party system era, as 
well as the democratization era. Figures 9.1.2.5(3) and 9.1.2.5(4) hereafter present the 
main features of these configurations. 
As Figure 9.1.2.5(3) shows in abstract terms, the political system, given the post-
independence state formation, established centralization as a model for the political, 
economic and social life of the country. Consequently, the supremacy of the political 
rationality in the development decision-making arena become an unquestionable 
issue, strongly backed by the technical rationality of the planners and the technical 
staff of the R & D system. Thus, the system looked like a "closed system" (Cleaves, 
1980: 284; Heywood, 1997:340; my italics). 
The process of democratization that started with the 1989 constitution allowed for 
new political parties to exist and associations to be created. Freedom of press and of 
association was recognized as a fundamental right. There is undeniable evidence 
that, within the last decade, the socio-political landscape in Algeria moved far away 
from a strong monolithism which favoured allegiance to the pouvoir and subdued 
freedom of thought, and changed into a pluralist opening, which is in line with the 
expectations of the 'free' citizens and the 'transmogrification' of Algerian society, yet 
the regime tried vainly to control this process to its benefit. 
Figure 9.1.2.5(2) - Relating the presented case-studies to major political events in Algeria 
Source: this study 
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Figure 9.1.2.5(3) - The development theater before democratization (before 1988) 
Source: this study 
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As Figure 9 . 1 . 2 . 5 ( 4 ) shows, a substantial transformation occurred in the 
configuration of the development theater. Thanks to the organizations created by 
farmers and pastoralists, which developed into an associative pyramid from the 
grass-roots to the national level, farmers (and their ethical or humane rationality) are 
now well represented in the development decision-making arena at any level of 
aggregation, although the experiment is yet too recent to be objectively evaluated. 
So, the major adjustment required to occur in the political sphere for the 
alternative development view to work resides in a process of true democratization of 
social life and protection of basic human rights induced by citizenship. This process 
will help liriking decentralization to participation as being parts of the interwoven 
nature of social and spatial structures in the development process (Brohman, 1 9 9 6 : 
2 2 6 ) . Of course, nobody can assert that what is going now in Algeria is a true 
democratization process but at least it is setting the rules of the democratic game. As 
Quandt ( 1 9 9 8 : 1 1 ) suggests, 
If, as some have argued, democracy is always preceded by a hot family feud that neither side 
can win, leading to codification of rules of the game for sharing power, then Algeria may be 
setting the stage in its unhappy present for a more hopeful future. 
k). M the .development, planning, system. 
As Figure 9 . 1 . 2 . 5 ( 3 ) above shows, the central planning system imposed by the one-
party system, and their inherent rationalities imposed the supremacy of political 
decision on the decision-making arena of the development theater. In such a context, 
beneficiaries (farmers and pastoralists), seen as passive people, recipients of 
development, had no role in the decision-making arena of their development 
theater. Consequently, development decisions, objectives and actions were not made 
with them but made for them. This way of flunking, sustained by the development 
philosophy adopted by the regime since independence, has demonstrated its 
shortcomings with disastrous results. 
Planners were self-referent, assuming that no one other than themselves could 
plan, and that there could be no planning without them. Because of their 
professional teaming or the particular positions they occupied in the development 
administration system, professional planners had a special role to play in the planning 
process (Conyers and Fulls, 1 9 8 4 : 1 3 ; authors' italics). However, evidence has shown 
that many planning exercises can be practiced by a wide range of individuals and 
groups and organizations. 
In fact, according to Conyers and Hills (ibid.: 1 4 ) , other people, in addition to 
planners, are involved de facto in the planning process, and this should be 
acknowledged by the planners themselves. Moreover, the three cases presented in 
chapter 7 to a great extent showed that when beneficiaries (or the planning-object) 
are involved from the first step of the development action cycle, not only planning of 
activities improved but implementation was made with less distortion. What then, is 
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the necessity and efficiency of planning if it does not guarantee a less distorted 
implementation? Nevertheless, the involvement of the beneficiaries in evaluation, as 
these cases show, yielded valuable information and knowledge for planning. 
In this context, the planner, without being differentiated from the implementers 
and evaluators acted, according to Conyers and Hills (ibid.: 1 4 ) , as 
A co-ordinator, collecting and analyzing the information and proposal of actions provided by 
the others, rather than actually making all the decision himseE 
Activities of the development actions were planned and evaluated by the main 
stakeholders in some of these three mentioned cases, without a real presence of 
professional planners. As the achieved results speak for themselves, the absence of 
professional planners did not harm much the planning process, especially if it is 
admitted that the rate of realization was not only high but also realized on the basis 
of an adequate rationale and logic of sustainable development. According to 
Conyers and Hills (ibid.: 1 4 ) , 
Planning can, in fact, take place without any professional planners, although their existence can 
enhance the planning process in many ways. 
In spite of this, planners took advantage of the rules of the game set by the 
authoritarian regime, produced the illusion of an omnipotent intelligence 
(Friedmann, 1 9 7 3 : 5 9 ) , and settled in fact the supremacy of their scientific 
knowledge, which impinges upon their functional (technical) rationality. The results 
of this endeavour perfectly match the outcome that Scott ( 1 9 9 8 : 6 ) suggests, that is: 
Authoritarian solutions to production and social order inevitably fail when they exclude the 
fund of valuable knowledge embodied in local practices. 
The basic adjustment that is required at the planners' level is to open their systems 
up to their clients and make it more participatory. Moreover, they should 
acknowledge the evident fact that efficient plarining can only occur when it is 
embedded in the undifferentiated process of the action itself (Friedmann, 1 9 8 4 : 1 9 2 ) , 
where the planner, especially the professional one, behaves like a co-ordinator, as 
depicted above by Conyers and Hills (ibid.: 1 3 ) . 
Here, the specific case of the rangelands deserves special attention. Most 
development actions in these areas were planned with the objective of bringing 
about sedentarization, or were based on 'imported' cooperativist arrangements 
which did not live long. The anti-drought campaigns transformed transhumant 
systems from semi-sedentary to sedentary ones and undermined the tiacking 
strategies used by pastoralists for centuries. 
Compared to the requirements of the "critical triangle of sustainabUity", these 
actions might have achieved economic growth in these areas in terms of quantity of 
meat produced, but it is evident that it was to the detriment of poverty alleviation 
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(poverty increased because such policies benefited more the rich, big pastoralists.), 
and environmental conservation (degradation is there). 
A more participatory, flexible planning process for these areas that incorporates 
short-term anti-drought actions into long-term plans of pastoral development is 
highly recommended, taJring into account the particular specificities of these areas. 
What planners should be aware of is that any planned development action 
planned at the central level is subject to a process of re-planning that occurs at the 
local level. This process is sustained by either the discretionary space allocated to 
local implementers, or a process of negotiation that takes place between beneficiaries 
and the local implementers. 
c). M th?. Research, & Develçrpment.system, 
The agricultural R & D system deals with 'contracting' technological solutions to 
tackle constraints encountered in the farming field. It should start from a real 
problématique ratified by the ones experiencing the problematic situation. However, 
embedded in a top-down linear model of technology transfer, strongly backed up by 
IARCs, this system was based on 'the' farmer as a unique and standardized vision of 
practicing agriculture. Uniformity of the HYVs promoted by the R & D system 
brought monoculture onto the farm. And monoculture, in its turn, helped planners 
to virtually produce the 'mono-farmer', a metaphor that sees all farmers cultivating 
the same crop as similar. 
This consolidated the supremacy of scientific knowledge and considered farmers 
as passive recipients, assumed to be waiting for technologies generated by the R & D 
system to undertake the development of their farms. 
As some of the three cases presented in Chapter 7 show, the setting up of a 
dialogue process between the R & D system and farmers (or pastoralists) helped to 
devise a pattern of développement à la carte which seemed more responsive to the 
needs and preferences of the beneficiaries. "Necessity is the motherhood of invention", 
says an old adage. In this context, the process of generating new technologies starts 
from a problématique that is not only real (not assumed), and appropriate for the 
agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions of the beneficiaries, but that requires 
that this problématique is to be approved by the beneficiaries themselves. Moreover, 
new technologies are presented to farmers differently than in the case of the Green 
Revolution. Given this orientation of développement à la carte, the development agent 
introduces to the farmer a "basket of alternatives' and lets the farmer choose the 
alternative that fits his/her own conditions. 
The major adjustment that is required in the R & D system is the responsiveness of 
the process of technology generation to the diversity of its clients. This can be 
sustained by an efficient development interface between two different worlds, two 
different types of knowledge, and two different rationalities that have to work 
together for a common purpose: The development of the farm and the increase of its 
productivity on an ethical and sustainable basis. 
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9.2 Slimming up: Do participation and social learning improve development? 
In this study, I formulated some criticisms to the conventional development thinking 
adopted by the Algerian state in the post-independence period. I asserted the failure 
of this philosophy to fit the 3Es - i.e. efficiency, equity and environment - of the 
"critical triangle of sustainability" (Oram et ah, 1998:1), and proposed some concepts 
in order to introduce change in this development philosophy. Hence, I set myself to 
answer whether participation, either directly (individually) and/or indirectly (via 
legitimate local organizations), and social learning could altogether develop a potential 
alternative view capable of challenging the so-called conventional development 
thinking. 
Looking back to the results of this investigation, I am tempted to declare that 
participation, local organizations and social learning can be set as the "building blocks' of 
an alternative development view seeking sustainability in the context of Algeria, 
having always in mind the "critical triangle of sustainability". Some results are worth 
to be summed up here. 
In some of the case-studies I presented in this study (see Chapter 7), a process of 
participation of the beneficiaries was set up in order to steer the development 
process. According to van Dusseldorp's (1981: 36-55; my emphasis) typology, 
participation was free (maybe facilitated), spontaneous and not induced [especially 
by the state]; it took both direct and indirect forms, although the latter was the most 
privileged; it was complete, organized, intensive, and unlimited, as it helped the 
beneficiaries gradually develop a sense of ownership of the development process; it 
involved especially the 'hitherto excluded', the disadvantaged members of a 
community and targeted social action in order to move the so-called beneficiaries 
(or 'target groups') from the position of passive recipients of development (being 
objects) to a partner in development (being subjects). However, it is needed to 
underscore that, in most cases presented in Chapter 7, participation took place at the 
first step of the development action cycle (problems identification and objectives 
determination). One case where participation did not start at the onset (Case No. 4) 
developed a phenomena of re-planning through the shortening of the phases of this 
development action, and the process of evaluating each phase before planning the 
next one. 
To strengthen their participation in the development process, farmers resorted to 
the creation of their own organizations, independently from the state-led 
organizations. This not only helped to improve their access to public resources they 
were 'hitherto excluded' from, but engendered also a fair equitable distribution of 
these resources to be respected. The summit of this process of participation is that 
farmers, feeling the trustful and fruitful collaboration they were experiencing with 
some public organizations, started mobilizing additional resources for development 
in addition to the public ones. 
In a similar vein, embedding the implementation phase of these development 
actions into a learning process, in a form of a regular, permanent and efficient 
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monitoring and evaluation process, had given a certain flexibility to the 
management of the development process in a context of uncertainty. Corrective 
measures were devised upon knowledge generated by the learning process and 
applied in true time, saving time and reducing the waste of resources. 
Needless to say that all these features improved to a large extent the design and 
implementation of development actions, but this could never be achieved if some 
"circumstances" were not there. I shall hereafter recall the most important ones: 
First, the transitory process of democratization launched in Algeria after the 
popular uprisings of October 1 9 8 8 made it possible for farmers, as for other 
segments of the population, to organize themselves as professional interests groups 
and claim the participation in the process of making decisions that might affect their 
lives. 
Second, some civil servants were not happy with the conventional development 
thinking and took advantage of the state opening of social life to apply new concepts 
in the field of development. Being in contact with the new developments overseas 
academicians and practitioners were making in development theories, mostly due to 
their contact with international development co-operation, they applied some 
concepts that were not new at the international level but certainly innovative enough 
in the Algerian context. 
Third, the good morale and values of certain civil servants that conceived and 
implemented these development actions, opposing the mainstream culture of 
arrogance and disdain of Algerian bureaucrats towards rural populations, were also 
prerequisites for a genuine participation of participation to take place. 
However, some shortcomings appear and need to be addressed. Participation is 'a 
ship that sails under different flags' and can thus be manipulated for a given 
purpose, as shown in the agrarian revolution policy (Case No. 1 ) . "True participation 
is about power, and the exercise of power is politics", argues Dudley ( 1 9 9 3 : 1 6 0 ) . The 
replicability of any successful participatory scheme is difficult to secure, given it is 
hard to mobilize the same conducive environment which made it possible for this 
innovation to be successful. 
Moreover, the good morale and values of the civil servants mentioned above is 
not a characteristic that can be found in every corner among Algerian bureaucrats. 
This would worsen the problematic replicability of participatory schemes developed 
earlier. 
These statements present the alternative development view as not being a 'robust' 
theory. However, although it looks fragile, almost like a spider's tiny web, it needs to 
be considered and taken seriously. If viable conditions for genuine participation are 
not mobilized, and consequently participation strengthened by an ordinary practice, 
then exclusion will expand and do more harm that it already did. In this perspective, 
the alternative can be at least considered as the less worse development philosophy 
in comparison to the conventional thinking adopted by the state in the context of 
post-independence Algeria. So, will it be better to put into practice this alternative or 
leave the conventional thinking expand exclusion? 
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S U M M A R Y 
This study concerns agricultural development planning and poHcy-making in the 
context of post-independent Algeria, which went unquestioned for more than three 
decades. Algeria won its independence in 1962 after 132 years of French 
colonization. A post-independence State was formed, taking over the colonial 
power, and set a centralized planning for economic and social development. 
In the agricultural sector, the effects of this planning model were far-reaching and 
turned a potential agricultural country par excellence into one of the most net 
importers of food in the developing world. 
The onset of this study stems from the questioning of whether plarming, as a 
fundamental item of the development process, and in addition of being inspired by 
de-humanizing philosophy and methods, can still be seen as a mere technical 
discipline. The response of this study is that development planning and policy-
making is not only a technical discipline but certainly a political process. By 
deduction, the development process was and could never be apolitical. 
The study tries to describe how the influence of different political actors, in 
particular, and the political system, in general, shape the outcomes of the 
development process. To achieve this, the study compares two sets of development 
actions (policies, programmes and projects) planned and implemented under two 
different political perspectives: the first set represents the authoritarian regime era 
(1962-1988), based on the one-party system and an arrogant interventionist 
bureaucracy; the second introduces some development actions conducted during the 
transitory process of democratization (1988-1998). The study describes in parallel the 
changes introduced by the process of democratization and how these influenced the 
conventional development vision adopted by the state in post-independent Algeria. 
In more a detailed explanation, the study starts first by describing the 
shortcomings of the conventional development thinking and the different influences 
that the Algerian development planning system underwent since the independence 
time. Then, it develops the research hypotheses which will orient the comparison of 
the two set of development actions presented in this book. Finally, it reflects on the 
advantages offered by an alternative development view, based on participation, local 
organizations and social learning, and their effects on the issue of sustainabiHty. In this 
study, the conceptualization of sustainability refers to the "critical triangle of 
sustainabiHty" (Oram etal. 1998:1). 
The basic assumption of this study is that the main condition for a development 
action to secure some substantial and sustainable outcome resides in the fulfillment 
of the four foUowing prerequisites formulated by van Dusseldorp (1992:12): 
1. The possibiHty of formulating a consistent, realistic and durable set o f objectives, 
which is acceptable to all, or at least to a large majority o f the people who will be 
involved in/or and affected by the planned development; 
2. The availabiHty of knowledge of all the relevant processes and their 
interrelationships which have to be influenced to change the present situation in 
such a way that the objectives wiH be realized; 
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3 . The availability of the means and power to influence these processes; 
4. The political will to use the available means and power, to influence the relevant 
processes in order to realize the desired objectives. 
In most development actions designed for and implemented in Third World 
countries, these prerequisites were never completely fulfilled, especially in people-
centered development actions. More clearly put, in some development actions, some 
prerequisites might have been fulfilled to some extent, but others have never been 
fulfilled, even to a very small extent. In fact, in the general case, objectives were ill-
defined and top-down decided; knowledge was mobilized in a very reductionist 
way - most of time supposedly ratiorial/sdentific - with a complete denial of 
people's knowledge; means and power were never sufficiently made available, and 
when available, were not fairly distributed among the needy ones; and finally, the 
political will was never concretized unless the development action in concern aimed 
to incorporate, encapsulate and increase control over rural populations, or at 
sustaining an actual status quo in benefit of the powerful actors. 
In this context, the study suggests that integration of some features, such as 
participation, either directly (individually) or indirectly (through local organizations), 
on the one hand; and social learning, (either as a flexibility in the project design and 
implementation and/or as a monitoring & evaluation mechanism), on the one hand, 
increases the probability of fulfillment of the aforementioned prerequisites. 
At the level of operatiorialization of the basic concepts on which the study bases 
the present work, it faced a dilemma with the concept 'sustainable development'. To 
which actor or group of actors should development be sustainable in the context of 
this study? As the implicit and explicit assumptions of this study may suggest, the 
sustainability of the outcomes of a given development action is posited here to be in 
line with the interests of the "hitherto excluded', the disadvantaged segments of the 
population. Hence, in the context of this study, the prerequisites and conditions of 
sustainability rely to a large extent on the centrality of the beneficiaries' knowledge, 
and the importance of participation of these beneficiaries in their (self-)development. 
In this order, up till now and for not less than three decades, development actions in 
Algeria were designed without consultation of their supposed beneficiaries, and 
yielded a huge gap between the priviligentsia and the disadvantaged. It was thus 
important that the study focuses more on the impact of beneficiaries' participation 
and knowledge in steering a given development action towards their needs of 
development. 
However, although the study considers that beneficiaries' participation and 
knowledge is a necessary condition for sustainable development, it is not a sufficient 
condition per se. This is true given that the so-called beneficiaries are still strongly 
interacting with other actors that hold a great power of decision, and are extremely 
self-referent and self-impressed by the rationality and 'sdentificaUty' of their 
knowledge, such as planners, researchers, development staff, etc. It is, thus, 
important that the availabuity of the beneficiaries' knowledge must be 
SUMMARY 3 2 3 
acknowledged by these latter actors. Moreover, all this must be supported by a real 
social learning process whose importance for sustainable development is 
acknowledged and supported by all social actors who have some interest at stake in 
a given development action. 
Consequently, the study aims at answering the following general research and 
sub-research question: 
GQ.How can (direct and indirect) participation of the beneficiaries and the social learning ability of 
diverse actors acting in the development theater secure sustainable achievements of a people-
centered planned development action ? 
Ql. To which extent and when is participation of the beneficiaries required in order to steer 
development actions towards their (self-) development? 
Q2. Which role(s) can local organizations play in the beneficiaries' steering of development actions? 
Q3. Which mechanisms are required to make monitoring and evaluation play the role of a learning 
process in steering development actions? 
Q4. Can the design of a practical methodology be proposed according to the advocated issues in this 
study, such as participation, local organizations and social learning? 
Q5. What might be the shortcomings of this methodology and what political, institutional, and socio-
cultural pre-requisites are needed for such a methodology to work? 
The results of the study shows that: 
• Participation since the first step of the development action cycle (problems 
identification and objectives determination) improved the design and the 
implementation of development actions. Participation helped the beneficiaries not 
only to develop a sense of ownership of the development process, but to mobilize 
their own resources when needed, in addition to public ones. 
• Creation of farmers' organizations independently from State-led organizations 
helped the 'excluded' to improve their access to public resources they were 
hitherto excluded from. It sustained participation of the beneficiaries towards a 
more democratized development and turned it into a means of sustainable 
development. 
• Embedding the implementation phase of development actions into a learning 
process, that is a regular, permanent and efficient monitoring and evaluation 
process, gives a certain flexibility to development. Corrective measures were 
devised upon knowledge generated by the learning process and applied in true 
time, saving time and reducing the waste of resources. 
• The 'bunding blocks' of an alternative development view for Algeria were defined 
and a methodology needs to be designed its application. 
• A process of democratization of social and political life, on the hand, and a reform 
of the mentality and procedures of the development planning and pohcy-making 
system, on the other, are necessary conditions for the application of the alternative 
development view. 

RÉSUMÉ 
La présente étude concerne la planification et l'élaboration de politiques de 
développement agricole dans le contexte de l'Algérie d'après-indépendance, qui est 
resté sans questionnement profond durant les trois dernières décennies. L'Algérie a 
recouvert son indépendance en 1962, après 132 ans de colonisation française. Un Etat 
d'après-indépendance a pris forme, prenant le relais du pouvoir colonial, et a adopté 
un modèle de planification centralisée pour les besoins du développement 
économique et social. 
Dans le secteur agricole, les effets de ce modèle de planification ont été d'une 
grande portée, transformant un pays agricole par excellence en l'un des pays les plus 
radicalement importateurs de biens alimentaires dans le monde. 
L'étude trouve son ébauche dans la question de savoir si la planification, en tant 
que rudiment fondamental du processus de développement, et en plus du fait 
qu'étant inspiré par une philosophie et des méthodes "dé-humanisantes", peut 
encore être considérée comme uniquement une simple discipline technique. La 
réponse de cette étude est que la planification et l'élaboration de politiques de 
développement est non seulement une discipline technique mais en plus, et 
certainement, un processus à grande connotation politique. Par déduction, le 
processus de développement n'a jamais et ne pourra jamais être apolitique. 
L'étude s'est assignée de décrire comment l'influence des différents acteurs 
politiques, en particulier, et le système politique, en général, donne forme aux 
outputs du processus de développement. Pour atteindre un tel résultat, l'étude 
compare deux groupes d'actions de développement (politiques, programmes et 
projets) planifiées et exécutées sous deux perspectives politiques différentes: le 
premier groupe représente l'ère du régime autoritariste (1962-1988), basé sur le 
système du parti unique et une bureaucratie interventionniste et arrogante; le second 
introduit quelques actions de développement conduites durant le processus 
transitoire de démocratisation (1988-1998). L'étude décrit en parallèle les 
changements induits par le processus de démocratisation et comment ceux-ci ont-ils 
influencé l'approche conventionnelle de développement adoptée par l'Etat d'après-
indépendance en Algérie. 
De manière détaillée et plus expUcative, l'étude commence d'abord par décrire les 
insuffisances relevées dans la bibliographie concernant l'approche conventionnelle 
de développement et les différentes influences auxquelles a été sujet le système 
algérien de planification du développement depuis l'indépendance. Ensuite, elle 
développe les hypothèses de recherche qui orienteront la comparaison entre les deux 
groupes d'études de cas présentés dans cet ouvrage. Finalement, elle élabore les 
avantages offerts par une vision alternative de développement, fondée sur la 
participation, les organisations locales et Y apprentissage social (social learning) ainsi que 
leurs effets sur la question de la durabilité. Dans cette étude, la conceptualisation de 
la durabilité repose sur le concept du "triangle critique de la durabilité" (Oram et al. 
1998:1). 
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La supposition fondamentale de cette étude est que la condition majeure pour 
qu'une action de développement puisse atteindre un quelconque résultat qui soit 
durable, il est nécessaire que soient réunis les quatre préalables (van Dusseldorp, 
1 9 9 2 : 1 2 ) qui suivent: 
1. La possibilité de formuler un ensemble d'objectifs consistants, réalistes et 
durables, qui soient acceptables pour tous, ou du moins pour la majorité large de 
la population qui sera impliquée et/ou affectée par l'action de développement 
envisagée; 
2 . La disponibilité du savoir concernant tous les processus liés à l'action de 
développement envisagée ainsi que leurs interrelations, et que la dite action doit 
influencer afin d'arriver à un changement de la présente situation de telle manière 
que les objectifs assignés à l'action de développement en question soient réalisés; 
3 . La disponibilité des moyens et de la force nécessaires à l'influence par l'action de 
développement envisagée des différents processus dans le sens de l'atteinte des 
objetifs fixés; 
4. L'existence d'une volonté politique d'utiliser les moyens et la force disponibles 
afin d'influencer les différents processus de manière à atteindre les objectifs 
assignés à l'action de développement envisagée. 
Dans de nombreux cas d'actions de développement conçues et exécutées dans les 
pays du Tiers-Monde, ces préalables n'ont jamais été totalement réunis, 
particulièrement dans celles centrées sur le développement humain. En clair, dans 
certains cas, quelques préalables ont été réunis jusqu'à niveau jugé satisfaisant, alors 
que d'autres ne l'ont jamais été, même pas à un très faible niveau. En général, les 
objectifs sont mal définis, et imposés d'en haut (planification centralisée de type 
"ascendant"); le savoir est mobilisée de manière réductionniste, mono-disciplinaire 
dans son unique forme dite "scientifique", et sans aucune reconnaissance du savoir 
populaire; les moyens et la force ne sont pas suffisamment disponibles, et même 
quand disponibles, ne sont pas répartis équitablement parmi les plus nécessiteux; et 
le dernier mais non moins important, la volonté politique n'est jamais suffisamment 
mobilisée sauf dans le cas où l'action de développement envisagée viserait à 
"incorporer" des populations rurales et/ou élever leur contrôle, ou alors renforcer un 
statu quo existant au bénéfice de clans forts au sein de la société. 
Dans ce contexte, l'étude suggère que l'intégration, dans l'approche de 
développement, de certains éléments, telles la participation, autant directe 
(individuelle) que indirecte (par le biais d'organisations locales), d'une part, et 
l'apprentissage social (que ce soit en termes de flexibilité dans la conception et 
l'exécution de projets ou à travers la mise en place de mécanismes de suivi-
évaluation), d'autre part, améliore la probabilité pour que les préalables ci-dessus 
évoqués soient réunis. 
Au niveau de l'opérationalisation des concepts de base sur lesquels repose cette 
étude, il été fait face à un dilemme quant au concept de "développement durable". 
Pour quel acteur or groupe d'acteurs doit le développement être durable dans le 
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contexte de cette étude? Comme les suppositions aussi bien explicites qu'implicites 
de cet ouvrage peuvent bien le suggérer, la durabilité des résultats d'une action de 
développement donnée doit être en accord avec les intérêts des "exclus auparavant", 
des couches défavorisées de la population. Ainsi, dans le contexte de cette étude, les 
préalables et conditions de durabilité repose sur la centrahté du savoir des 
bénéficiaires, ainsi que l'importance de la participation de ces mêmes bénéficiaires 
dans leur processus de (auto-)développement. Dans cet ordre, il est aisé de dire que, 
jusqu'à maintenant, et pendant pas moins de trois décennies, les actions de 
développement conduites en Algérie ont été conçues sans la moindre consultation 
de leurs supposés bénéficiaires. Le résultat en est un fossé énorme entre la 
privilegentsia et les couches défavorisées. Il était apparu alors important que l'étude 
focalise plus sur l'impact de la participation des bénéficiaires et de leur savoir dans 
l'orientation d'une action de développement donnée vers la satisfaction de leurs 
propres besoins en développement. 
Cependant, bien que l'étude considère que la participation des bénéficiaires et de 
leur savoir demeure une condition nécessaire pour le développement durable, celle-
ci n'est pas pour autant suffisante à elle seule. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai que ces 
présumés bénéficiaires du développment entretiennent des rapports permanents 
avec d'autres acteurs, tels que les planificateurs, les chercheurs, les agents de 
développement, etc. Ces derniers détiennent un grand pouvoir de décision dans le 
domaine du développement, et sont quelque peu autistes, parce que impressionnés 
par leur rationalité et la "sdentificité" de leur savoir. Il est, en fait, de toute 
importance que la mobilisation du savoir des bénéfidaires ainsi que sa disponibilité 
soit une nécessité reconnue par ces derniers, et supporté par un réel processus 
d'apprentissage social (social learning) dont l'importance pour le développement 
durable devrait être partagée par tous les acteurs sodaux qui dénotent un intérêt 
quelconque dans le contexte d'une action de développement. 
En conséquence, l'étude tente de répondre à une problématique générale d'où 
sont dérivées les questions de recherche qui suivent: 
Problème général: 
Comment la participation (directe et/ou indirecte) des bénéficiaires ainsi que la capacité d'apprentissage social 
des différents acteurs agissant dans le domaine du développement peuvent-ils garantir une durabilit'e des 
résultats d'une action de développement centré sur le facteur humain? 
Questions de recherche: 
Ql. Jusqu'à quel niveau et quand la participation des bénéficiaires est-elle requise afin qu'ils puissent orienter 
les actions de développement dans le sens de leur (auto-)dêveloppement? 
Q2. Quel(s) role(s) doit(vent) jouer les organisations locales des bénéficiaires dans la perspective d'orienter les 
actions de développement dans le sens de leur (auto-)dévéloppement? 
Q3. Quels mécanismes sont requis pour que puissent le suivi et l'évaluation jouer un rôle d'apprentissage 
social dans la perspective d'orienter les actions de développement dans le sens de la durabilité? 
Q4. Est-il possible de proposer la conception d'une méthodologie sur la base des concepts défendus dans cette 
étude, tels la participation, les organisations locales et l'apprentissage social? 
Q5. Quelles pourraient être les éventuelles insuffisances d'une telle méthodologie et quels préalables politiques, 
institutionnels et socioculturels sont préalablement requis pour qu'une telle méthodologie puisse 
fonctionner correctement? 
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Les résultats auxquels aboutit l'étude sont comme suit: 
• La participation dès la première étape du cycle d'une action de développement 
(identification de la problématique et définition des objectifs à atteindre) a 
considérablement amélioré la conception et la réalisation des actions de 
développement. Celle-ci a permis aux bénéficiaires non seulement de développer 
un sens d'appropriation du processus de développement, mais aussi de mobiliser 
leurs propres ressources en vue de supporter les actions de développement, en 
sus des ressources publiques. 
• La création d'organisations professionnelles, autonomes par rapport à celles 
"commanditées" par l'Etat, a permis aux bénéficiaires d'améliorer leur accès aux 
ressources publiques allouées au développement, bien qu'étant auparavant exclus 
de la distribution de ces ressources. Ceci a consolidé la participation des 
bénéficiaires en vue d'un développement plus démocratisé et affirmé que la 
participation est un moyen réel pour le développement durable. 
• Le fait d'envelopper la phase d'exécution des actions de développement dans un 
processus d'apprentissage social (social leaming), en la forme d'un processus 
permanent de suivi et d'évaluation, a donné une certaine flexibilité dans la gestion 
de ces actions de développement. Des mesures correctives ont pu être prises en 
temps réel sur la base de l'information et du savoir générés par ce processus 
d'apprentissage social, épargnant ainsi le gaspillage inutile des ressources. 
• Les "pierres angulaires" pour une approche alternative de développement agricole 
pour le cas de l'Algérie ont été définies et la conception d'une méthodologie pour 
sa mise en appUcation demeure nécessaire. 
• Un processus de démocratisation de la vie politique et sociale, d'une part, et la 
réforme de la mentalité et des procédures en vigueur dans le système de 
planification et d'élaboration de politiques de développement, d'autre part, sont 
les préalables nécessaires pour la mise en application efficiente de cette approche 
alternative de développement évoquée dans cette étude. 
S A M E N V A T T I N G 
Deze studie betreft de ontwikkelmgsplanning en beleidsformulering in Algerije na 
de onafhankelijkheid. Gedurende drie decennia heeft deze plaatsgevonden zonder 
ter discussie gesteld te worden. Algerije verkreeg z'n onfhankelijkheid in 1962 na 132 
jaar van Franse kolonisatie. Een post-onafhankelijkheids Staat werd gevormd, die de 
koloniale macht overnam en een gecentraliseerde planning opzette voor 
economische en sociale ontwikkeling. 
In de landbouwsector waren de gevolgen van dit planningsmodel zeer ingrijpend 
en veranderde het een land met een enorm agrarisch potentieel in één van de 
grootste netto importeurs van voedsel van de ontwikkelingswereld. 
De aanzet tot deze studie is de vraag of planning, als een fundamenteel element 
van het ontwikkelingsproces, en geïnspireerd door een de-humaniserende filosofie 
en methoden, nog steeds gezien kan worden als een zuiver technische chsdpline. Het 
antwoord van deze studie is dat ontwlldselmgsplanning en beleidsformulering niet 
alleen een technische discipline is, maar vooral ook een politiek proces. Hieruit volgt 
dat het ontwikkelingsproces nooit a-politiek was en kan zijn. 
De studie beschrijft hoe de invloed van het politieke systeem in het algemeen, en 
van verschillende politieke actoren in het bijzonder, de uitkomsten van het 
ontwikkelingsproces vorm geven Om dit te bereiken worden twee series 
ontwikkelingsactiviteiten (beleid, programma's en projecten) vergeleken die gepland 
en uitgevoerd zijn onder twee verschillende politieke regimes. De eerste serie 
vertegenwoordigt de periode van het autoritaire regime (1962-1988), gebaseerd op 
het één-partij systeem en een arrogante interventionistische bureaucratie. De tweede 
introduceert enkele ontvvikkelingsactiviteiten uitgevoerd tijdens het 
overgangsproces van democratisering (1988-1998). De studie beschrijft tegelijkertijd 
de veranderingen die geïntroduceerd zijn tijdens het proces van democratisering en 
hoe deze het conventionele ontw^elingsdenken beïnvloedden dat was 
aangenomen door de Algerijnse post-onafhankeUjkheids Staat. 
In een meer gedetailleerde analyse, begint de studie met het beschrijven van de 
tekortkomingen van het conventionele ontwikkehngsdenken en de verschillende 
invloeden die het Algerijnse systeem van ontwikkehngsplanning heeft ondergaan 
sinds de onafhankelijkheid. Vervolgens worden een aantal onderzoekshypothesen 
ontwikkeld die richting geven aan de vergeUjking van de twee series van 
ontwikkelingsactiviteiten die gepresenteerd worden in dit boek. Uiteindelijk wordt 
stil gestaan bij de voordelen van een alternatieve ontwikkelingsvisie, gebaseerd op 
participatie, lokale organisaties en sociaal leren, en hun effecten op de kwestie van 
duurzaamheid. In dit werk refereert het concept duurzaamheid aan de "critical 
triangle of sustainability" (Oram et al, 1998:1). 
De basisgedachte van deze studie is dat de belangrijkste voorwaarde voor een 
ontwikkelingsactiviteit om te leiden tot een substantiële en duurzame uitkomst ligt 
in het voldoen aan de volgende vier vereisten, die zijn geformuleerd door van 
Dusseldorp (1992:12): 
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1. De mogelijkheid een serie doelstellingen te formuleren die consistent, realistisch 
en duurzaam zijn en die acceptabel zijn voor alle, of ten minst voor een grote 
meerderheid van mensen die betrokken zullen zijn bij en geraakt zullen worden 
door de geplande ontwikkeling. 
2. De beschikbaarheid van kennis van al de relevante processen en hun onderlinge 
verbanden, die beïnvloed moeten worden om de huidige situatie zodanig te 
wijzigen dat de doektellingen gerealiseerd zullen worden. 
3 . De beschikbaarheid van de middelen en de macht om deze processen te 
beïnvloeden. 
4. De politieke wil om de beschikbare middelen en macht te gebruiken om de 
relevante processen te beïnvloeden, om de gewenste doelstellingen te bereiken. 
In de meeste ontwikkelingsactiviteiten die werden ontworpen en uitgevoerd in 
Derde Wereld landen, was aan deze vereisten nooit volledig voldaan Dit was met 
name het geval in people-centered projecten. In ander woorden, in sommige 
ontwikkelingsactiviteiten was misschien aan sommige voorwaarden voldaan, maar 
aan de andere voorwaarden was zelfs niet in geringe mate voldaan. In het algemeen 
kunnen we stellen dat doelstellingen slecht geformuleerd zijn en top-down worden 
besloten, kennis wordt gemobiliseerd op een reductionistische wijze - veelal 
zogenaamd rationeel/ wetenschappelijk - met een complete ontkenning van de 
kennis van de mensen zelf. De middelen en macht worden nooit in voldoende mate 
beschikbaar gesteld en wanneer ze al beschikbaar worden gesteld, dan worden ze 
niet eerlijk verdeeld over de mensen die ze het meest nodig hebben. Tenslotte is de 
politieke wil nooit aanwezig tenzij de betreffende ontwikkelingsactiviteiten ten doel 
hebben om de rurale bevolking te incorporeren en in te kapselen en de controle over 
hen te vergroten, of de huidige situatie te continueren in het voordeel van de 
machtige actoren. 
In deze context stelt deze studie dat de integratie van sommige kenmerken, zoals 
aan de ene kant participatie - direct (individueel) of indirect (door middel van lokale 
organisaties) - en aan de andere kant sociaal leren (in het ontwerp en de uitvoering van 
het project en/ of als een mechanisme van monitoring en evaluatie) het 
waarschijnlijker maakt dat aan de hierboven genoemde voorwaarden wordt 
voldaan. 
Op het niveau van de operationalisatie van de basis concepten verkeert de studie 
in een dilemma met betrekking tot het concept 'duurzame ontwikkeling'. Voor 
welke actor of groep van actoren zou de ontwikkeling duurzaam moeten zijn in de 
context van deze studie? Zoals de impliciete en expliciete veronderstellingen van 
deze studie reeds suggereren, wordt er hier vanuit gegaan dat de duurzaamheid van 
de resultaten van een bepaalde ontwikkelingsactiviteit in overeenstenuning moet 
zijn met de belangen van de 'tot nu toe uitgestotenen', de minder bedeelde 
segmenten van de samenleving. In deze studie hangen de vereisten en voorwaarden 
voor duurzaamheid dus in grote mate af van de centrale plaats van de kennis van 
de begunstigden en het belang van de participatie van deze begunstigden in hun 
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(zelf-)ontwikkeling. Tot aan de dag van vandaag en gedurende meer dan drie 
decennia, werden ontwikkelingsactiviteiten in Algerije ontworpen zonder overleg 
met de begunstigden en dit leidde tot een enorm gat tussen de geprivilegieerden en 
de minder bedeelden. Het was daarom belangrijk dat deze studie meer aandacht gaf 
aan de gevolgen van de participatie en de kennis van de begunstigden in het richting 
geven aan een bepaalde ontwikkelingsactiviteit voor hun eigen behoeften aan 
ontwikkeling. 
Hoewel deze studie stelt dat de participatie en kennis van de begunstigden een 
noodzakelijke voorwaarde vormen voor duurzame ontwikkeling, is dit echter niet 
voldoende. Het punt is dat de zogenaamde begunstigden in hoge mate contacten 
onderhouden met andere actoren die een grote macht hebben in de beslmlvorming 
en dat ze zelf extreem veel refereren en onder de indruk zijn van de rationaliteit en 
"wetenschappeKjkheid" van de kennis van mensen zoals planners, onderzoekers, 
ontwikkelingsstaf, etc. Het is daarom van belang dat de beschikbaarheid van de 
kennis van de begunstigden wordt erkend door deze laatsten. Bovendien moet dit 
alles gesteund worden door een echt proces van sociaal leren en moet het belang 
daarvan voor duurzame ontwikkeling worden erkend en ondersteund door alle 
sociale actoren die belangen hebben bij een bepaalde ontwikkelingsactiviteit. 
Daarom heeft deze studie ten doel de volgende algemene en afgeleide 
onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden: 
AV. Hoe kunnen de (directe en indirecte) participatie van de begunstigden en de sociale leer 
mogelijkheid van de diverse actoren die optreden in het ontwikkelingstheater de duurzame 
ontwikkeling van een people-centered geplande ontwikkelingsactiviteit garanderen? 
VI. In welke mate en wanneer is participatie van de begunstigden vereist om ontwikkelings 
activiteiten te sturen in de richting van hun (zelf-) ontwikkeling? 
V2. Welke rol(len) kunnen lokale organisaties spelen in het sturen van ontwikkelings- activiteiten 
door begunstigden? 
V3. Welke mechanismen zijn vereist om monitoring en evaluatie de rol te laten spelen van een 
leerproces in het sturen van ontwikkelingsactiviteiten? 
V4. Kan het ontwerp van een praktische methodologie worden voorgesteld overeenkomstig de zaken 
die in deze studie worden bepleit, zoals participatie, lokale organisaties en sociaal leren? 
V5. Wat kunnen de tekortkomingen van deze methodologie zijn en wélke politieke, institutionele, 
en sociaal-culturele vereisten zijn nodig om zo'n methodologie te laten werken? 
De resultaten van de studie laten zien dat: 
• Participatie vanaf de eerste stap van de ontwikkelingsactiviteit (identificatie van 
problemen en bepalen van doelstellingen) het ontwerp en de uitvoering van 
ontwikkelingsactiviteiten verbeterde. Participatie hielp de begunstigden niet 
alleen een gevoel van zeggenschap over het ontwikkelingsproces te ontwikkelen, 
maar ook om naast de publieke middelen hun eigen middelen te mobiliseren 
wanneer dat nodig was. 
3 3 2 RE-HUMANIZING THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
• De vorming van boeren organisaties, onafhankelijk van door de Staat geleide 
organisaties, hielp de "uitgeslotenen" hun toegang tot publieke middelen, waar ze 
to dan toe van uitgesloten waren, te verbeteren. Het ondersteunde de participatie 
van de begunstigden in de richting van een meer democratische ontwikkeling en 
veranderde het in een middel tot duurzame ontwikkeling. 
• Het vastleggen van de uitvoeringsfase van ontwikkelingsactiviteiten in een 
leerproces, dat wil zeggen, een regelmatig, permanent en efficiënt monitoring en 
evaluatie proces, geeft een zekere flexibiliteit aan ontwikkeling. Corrigerende 
maatregelen werden ontworpen op basis van de kennis die gegenereerd was door 
het leerproces en werden toegepast op het juiste moment, waardoor tijd werd 
gespaard en de verspilling van middelen werd verminderd. 
• De "bouwstenen" van een alternatieve ontwikkelingsvisie voor Algerije werden 
gedefinieerd en een methodologie dient te worden ontworpen voor de toepassing 
hiervan. 
• Een proces van aan de ene kant de democratisering van het sociale en politieke 
leven en, aan de andere kant, een hervorming van de mentaliteit en procedures 
van ontwikkelmgsplanning en het systeem van beleidsformulering, zijn 
noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor de toepassing van een alternatieve 
ontwikkelingsvisie. 
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